Yp, I like that period of our history.
I thought you call "Sun Tzu" as the one we called "Sun Wu" in China, you meant they're not the same one?
I do not know, but I like Sun Wu.
Sun Wu was the ancestor of Sun Bin. That's for sure.
Yes, Sun Wu was the one who wrote The art of War
Yes, Sun Wu or Sun Tzu . . . he is usually known by the second name to people in the west . . .
My hometown ChengDu was the capital city of Shu Kingdom, Liu Bei had it.
But I do not like Liu Bei.
Why not?
Is Guan Yu revered by the people there?
Yes, Guan Yu was a good one, many people like him.
However, many other people including me, do not like them.
Liu Bei cried for the land, everytime he's in trouble, he just cried...
Guan Yu was good, but sometimes I feel Luo GuanZhong wrote him as a god or something, overwrote him.
He made some stupid mistakes in his old age, he's too proud of himself.
He should know Zhou Yu, Lu Su wouldn't pick someone stupid to replace him, so they picked Lv Meng, in the same case, Lv Meng was so young, it's obviouly something in-normal(un-normal) there, how he could be sick so badly.
Even he was sick, he was not a fool, he pointed Lu Xun must for reasons, so Guan Yu should not look down upon Lu Xun.
That's just one example.
And Luo GuanZhong who wrote the book, he wrote the book for his King.
In that case, to reinforce the control, he worte the country should under the control of the same family.
Liu Bei held the same family name with Han Dynasty.
It can explain the reason why Luo wrote some many good things of Kingdom Shu.
I was unaware of the family relationship, and how it related to the author of RTK. That is definitely significant information. When investigating history, it is always essential to ask the question "who benefits" from a certain account. Thank you for that insight . . .
You're welcome.
I am interested in western history as well.
Maybe I will ask u some question abou it.
Thanks in advance:)
What about Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, William Howe, or Charles Lee?
Charles Lee was all reputation (with no basis) and mouth, and no performance. Nathaniel Greene was first class, a true natural. Henry Knox made a soldier of himself, although he was not one to begin with. His energy and devotion to the cause were his paramount contributions. His military judgment was lacking, though, the prime evidence for that being his fixation on the Chew House at Germantown, which may well have cost the Americans the victory. William Howe was professional and competent, but there is no reason to consider him to have been brilliant.
Washington
R. E. Lee {Jackson, Longstreet}
Patton
Sorry, not William Howe, I meant Charles Cornwallis.
Cornwallis was, in my never humble opinion, a competent, if conventional officer. He was good, but not great. From Boston to Yorktown, he never rose above competence, but never sank below the standard, either.
Thomas Jackson
Erwin Rommel
Gaius Julius Caesar
In order to judge the qualities of a military commander, one need consider the three primary aspects of military practice: tactics (local), operational (campaign) and strategic (geo-political). Additionally, a truly great commander in most periods of history until quite recently had also to be responsible for the logistics of putting and keeping a force in the field, able to fight effectively. Strategic principles are determined on the basis of gross geography, resources and overall objectives--both operational planning and tactical practice are subordinate to and must serve strategic interests. Operational planning can, of course, have tactical aspects, but operates at a higher level than tactics, and on a broader scale. Operational planning must seek to achieve strategic goals with due consideration of detailed geography and gross terrain description, and a realistic assessment of forces and resources, and an effective logistical method to bring force to bear with sufficient resources to achieve the desired goals. Tactical doctrine can ignore to a certain extent the balance of forces, and in fact, achieving local superiority of force without regard to the balance of forces, and applying the most force to the crucial point in the enemy's position remove balance of forces from the equation, making it possible for an inferior force to defeat a superior force. Tactical doctrine can afford to ignore geography, but must have a detailed knowledge of terrain, and must be supported by effective logistical planning and delivery for the application of force to be effective. At all levels, intelligence gathering and perceptive appreciation of the intelligence gathered is an absolute necessity--blundering about can only produce success accidentally, and will eventually result in disaster. At the tactical level, intelligence gathering has usually consisted of a line of sight survey of the enemy's position or the dispositions of the enemy's forces by commanders, aides or scouts (usually cavalry). Obviously, modern technology adds new dimensions to all aspects of military operations, but the basic principles remain the same.
Ancient accounts of campaigns and battles are usually so woefully lacking in pertinent detail as to make a reasonable judgement of the qualities of any individual commander impossible. In the ancient Chinese Warring States and Autumn Eras, great forces were marshalled, and campaigns and battles were fought, literally for centuries, about which we can have no certain knowledge with which to judge. The great Chinese military master of the Spring and Autumn periods, following the Warring States period, in the sixth century BCE, was Sun Tzu, author of The Art of War. However, it is not even certain that a single author was responsible for that work. Even were it so that a single man wrote it, his own advice in the book suggests that he would have hidden his identity. His reference to war chariots, used only briefly in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE lead many contemporary military scholars to suggest that his standard biography is apocryphal, or, once again, to suggest that The Art of War is the work of more than one author over a long period of time. The earliest version in China is in thirteen chapters, and the "canonical" version is in eighty-four chapters.
The ideas expressed in The Art of War, however, suggest a nearly complete comprehension of all aspects of military practice, with a particular emphasis on intelligence, "disinformation" operations and logistical planning and execution--suggesting a high degree of sophistication of military practice. What we know little to nothing about is tactical doctrine, other than general statements about the weapons used. However, tactical practice in all ages and right across the globe for almost all of history, until less than four hundred years ago, has always been primitive and unimaginative. In most eras, we know very little about what tactical doctrines were used, other than that all battles until the mid-eighteenth century in Europe were fought in parallel order, and all armies employed a single operational axis, although sometimes with a "holding force" used to "fix the enemy"--i.e., to distract the enemy's attention while an effort were made to turn one or the other flank. Almost without exception through history, battles were determined "at push of pike," or through the effects of archery (in the case of the Chinese, the effect of the crossbow), or, finally, through the momentum of a coordinated cavalry charge. Few variations on parallel order appear before the French Revolution. The most common is another tactic which appears to have been universal, being used by the Persians, the Japanese and the Zulu, among others. This is "the horns of the bull." In that variation, a compact body of heavy infantry or cavalry move out from the center, with light infantry or cavalry on the wings, and engage the enemy's line, applying the greatest possible pressure, at which point the light forces attempt to turn both flanks, to cause the enemy line to crumble. The Persians attempted this at Marathon, but underestimated the discipline and "staying power" of the Attic hoplites (heavy infantry). Miltiades had cavalry waiting on the Greek left (the Persians had no cavalry to dispose, other than scouts, and neither force had a flank on the sea--the battle was fought just above the beach where the Persians had grounded their ships), and when the Persians attempted to deploy the "horns" of their attack, the Greek cavalry struck the Persian right flank in force, while the hoplites advanced and put more pressure on the Persian "Immortals" than had been applied to them.
But we cannot judge Miltiades overall as a commander, once again for the lack of evidence. The Attic policy (Attica is the "province" in which Athens is located) was to put ten officers in charge of the army, with the command rotating on a daily basis--this was a common practice in republics where the most notable political characteristic was distrust. Aristides was long called "the most noble Greek," because he surrendered the command to Miltiades on the day of battle, Miltiades having commanded the day before and having made the dispositions for battle. The logistics of fighting so close to home were such that not much needed be done, and not much can therefore be said of the Attic doctrine, or the skills of Miltiades. Strategy was dictated by the details of the Persian invasion attempt, and operational planning consisted of getting the army to the battlefield in a coherent body. The operations of Greek armies in the subsequent Persian invasion, and in the Peloponnesian Wars are not well enough described to judge of the abilities of any single commander. Leonidas at Thermopylae simply put his Spartans in parallel order, and slugged it out with the Persians, and was taken in flank--suggesting that he hadn't done his reconnaissance, or had done it poorly, and had given little thought to his dispositions. "Undying" heroism is hardly a recommendation when in fact, your entire force dies.
Philip of Macedon seems to have been a thorough and intelligent commanders at all levels, again with the caveat that we know little of tactical doctrine other than assuming parallel order battles with cavalry on the flanks, and a reliance upon the "push of the pike" by the Macedonian phalanx. There is no reason to assume any particular military skill on the part of his son by his second wife, Alexander III, despite that sociopathic homicide being given the title "the Great." In fact, it seems inferentially that Alexander relied upon the knowledge and skills of his father's officers, and the Greek officers and hoplites who made the army nearly invincible when combined with the Macedonian phalanx, and the superior Macedonian cavalry. At Issus, one has a classic battle in parallel order, with cavalry attacks on both flanks sealing the issue--the massed Persian cavalry attack on the Greco-Macedonian left failed because that flank was "anchored" on the sea, and the breadth and depth of the river broke up the charge; the Macedonian cavalry attack on the Persian left succeeded because it came in an organized body, easily fording the narrower and shallower course of the river in the foothills of the mountains to the east, and the "frenzy" of Alexander and his household cavalry sealed the fate of the Persian command. The most that can be said of Alexander was that he exhibited excellent tactical leadership.
The legendary military leaders of the Three Kingdoms period at the end of the Later Han dynasty also come down to us with insufficient information to make realistic judgments. Cao Cao (which i believe is rendered as Tsao Tsao in Pinyan) seems to have been a thorough-going commander, but the evidence is inferential. The highest ranking imperial commander when Dong Zhou took over the capital and terrorized the imperial administration, he persevered for decades, and even survived to come back to triumph after the Battle of Red Wall, when fire ships destroyed his fleet and most of his army. One can assume, then, that he represented the best of Chinese military practitioners in his age. In all ages until recently, single combat by commanders often decided battles, so that one sees Alexander carrying all before him at the climax of a battle at the head of the household cavalry, or Guan Yu routing a superior force because he has killed the enemy commander in single combat. Few exceptions are apparent--Iulius Caesar left a good record of careful logistical preparation for every campaign, and showed a superior ability to adapt his tactics to circumstances--he is the first commander in history about whom i would say it is certain that he excelled in all necessary areas of military practice. This also likely true of the Ayyubid commander Yusuf (the Kurd known to the Crusaders as Saladin) and the great Japanese leader Oda Nobunaga--but in both cases, the evidence is only inferential, little reliable direct evidence of either operational planning or tactical doctrine being available. It is certain that both Saladin and Nobunaga were politically astute and used intelligence of the enemy intentions and dispositions as well as deception to achieve their military ends. Otherwise, single battles usually decided entire campaigns, and these were often decided by the morale of the troops (usually implying good leadership) and the tactical doctrine dictated by available weapons--such as the Chinese crossbow, the huge pike of the Macedonian phalanx, or the firearms cleverly exploited by Nobunaga.
In my never humble opinion, we do not see clear evidence of a superior grasp of and exploitation of all areas of military practice, combined with true innovation, until the appearance of Gustav Adolf and the Swedes in the Thirty Years War. It cannot necessarily be said of Iulius Caesar, because he employed the existent Roman system, although his victory over the superior force of Pompey at Pharsalus suggests that at least leadership, and likely, superior tactical doctrine was the decisive factor, as he was outnumbered by about five to two. It was probably true of Oda Nobunaga, although once again, a lack of definite information hampers the judgment. It is interesting, though, that Nobunaga seems to have arrayed his gun units in long shallow lines, something which had not yet been done in Europe when Nobunaga defeated all of his enemies in every engagement. In Europe at that time, regiments were massed in dense squares, and most firearms users could not employ their weapons due to too narrow a front and too deep a mass of troops. Maurice of Nassau (Dutch) was the first commander in European history to stop a charge of heavy cavalry with fire arms alone when he stopped the Spanish employing a line ten men deep--Nobunaga routinely accomplished the same thing, and seems to have used a line three men deep, something not seen in Europe until Gustav Adolf deployed his Swedes three men deep at Breitenfels in 1631.
As i have time, i will come back to finish this personal assessment of commanders through the ages, based upon what i contend to be the determining factors for such a judgment.
I believe the topic is "Who is your FAVORITE general in history?" Favorite does not necessarily mean great or brilliant. My favorites are Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, Charles Cornwallis, William Howe, George Washington, and CHarles Lee.
I find the lives of each of them fascinating and at times (CHarles Lee's capture by the British in his dressing gown) quite humorous.
Set, don't be so hard on Alexander. He was raised in a dysfunctional family and was only trying to live up to the expectations of his parents.
His mother was a Witch with a capital "B"--no bout adoubt it . . .
favorite generals...
General Robert E. Lee- Jan 19th 1807 - Oct.12th 1870..
Victories over superior forces and his great leadership abilities.
Hannibal 247-182 BCE
Victories over superior forces and great leadership abilities.
Brought Rome to its knees.
Alexander the Great July 356 BC- June 323 BC
Conquered Persia and most the known world.
All listed, early on fought superior forces yet won great victories.
Only Alexander came nearest to his goal.
Death be the final judge..
