THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: the East and First Manassas

I just saw this while scouting the "At a glance" list. May this preserve my place.
Is Civil War Times still published? and is there a website?

A very good question, FM, and one which had not occurred to me. I've probably not looked at an issue for almost twenty years, but easily found The Civil War Times on-line[/b].

Johnston, Patterson, Jackson and the Valley of Virginia

Writing in 1945, Julia Davis had the following observations on the name Shenandoah:

The name has evolved, like most American place names of Indian origin, coming down through old records in many phonetic spelling: Gerando, Gerundo, Shendo, Genantua, Sherando. Many meanings have been assigned to it. The most romantic one, the one popularly accepted by the Valley people themselves, is Daughter of the Stars. This meaning has been much beloved, and incorporated into the writing which every generation of inhabitants feels inspired to produce, but the basis for it has remained concealed from the present researcher. The name appears in books of Indian etymology as Schin-han-dowi, the River-Through-The Spruce, (but spruces are rare in those mountains), or On-an-da-goa, the River-of-High Mountains, or as Silver-Water. The Museum of the American Indian in New York City believes that it is a word of Iroquois origin meaning Big Meadow. Or it might come from the fallen chief, Sherando, or from the earlier exterminated tribe, Senedos...But these discussions matter little. As Daughter of the Stars the river has been enshrined in the hearts of Valley dwellers, and Daughter of the Stars it will remain to them.

For whatever the origin of the name might have been, the valley of the Shenandoah was a crucial part of the eastern theater of the war in Virginia. For the residents of Virginia, it was simply "the Valley." Formally, both north and south of Mason and Dixon's line, it was then known as the Valley of Virginia. It was the state's granary, and the most important stud ground for horses, whether drays for wagons and artillery, or remounts for the cavalry. It was to be one of the most fought-over stretches of territory in the war-ravaged northern half of Virginia.

Colonel Jackson arrived in the last week of April. Governor Letcher had issued a proclamation that all militia officers above the rank of captain were relieved of their commands and their commissions void upon the arrival of a state-appointed officer. Jackson was that officer. Most of the militiamen went to Richmond to complain of their treatment, but many stayed, and many came back, having accepted lower rank. By the end of June, Jackson had about 4,500 effectives (the term is commonly used in the war--an effective is someone carrying a musket in the line, and does not include officers, musicians, carters, or any form of support troops). When asked by a Maryland delegation how many troops he had, he responded that he would be pleased if Lincoln thought he had 15,000, and he quickly changed the subject. (Throughout the war, officers complained about Jackon's secretiveness--but he was fond of quoting Frederick the Great: "If I thought my coat knew of my plans, I would burn it.") VMI cadets arrived to help train the officers, and then, with those officers, to train the men. Jackson had about 20 of these assistants, and he began to form a staff--for a force to which he had not attached any name, but which was already being gradiloquently referred to in the newspapers as "the Army of the Shenandoah." The most important addition at this time was Major John Harman, one of a family of successful brothers in Staunton and a Mexican War veteran. He would remain Jackson's quartermaster and commissary for the remainder of Jackson's life, despite becoming enraged and resigning on many occassions. It was said that if Old Jack gave him an order, he would turn around and order Jackson out of his way so he could comply. A little later, he acquired the services of Dr. Hunter McGuire, who was to be his surgeon throughout the war.

Many myths abound about how Jackson cut the line of the B & O (the Baltimore and Ohio railroad was the lifeline of Washington City)--and they are just that, myths. Jackson would make no such move while Maryland was still "neutral" and he had no such orders in any event. Because of what he deemed overriding military necessity, he did put two companies across the Potomac, one to hold a post at the foot of Maryland Heights, and the other to hold a post at the summit--the Heights dominated all the surrounding countryside, including Harper's Ferry. Jackson's orders were to defend Harper's Ferry--he wasn't about to swat at hornet's nests in the process.

Joseph Eggleston Johnston had been the United States Army Quartermaster General, with a brevet to Brigadier General, when he resigned in April, 1861. He was commissioned Major General in the forces of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Brigadier General of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States of America. He was sent to take command at Harper's Ferry, arriving well before the formal date of his accession to command, June 30; Jackson repsonded characteristically, and surrendered his command without a murmur, awaiting further assignment. A great deal of useless speculation has been vented about how Jackson took this--it is nonsense, however. He had his orders, he obeyed them. He expected no less of anyone else, and never applied to others a standard which he did not apply to himself. In many respects, it freed him of many of the concerns of quartermaster, commisary, ordnance, provost and the many other duties which Johnston now took up as commander. Jackson had obeyed his orders, built up a credible military force at Harper's Ferry, but he had also alarmed people in Richmond. He had crossed the river and fortified posts in Maryland; he advocated an early drive into the western counties (one does wonder if McClellan and Rosecrans would so easily have routed Old Jack). It was felt that he would be good material "under a steady hand." Johnston now had about 5000 men. He left the cavalry in small detachments to operate with the infantry formations. He formed three brigades, and spread two of them out along the Potomac as "trip wires." They were not to contest a crossing, but simply to fall back keeping a distant contact with any enemy.

On Bolivar Heights, southwest of the town, Colonel Jackson was given the First Virginia Brigade: the 2nd Virginia, the 4th Virginia, the 5th Virginia and the 27th Virginia, and the Rockbridge Artillery. All the units were from the Valley of Virginia, and the Rockbridge Artillery had been organized around Lexington--its officers and men were known to and knew well Colonel Jackson. Their commander was the Reverend William Nelson Pendleton, and the gunners therefore named their three six-pounders and their 12-pound howitzer Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. But Johnston was not happy. As a professional soldier with the life-long justifiable contempt entertained by American officers for militia, he was caustic and critical. Jackson's view was that these men (voluteers to a man, even if formerly militia members) were patriots serving in a cause in which they believed, and therefore would prove just as reliable as regulars. The experience of the war on both sides was to prove him correct.

Superlative history here Set. If I'd had you as my History teacher I would surely be teaching History myself.

did you get my email?

awwww...you guys are so cute!

(The Valley of Virginia . . . continued)

An Irish immigrant, whose father had come to America after the failed uprising of 1798, when the boy himself was not yet ten years of age, Major General Robert Patterson was given command, in late June, 1861, of a force to enter the Valley of Virginia, and to there mask Harper's Ferry and operate against the Army of the Shenandoah. Born in 1792, he was nearly 70 years of age at this time, and perhaps consideration ought to have been given to the "unwisdom" or relying soley upon seniority in this case. There is nothing to criticize in his organization of the force, nor in his initial moves. But he seems to have lacked the will or the heart to press his efforts. He might have done much better. Johnston had become sufficiently depressed about his "exposed" position that he repeatedly demanded that he be allowed to fall back. Jackson did not publicly comment, but his previous correspondence, and his private correspondence at the time show that he, just as was the case with Lee in Richmond, felt that the post should be held. Johnston, however, got his way, and the little army began to fall back. Jackson and his brigade were tolled off to march to the foot of the Valley (the northern end, the Sheandoah flows from southwest to northeast). Establishing his pattern, Jackson simply ordered his officers to assemble their men at the point he had selected. When a quartermaster insisted on more information about where his wagons were going, Jackson became visibly annoyed. The officer thereafter swore never to ask Old Jack about his plans again. Outwardly calm and completely subordinate, Jackson vented his annoyance in letters to his wife. Johnston sent Jackson to form an outpost line at Bunker Hill north of Winchester, and Jackon was happy to learn that Patterson was assembling a force rumored to be of 18,000 effectives in Maryland opposite Williamsport. Near Martinsburg, a small cavalary regiment was on outpost duty, a little more than three hundred men under the command of Captain James Ewell Brown Stuart, a veteran of Indian warfare and of "Bloody Kansas." He would assume command of the First Virginia Cavalry in July.

Johnston was not pleased by the prospect of Patterson's arrival south of the river, and although determined to do his duty, continued sending complaints, demands and gloomy predictions to Richmond. He now disposed of about 9,000 effectives, and had "beefed up" Jackson's command with the addition of the 33rd Virginia Battalion, and formed brigades commanded by Barnard Bee, Arnold Elzey and Francis Bartow. On June 19, Johnston became alarmed at Stuart's reports that Federal forces were assembling across the river with the apparent goal of securing the Martinsburg B & O yards (as Morris had done at Phillipi, and McClellan was to do in western Virginia). Jackson was sent with orders to destroy the yards there and all of the rolling stock. Although he disapproved, and thought the equipment could be taken and shipped to Richmond, orders were orders, and he duly destroyed the railyards there, the workshops and dismantled as much of the rolling stock as possible, which was then heaved into a nearby creek. However, Jackson was somewhat vindicated when two railroad engineers arrived from Richmond, and he had thirteen of the least-damaged locomotives hauled from the creek. The engineers dismantled them, and 40-horse teams were used to haul the parts by wagon to Strasburg for shipment to Richmond.

If Jackson was dismayed at the inactivity of Johnston's command, Patterson was alarmed by the activity of Jackson. Jackson disposed of about 2,300 effective and four guns. Patterson reported to Washington that he faced 16,000 infantry and 22 guns. Lincoln was dismayed at Patterson's inactivity, and he pressed Winfield Scott to make Patterson move. Patterson finally crossed the river on July 2. He moved promptly on Martinsburg, only slightly delayed by Stuart. Patterson put forward brigades commanded by Generals John J. Abercrombie (Patterson's son-in-law) and Thomas, and they encountered Jackson's command near Hoke's Run. Johnston had ordered that Jackson retire if the enemy were in force to his front. After Stuart's courier arrived, Jackson stated to no one in particular that they must determine if the enemy were in force to their front, and he moved his entire command forward to confront Patterson's division. Jackson then led about 400 men north, along with the Reverend Pendleton's three small cannon. Abercrombie's men began to appear from the direction of Falling Waters (a bend in the Potomac which has also been used to name this "battle"), and they were strongly supported by cavalry. Abercrombie's brigade was about 3,000 strong, and the cavalry was of regimental size. Pendleton had masked his battery, and when he fired upon the Federal Cavalry, they remembered pressing engagements elsewhere. But Jackson was not a fool, and he did obey orders. He withdrew toward his former camp, where he had left the 2nd and 4th Virginia. He formed a line north of Martinsburg, but when Federals appeared on his flanks, he withdrew again, about three miles south of the town. Patterson was content with the day's results, and did not pursue. On the following day, July 3, Patterson occupied Martinsburg, and then waited, although i doubt that anyone can say with assurance what it was he waited for. On July 15, he moved to Charles Town, and then he moved on to Harper's Ferry (often in this war, general officers lost sight of the enemy army as their target, and took territory instead--Sherman's "March to the Sea" is the most egregious example, he let Hood escape Georgia with more than 40,000 effectives). Johnston left a screening force with strict orders not to engage but only to maintain distant contact with the Federals, and with his four brigades, hurried over the mountains to join Pierre Gustave Toutant, known as Beauregard, at the Manassas Junction railway station, just south of Bull Run.

i'll go look . . .

I've just sent another one.

(why don't we keep track of this in a testing thread?)

Why not a Set-ehbeth e-mail thread? We could read your posted mail and follow the courtship...sort of an ant colony in an aquarium thing. Whaddya think?...give it a try?

I already started one, panzade.
After 4 years, you'd think we'd have this courtship thing sorta sorted. :wink:

Courtship is a very tricky mammalian endeavour. Your courtship with Set happens to gladden my heart...immensely.

For anyone who bothers to read this thread: I have been distracted by personal considerations, and it will be some time until i can return to this. Thank you for your patience--it may be quite a while. My thanks to any who have been interested enough to read.

Set, just get the next installment in by the 15th ...or you're fired.

I'll be in Canadia then . . . i quit . . .

Have fun on your northern sojourn, say hi to eh and do good work. I'll miss you.

Workin' on the Railroad

In the mid-1850's, the industrialized nations of the world (which was primarily Europe and North America at that time) suffered a prolonged, although not necessarily severe, economic slump. We would call it a recession. As is always the case in the complex reticulation of economic instruments and ventures, there were a variety of reasons. Capitalist economies always skate on thin ice, and a little over-heating here or there can bring disaster to many moderate and a few heavy investors. People then believed in cycles of "boom and bust" as an article of faith. Although most "boom-bust" episodes can be demonstrated to have arisen from unfettered speculation and speculative fraud which, when eventually exposed, collapses (The South Sea bubble, the Specie Circular bubble, the constantly recurring "land bubbles" as settlers moved west in the United States), most people, including a remarkably large number of successful investors, did not recognize the cause and effect in the economic "rollercoasters" which frequently gripped the "civilized world."

Often, however, the remarkable and widespread ignorance of investors and speculators, large and small was the root of the problem. In the mid-1850's, a large measure of the eventual "bust" was the end of the California gold rush. The imperialistic war against Mexico had secured vast new territory for the United States, and the "Anglos" flooded in. (It is not simply polemics for me to refer to this as an imperialistic war--it was seen as such in many sections of the nation at the time, especially in New England, where "Mr. Polk's War" was seen as a thinly-veiled excuse to extend slavery; it is perhaps unjust to accuse Polk of that end, but the prospect fueled great enthusiasm for the war in the slave states.) With the discovery of gold near Sacramento, the entire industrial world, especially the English-speaking portion thereof, was significantly disrupted by the flight of labor in the persons of those who headed for San Francisco by the fastest means available. Although the steam engine had been in use for nearly a century, it had not made much headway at sea. Sail still reigned supreme, and the new clipper ships literally raced each other to California. Early in the history of the United States, Virginia and Maryland, and Baltimore in particular, had been deeply involved in sea-borne commerce. Baltimore had long fitted out privateers ("licensed" pirates, preying upon the shipping of enemy nations in war), and had been a home to many ship-building inovations. One was the Baltimore clipper, a seemingly freakish blend of the brig and the schooner, with a long and narrow hull, a sharp and hydro-dynamic bow, but carrying large amounts of canvas. This was quickly developed into the clipper ship. Technically, a ship is a vessel of three masts, square-rigged, and in the bluff-bowed, wallowing merchantmen such as the East Indiamen of England and Holland it was the backbone of the commerce of the industrial world--the steam engine had not yet made its great impact with locomotives, either. But the clippers were sailing queens, intended for speed, and carrying far less in their holds, although in length and square feet of canvas, they were the largest ships in the world. New England and New York soon outstripped Baltimore in the production of clippers, largely because of their ready access to standing timber, a special advantage over other shipyards worldwide.

The gold rush made the clippers briefly the monarchs of the seas. From Liverpool, Melbourne, Sydney, New York, Boston and many other ports, thousands headed for the California gold fields. Surprise made the run from New York to San Francisco in 96 days and some-odd hours, then a breathtaking accomplishment (when Flying Cloud made her record-breaking run a few months later, she "spoke" a Liverpool packet which was then 180 days out of Liverpool bound for California--Flying Cloud was then 84 days out of New York, and would enter the Golden Gate 89 days, 21 hours since she had crossed the bar at Sandy Hook.) In 1854, Flying Cloud beat her previous run by half a day, entering the Golden Gate 89 days, 9 hours out of New York--a record which was not broken until her voyage was repeated by a modern racing yacht in 1989. But already, the brief days of the clipper ships were waning. The gold rush was over. Merchants could no longer sell hens' eggs in San Francisco for $3 apiece, or a barrell of salt pork for $210. Passengers were no longer lining up to sail to the El Dorado of their hopes. The dislocation of labor, the failed (and foolish) investments which had been made as though the gold in California were inexhaustible, the shipbuilding craze, and the host of other feverish and unrealistic activities dealt a body-blow to the industrial economies.

Two factors, however, lessened the impact, and slowly and painfully brought prosperity back. Both relied upon the steam engine. At sea, screw propellors and reciprocating steam engines allowed steamships to compete reasonably with sailing vessels. The improvement in steam power plants also made possible faster and more reliable locomotives--the new technology made both ships' engines and locomotives much more efficient in burning coal. During the economic frenzy of the early 1850's, railroads had expanded to meet the demand for cartage of the goods everyone hoped to sell to the briefly but fabulously wealthy fools in California. By 1855, big investors had lost interest in the clipper ships, and had turned to the railroads. No longer a quaint, dirty and smelly means of transporting the wealthy more comfortably (perhaps) then by coach on rutted and muddy roads, the locomotive had begun to change the face of the world. When the French and English besieged the Russian port of Sevastapol, the English finally got wise and built a railway from Balaclava to the front lines to supply their battered army. Railroads had a role to play in warfare which would soon be realized with a vengeance.

The backbone of railway commerce in the Old Dominion was, not surpisingly, called the Virginia Central. At Orange Court House, a branch line lead to the Potomac--the Orange and Alexandria. When war came, the Provisional Army of the Confederate States had immediately begun to send forces to northern Virginia to confront the inevitable advance from Washington City. They congregated to the east of, and were supplied at the railway station on the Orange and Alexandria known as Massass Junction, where the Manassass Gap railroad joined the O & A, linking northern Virginia to the Valley of Virginia. West of the depot ran a dirt road of the type still typical of the indusrialized world, and known as the Warrenton Turnpike, linking that village to the villages of Groveton and Centerville and to the Potomac. That road crossed, on a solid stone bridge, a creek known as Bull Run.

First Mannassass

Gotzendammerung: Invitation to the Dance

Perhaps the most famous Creole in American history, even better-known than Jean Lafitte, was Pierre Gustave Toutant. He was duly awarded a place at the United States Military Academy while in his late teens, and, callow youth that he was, upon his arrival, he took to signing his name "Pierre Gustave Toutant de Beauregard," referring to the rather quandiloquently named plantation house in which he had been born and reared--Beauregard. The Army being was it is, he was obliged to use initials, but he was ever after P. G. T. Beauregard to the United States Army. Beauregard he has been known to our history ever since. As was the case with Lee, McClellan and a host of others, he made a name for himself serving as a staff officer to Winfield Scott in the classic campaign from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico. He had graduated second in the class of 1838, and was an intelligent and capable man. After the war, he transferred to the Corps of Engineers, and, as did Lee before the war, he worked on the huge project which cleared the Mississippi river and opened it to large volume commercial traffic. In January, 1861, he was appointed Commandant at West Point, again as Lee had earlier served, but held the post for a record five days before being relieved--he was probably mistrusted as a Lousianian, and a son of slave-owners. In February, he offered his services to the Provisional government of the Confederate States, and his first assignment was the command of the water batteries which besieged Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. I made no particular mention of him earlier in recounting that event, as the batteries from which the fort was shelled had been laid out generations before, and no particular skill was required of the officer who conducted that bombardment. With the surrender of the fort in May, he was sent to command the "Alexandria line," taking up that post on June 2. This was a rather foolish military concept, as there was simply no way the Confederate States could hold the line of the Potomac in the face of the U.S. Army and Navy. Colonel Ellsworth of New York had been killed in Alexandria on May 24, and his death was immediately avenged by his Zouaves, who then occupied the city and imposed a harsh martial law. Cooler heads prevailed in Richmond, and Confederate forces were removed to a position south of Fairfax Court House. On June 20, Beauregard took command of what was now known (still rather unrealistically) as the Army of the Potomac.

In that same class of 1838 at the U.S.M.A. was Irvin McDowell. He also served in the Mexican War; however, he served with General Wool in Zachary Taylor's army, serving with distinction at Buena Vista, but earning the suspicion of Winfield Scott, who did not employ him as he did so many other young officers. His other experience of large scale warfare was as the official U.S. Army observer attached to the army of Louis Bonapart, the soi-disant Napoloen III, in his short, brutal and bloody campaign against the Austrians in northern Italy in 1859. At Solferino and Magenta, the French overcame the first-class and badly-lead troops of the Austrians by dint of heavy artillery bombardment and pig-headed frontal assaults by the French infantry. One wonders if the ham-handed manner which Napoleon III employed influenced McDowell (i'll comment later) in the conduct of his one major battle. He was a native of Ohio, and enjoyed the political influence of Salmon Chase, Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, and a man who had his finger in a great many of the pies cooked up by the dubious crew with which Lincoln was surrounded as a result of political indebtedness. Chase assured that McDowell was given command of the forces at Washington City, and when the Republican radicals in Congress put pressure on Winfield Scott to advance on Beauregard's army, McDowell was obliged to move with dubious material in what was at the time the largest campaign in American history. McDowell's little of army of about 35,000 men equalled the entire amount of forces committed to the Mexican War. His command was the Department of Northeast Virginia. His army was known as the Army of Northeast Virginia, or the Army of Northern Virginia, depending upon whose account you read. The army was organized into five divisions, the first of four brigades; the second, fourth and fifth of two brigades each, and the third containing three brigades. The commanders who served under him were anonymously memorable only for being so forgettable. Two officers only stood out, Samuel Heintzelman, commanding the third division, and William Sherman commanding the third brigade of the first division. By and large, the judgement of careful students of the performace of the army is that the material was raw but good, and very badly lead. Many troops commented later that they would be happy to see their regiments disbanded and to join different organizations under competent officers. Heintzelman lacked no courage, nor willingness to fight--but above the level of a regiment, he was in over his head. Just like Grant, Heintzelman had a habit of wandering off during an engagement and not devoting his otherwise considerable energies to the fight at hand. Unlike Grant, Heintzelman had no flair for inspirational leadership, and lacked the unrelenting drive which made Grant--a mediocre officer at the regimental level--a first-class commander of armies in the field, so long as his subordinates were able, and Grant had a genius for choosing his subordinates. Commanding the Third Corps of McClellan's Army of the Potomac, Heintzelman had two such commanders in Joe Hooker and Phil Kearney, but in the gossipy, old-boys' club of the eastern army, his shortcomings were not overlooked. Sherman's career might similarly have been doomed if he had remained in the east, but he had the good sense to know it, and wangled his way into another command in the west. We will join him there later.

McDowell's advance might have been even more of a fiasco had he not been based in Washington City. For most of the war, and in most of the departments of the United States Army, the most noticable quality of the officer corps is an unstinting mediocrity. Nevertheless, when McDowell took the field, his little army was as well supplied and supported as it was possible to be on the North American continent in 1861. His army wandered into northern Virginia, and straggled badly, but didn't suffer the consequences such disorganization would have cost him only a few months later. The desire to be fed returned most stragglers to their regiments by nightfall each evening. After five days on the road (to cover a distance most healthy adults could walk in a day), he had entered Prince William and Fairfax counties, where Beauregard had been. A young officer who was once obliged to report bad news to Thomas Jackson, began by saying: "General Jackson, i fear . . ." Jackson interrupted him to say: "Never take counsel of your fears." This advice could well have been heeded by many in higher command levels than Jackson in that war. Among them i would number Pierre Toutant. When Beauregard arrived in northern Virginia on the first of June, he was alarmed to discover that not only had the New York Zouaves taken Alexandria, but that Arlington (the estate of Lee's father-in-law) had also been occupied--yet southern troops continued to occupy unorganized bivouacs strung out along the roads by which they had straggled into Prince William and Fairfax counties. When the sluggish bureaucracy of the United States Army finally lurched into gear, under the unfailingly competent hand of Halleck, the organization which only a handful of officers (most notably, George Thomas) had imposed on federal forces was eventually everwhere apparent. By contrast, the Confederate War department limped along like a lamed hanger-on forever failing to catch up to the army ahead on their shared road. But southern officers did from the outset display a flair for ad hoc organization. But southern organization was all too often of the nature of a gentleman's club organizing a field day--a group of cronies, and some disgruntled, suspicious and plotting members on the fringes, performing brilliantly, until their interest and their energy flagged, or they became so caught up in the bickering (viz. Braxton Bragg and the Army of the Tennessee) that their commands were neglected. Most of the senior officers of the southern forces knew each other from the "Old Army," and so many of them had been cultivated by the Virginian (unfailingly loyal to his country and the Union) Winfield Scott, and by Jefferson Davis when he had been Secretary of War, that they had an initial advantage in organizing their armies.

Beauregard quickly assured the tightening of organization in his force, and as quickly pulled it back across a small but fast running and deep stream, now legend in American history, Bull Run. He formed six brigades, and the list of commanders is very nearly in its entirety a list of high ranking officers later in the war, with the single exception of Phillip Saint George Cocke (pronounced "cook") who took his own life in December of that year. The first brigade was commanded by Milledge Luke Bonham, the second brigade by Richard Stoddard Ewell, the third by David R. Jones, the fourth James "Pete" Longstreet, the fifth by the unfortunate Cocke and the sixth by Jubal Anderson Early. Initially, batteries of artillery were randomly assigned, and the cavalry, such as it was, was complete unorganized, but tended to congregate near the command post of the Army, so they were ready-to-hand if Beauregard had conceived of a use for them. The only well-organized cavalry force then available to the southerners was the First Virginia Cavalry in the command of James E. B. Stuart (see the earlier account of Jackson at Hoke's Run or Falling Waters). This was one more well-organized cavalry force than McDowell possessed, however. Among the troopers was a newly-made officer who had enlisted as a private soldier when the regiment was formed, John Singleton Mosby. Mosby had been an attorney with a love of casual violence--he frequently challenged men whom he believed had slighted him to duels without regard for the illegality of the passtime, and on a few occassions, was reputed to have publicly pistol-whipped men who refused to fight him. Perhaps it is well that he was versed in the law. Becoming a partisan after the sorry retreat of Johnston from northern Virginia, he made that ground so dangerous to any Yankee who strayed from the railroad or a marching column, that it became known as "Mosby's Confederacy." He also survived the war by more than fifty years, making him one of the longest lived of the famous men of that war, and one of the most unreliable sources for events in the war, no mean feat in that pantheon. Stuart arrived on July 16, the same day that McDowell advanced into Virginia, and he kept Beauregard apprised of the Federal forces--which may have been a disservice, given the regularity with which Pierre Gustave took counsel of his fears.

A few miles north of the stream at Centreville, McDowell came to a halt on July 18th, and sent Tyler forward to Blackburn's ford, due south on the road to Manassass Junction. This was a rather obvious move, and one for which Beauregard had very naturally prepared. "Pete" Longstreet held the ford. Jackson said of his men--the Stonewall Brigade--that they had sometimes failed to take a position, but they had never failed to hold one. That is not strictly true, although close enough. I know of no occassion on which troops under Longstreet's command failed to hold their ground. Contrary to Beauregard's habit of taking counsel of his fears, McDowell took counsel of his officers, placing him at a severe disadvantage in the comparison. One of the officers present wrote to his mother that "every one issued orders, and no one issued orders." McDowell had sent his vanguard under Brigadier Daniel Tyler to reconnoitre the ford, to conduct a reconnaisance in force. Tyler, styling himself "Connecticutt Militia, commanding first division" in his report, made up for his almost complete lack of military sense and ability by the expedient of aggressiveness. He ordered his regimental commanders to attack, without consulting his brigade commanders, and awaited the results. Longstreet doubtless could have held them had they come at him in a body--one regiment at a time coming up, the southerners would kill a dozen men or so, and the regiment would break for the rear. It was more than enough to spook Beauregard, however, who had, ironically, so far done everything just as he should. On one of the few occassions in the war when this was true, both sides knew almost exactly the size of the opposing force. McDowell command just fewer than 35,000 effectives, and Beauregard just a few more than 22,000. All tolled, there were about 80 Federals killed, and about 70 Confederates. The lack of a disparity in the casualty figures reflects the accidental excellence of Federal artillery support--batteries usually plunged ahead of the infantry line, with the whole-hearted support of the foot soldiers now behind them, and popped away for all they were worth. This would lead to disaster in three days time.

McDowell now assembled his force in a ring around Centreville and spent three days listening to more and more bad advice from his officers, the most of whom had even less experience than he, or no experience at all. By the evening of July 20th, he had a plan . . . so to speak.

Welcome back, Set, and thanks for those posts.

You welcome . . . i've been working on them here and there . . . i hope to finish the battle soon . . .