4
   

The German Election of Chancellor 2017

 
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  2  
Reply Wed 10 Jan, 2024 12:37 pm
@Lash,
German Fleet Admiral Dirk Gärtner is currently the commander of Unifil's Maritime Task Force.

Unifil is the United Nations mission that was tasked in 2006 with strengthening the Lebanese armed forces and disarming Hezbollah and allied Palestinian groups. This is what UN Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006 stipulates.

To further support the Lebanese armed forces, German Foreign Minister Baerbock pledged a further 15 million euros today on board the frigate "Baden-Württemberg" (Unifil lead ship).
(The German Navy is currently involved in the UN mission with around 250 soldiers).
Lash
 
  1  
Reply Fri 16 Feb, 2024 02:59 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Thank you.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 10:38 am
Since yesterday evening, Germany is heading for snap elections. Until then, Chancellor Olaf Scholz wants to continue heading a minority government of his Social Democrats and the Greens.
0 Replies
 
Lash
 
  -1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 10:53 am
Germany’s economy is reportedly on the verge of a crash.
They blame Ukraine.
Lash
 
  -1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 10:55 am
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2024/11/07/europe/germany-government-collapse-explainer-intl

Germany’s normally stable government has collapsed. Here’s why
By Sophie Tanno, Sebastian Shukla and Olesya Dmitracova, CNN
Updated 9:37 AM EST, Thu November 7, 2024

___________________

NATO is to blame.
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:16 pm
@Lash,
Lash wrote:
NATO is to blame.
What, in your exclusive opinion, has NATO to do with the “debt brake” (Articles 109, 155 of our Basic Law [constitution] and the rights of the Chancellor (here: Article 64 of the Basic Law)?
Lash
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:18 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
NATO twisted and goaded German leadership (& bribed them) until they obv spent more public money on Ukraine than they could afford.

Other countries will follow suit—as will we.
Walter Hinteler
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:18 pm
@Lash,
Lash wrote:
Germany’s economy is reportedly on the verge of a crash.
They blame Ukraine.
Perhaps you have better sources than I have.
Mind to share your information?
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:19 pm
@Lash,
What, in your exclusive opinion, has NATO to do with the “debt brake” (Articles 109, 155 of our Basic Law [constitution] and the rights of the Chancellor (here: Article 64 of the Basic Law)?
0 Replies
 
Lash
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:21 pm
@Lash,
Lash wrote:

NATO twisted and goaded German leadership (& bribed them) until they obv spent more public money on Ukraine than they could afford.

Other countries will follow suit—as will we.

I reject the avoidant premise of your little question.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  2  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:25 pm
The coalition between the SPD, FDP and Greens did not fail due to a lack of common ground, but due to a lack of common sense.
The differences between the parties were great, but not irreconcilable.
Even now, it would have been possible to agree on a budget and reforms if all sides had shown a willingness to compromise. But the will to do so was lacking, especially among the Social Democrats and Liberals. (Personally [and perhaps biased] I mainly blame the Liberals.)
Lash
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:37 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
You don’t think exorbitant expenditures on Ukraine was pivotal?
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:38 pm
As an aside:
Germaan exports to Ukraine increased by 6.7 per cent to just under 3.6 billion euros in the first half of this year according to the Federation of German Industries. Imports from there even grew by a fifth to 1.6 billion euros. This means that trade with Ukraine is bucking the overall trend: total German exports shrank by 1.6 per cent in the first six months of the year, while imports fell by as much as 6.2 per cent.

Ukraine moved ahead of Russia in the balance of trade in the first half of the year: imports and exports totalled almost 5.2 billion euros, while foreign trade with the Russian Federation only reached just under 4.8 billion euros.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  2  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 12:40 pm
@Lash,
Lash wrote:
You don’t think exorbitant expenditures on Ukraine was pivotal?
Neither I do nor anyone besides you mentioned it.

Besides that: what exactly do you call "exorbitant expenditures on Ukraine"?
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 01:06 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
The ‘traffic light coalition’ is history.

There are different answers to the question of what happens next. Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) has announced that he will put a question of confidence to the Bundestag, which will be put to a vote in January. The aim is to hold a new Bundestag election by the end of March.

CDU leader Friedrich Merz (leader of the largest opposition party) does not agree with this timetable. Today he called on Chancellor Scholz to call a vote of confidence immediately, next week at the latest. A new election is possible in the second half of January.


There have already been five votes of confidence in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The procedure for a vote of confidence is regulated in the Basic Law and comprises various steps:

Step 1: The Federal Chancellor submits a motion to the Bundestag under Article 68 of the Basic Law to express confidence in him. Scholz wants to do this in the first week of the new year.
Step 2: Following the motion, the Bundestag can vote on it 48 hours later at the earliest. According to Scholz, this should happen on 15 January 2025.
Step 3: If the vote of confidence is lost, the Federal Chancellor can propose to the Federal President that the Bundestag be dissolved.
Step 4: The Federal President can then dissolve the Bundestag. But he does not have to. He has 21 days to answer this question. If he refuses to dissolve the Bundestag, a minority government remains in place. If he dissolves the Bundestag, there will be a new government.
Step 5: The election of a new Bundestag must take place within 60 days of the dissolution of the Bundestag. At the request of the Federal President, Chancellor Scholz would remain in office in an acting capacity until a new Bundestag has elected a new chancellor.


The end of a coalition does not automatically mean the end of the federal government: Scholz wants to continue governing in a minority government with the Greens until new elections are held. However, this has consequences for his approach.

Scholz wants to put all bills to the vote by Christmas that he believes ‘cannot be delayed in any way’. To do this, he must now seek the support of individual parties or parliamentary groups for each legislative proposal in order to achieve the necessary majorities. Because without the FDP, he no longer has a majority in the Bundestag.

Chancellor Scholz has announced that he will put a number of important legislative projects to a vote in the Bundestag before Christmas. He is hoping for the support of CDU leader Merz. The projects in question include the following:

Tax relief: Scholz wants the effect of inflation on income tax to be offset. As a result, employees should ‘have more net from gross from 1 January’, according to the Chancellor.
Pension package: The Chancellor wants to stabilise the statutory pension. At the end of September, the Bundestag had its first reading of the long-prepared pension package.
Asylum policy: Scholz wants the rules of the Common European Asylum System to be implemented quickly. On Wednesday morning, the coalition agreed two amendments to the law.
Aid for industry: Scholz now wants to cap network charges for companies by the end of the year. Jobs in the automotive industry are also to be secured.

What will become of the 2025 federal budget is still unclear. A majority of the traffic light coalition is now lacking. It is unlikely that the CDU/CSU will now secure a majority.

If no budget is passed, a so-called provisional budget would apply from January. For the time being, only expenditure that is necessary to maintain the administration and fulfil legal obligations will be possible.

In practice, however, the Ministry of Finance can authorise the ministries to use a percentage of the funds in the draft budget that has not yet been adopted each month.
0 Replies
 
Lash
 
  -1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 02:16 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
Walter Hinteler wrote:

Lash wrote:
You don’t think exorbitant expenditures on Ukraine was pivotal?
Neither I do nor anyone besides you mentioned it.

Besides that: what exactly do you call "exorbitant expenditures on Ukraine"?


Warning: if you want to continue to be innocent of mentions of how Ukraine spending is torpedoing the German economy, close your eyes.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-economy-minister-backs-scholzs-decision-end-coalition-2024-11-07/

Excerpt:

The coalition fell apart on Wednesday when years of tensions culminated in a row over how to plug a multi-billion-euro hole in the budget and revive Europe's largest economy, headed for its second year of contraction.

The break-up creates a leadership vacuum at the heart of the European Union just as it seeks a united response to Tuesday's election of Donald Trump as U.S. president on issues ranging from possible new U.S. trade tariffs to Russia's war in Ukraine and the future of the U.S.-led NATO alliance.
The chancellor said he would hold a confidence vote in January, which he would probably lose, triggering a new election by the end of March - six months ahead of schedule.
_______________

You lost the very fairly priced oil/gas from Russia which has undeniably hurt the German economy—and bent the knee to NATO and raped your budget to throw money behind an UN winnable war designed to weaken your neighbor, but strengthened him instead and broke your own country.

Sigh.

0 Replies
 
Lash
 
  0  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 02:19 pm
Sensitive eyes: on guard!

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/Germany-economic-update-emerging-impact-of-the-war-in-Ukraine.pdf

Summary
 Germany – Aotearoa New Zealand’s number one trading partner in Europe – is particularly exposed to the economic effects of the war in Ukraine, western sanctions, threatened energy security and stressed supply chains. As a result, Germany’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery will at best be delayed and at worst reversed, with trade in goods and services with Germany remaining challenging.

Report
 Germany is the largest economy and our number one trading partner in Europe. It is also Russia and Ukraine’s second most important trading partner. Importantly, Russia is Germany’s number one source of gas (>50%), coal (>50%), and oil (>30%). This report canvasses the broader impact of the war in Ukraine on the German economy and the potential effects on our bilateral trade.
German economy 2022: a recovery at risk

Prior to the war in Ukraine, the German economy seemed to be up for a good year, but now the outlook is more sobering. The most immediate impact of the war relates to Germany’s trade with and investment in Russia and Ukraine. Last year Germany exported goods worth €27 billion to Russia and has invested a total of €25 billion. Western sanctions, the proactive withdrawal of German businesses and a recession in Russia will see exports collapse and a lot of investment written off. As a result of disrupted business and war-related destruction, economic relations with Ukraine will also suffer significantly. And the war in Ukraine will have even broader impacts on the German economy.
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 02:25 pm
@Lash,
Lash wrote:
Sensitive eyes: on guard!

https://i.imgur.com/CCimQM7m.png
https://i.imgur.com/yQESRC1l.png
Lash
 
  -1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 03:00 pm
@Walter Hinteler,
You seemed to require a backgrounding on the cause, since you reportedly never heard it.
Now, I’ll continue with current economic destruction and manufacturing losses.
0 Replies
 
Lash
 
  -1  
Reply Thu 7 Nov, 2024 03:11 pm
https://quincyinst.org/research/the-risks-to-germany-and-europe-of-a-prolonged-war-in-ukraine/#executive-summary

Beware: Facts are included!!

EXCERPT

US policy in support of Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion has inflicted a disproportionate risk of escalation on Europe, which has also borne a disproportionate economic impact. Allowing Europe to become collateral damage in an effort to defeat Russia is strategically unsound.

In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the second-order consequences of the war in Ukraine have destabilized politics. A policy that aimed to roll back global autocracy has ironically promoted the electoral appeal of an ascendent populist-right across Europe.

The fracturing and polarization of party systems produces fragile and fractious governing coalitions. This tendency is evident in Germany and France, but elsewhere in Europe as well.

Europe’s leaders have embraced the aim of raising Europe’s own military readiness. However, debt-constrained finances and weak economic growth impede the increased defense spending that Europeans have pledged to deliver.

Given the fiscal constraints faced by Europe’s NATO members, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between maintaining levels of arms and equipment sent to Ukraine, and any substantial effort by European NATO members toward rearmament and greater responsibility for their own territorial defense.

Europe’s relative economic weakness arises from a host of causes, many of which are outside the power of the U.S. to reverse or mitigate substantially, including a global turn toward greater trade protectionism. Given Europe’s weak growth prospects, devising policies that reinforce and empower NATO’s European pillar should be given priority.

The current crisis calls for a radical revamp of U.S. policy toward Europe that ultimately promotes Europeans from clients to peers. Since Germany is the strongest power in Europe, such a revamp would mean accommodating, to an extent, Germany’s foreign policy preferences and its concerns about the risks of escalation in Ukraine.

Overview
The war-crisis nexus across Europe

One of America’s greatest post–World War II diplomatic achievements has been the fostering of a peace order in Europe — including, in particular, the expansion of liberal democracy, and the formation of the European Union (E.U.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Recent developments suggest, however, that the policy course on Ukraine that the United States has followed since Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion risks inadvertently contributing to conditions in Western Europe that undermine the E.U., create conditions for social instability, and foster illiberal political trends. This has been made evident by the recent success of populist-nationalist parties — which are generally lukewarm, at best, about the defense of Ukraine — in Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Even in the United Kingdom, the formerly-governing Conservative Party has lost ground to the populist-right party, Reform U.K., which opposes aid to Ukraine.

The continued burden of supporting the war in Ukraine is taking a toll on European solidarity as a growing share of the public either favors or anticipates a negotiated settlement.

The strategy adopted by the United States and NATO points to a prolonged war with no predictable outcome or duration, and an ever-growing risk of escalation. Decision-makers in the United States should take into account what the pursuit of that strategy implies for ensuring stability and prosperity in Europe. One of Ukraine’s most significant postwar aims is, after all, to join the E.U. It is vital, therefore, that Europe’s democracy, social protections, cooperative diplomacy, open markets, and social pluralism survive. It is not clear that U.S. and NATO policy is fully taking into account the risks and vulnerabilities that Germany, France, and other European NATO members face under these conditions — risks that are exacerbated the longer the war drags on and draws resources from weak European economies.

Under this prolonged and inconclusive war scenario, anti-establishment forces in Europe — already on the ascendent — are likely to further exploit grievances for their political gain against the United States for the disproportionate costs and social hardship its strategy has imposed on Europe. Such a risk is especially pertinent if the war in Ukraine spills into open conflict between Russia and NATO. Already, it is evident that the direct and indirect effects of a policy aimed to roll back global autocracy has promoted the electoral appeal of anti-war, anti–NATO populist-nationalists of right and left in Germany, in particular.
————
So much more at the link explaining how (ahem) Germany’s knuckling under the US/NATO and unrestrained spending trying to prolong the war (down to the last Ukrainian) and the loss of reasonably priced Russian oil/ gas products has set their govt and economy ablaze. (In case, like Walter, you hadn’t heard.)
👀
0 Replies
 
 

Related Topics

 
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.04 seconds on 11/12/2024 at 06:04:43