THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: the East and First Manassas

Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition,
All aboard, we ain't agoin' fishin'
Prasie the Lord and pass the ammunition
And we'll all be free.

Oops, sorry, Set. Wrong war!

Merry Christmas to you and miz dimples.

With love from LettyBettyGetty................................


Lee

Here ya go Miss Lettybettyhettygettymarycustislee:

A real war between the states marching song:

Sittin' by the roadside on a summer's day,
Chattin' with my messmates, passing time away,
Lying in the shadows, underneath the trees --
Goodness, how delicious, eating goober peas!

Peas! Peas! Peas! Peas! Eating goober peas!
Goodness, how delicious, eating goober peas!

When a horseman passes, the soldiers have a rule
To cry out at their loudest "Mister, here's your mule!"
But still another pleasure enchantinger than these
Is wearing out your grinders, eating goober peas!

Peas! Peas! Peas! Peas! Eating goober peas!
Goodness, how delicious, eating goober peas!

Just before the battle, the General hears a row;
He says "The Yanks are coming, I hear their rifles now"!
He turns around in wonder, and what do you think he sees?
The Georgia Militia, eating goober peas!

Peas! Peas! Peas! Peas! Eating goober peas!
Goodness, how delicious, eating goober peas!

I think my song had lasted almost long enough!
The subject's interesting, but rhymes are mighty rough!
I wish this war was over, when free from rags and fleas,
We'd kiss our wives and sweethearts and goble goober peas!

Peas! Peas! Peas! Peas! Eating goober peas!
Goodness, how delicious, eating goober peas!

You can hear the tune rightchere[/b]

For our Yankee friends, goober peas is peanuts . . .

Heh! Heh! I knows what the tune sounds like to eatin' goober peas, Set.

My Mama did raise no tin ear.

She rocked me to sleep singing:


Nellie Gray




VERSE 1
There's a low green valley on that ole Kentucky shore
There I've toiled many happy hours away
Setting an' a singing in my little cottage door
Where there lived my darling Nellie Gray

VERSE 2
I went one night to see her an' she'd gone th neighbor said
For th white man had bound her, with his chain
Taking her to Georgie to wear her life away
They do toil in th cotton an' th cane

VERSE 3
My poor Nellio Gray, she's in Heaven so they say
An' I'll never see my darling anymore
Setting by th river an' I'm weeping all th way
For she's gone from th ole Kentucky shore

VERSE 4
My canoe is under water an' by banjo 'er untuned
I will take my darling Nello Gray
An' we'll float down th river in my little red canoe
While my banjo sweetly I will play

VERSE 5
O, poor Nello Gray, they've taken you away
An' I'll never see my darlin, anymore
I'm setting by th river an' I'm weeping all th day
For she's gone from the ole Kentucky

Those are not the exact lyrics that she sang. I'm certain her's were authenic....but I'm too tired to post the REAL ones.

This Yankee sure knows the melody for 'goober peas' as well as the definition of the comestible. (Oh, I forgot. There's no such word as yankee. There's always a prefix, isn't there?)

heeheeheeheeheeheeheeheeheeheeheehee . . .



okbye

First Mannassass

Gotzendammerung: Taking the Cars

The introduction to this battle was prefaced by remarks about commerce in the mid-nineteenth century, and in particular the rise of steam power to a place of prominence in transportation and commerce. By 1861, rail travel was a commonplace in the industrial world, known of by all, even if not everyone had "taken the cars." In that July, Johnston's small command took the cars--it was the first militarily significant movement by rail in the war, and was, in fact, to prove crucial in that July.

A recapitulation is in order here. The western counties of Virginia formed a round "bulge," which, following the line of the the Ohio River, brush the western border of Pennsylvania and the southereastern corner of Ohio. Through portions of Virginia (as it then was--West Virginia did not yet exist) ran the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Much of the "sinews of war" available to Lincoln's administration came from the "West" (now known as the midwest, the former Northwest Ordinance territories: Ohio, Indiana, Michingan, Illinois and Wisconsin) over that railroad line. In the preceeding centuries, armies usually did not come out of winter quarters until April, or even May, waiting for the grass to have grown well enough to provide fodder for the drays and remounts without which an army simply could not move. In the American Civil War, just as was true then in France, Germany and Russia, large field armies required thousands of horses and their fodder to be able to move and campaign in the field. But modern technology had thrown in a catalyst that drastically and forever altered the tempo of war. The old minuette step was now changed into a waltz--by the standards of the day, a dizzying whirl of activity. Properly managed, railroads could concentrate fodder for livestock stored for the winter from across the states; men, equipment, clothing and provisions--and an army could take the field fully supplied, including horses brought in by rail, in April, or even in March. This was probably better appreciated at this time in North America than in Europe. Lincoln assembled troops from across a span from Maine to Kansas which greatly exceeded the distance from Paris to Berlin. In Canada a few years later, only railroads made possible material communication between the Maritime provinces and western Ontario, more than 2,000 miles distant. The overworked railroads of the old South had allowed the Provisional government of the Confederate States to move from Montgomery, Alabama to Richmond, Virgnia; and with what would hitherto have been considered breathtaking speed, had assembled tens of thousands of voluteers and enrolled militia men at Richmond. Major Jackson had arrived from the Virginia Military Institute with his cadets to train those voluteers by railroad in just over 24 hours.

Similarly, at the North, volunteers and three-month militiamen flooded Washington City as they rode the rails from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticutt, New York and Pennsylvania. Soon camps had sprung up, literally overnight, throughout southern Maryland. Despite whatever inclinations the inhabitants may or may not arguably have had, Maryland was going to remain in the Union by simply virtue of geography. To join the "easterners" there came the "westerners" of the aforementioned Northwest Ordinance states, and they came on the Baltimore and Ohio, just has Lincoln had done for his inauguration. Lincoln had slipped through Baltimore (known for a secessionist hotbed of hotheads) in disguise, and New York troops had detrained, fixed bayonets, and cleared the streets to allow the passage of their baggage. The "rubes" of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, from Michigan and Wisconsin, were met with resentful glares and muttered imprecations, but they detrained, gathered their regimental baggage and marched south unmolested. The majority of the draft animals, cavalry remounts, and live pork and beef, "on the hoof," arrived in Washington from the west as well, and would do so throughout the war. When Stoneman's cavalry raided deep into Virginia later in the war, the fodder which had kept his horses fit through the winter and supplied his raiders before they set out had doubtless come in largest measure from the hay fields of what we call the Midwest. It was no exageration to call the Baltimore and Ohio the lifeline of the Union.

We arrive, therefore, at an understanding of why the Phillipi Races, Rich Mountain and Patterson's advance to Martinsburg and then Harper's Ferry were inevitable events--completely necessary from the point of view at the North. Morris, McClellan and Rosecrans, and Patterson were all acting to secure the vital railroad which would fuel the Federal war effort. It is a truism that the eastern armies were the principle forces. The proximity of Washington and Richmond assured this. They were the "showcase" armies: westerners were despised and despised the easterners in return, but one fact is inescapable. That is that both governments relied on the production of the west to supply them. When Johnston withdrew from the Manassass line later in 1861, he left behind more than a million pounds of beef--it represent the entire surplus production of Georgia and Florida for several years before the war, and its loss meant that the Confederate armies depended upon Tennessee pork. That was soon denied them as Grant, Buell, Thomas and Rosecrans overran that state. Abundant beef was available in Arkansas and Texas, but Grant's capture of Vicksburg in 1863 forever cut off the Transmississippi from the western and eastern theaters. Lincoln commented: "The Father of Waters flows again untroubled to the sea." But the importance of the river was tied inextricably to the rails. Yankees continued to eat Midwestern pork and beef, and to feed fodder from that region to their livestock, as well as adding Tennessee pork to their diet. The Confederacy was born to languish, wither and die. I will later discuss the unreality of Southern attitudes and expectations which made this inevitable, but a great deal of it comes down to simple economy. As the war progressed, Southern resources dwindled and Federal resources grew. The Southern Confederacy's only chance in the war, tacitly acknowledged, but neurotically denied in the credo of Southern arms, was to fight the Yankees into a negotiated settlement. At the highest levels, Lee, Johnston, Bragg and above all others, Benjamin and Davis recognized this, and it shaped the direction of their strategy as surely as did geography.

And just as surely, the railroads had coreographed this dance as the war opened in the east. The failure of Porterfield and Garnett to prevent the invasion of Virginia by small Federal forces allowed Lincoln to secure his vital conduit for troops and material. Those Federal troops had been assembled with reasonable speed, despite the predictable early sluggishness and clumsiness at the beginning of any war, because railroads made possible movements which as recently as the previous generation would have required a month or more of hard marching. Cameron and other political hacks in Lincoln's administraiton had cheated the army scandalously in huge thefts of Federal contracts as soon as the ink was dry on their appointments, but those troops of McClellan and Patterson nevertheless took the field well-equipped and well supplied. When Jackson's men raided the Federal depots at Manassass Junction a year later, they found canned lobster salad, French Poupon mustard, German Rhine wines, Belgian and Irish linen "small clothes"--wealth so long conspicuous by its absence in the South that stories of ragged and dirty "butternut troopers" eating like kings or sporting ladies' lace petticoats abound. Forward-looking officders such as George Thomas used the railroads and the telegraph as though born to the technology--after his crucial victory at Mill Spring in Kentucky later that year, Thomas would inform the War Department by telegraph shortly after nightfall, as he had "telegraph wagons" following every force he ever commanded, and strung wire wherever he went. His wounded were recuperating in Louisville and Cincinnati within a few days thanks to the railroads and steam-powered river boats of the United States Navy, which ruled the rivers of that war.

Now the western counties of Virginia were lost to the state forever, although that was not yet known to be certain. Lincoln's vital supply line was secured. The war had begun in Virginia in two corners about as far separated as was possible. On the Virginia Penninsula, the Yankees had been routed handily at Big Bethel, but they retained Fortress Monroe on the tip of the penninsula at Newport News. Across the river, the naval shipyard at Gosport by Norfolk had been fired, but state troops had quickly extinguished the flames, and more than a thousand cannon gun tubes had been salvaged, and were used to make the coastal defenses of the Confederacy. The line-of-battle ship Merrimac had been in the yard, dismasted and under repair. It had also been fired, and burned to the waterline before sinking and extinguishing the flames. But building standards of the United States Navy meant that Merrimac's ribs were built of oaken slabs weighing tons, and her outer hull was planked with 26" oak. The hulk was raised and repaired, and was used to build the iron-clad warship Virginia.

But Patterson's behavior in the northwestern portion of the state was not just inexplicable, it was to prove disasterous. Having secured Martinsburg, with Johnston in inferior force to his front, he advanced to Johnston's Bunker Hill position on the 15th of July. But he then side-stepped to Charlestown on July 17th, and by that time McDowell was moving his alleged army south into Prince William county. Patterson had initially seemed to be interposing his forces between Johnston and Manassass Junction, which is what he ought to have done. He then ought to have screened Johnston with a small force and moved to the aid of McDowell. Instead the opposite happened. Beauregard had taken a position to defend railways as vital to Virginia as the Baltimore and Ohio was to Washington City. The Manassass Gap railroad joined Winchester to Manassass Junction, and by way of the Orange and Alexandria, connected to the Virginia Central. This allowed the lower Valley (remember, the Shanandoah flows southwest to northeast, and therefore the lower valley is to the north) to supply Richmond. A little, frail rail line connected Winchester to Harper's Ferry, but was to much in the battle grounds to have an important impact. Troops must march when the enemy is nearby, however many rail lines are present. From Staunton, the upper (south) Valley connected to the Virginia Central, and that region remained in communication with Richmond throughout most of the war. Now Beauregard was pleading with the Adjutant General, Samuel Cooper, to send Johnston to his aid.

First Mannassass

Gotzendammerung: The Guests Assembled

Johnston, not always governed by a cautious nature, responded to Beauregard's plea on orders from General Cooper, and left a small screening force (i.e., a force sufficient to prevent the enemy from patrolling one's camps and learning of one's movements) in front of Patterson, and entrained his forces. Jackson's First Brigade marched away from the Bunker Hill encampment, as usual, without a clue where they were going. Johnston's other brigades were moving already, and new forces had continued to come in: Jackson was given the 33rd Virginia, Bee was given the 6th North Carolina, and Bartow was given the 11th Georgia, with the 9th Georgia having joined his brigade just as they were marching away from Winchester. The 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Alabama regiments, and the 19th Mississippi regiment were brigaded, and given into the command of E. Kirby Smith, also provided with Stannard's Virginia battery. The little Valley army marched to Manassass Gap and boarded the cars. As Tyler's division licked its wounds after the Blackburn's Ford fiasco, Johnston's troops were detraining and moving up into Beauregard's lines.

McDowell was holding several councils of war each day, for three days. It was the consensus wisdom of American officers in that war that "councils of war do not fight," but McDowell had no choice. He also had no idea how to proceed. There is no record of which i know which tells of how he developed his plan. I have earlier referred to his service as an observer with Napoleon III's army in Italy, but that may have (emphasis on may have) influenced his tactical directives--the strategy of coming to grips with the Southerners came from elsewhere. Heintzelman or Howard or Sherman may have suggested to him the course adopted, or he may have come up with the plan on his own. It was a sound plan, and would not have been difficult to execute with seasoned troops. Thomas or Meade would have made short work of Beauregard using exactly his plan, which was a rather obvious one, but very favorable to the Federal forces. Bull Run wanders from the Bull Run Mountians down into the hill country and out into the flats of northern Virginia by a wandering, but mostly east and southeast course. Two major lines of communication run from southwest to northeast on the easter slope of the mountains, the Warrenton Turnpike, which crosses Bull Run at what has become known as the Stone Bridge; and, of course, the Orange and Alexandria railroad, running through Manassass Junction, and roughly parallel to the Turnpike. At about the Stone Bridge, the Run turns more directly east, and at Blackburn's ford briefly flows east-northeast. This obliged Beauregard either to spread his forces thinly and try to cover all the crossings and the line of the Run, and that would leave his flanks pointing north, and "up in the air"--or to take a defensible position and await McDowell's movement. He chose the later course, and was obliged by circumstance to surrender the initiative. Even with the arrival of Johnston's forces, there were insufficient troops to safely spread out to attempt to prevent a Federal crossing. Beauregard could not prevent a crossing and a battle. He even seems to have briefly entertained the notion of moving by his right to turn the left flank of the Federals, but i ascribe that more to his mercurial nature than to a genuine conviction on his part. Historians of the event like to point to this because of the literary symmetry of suggesting that the two forces had identical plans to turn the left flank of their opponents, but i think the suggestion an overblown statement of a fleeting idea of Beauregard. His behavior that week in July is such, to my mind, that i doubt that he ever seriously contemplated making an offensive movement. The arrival of most of Johnston's force still did not give him a numerical superiority, although it did more nearly "even up" the balance of forces.

McDowell chose to cross farther up the run, northwest of the Warrenton Turnpike, and to drive southeast along the banks of the run to clear the Stone Bridge on the Turnpike and allow the rest of his army to cross. This would either roll up Beauregard's flank (and is predicated upon an assumption that the enemy would simply remain in place to facilitate the victory--it is not uncommon for military men to make plans based upon an assumption of static passivity on the part of their opponents), or it would force Beauregard to turn and give battle south of the Run. McDowell may have known of Johnston's arrival, but i have no source for such a statement, and his plan is predicated more upon an assumption that Patterson covered the flank he would expose in such a movement, and suggests to me that he apprehended no threat from the Valley army. As Beauregard was not in a position to contest such a crossing, it was a sound plan, and probably the best which could suggest itself. Bull Run rapidly digs a deeper channel as it flows on to the east, and crossings were only possible in combat by fighting across a ford. The only reasonable ford in the area of operation was Blackburn's ford--the smaller fords between Blackburn's and the Stone Bridge were well covered, and that was known to McDowell. Whatever his original intention may have been, Tyler's experience at Blackburn's on the 18th demonstrated that crossing in the face of stiff resistance would be a difficult and bloody affair. I consider that McDowell was correct in not trusting raw troops to stand up in a stiff fight for hours on end. Therefore, McDowell's plan not only suggested itself, it was just about the only move from which he could reasonably expect success. As with Husband Kimmel and Walter Short at Pearl Harbor, McDowell's historical image is that of a loser. Kimmel, at the least, could make a case that he was not negligent, but simply unfortunate. In McDowell's case, despite the lack of any evidence that he was prepared for the responsibilities of his command by prior experience, i think historians have been unfair to him. He did the best he could with the material at hand, and his plan of battle was neither unreasonably complex, nor expected too much of the troops involved. His defeat was a result of tactical method and the invisible but undoubtable effect of Johnston's steady hand in the midst of Beauregard's expenditure of nervous energy, and the timely arrival of significant reinforcement. Officers who take high command at the beginnings of wars often face eventual oblivion as wars have a habit of following their own courses rather than the plans made for them. The first commanders are often made the scapegoats when this reality imposes itself unpleasantly on governments making war.

The guests were now assembled and the orchestra began tuning their instruments and warming up for the dance to come. Although there are many accounts of southern troops detraining and marching directly into the firing line, this has been exagerated. Johnston's troops were already present in their majority, and McDowell's first blow would fall on them. His final effort would break on the "stone wall" of the First Virginia Brigade.

It was either William McFeely or John Keegan, I forget which, who noted that Grant was the first Union general to grasp this. His army was never stationed more than half a day's wagon travel from a rail head or steamboat dock. Thus his supply columns never had to carry their own provisions and all wagon space could be use for army supplies.

Interlude: The Guest List

A few observations. The "correct" spelling of the name of this railroad junction is Manassas. However, in the 1860's, correspondents and report-writers almost invariably used "Manassass," and i have decided to stick to the spelling current at that time. I refer to this battle as the first battle of Manassass because the Confederates won, and as i observed much earlier, i'll follow that etiquette in the names of battles. For anyone who has failed to repeatedly trip over the name, this is about the Battle of Bull Run.

Below are the orders of battle of the two armies. I have extensively used "civilwarhome.com" for these narrations, and they are a thoroughly reliable source. The authors cited often use the OR as a resource (see the note on sources in the first thread on this topic), as well as citing memoirs and the literary controversies which raged in print for fifty years after this war. I find a few errors here and there, but their authors might not agree that these are errors. But, for example, civilwarhome.com's orders of battle lists the 33rd Virginia as unbrigaded, whereas Freeman and all of Jackson's biographers state that the 33rd Virginia Battalion (the size of the organization is also missed at that site) joined the First Brigade before it left the Valley. When a regiment is named (and all lowest level infantry organizations refer to regiments unless otherwise specified), such as the Sixty-ninth New York, or the Sixth North Carolina, the reference is to a volunteer regiment--again, unless otherwise specified. United States Army infantry and cavalry regiments, and companies of artillery regiments are so named. The term company was used at that time in the artillery, rather than the modern usage of referring to that organization as a battery. After the names of several of the Brigade commanders you will see a reference to an infantry regiment of the Regular Army of the United States. This does not mean that those regiments were present at the battle, simply that the officer named was the Colonel commanding the regiment when appointed to command one of McDowell's Brigades.


The Department of Northeastern Virginia

Major General Irvin McDowell, commanding.

Brigadier General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Militia, commanding First Division, as follows:

Colonel Erasmus Darwin Keyes, 11th United States Infantry Regiment, commanding First Brigade: Second Maine, First Connecticut, Second Connecticut, Third Connecticut.

Brigadier General Robert Cumming Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade: Second New York (three month militia), First Ohio, Second Ohio, Company E, Second U.S. Artillery.

Colonel William Tecumseh Sherman, 13th United States Infantry Regiment, commanding Third Brigade: Thirteenth New York, Sixty-ninth New York, Seventy-ninth New York, Second Wisconsin, Company E, Third U.S. Artillery.

Colonel Israel Bush Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commading Fourth Brigade: First Massachusetts, Twelfth New York, Second Michigan, Third Michigan, Company G, First U.S. Artillery, Company M, Second U.S. Artillery.

Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth United States Infantry, commanding Second Division, and First Brigade: Eighth New York (three month militia), Fourteenth New York, Twenty-seventh New York, a battalion of U.S. Infantry (Porter does not mention in his report the regiment of infantry from which this battalion came), two battalions of United States Marines (Porter declares that they were recruits and were left in support of the artillery--but as all of his troops were just as raw as the Marines, he may have been revealing a deepseated army prejudice against Marines), a battalion U.S. Cavalry consisting of one company of the Second Dragoons, two companies of the First Cavalry and four companies of the Second Cavalry (McDowell had made almost no use of his cavalry as cavalry were intended to be used, giving them little else to do than guard the line of march), Company D, Fifth U.S. Artillery. (I have not linked Colonel Porter's name, as i can find no on-line biography.)

Colonel Andrew Everett Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding second Brigade: Second New Hampshire, First Rhode Island, Second Rhode Island, Seventy-first New York.

Colonel Samuel Peter Hintzelman, Seventeenth United States Infantry, commanding Third Division, as follows:

William Buel Franklin, commanding First Brigade: Fifth Massachusetts, Eleventh Massachusetts, First Minnesota, Company I, First U.S. Artillery.

Colonel O. B. Willcox, commanding Second Brigade: Eleventh New York (known as the Fire Zouaves, these were the colorfully dressed New York firefighters who had followed Ellsworth to Alexandria, as described earlier), Thirty-eighth New York, First Michigan, Fourth Michigan, Company D, Second U.S. Artillery. (I could find no on-line biography of Colonel Willcox.)

Oliver Otis Howard Maine Volunteers (although a U.S.M.A. graduate), commanding Third Brigade: Third Maine, Fourth Maine, Fifth Maine, Second Vermont.

Brigadier General Theodore Runyan, commanding Fourth Division, as the reserve; McDowell had apparently not thought it necessary to provide regular brigade organization to the reserve regiments, and they were administratively commanded by General Runyan. I could find no biography for him on-line. Perhaps General McDowell thought simply to parcel out General Runyan's regiments as it appeared they would be needed. These were:

Three month militia: First New Jersey, Second New Jersey, Third New Jersey, Third New Jersey (I can find no distinction in the reports between these two "Third New Jersey" militia organizations).

Three year volunteers: First New Jersey, Second New Jersey, Fourth New Jersey, Forty-first New York.

Colonel Dixon S. Miles, commanding Fifth Division, as follows:

Colonel Louis (né Ludwig) Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade: Eighth New York, Twenty-ninth New York, Thirty-ninth New York, Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania, Company A, Second U.S. Artillery,
Bookwood's New York Battery. (Colonel, and later, General Blenker was born in Worms, in Germany in 1812. He joined a Bavarian volunteer regiment as a youth, and gained some combat experience. During the doomed 1848 socialist uprisings in Europe, he command troops from Worms which managed to initially defeat Prussian forces. The cause failed, however, and Blenker was forced to flee to Switzerland, having occupied high office in the revolutionary government. He later came to the United States, and, at the beginning of the war, raised the Eighth New York Regiment of United States Volunteers. He was a competent officer with sound tactical skills, and his brigade stood firmly to cover the retreat of McDowell's shattered army after the battle, for which he was not appreciated by his fellow officers. Having no political influence and apparently few friends among other Federal officers, he served honorably and well, was promoted for his service at First Manassass, but was quickly forgotten outside of New York in the North. In the South, however, he was immediately and ever after the war accused of atrocities against "white citizens" [as though atrocities against "whites" were somehow especially vicious]. To this day, it is possible to find both diatribes and web sites devoted to slandering his name--some web sites today accuse him of "ethnic cleansing" during operations in the Valley of Virginia. He fell from his horse when his command entered Warrenton, Virginia later that year, and he never fully recovered from his injuries. Although he remained in service for more than a year after that, he returned to his home in New York early in 1863, where he died in the autumn.)

Colonel Thomas A. Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade: Sixteenth New York, Eighteenth New York, Thirty-first New York, Thirty-second New York, Company G, Second U.S. Artillery. (I could find no biography of Colonel Davies on-line.)



Army of the Potomac (Provisional Army of the Confederate States)

Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant de Beauregard, commanding.

Brigadier General Milledge Luke Bonham, commanding First Brigade: Eleventh North Carolina, Second South Carolina, Third South Carolina, Seventh South Carolina, Eighth South Carolina.

Brigadier General Richard Stoddert Ewell, commanding Second Brigade: Fifth Alabama, Sixth Alabama, Sixth Louisiana.

Brigadier General David R. Jones, commanding Third Brigade: Seventeenth Mississippi, Eighteenth Mississippi, Fifth South Carolina. (I could find no biography of General Jones on-line.)

Brigadier General James Longstreet, commanding Fourth Brigade: Fifth North Carolina, First Virginia, Eleventh Virginia, Seventeenth Virginia.

Colonel Phillip St. George Cocke, commanding Fifth Brigade: First Louisiana Battalion, two battalions of the Eighth Virginia, Eighteenth Virginia, Nineteenth Virginia, Twenty-eighth Virginia, a battalion of the Forty-ninth Virginia.

Colonel Jubal Anderson Early, commanding Sixth Brigade: Thirteenth Mississippi, Fourth South Carolina, Seventh Virginia, Twenty-fourth Virginia.

Brigadier General Theophilus Hunter Holmes, commading "Seventh Brigade": Seventh Louisiana Infantry, Eighth Louisiana Infantry, Hampton Legion (South Carolina) Infantry, Thirtieth Virginia Cavalry, Harrison's Battalion of cavalry, ten independent companies of cavalry, Washington (Louisiana) Artillery, a battalion. (None of these troops are listed on Beauregard's returns (a "return of the day" was then what a "morning report" is today, a report of all the soldiers and other attached persons present for duty on any give date) before the battle, and their presence is only certified by reports, eyewitness accounts and the orders of the Provisional government which sent them to Beauregard before the battle. It is known that Holmes was without a command and was given charge of the newly arriving, un-brigaded units. I do not believe that i have erred in stating that James E. B. Stuart's cavalry was the only organized cavalry force present, as the cavalry here mentioned only arrived on the 20th or early on the 21st of July.)

The following batteries were assigned to the army generally, and i know of no specific assignments for them to any of the brigades: Kemper's Battery, Latham's Battery, the Loudoun (County, Virginia) Battery, Shields' Battery. There were also several companies of camp guards mentioned in reports, which i cannot otherwise identify. Whether there were a single company mentioned several times or several companies i do not know. It is possible that this company or companies were detachments from the regiments assigned as field police, the Provost Marshall's guard to prevent looting and straggling--this was not an uncommon practice, few commanders regularly assigned troops to such a duty, although the use of the Eleventh Indiana Regiment of United States Volunteers as a permanent Provost Guard and field police by Thomas proved especially effective, and crucial at Stone's River. It is likely that the companies were simply a Provost Guard assigned by Beauregard or some member of his staff.


Army of the Shenandoah (Originally State Forces of the Commonwealth of Virginia, then Provisional Army of the Confederate States)

Joseph Eggleston Johnston, commanding.

Colonel Thomas J. Jackson, commanding First Brigade: Second Virginia, Fourth Virginia, Fifth Virginia, Twenty-seventh Virginia, Thirty-third Virginia Battalion, Pendleton's Battery.

Colonel Francis Stebbins Bartow, commanding Second Brigade: Seventh Georgia, Eighth Georgia, Ninth Georgia, Eleventh Georgia, Duncan's Kentucky Battalion, Pope's Kentucky Battalion, Alburtis' Battery.

Brigadier General Barnard Elliott Bee, commanding Third Brigade: Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, Eleventh Mississippi, First Tennessee, Sixth North Carolina, Imboden's Battery. (I could not find a biography on-line for this capable and distinguished career soldier, and i am frankly astonished. He is at the least notorious in American history for being credited with the coining of the nickname applied to Jackson and his brigade. As his brigade finally disintegrated after hours of hard fighting, bearing the brunt of the Federal attack along with "Shanks" Evans, he is said to have rallied his men by pointing to the Henry House Hill and telling them: "There stands Jackson, like a stone wall." Once again, i'm flabergasted.)

Colonel Arnold Elzey (Jones), commanding Fourth Brigade: First Maryland Battalion, Third Tennessee, Tenth Virginia, Thirteenth Virginia, Grove's Battery.

James Ewell Brown Stuart, First Virginia Cavalry, was technically speaking not brigaded. However, Jackson had given him command of all of the cavalry at Harper's Ferry, a wise move given his professional skills and experience. This had enraged the local man, Turner Ashby, a charismatic recruiter, and a peerless scout and screener of the little army, who was totally incapable of imposing discipline on his troops. When they were determined, they had no superiors in cavalry actions in the war; at other times they were badly caught napping by the Federals, and on one occassion, and entire company was captured while occupying an abandoned mill in a drunken condition during a crucial campaign. Ashby was left behind in the Valley to screen Patterson, something which he did quite effectively. Stuart, custom and inclination, attached himself to Jackson's brigade, and was there for a crucial hour in this battle.

Sorry not have responded sooner, Acq, but as you can imagine i was a little tied-up up there for a while. You might find the following of interest:

Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War, George E. Turner: Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953.

I don't know if it has remained in print, or if it has been reissued.

Set, thanks', I'll rummage in the library.

First Mannassass

Gotzendammerung: La Danse Macabre[/i]


During the terrible three days of Gettysburg, Lee turned to a Prussian officer attached to his army as an observer, and told him: "I plan and work to bring the troops to the right place at the right time; with that, I have done my duty. As soon as I order the troops forward into battle, I lay the fate of the army in the hands of God." Without reference to the controversies about Lee's command style, such a statement is as succinct a description of the entirety of a commanding officer's duty as can be made. It does not matter if one subscribes to Lee's spiritual beliefs--at the point of contact, when the first shots are fired in anger, the general commanding has done all that he can do. Anything further than that--Marlborough charging la Maison du Roi with the red coat troopers and the Hanoverian cavalry, Napoleon carrying the colors of the light infantry over the bridge at Lodi, von Moltke playing the military policeman at a road junction and feeding Prussian regiments into the meat grinder at Sedan--is simply a high-ranking officer providing the leadership one expects from a battalion commander. Irvin McDowell had indeed brought his virgin army to the right place at the right time. By whatever means, flawed or otherwise, he had employed to devise his plan of battle, whether born in his own battle sense or urged upon him by other officers, i do not believe that he could have had a simpler, more effective means of turning Beauregard out of his position with a better chance of success. All other options would have been brutal murder in the attempt to overwhelm a well-posted opponent. He had a good opportunity, he recognized, he acted upon it, he set his forces in motion. His job was done; his subordinates would briefly perform a similar function in miniature: delivering, rather than an army, a division, or a brigade, or a regiment, to what had been ordained to be the right time and place. For whatever else in their performance they may be faulted, his subordinates did their job in that respect. Finally, in all battles, whether it is the Imperial Guard, the Preobrezhensky, the United States Marines, or simply the "hayseeds," the 90-days boys, it will come down to a fight, it will come down to slugging it out. Everyone in their places, the orchestra begins the overture, and the dance begins; the macabre dance, the dance of death.

This is not to say that there are not many important factors to consider thereafter. At the muzzle of a musket or a cannon, or the point of the bayonet, there is nothing further an officer can add, however, except for their own willingness to die, and soldiers soon recognize the justice of the highest officers being exempt from that exposure. Commanders of companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, even of corps, may share the same risk as their men, but the entire outcome will depend upon the performance of the troops, if indeed the officer commanding has brought them to the right place at the right time. Comfortably seated in the vantage of the easy-chair Hindsight, we can level small criticisms at those responsible for battles. When they blunder, it is right to point it out, though sometimes this is simply the result of bad fortune--sometimes a mistake is just a mistake. McDowell had not blundered. Beauregard had fretted, worried, hatched dozens of schemes, issued streams of orders, many countermarching brigades already moving to his earlier orders--but he had not blundered. It all came down to a fight.

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Bull Run, flowing more south than east at the extreme northerner portion of what became the battlefield, takes a loop to the north, before heading southeast again to the Stone Bridge. McDowell's army lay in a semi circle with their right flank near this northern loop of the Run, and arcing toward the Stone Bridge, and turning northeast from the center, the left flank faced Longstreet's position across the Run at Blackburn's Ford. Just before Bull Run loops to the north, there is a wide and shallow ford, and "easy" ford known as Sudley Springs Ford. McDowell's staff, such as it was, was sufficiently competent to have scouted that ground for a possible approach march, and this was the route McDowell chose. I have already noted that Beauregard hadn't sufficient force to cover every crossing, and this war had not become a war of manoeuvre--the battle would be fought here. McDowell had a good approach to Beauregards position, and Beauregard had done all that could be expected of him in sending Johnston's newly arrived brigades to cover the Stone Brigde, and "refuse the flank" (turn the line away from the enemy position) just beyond the Warrenton Turnpike. McDowell gave Tyler's big division the job of "fixing the enemy in place." To accomplish a turning movement around the outside of the enemy's line, it is desirable to prevent the enemy from changing position to conform to your movement. This is accomplished by a demonstration (simply showing up and looking bellicose, ready to attack), by feinting (moving as though to attack, without actually engaging the enemy), or creating a diversion--which usually involves at least some fighting to convince the ememy that your attack at that point is real. Tyler left one brigade of his four to "demonstrate" against Blackburn's Ford on the Federal left, opposite the right end of Beauregard's line. He sent Keyes' brigade north on the direct road from Manassass Junction to a position he described as two miles from the Run to guard the rear of the army's position. With the brigades of Sherman and Schenck, and two batteries, he removed the rest of his division and crossing behind the lines, came up to the Stone Bridge, to execute a feint, to challenge the Confederate batteries placed to sweep the approaches to the bridge, as though he meant to cross. In the order of battle i have listed Colonel Porter as the commander of the Second Division, although this was only strictly true at the end of the battle. Originally commanded by Colonel David Hunter, it was sent to the extreme right of McDowell's line, with the intention of crossing the Run at Sudley Springs Ford to assail the refused left flank of Beauregard's line. Porter states that his brigade did not arrive at Centreville until 4:30 a.m., and blames delays by the brigade ahead (Burnside's Second Brigade). There is some slight discrepancy, Porter reporting that owing to the repeated delays (damn that Burnside!), he required four hours to get up to the ford across the Run. He then states that a rest of a half an hour took place. Burnside reports that his brigade was in position by 9:30 a.m., and was then rested. Both report that a Confederate column could be seen coming up on their left (from the flank position at the Stone Bridge. Writing well after the war, Beauregard contends that he faced 50,000 Federals with 18,000 men (although he knew and inferentially acknowledged at the time of the battle that the balance of forces was about 35,000 to 32,000); that he proposed to move on McDowell's "convenient flank" to interpose between McDowell and Washington City, and thereby achieve wonderous results including the withdrawl of Patterson and the capture of the Union capital. He then contends that Davis and Generals Cooper and Lee found the plan "brilliant and comprehensive," but "impracticable." He states that he was advised to retire to the line of the Rappahanock, but that he elected to stand his ground and fight it out, so as not to compromise Johnston's position in the Valley, and surrender the major resources of the Commonwealth to the enemy. This is why Civil War history is so hard to do--the real generals who survived the war became arm-chair generals for fifty years after the war. Johnston was moving to a juncture with Beauregard on the orders of Adjutant General Cooper, at the request of Beauregard, and pursuant to a plan Lee had suggested to him in correspondence as early as two weeks before. Beauregard spent the night of the 20th to the 21st, apparently sleepless, endlessly canvassing the best possible positions for the brigades now at his disposal. He sent streams of orders to the brigade commanders before dawn broke, and more than half his army was marching and countermarching south of the Run while Porter and Burnside were stumbling toward Sudley Mill and the ford over Bull Run. In his pre-eminently subordinate style, Colonel Jackson simply commented in his report that "the orders of the General commanding were complied with in the order in which they were received." Johnston provided a steady influence, and Johnston's brigades, comanded by Bartow, Jackson and Bee, were moved to the left, and out of the potential traffic jam which was developing between Blackburn's Ford and the Stone Bridge. What Beauregard calls a "demi-brigade" formed from General Cocke's brigade had already been posted at the Stone Bridge, commanded by Colonel Nathan George Evans, known throughout the army as "Shanks" Evans, and consisting of an infantry regiment, an infantry battalion, a cavalry battalion and a section of guns. These were the troops which Tyler and Sherman describe in their reports as covering the approaches to the Stone Bridge. Evans was an energetic and intelligent officer, although his manner alientated his subordinates, which hampered his career in the war. Receiving reports of Yankee movement on the left of the army's position, he rode out to see for himself, and observing that Bartow and Bee were moving up toward his position, he immediately and without waiting to report and receive orders, advanced his little force onto a low, extensive plateau known as Matthew's Hill, which forced Bull Run into the loop to the north which has been described. Beauregard states that he ordered Cocke and Evans to "stand to the last extremity" at the Stone Bridge at about 5:00 a.m.--but Porter's and Burnside's reports make it clear that they were not yet anywhere near Bull Run at that point in the morning. Evans acted upon his own initiative. His intelligence was derived from simple eyewitness reports of the Federal advance well after the sun had risen. His movement was crucial in the timing of the battle. He double-timed his men onto Matthew's Hill, and placed them in the numerous wood lots and stands of trees which then lay across the top of the emminence. As Burnside's brigade was being rested prior to going into line, Colonel Hunter rode forward with the skirmish line, and was seriosly wounded when Evans' men opened on them unexpectedly from cover.

Porter's comments in his report about Burnside's brigade's "slow and intermittent" movements has the sound of self-justification, the tone of his report has very much a "not my fault" ring. Leaving Centreville at about 5:00 a.m. with about 6,000 men and their attendant artillery and ordnance wagons (it was the rumble of the wagons which first alerted partrolling Confederate cavalry), Hunter's column had made good time to have crossed the Run where they did, and to be in a position to put forward skirmishers by 10:00 a.m. Burnside met Hunter as he was carried to the rear, and states in his report that he was "requested to take charge of the placement of the division in the presence of the enemy." Porter states that Hunter's Adjutant General, Capt. Whipple, then reported the wounding of Hunter to him, and that he (Whipple) had been ordered to report to him (Porter) as commander of the Second Division. Porter, having complained for three paragraphs about Burnside having a bad case of the "slows," then states that: "The Second Brigade was at this time attacking the enemy's right with, perhaps, too hasty vigor." He seems to have been a hard man to please. Burnside (who was actually on the scene at that time) constantly refers to "the attacks" of the enemy. Evans and his little band did yoeman's service in holding off a large division for as long as they did--they certainly at no time attempted an organized attack against seven regiments, a cavalry battalion and a large artillery company. The battle had begun.

McDowell's officers were executing his plan, and in my opinion, were doing the job properly. Porter reveals an ignorance of the "hurry-up-and-wait" nature of long marching columns in his complaints about the Second Brigade, rather than a justifiable complaint. Hunter had moved his force up well, and in the terms of the day, riding forward with the skirmishers to observe the enemy might have been a little risky, but well within his job description. I am mystified to know how Porter thinks that Burnside was attacking with "too hasty a vigor" when he launched four large regiments at a force less than half his size. This is why they had been in the road for five hours--to get down to the fight.

At this point, Burside's officers were having trouble handling their troops, already tired from long marching (they had been awakened at 2:00 a.m.), and bewildered in their first experience of battle. In such situations, a man's perspective quickly narrows to himself and those on either side of him. To make matters worse, most of them could not see the enemy firing upon them. Burnside's response was a good one, but it inadvertantly set a pattern for the regimental commanders which would lead to distaster. Company D, Fifth United States Artillery came up, unlimbered and began lobbing case shot into the high branches of the trees in which Evans had posted his men. This is an especially effective method in such a situation, because not only are iron fragments whistling through the air around the heads of the enemy, but branches fall on them, and the splintered trees throw out a wooden shrapnel as well. Evans barely had the force to delay the Second Division's advance, let alone advance against their tormentors firing the cannon. Slowly they were forced backward. Just as slowly, Porter and Burnside were able to open out their brigades and form a line. This line was now comprised, however, of tired and thirsty men, covered in dust and soot from the smoke of the black powder, who had become convinced that combat consisted in forming a line and following the artillery forward as they blasted the enemy out of cover. A good deal of the reason that Evans was able to hold on until Bartow and Bee filed in on his left was that at no time was the entire force arrayed against him, or even a significant portion of it, launched against him in a plain, old-fashioned infantry assault. A fatal pattern was set.

Bonham reports that upon Beauregard's order in the presence of Johnston, at about noon, he detached two regiments and a battery and sent them to the left. This would square fairly well with the report of Burnside, and Evans' account of the affair, to the effect that his little band had been able to withstand the Federal advance, and significantly retard it, for two hours. Most of the Federal troops had been under fire at some point in that two hours, but none had been seriously engaged for any prolonged time. Barnard Bee wrote no report, he did not survive the battle; neither did Colonel Bartow file a report. Others recount that he moved with his entire brigade to the support of Evans. Finding Bonham's detachement forming up to the left of Evans, he filed further to the left, and his regiments came into line just as Heintzelman's division, which had followed Hunter's, was deploying to swamp the small force which was all they had so far seen in front of them. Heintzelman reported that he arrived at the ford at 11:00 a.m., and found one brigade of Hunter's divison still to his front. There is a lot of complaining in the Federal reports about the road being blocked by the unit in front. This, however, would put him across the Run and deploying Franklin and Willcox's brigades sometime between noon and 1:00 p.m., which can be judged to be about the time that Bee came up, and does no violence to an attempt to view these events in order of their occurance. At about 1:00 p.m., Evans' men either gave out, or Evans felt justified in withdrawing them. His withdrawl uncovered a space between Bonham's detachment (commanded by Colonel Kershaw) and the Run. Porter, Burnside, Franklin Willcox and Howard had finally gotten their commands sorted, and put into line, and advanced beyond the artillery, which limbered up to move forward again. Bartow had just deployed his brigade, with a good deal of difficulty as the Federal artillery were now lobbing case shot into any wood lot they saw. Bee came up behind Bartow, and was attempting to deploy his regiments just as the combined line of the Second and Third Divisions came out of the belt of trees. Bartow's men poured in a volley, from which the Federals recoiled in surprise, but they were steadied by their officers, and roughly 10,000 muskets replied, shredding Bartow's lines, and sowing confusion in Bee's regiments who could not see their assailants. Bonham's detachment was forced to refuse the flank, to conform to Evan's departure, and Bartow's line now took fire in the flank as well, as their position was "uncovered." Bee moved his line by the right to shore up that position, but by now, the Federal artillery was again up, having moved into the skirmish line, and was sowing round shot throughout the open ground, with a good view of their enemy. The range at which Federal infantry were firing was far less than optimal, but there were so many muskets now turned on Bartow's faltering line that, combined with the bouncing cannon balls, the Confederate line was rapidly disintegrating. As Bartow's line faltered, Bee's line was exposed to the fire, and although standing for a while, they became infected with the panic which often arises among green troops when they see men falling in rows around them, and nearby troops are faltering. They began to break for the rear, and now Bee was unable to lead, from the necessity of following his men to try to rally them. The Confederate line was coming apart at the seams, which is what had been intended when McDowell sent nearly half his force on the march around Beauregard's left. The guns accompanying Schenck's and Sherman's brigades to the north of the Stone Bridge were now in a position to see and fire into Bartow's and Bee's lines, causing further confusion and panic. So far, so good. McDowell had a good plan, and for however slowly one may allege it was being executed, his officers were carrying out the plan, and were now moving into the crescendo of small arms fire which should have broken the Confederate left and lead to the desired result.

La Danse Macabre (cont.)

Now working as a team, Johnston and Beauregard had been forwarding troops to the left throughout the forenoon, and just after. Early, Elzey, Ewell and the unbrigaded troops under Holmes had been marched to the left. The first unit to arrive, however, was the First Virginia Brigade, in the command of Colonel Jackson. Immediately to the south of the Turnpike, hard by the Stone Bridge, was another plateau-like hill, known since the battle as the Henry House Hill. Jackson had been posted there when Beauregard still believed that McDowell's main effort would be at the Stone Bridge. They had been in the road since about 3:00 a.m., what Jackson customarily referred to as "earliest dawn," but of all the troops present that day, they were the most accustomed to marching from dark until dark, without the least notion of where they were going or why. They had developed faith in their commander, even if everyone else thought he was crazy (as many in the South did at that time, and for long after). Jackson found a swale, or depression at the top of the hill, covered by an extensive and relatively open wood lot. By about 11:30 a.m., he had posted all of his regiments in line there, and then withdrawn them from the skyline, ordering them to lie down and be quiet. He reports that he had moved to the support of Bee, having ascertained that he was hard-pressed on the left, but that upon his arrival, he found him falling back, and took from him Imboden's battery, and Stannard's battery, the latter having originally accompanied Evans to the Stone Bridge, with the understanding that Bee would reform his men in Jackson's rear. It would have been at about this time (closer to 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. than Jackson's reported 11:30 a.m.) that Bee allegedly uttered his undying remark about Jackson standing like a stone wall. Now Jackson placed Imboden's guns on his right, and sent a section of Stannard's to the right and one to the left to join with the Reverend Pendleton's guns. These were placed to fire obliquely at the Turnpike, and the 33rd Virginia Battalion was sent further to the left to support the guns, and was placed by in a dense lot of pine trees. This had the eventual unfortunate effect of masking the approach of the Federals, and turning it into a nasty surprise for those men.

Riding back and forth behind the line, Jackson was exposed to the occassional case shot which was lobbed over from Sherman's position, as Porter's and Heintzelman's Divisions were halted to sort out the commands, dress the line, and renew the advance. Once again, regimental commanders waited for the artillery to advance into the skirmish line, and foolishly, the brigade commanders allowed this to be done. Jackson remained calm, almost sleepy, and the troops, somewhat irked to be lying down while he rode back and forth behind them, could now hear the guns of the Federals near at hand--members of the brigade reported in their letters home that many men became nervous, especially as they could not see the guns which were firing upon them, but that Jackson's lack of concern reassured them, and they knew at any event, that he would tell what they were to know, and what they were to do, when the time came. Evans had reformed his little command, and the guns Jackson and Bee had placed on the Henry House Hill now supported them, but when Evans begged Bee to come to his support, he was advised to withdraw. Across the front of the hill, and wandering along the line of the turnpike was Young's Branch. This water course was easily crossed, but it's existence was unknown to the Federals, and the artillery followed in the wake of Evan's retreat, crossing the branch, while the infantry stopped at the watercourse, awaiting orders to cross. Elzey and Early had filed into position on Jackson's left, and Stuart had come up with his troopers. Growing impatient, Sherman had crossed a deep ford against a strong current just to the north of the Stone Bridge, and added his brigade to Porter's and Heintzelman's divisions. But no one was closely overseeing the deployment of the infantry, and no one seems to have objected when Griffith's and Rickett's batteries pushed out more than a hundred yards in front of the line of the divisions. Some regimental commanders crossed Young's branch and assaulted the Henry House Hill. The 33rd Battalion, surprised in the first encounter, broke; an enraged Jackson kept his temper, and Colonel Cummings rallied the battalion, it was reformed, fixed bayonets, and charged back into the pine trees, and cleared the position, rushing on to take the exposed Federal batteries. Jackson comments that the small arms fire was so heavy that they were obliged to abandon those guns, but between the fire of Jackson's well-posted guns, and the now heroic little battalion's charge, the threat from Federal artillery south of the Run was removed. Although Federal regiments were attacking piecemeal, they were piling up on Jackson's front, and Elzey and Ewell did not seem disposed to do anything about it. Jackson reports that he called upon Colonel Stuart to cover his flanks. It was at about this time (between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m.) that Stuart made a mounted charge on the flank of the New York regiments which were then enveloping Jackson's flanks, and began that rise to fame which has made him an icon in American military history. Jackson then states: "At 3.30 p.m. the advance of the enemy having reached a position which called for the use of the bayonet, I gave the command for the charge of the more than brave Fourth and Twenty-seventh, and, under commanders worthy of such regiments, they, in the order in which they were posted, rushed forward obliquely to the left of our batteries, and through the blessing of God, who gave us the victory, pierced the enemy's center, and by co-operating with the victorious Fifth and other forces soon placed the field essentially in our possession." The fight was now over, even the shouting.

Criticisms of McDowell abound. It cannot be stated with any certainty whether or not he was aware of, let alone responsible for, the pattern of the batteries advancing to fire obliquely at the enemy before the infantry line advanced. This worked only so long as there was no artillery to reply, and Evan's had one section of two guns. Jackson, however, had concentrated three batteries, including the section which had accompanied Evans, and career artillery officer that he was, he had placed them to sweep the approaches to his position. Now the Federal gunners found themselves exposed to counter-battery fire, and then infantry could do nothing to protect them from that, and had not advanced to their support when Colonel Cummings and the little 33rd Battalion rushed out of the pine thicket at them. The men of the Second and Third divisions had been marching or standing in column or line for 12 hours, and lacking experience, had already emptied the canteens they had been allowed to fill in mid-morning after crossing the Run. They fought courageously enough, but they were exhausted, and despite being in combat for more than five hours, were for the first time facing an infantry line which was not retreating. When Jackson issued his cherished order to "give them the bayonet," all the fight had drained out of them. I do not believe that McDowell can be faulted for his plan, which was direct, simple and obvious. That it was obvious does not alter that it was the best plan available, and very nearly worked. As Colonel Long observed about Longstreet's attack on the second day at Gettysburg, had the attack succeeded, the critics would have been competing to heap praise on the brilliant commander. Much the same can be said in the case of McDowell. My personal feeling is that he was being kicked while he was down, and the kicking hasn't stopped for 133 years. Beauregard's account of the battle written after the war is so far into the realm of fantasy as to be worthless as a source for anything other than his lack of a grasp of the meaning of events, and the possiblities which actually existed for his command in that summer of 1861. Writers have criticized Johnston for not taking control sooner, but those familiar with the ridiculous issues of protocol and honor which prevailed among Confederate officers will understand, i think, why he waited so long to basically step in front of Beauregard, and ignore him to take control of the situation. Johnston himself states that: "A large proportion of [the army] was not engaged in the battle. This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed in the interval on Bonham's left--if not then, certainly at nine o'clock, when a Federal column was seen turning our left: and, when it seemed certain that General McDowell's great effort was to be made there. Bonham's, Longstreet's, Jones', and Ewell's brigades, leaving a few regiments and their cavalry to impose on Miles' division, should have been hurried to the left to join in the battle. If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy." I would comment that General McDowell intended such a formation, but his officers failed of the effort. Many of the Federal troops who broke and ran back to Washington that day felt the same way, and complained of their officers--not for what those officers did, but that they did little or nothing to guide and instruct them. One officer commented: ""this feeling was uppermost: want of orders." The greatest fault on McDowell's part was the lack of a competent staff. Officers would be sent with dispatches, and stay at the firing line to watch the fun. The brigade commanders across the run would send couriers to McDowell, but no one could tell the couriers where to find headquarters. I have one major criticism of McDowell, that he did not accompany the march of what would eventually involved half of his army. Without the steady hand of Johnston, and Johnston criticizes himself for waiting too long, Beauregard may ahave gone to pieces. In McDowell's case, there was no hand to guide his forces once he had set them in motion.
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I have entitled this "Gotzendammerung," the fall of the idols. Some of the Federal officers made further careers in the war despite being involved in the debacle--most did not, or lingered briefly before fading away, as old soldiers do. Most of the Confederate officers either made names for themselves, or remained in their commands, with no complaints made against them. Heintzelman lingered on to command a "grand division" (a corps) in McClellan's army, but he sank out of sight by the second year of the war. Sherman got out of town, and none too soon; we will meet with him elsewhere. Oliver Howard had acted steadily, and was not stained by the event--he had a role to play in the Army of the Potomac, and provided a steady, reliable leadership in every assignment he was given, enough that he survived the collapse of his Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, and again at Gettysburg, where he took command upon the death of John Reynolds (commanding First Corps), and established a position on Cemetary Hill from which he was not dislodged (and likely could not have been moved). He went on to join Hooker in the west at Chattanooga, and took command of the Army of Tennessee (Union) before Atlanta. He participated in the "March to the Sea," and had shown a consistent dedication to black emancipation which lead Lincoln's successor, President Johnson, to appoint him to head the Freedman's Bureau. Unfortunately, this was a post for which the war had not prepared him, but that is his story, and not the story of this war.

Kipling tells us, If you can keep your head when all about you Are losing theirs and blaming it on you . . . , etc.--and this might be applied to Louis Blenker. His brigade stood firm, like a line of regulars, when the rest of the army was a fleeing mob, and the roads were choked with them, screaming civilians, dying horses and overturned wagons. Many have debated the value of a pursuit, which Jackson longed to do, and Longstreet begged to do. I consider the speculation pointless, i doubt they had the energy to break Blenker's line. In any event, Jefferson Davis arrived on the field as the sun was setting, and he vetoed any pursuit.

Burnside went to North Carolina, invaded the coastal east, and, acquiring a "name," returned to Virginia, to replace a McClellan in whom Lincoln had lost confidence, and to destroy his own career at Fredericksburg. He lingered on in lower level commands, no longer trusted, and rarely liked by his fellow commanders. Franklin enjoyed a brief career in high commands, until he fell afoul of Burnside after Fredericksburg, and was sent before the Special Committee on the Conduct of the war. (This was a Star Chamber-like committee, heavily packed with abolitionist radicals, which more resembled le comité de salut public of the French revolution than a joint committe of Congress--shades of Tailgunner Joe McCarthy). Relieved by Burnside, he had only one more brief command, the Nineteenth Corps during the disasterous Red River campaign in Louisiana in 1864. He was badly wounded at Sabine Crossroads, and his military career was over. The rest of McDowells Lieutenants who retained commands after the battle simply faded away, most more quickly than did Heintzelman.

Of course, on the southern side of Bull Run, reputations were made. Thomas Jackson and the First Virginia Brigade began their ascent to military sainthood, both now known as "Stonewall." James E. B. Stuart attained a fame which never left him, and continued to grow. As in the case of "Stonewall" Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade, Stuart's reputation was deserved. Bee died, and Bartow and Bonham went on to responsible commands, but not great fame. Evans remained feisty and capable, but his abrasive manner cause too many problems among his subordinates, and he never achieved fame in high command. Ewell, Holmes, Longstreet and Early all went on to higher responsiblities and fame, or at least notorieity, but not as a result of this battle.

With Beauregard, it is difficult to assess precisely what damage he had done to himself here--it is certain that he had ruined his career, but it was not immediately evident at the time, and it cannot be stated with certainty whether there was then a conspiracy against him in command, although i believe there was such a conspiracy later. Davis was known to be unhappy, and Lee privately urged that the army be given to Johnston. The "Hero of Fort Sumter" would never have a settled command again. Second in command to Albert Sydney Johnston at Shiloh, he was faulted by many for not pressing the attack on Grant's position after the death of Johnston. He wandered through many commands thereafter; never a friend of Davis, he became more and more the object of Davis' contempt, and he angered Davis's political friend and confidante, Judah Benjamin, who proved to many southern aristocrats to be a deadly foe. The prospect of his superiority in rank to Lee as Meade drove the Army of Northern Virginia back onto Richmond and Petersburg in 1864 was enough to convince Davis to get rid of him permanently.

Joe Johnston was given the command of the Army of the Potomac (Confederate), and in the spring of 1862, he abandoned northern Virginia altogether to confront McClellan, who had landed a huge army on the Virginia Penninsula, and was advancing on Richmond. Goaded into attack in the Battle of Seven Pines--a dismal failure with an attack that petered out as the lines were being formed--he was riding toward the sound of the guns on the Nine Mile Road when he was wounded and put out of action for a year. His place was taken by Robert Lee. When Braxton Bragg finally managed to destroy his career and almost destroy the Army of the Tennessee (Confederate) before Chattanooga, Johnston was given command of that battered but still excellent army (as good as the ANVa, it is rarely accorded the respect by "Civil War nuts" which it is due). Long sneered at by officers and private soldiers alike as a "retreating general" rather than a "fighting general," he conducted the retreat of the army to Dalton, Georgia, and then to Atlanta. If he was a "retreating general," he was magnificent at the task. Through all those miles of rugged forest and mountain, Shermand and Thomas were obliged to slug it out at every defensible position, at great cost. Johnston's infantry would stay in line while tack was removed from dead horses, and useable parts taken from damaged wagons and caissons. When the dead and wounded had been taken to the rear, then the infantry would be allowed to retreat. Their line did not break once. Retreat though it may have been, it is one of the most expertly executed fighting retreats in military history, and that assignment is about the hardest job a commander can be given. He was removed from command once more, the Army of the Tennessee was given to John Bell Hood, who eventually lead it to destruction at Nashville against George Thomas. In the late winter of 1865, as Sherman's army, having made Georgia howl, was burning a ten-mile wide swath through South Carolina, the old war horse rode forth once more, and sweeping up the fragments of the Army of the Tennessee who were still willing to fight, and combining that with the shattered regiments and bands of angry militia in Georgia and the Carolinas, he formed an army, and fought the last major battle between mobile field forces in that war at Bentonville, North Carolina in March of 1865. His was the last major command left standing; he surrendered at Durham, North Carolina on April 29, 1865.

Another idol had fallen, as well. That was the idol of the citizen soldier, of the quick war, of "home by Christmas." Three month militia could not supply the place of continuous service troops, who alone could develop the skills and gain the experience to fight the war to a conclusion. When Johnston had superceded Jackson at Harper's Ferry earlier in the year, he had expressed contempt for the militiamen who were mustering out, but enlisting in the voluteer regiments. Privately, Jackson commented that he believed that men who voluteered from a sense of dedication to the cause would make the best soldiers. Although there is ample evidence of this among southern soldiers, Jackson misjudeged the northerners. Bull Run was the first major catalyst which lead men all over the North to enlist, and to suffer the privations, the humiliating defeats, the clueless commanders and the terrors of facing Jackson or Lee, and to create Mr. Lincoln's devoted armies, who determined to see the war through to its end. On July 21st, 1861, everything changed in America forever.

Lest you think it has gone unnoticed, I love your revised spelling of "Mannassass."

Lest you think it has gone unnoticed, I love your revised spelling of "Mannassass."

I got a charge out of reading this thread again.
Take this quiz and then read some interesting things in " 5 Myths Of The Civil War"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/quiz/five_myths_civil_war.html?sid=ST2011010703601

Oh my god . . . the dead have arisen ! ! !

Now don't get all clammy Set. You are under no obligation to continue this series...but it would be nice!

Yeah, right . . . you're not holding your breath, i hope . . .

I did re-read much of this thread, and it occurs to me that the first battle of Manassas, the North's Bull Run, had an unfortunate effect of setting a completely false tone for the Federal army in the East.

McDowell's men were awakened at 2:00 a.m., and were in the road soon after. They marched until they reached the other side of Bull Run far to the north of Confederate lines--arriving between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. They fought Evans, then Bonham, then Bartow, then Bee, and finally came up against Jackson's boys. They had been awakened twelve hours before the last big fight began, they had marched and fought throughout those tweleve hours. Their company and regimental officers behaved well enough, but there was a distinct lack of command control at the brigade and division levels. Almost everybody was new to this game, so i'm not heavily condemning Federal commanders. But i know of no other examples in large battles in that war in which so many of the men marched and fought for such extended periods of time. The Federal troops performed very, very well--especailly when you consider that they had no previous combat experience.

But the rout at the end of the battle engendered a mentality of defeat among those fine troops, and a distrust of higher command. McClellan drilled them, saw that they were equipped, and for as much as could be accomplished without fighting a pitched battle, made a first class army of them. Then began a string of defeats which served to depress the spirit of that fine army, and to set up a revolving door of command--McClellan, Pope, McClellan again, Burnside, Hooker and then finally Meade. It was not until Meade's defeat of Lee in 1863 that the troops began to get a sense of themselves as a real army, well-led. And yet the material there, the human material, was as good as or better than anything the South ever sent against them.

Just some thoughts on the legacy of that unhappy battle in Virginia in the summer of 1861.