@revelette1,
revelette1 wrote:
Quote: They are not HIS memos, they are work product and covered under 18 USC 641.
Can you prove your statement? How do you know those memos would be covered under the number you cited? Are you some kind of expert on the subject? Comey took it upon himself to write the memos. It is not as though writing the memos was some kind of official duty like filling out a report or something.
In as much as I was a federal law enforcement officer and am presently a federal employee, yes, I am an expert.
As a federal employee of a cabinet level agency, we are required yearly to go through TMS training. That is one of the subjects covered.
Comey was documenting an incident while engaged in his official duties and did so on a government encrypted laptop. He further briefed FBI leadership as to the content. That all makes it work product and subject to 641.
The United States Department of Justice
U.S. Attorneys
U.S. Attorneys » Resources » U.S. Attorneys' Manual » Criminal Resource Manual » CRM 1500-1999 » Criminal Resource Manual 1601-1699
1638. Embezzlement Of Government Property -- 18 U.S.C. § 641
In Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 269 (1895), the Supreme Court defined embezzlement in the following terms:
Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in the fact that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking.
There are six elements to the crime of embezzlement, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 641. These are: (1) a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the property owner; (2) the property taken falls within the statute; i.e., it must be government property (see this Manual at 1643 for a discussion of the types of property which fall within this section);
(SEE BELOW)
(3) the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his employment; (4) the property belonged to another, in this case the United States; (5) the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his own use; and (6) the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. See United States v. Dupee, 569 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Powell, 294 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 413 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1968).
The requirement that the defendant act with the intent to deprive the owner of his property makes embezzlement a specific intent crime. See United States v. May, 625 F.2d 186, 189-90 (8th Cir. 1980). It should be noted, however, that the intent required to violate the law is not an intent to deprive another of his property permanently. Therefore, even if an individual intends to return the property, his actions are still criminal. In short, restitution is no defense to embezzlement. See United States v. Powell, 294 F. Supp. at 1355.
1643. Definition -- Property Protected By 18 U.S.C. 641
The property encompassed by 18 U.S.C. § 641 is also defined in broad terms. Section 641 protects "any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof."
Generally, jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 641 turns on the nature of the government's interest in the property which has been stolen. If that interest is sufficient, federal jurisdiction attaches; if it is not sufficient, the prosecution must be deferred to the state or local authorities. The question of whether the United States has sufficient interest in some property to trigger jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 641 arises in a wide variety of factual context.
Comeys professor buddy is also in violation of:
1642. Concept -- Receiving, Concealing Or Retaining Stolen Property
Section 641 of Title 18 also prohibits receipt of stolen government property. There are five elements to the offense: the defendant must receive, conceal or retain; stolen property; belonging to the United States; knowing that the property has been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted; and with the intent to convert that property to his own use or gain. See United States v. Fench, 470 F.2d 1234 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1972); Teel v. United States, 407 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1969).
At the outset, it should be noted that the conduct proscribed by this section is set forth in the disjunctive. Thus, a defendant violates the law when he either "receives, " "conceals" or "retains" stolen property. None of these words are terms of art and they should be given their normal construction.
The intent requirement of this section presents more serious problems. Prosecutions for receiving stolen property require proof of a compound state of mind. First, the defendant must know that the property he has received, concealed or retained is stolen. Note, however, that the defendant need not know that the property was stolen from the United States. See Baker v. United States, 429 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). Ownership of the property by the United States is simply a jurisdictional requirement and is not relevant to the criminal intent needed to violate the law.
The defendant must also act with the intent to convert the property to his own use. Thus, this offense is a specific intent crime. Proof of this intent, however, does not require evidence showing that the defendant actually derived some benefit from the property. This element is satisfied merely by showing that the defendant intended to convert some property to his personal gain. See United States v. Hinds, 662 F.2d 362, 369 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
