ican wrote:The point is that like Bush, Lincoln stumbled for quite a while before he finally got it right. According to Britannica, Lincoln personally managed the war, directing his generals one way or another. He did alot more than merely appoint, fire, and "go down the war department's telegraph office, and wait for the dispatches, just as the members of the Press did." Of course Lincoln solved the problem in only four years, but then pulling seven confederate states back into the union is a bit simpler than exterminating world-wide terrorist recruitors.p
Now your doomed attempt to compare the little **** in the white house to Lincoln gets even worse. Lincoln's management of the war was a matter of pushing general officers to be aggressive, and selecting the strategic goals--and anyone familiar with military history knows that if strategy does not suggest itself to the responsible party, then your effort is in the hands of an incompetent--rather like invading Iraq to get at terrorists who do not come from Iraq.
The shrub sent the army into Iraq with no other game plan than to take down the Iraqi army--Lincoln had policies for the occupation of the territory of seceded states, and sponsored and passed legislation to provide for the re-admission of such states.
The shrub sent in insufficient force, and still has insufficient force, and plays fast and loose with the truth about how to redress the problem--virtually the first act in office on Lincoln's part was to call for volunteers, which is not simply political rhetoric, but a specific request to the governors of states to recruit specific numbers of troops--which they did as best they were able. The majority of Federal forces during the war were United States Volunteers. When the desired response was not forthcoming in early 1863, conscription was instituted--the draft. The shrub has been dishonest about how he intends to maintain forces in this war, and since the beginning, has ignored cogent advice about the number of troops needed, and the types of troops, escpecially those with policing and civilian administration skills. It now appears that he will let the situation fester until after the election, at which time, feeling assured he will be returned, he will abuse whatever sector of the population he feels will be most convenient--either coscription, or calling up more reserves and Guard units.
Lincoln inherited Winfield Scott, who had begun his active military career with the invasion of the Niagara peninsula in 1812. His retirement was obvious. After Rich Mountain, he promoted George McClellan Major General (until that time, only one American had ever held a higher rank, that of Lieutenant General, and that office was held by George Washington), making him senior to all other officers except Scott. Upon Scott's retirement, McClellan succeeded to command of all of the armies. Lincoln did not interfer in operations, but if someone did not produce, they got the axe. When McClellan bogged down on the Virginia peninsula, Lincoln brought John Pope from the west, and Pope set about compassing his own destruction by trying to organize an army in enemy territory without taking even rudimentary precautions (in one raid, Pope slipped out the back door as Confederate cavalrymen kicked in the front door, and captured all of his papers and personal effects). When Pope was routed, Lincoln called McClellan back to give him another chance. And Lincoln gave him his head. When McClellan threw away the best opportunity of the war, and failed to destroy Lee's army at Sharpsburg, Lincoln started going down the list of Major Generals trying to find the right man. In each case, Burnside, Hooker and Meade, he gave them full, un-fettered control, apart from the imperative to follow strategic policy and observe official policy.
In the west, although Halleck showed little imagination, he assembled and brought overwhelming force to bear. After taking Corinth, Mississippi, Lincoln brought him east to administer the armies because he had just the quality Lincoln wanted--unrelenting pressure on the enemy. When Grant showed that same quality, and the ability to manage a large army in the field in an aggressive manner, he was brought east, and the Congress promoted him Lieutenant General, only the second time this had ever been done.
In all of these cases, Lincoln listened to his military advisors, and he followed that advice, unless and until it proved false or insufficient to the task Lincoln had set himself.
The shrub listens to the Project for a New American Century, and ignores the very good advice he is given by the military professionals which the nation employs at great expense to the taxpayer, for precisely the reason that they are professionals with the best available expertise.
This is as disgusting as the comparison of the shrub to Winston Churchill. I'm just surprised they haven't trotted out Teddy Roosevelt yet.
. Ican, your Britannica quote from p4 of 31 has me ghasted with flabber. Ive never seen a more revisionist view of the abilities of G Mclellan than in that article. Most historians recognize that McClellan was , for some personal reason, unable to engage in anything that approached a final battle. Also, the article paints Lincoln in a light similar to Hitler , when, as it happened, when Grant "took command" Grant kept Lincoln informed by dispatch but Grant called the battlefield shots. As set stated, Lincoln was waiting for a field commander who engaged the Confederates,thats why h went through so many generals.