Gaby Hinsliff, political editor
Sunday April 24, 2005 The Observer
The Iraq war was thrust dramatically into the election spotlight last night after long-sought government legal advice, cautioning that the invasion could be illegal, was leaked. ......
cautioning that the invasion could be illegal
ican711nm wrote:2. How critical to the future security of Americans is the success of US efforts to secure a democracy of the Iraqis own design.
Second question: I hope that I have never pretended to know everything but I don't see how securing Iraq is going to affect us over here. In fact it seems to have gotten all the terrorist over there into Iraq where Iraqi's can die instead of us. If that was our aim, I guess we succeeded.
Publication] Prospect
[Date] 050421
[Headline] To catch a thief
[Author] Dean Godson
Set a thief to catch a thief" has been one of the guiding principles of American and British efforts to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Far from being pariahs in the new democratic Iraq, ex-Ba'athists constitute the backbone of the reformed Iraqi intelligence service's efforts to face down "FREs"-"Former Regime Elements," to use US military jargon. Some 9,000 servants of the ancien régime have been recalled to the various intelligence branches since the US pro-consul, Paul Bremer, reversed course last April 2004 and announced that the policy of "de-Ba'athification" had been "poorly implemented." In other words, the good FREs were supposed to carry the fight to the bad ones.
After Bremer's volte face, insurgent attacks shot up. It was perhaps coincidental-or perhaps not. But since the election, there has been a sharp fall in bombings and murders: the latest figures indicate that attacks on US forces have dropped from 140 to 30 a day. There are a number of reasons for this, including improved coalition tactics on the ground and the demoralising effects on the rebels of a successful poll.
But even if these successes are maintained, the political orientation and nature of the new Iraq will be profoundly affected by the composition of its security services. Already, many Iraqi democrats fear that there will be a reprise of the state of affairs under the monarchy: over-representation of Sunnis in the upper reaches of the armed services, which made that polity desperately vulnerable to coups.
In fact the role of ex-Ba'athists in the security forces has become one of the most controversial issues in the new democratic Iraq-and triggered bitter exchanges in the new parliament in Baghdad in early April. Shia legislators alleged that the outgoing prime minister, Iyad Allawi (himself an ex-Ba'athist) had accelerated "re-Ba'athification" during his last days in office.
Even staunch anti-Ba'athists are sceptical of some of these claims, but the attacks were sufficiently stinging to prompt the interim defence minister, Hazem Shaalan, to return to the chamber and rebut the charges. Shaalan denied that he had recruited any Ba'athists and sought instead to place the blame for any hirings at the door of the Americans and the British.
It is hard to verify the accuracy of Shaalan's assertion. What can be said, though, is that the organising principles of the Iraqi intelligence services are opaque-which explains much of the anger of the newly elected Iraqi legislators. The intelligence services submitted no budgets to the old unelected assembly. And under an emergency decree passed by Allawi in 2004, they now have the authority to conduct their own prosecutions and arrests, as well as run prisons and interrogation centres.
Few think that the incoming government, headed by the Shia Islamist Ibrahim Jaafari, will tolerate this state of affairs for long. One of the critical issues in Iraqi politics is to what extent the coalition will permit the Iraqis to effect tat-heer, or "cleansing," of the intelligence services. In other words, a classic "who rules?" struggle.
The story of re-Ba'athification is peculiar indeed. With the insurgency gaining momentum in late 2003 and early 2004, American and British forces desperately needed whatever trained personnel came to hand. As casualties grew, the need for "Iraqisation" or the handing over of responsibility to local security forces grew ever more urgent, especially in a US presidential election year. After the alleged disaster of the disbandment of the Iraqi army in May 2003, which was said to have put thousands of discontented officers on to the streets with nothing to do but join the insurgency, de-Ba'athification itself became seen as a liability. Who knew better how to handle the terrorists than their former comrades-in-arms-subject, of course, to the appropriate vetting? It also became imperative to ensure that the disempowered Sunnis were not allowed to coalesce into a single united bloc. What better token of their stake in the new Iraq than reintegration into the key organs of state?
The roots of the re-Ba'athification policy go back much further than that, though. Much of the debate in Washington has been fought out between neoconservative proponents of democracy, concentrated at the Pentagon and the office of the vice-president and "realists" at the state department and the CIA. The latter group feared a Shia-dominated democracy getting too close to Iran and destabilising their Sunni Arab clients in neighbouring states. To realists, the problem with Iraq was not the Ba'ath party but Saddam and his henchmen. They wanted a far more limited "de-Saddamisation." Throughout much of the 1990s, the "realists" did not seek a popular uprising to overthrow Saddam. Instead, they craved a coup from within the Ba'athist hierarchy.
It was the realist faction, with British assistance, which prevailed in Washington over the neocons and which helped place Allawi in the prime minister's office. He was a key figure in one of multiple failed coup attempts sponsored by the CIA out of Jordan in the mid-1990s. One of his main lieutenants was Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani. Like so many of these officers, Shahwani left the country more because he had fallen out of favour rather than out of a wish to construct a democratic Iraq. Today, he is head of the new Iraqi intelligence service, commanding a 1500-strong paramilitary force known locally as the Shahwanis..
The new intelligence service seems to be thoroughly unrepresentative of the society which it seeks to defend- both in political and sectarian terms. In a country that is 60 per cent Shia, best estimates suggest that a mere 12 per cent of the intelligence services now come from the majority community. Some reports indicate that Shahwani personally vets every Shia candidate. Sectarian affiliation alone does not, of course, connote suitability or unsuitabiliy for appointment; about 40 per cent of Saddam's foreign intelligence service was composed of Shias.
Yet even if not a single member of this new service is conspiring with his old Ba'athist chums in the insurgency, the imbalance creates at minimum a big perception problem. If you were a Shia or an anti-Saddam Sunni who had just come through 35 years of hell, would you assist the new Iraqi security forces or the coalition when they are bulging full of your former tormentors? This is a society of mistrust-especially after the failure of the 1991 uprising-and the coalition has done little to alleviate such sentiments. Many democrats also fear that the recent fatwa issued by a prominent group of Sunni clerics called the Muslim Scholars Association-calling for Sunnis to join the security forces but to abstain from assisting the occupiers-presages a further programme of infiltrating the organs of state.
One of the key issues here is quis custodet? The CIA's Iraqi station is now said to be the largest in the world, amounting to around 500 personnel, many of whom are based in the same buildings as their Arab counterparts. But few observers reckon that the agency has the linguistic or cultural abilities, let alone the manpower, to maintain full control of thousands of ex-Ba'athist protégés. After all, the latter enjoy the priceless advantage of operating on their own terrain.
The most effective way of monitoring the ex-Ba'athists' activities is by changing the intelligence service's recruitment policy-to achieve a better balance between the old and the new Iraq. Certainly, many putative applicants from the ranks of the Shia Islamists either lack the skills or else are loyal to Tehran, but it would be wrong to infer from this that clandestine skills are the preserve of the representatives of the ancien régime. Both the Iraqi National Congress and the Kurdish PUK ran counter-intelligence programmes against Saddam's regime.
One lesson which could be learned from the Ba'athist insurgents is their cohesiveness, even as they speak in an increasingly Islamist voice. Ideological commitment is a great asset. The best guarantee of a reliable intelligence service is one that is staffed by people loyal to the vision of a democratic Iraq. For as fans of Alfred Hitchcock's To Catch A Thief know, it can be hard to distinguish between the reformed diamond thieves and those who are still wedded to the bad old ways.
Ellen Knickmeyer of the Washington Post reports, that the security situation is deteriorating in palpable ways. "In city after city . . . security forces who had signed up to secure Iraq and replace U.S. forces appear to have abandoned posts or taken refuge inside them for fear of attacks. ''We joined the police, and after this, the job became a way of committing suicide,'' said Jasim Khadar Harki, a 28-year-old policeman in Mosul, where residents say patrols are dropping off noticeably, often appearing only in response to attacks. Tips from Mosul's residents have dropped off as well, with residents doubtful that police can protect informants from retaliation."
Al-Hayat reports that Shiite-Sunni tensions in Iraq are boiling over. The new governor of Najaf, Asad Abu Kalal, threatened the Sunni Arabs with reprisals, during the funeral Saturday for victims of an attack on congregatnts at a Shiite mosque in Baghdad on Friday. He demanded that the Association for Muslim Scholars (a hardline Sunni group that often functions as the political wing of the guerrilla movement) "dissociate itself from the criminals." Th governor of Najaf is from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiite, fairly hardline group long in exile in Iran.
Abu Kalal said, "We hold responsible the members of the Sunni branch . . . and demand that they issue statements and halt these criminal actions, so that we are not constrained to react . . ."
Ghazi al-Yawir, the Sunni vice president, formed a Sunni Arab committee to negotiate with prospective prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari. They are asking for 7 cabinet posts, at least one of them a powerful one like Defense.
Sun, Apr 24, 2005 5:00
Ican you missed the point. The point was that we have dragged the terrorist into Iraq and they are killing Iraqi's now. Bush even egged them on to do it as though it is better to kill Iraqi's than for any of us to be killed.
McTag wrote:Gaby Hinsliff, political editor
Sunday April 24, 2005 The Observer
The Iraq war was thrust dramatically into the election spotlight last night after long-sought government legal advice, cautioning that the invasion could be illegal, was leaked. ......
McTag please provide a reference to, a link to, or an excerpt from the law which Blair is alleged to have violated.
In quotes: Blair and Iraq weapons
Here are some of the key statements made by the prime minister about Saddam Hussein's weapons - before and after the war.
10 April 2002, House of Commons
"Saddam Hussein's regime is despicable, he is developing weapons of mass destruction, and we cannot leave him doing so unchecked.
"He is a threat to his own people and to the region and, if allowed to develop these weapons, a threat to us also."
24 September 2002, House of Commons
"It [the intelligence service] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability..."
25 February 2003, House of Commons
"The intelligence is clear: (Saddam) continues to believe his WMD programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression.
"The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death."
11 March 2003, MTV debate
"If we don't act now, then we will go back to what has happened before and then of course the whole thing begins again and he carries on developing these weapons and these are dangerous weapons, particularly if they fall into the hands of terrorists who we know want to use these weapons if they can get them."
18 March 2003, House of Commons
"We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years-contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence-Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd."
4 June 2003, House of Commons
"There are literally thousands of sites. As I was told in Iraq, information is coming in the entire time, but it is only now that the Iraq survey group has been put together that a dedicated team of people, which includes former UN inspectors, scientists and experts, will be able to go in and do the job properly.
"As I have said throughout, I have no doubt that they will find the clearest possible evidence of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction."
8 July 2003, Evidence to Commons liaison committee
"I don't concede it at all that the intelligence at the time was wrong.
"I have absolutely no doubt at all that we will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction programmes."
16 December 2003, Interview with British Forces Broadcasting Service
"The Iraq Survey Group has already found massive evidence of a huge system of clandestine laboratories, workings by scientists, plans to develop long range ballistic missiles."
16 December 2003, Interview with BBC Arabic Service
"I don't think it's surprising we will have to look for them. I'm confident that when the Iraq Survey Group has done its work we will find what's happened to those weapons because he had them."
4 January, 2004, Speech to British forces near Basra, Iraq
"Repressive states are developing weapons that could cause destruction on a massive scale."
11 January 2004 , Interview with BBC Breakfast with Frost
What you can say is that we received that intelligence about Saddam's programmes and about his weapons that we acted on that, it's the case throughout the whole of the conflict.
I remember having conversations with the chief of defence staff and other people were saying well, we think we might have potential WMD find here or there.
Now these things didn't actually come to anything in the end, but I don't know is the answer. And what I do know is that the group of people that are in there now, this Iraq survey group, they produced an interim report."
25 January 2004, Interview with the Observer newspaper
"I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the intelligence was genuine.
"It is absurd to say in respect of any intelligence that it is infallible, but if you ask me what I believe, I believe the intelligence was correct, and I think in the end we will have an explanation."
3 February, 2004, evidence to Commons liaison committee
"What is true about (ex-Iraq Survey Group head) David Kay's evidence, and this is something I have to accept, and is one of the reasons why I think we now need a new inquiry - it is true David Kay is saying we have not found large stockpiles of actual weapons."
6 June, 2004, BBC Radio 4 Today programme
"What we also know is we haven't found them [weapons of mass destruction] in Iraq - now let the survey group complete its work and give us the report... They will not report that there was no threat from Saddam, I don't believe."
6 July, 2004, evidence to Commons Liaison Committee
"I have to accept we haven't found them (WMD) and we may never find them, We don't know what has happened to them. "They could have been removed. They could have been hidden. They could have been destroyed."
14 July, 2004, statement on the Butler report
"We expected, I expected to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons after we entered Iraq.
"But I have to accept, as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion, Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy."
28 September, 2004, keynote Labour conference speeech
"The evidence about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons, as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be wrong. I acknowledge that and accept it. I simply point out, such evidence was agreed by the whole international community, not least because Saddam had used such weapons against his own people and neighbouring countries.
"And the problem is, I can apologise for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I can't, sincerely at least, apologise for removing Saddam.
"The world is a better place with Saddam in prison not in power."
"I can apologise for the information being wrong but I can never apologise, sincerely at least, for removing Saddam. The world is a better place with Saddam in prison."
29 September speaking on BBC Radio 4's Today programme
The prime minister was asked about UN secretary general Kofi Annan's assertion that the war with Iraq was illegal.
"That is his view - it is not our view," Mr Blair said.
"The view we took at the time and we take it now is that the war was justified legally because he [Saddam Hussein] remained in breach of UN resolutions."
All the world knows we have found no WMDs in Iraq, and both the UK and the US have openly stated this. That doesn't change the facts of Saddam's refusal to comply with UN actions designed expressly to prove he didn't have them, and other bits of intelligence that still strongly suggest he was either in possession of them or working towards it.
ican711nm wrote:McTag wrote:Gaby Hinsliff, political editor
Sunday April 24, 2005 The Observer
The Iraq war was thrust dramatically into the election spotlight last night after long-sought government legal advice, cautioning that the invasion could be illegal, was leaked. ......
McTag please provide a reference to, a link to, or an excerpt from the law which Blair is alleged to have violated.
Read this
A government at bay over Iraq war legality
By Colin Brown, Deputy Political Editor
25 April 2005
The Iraq war was thrust to the top of the election agenda last night after the Attorney General's advice to the Prime Minister over the legality of the conflict was leaked.
...
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=632773
McTag please provide a reference to, a link to, or an excerpt from the law which Blair is alleged to have violated.
Attorney General's warnings
25 April 2005
The UN - not Mr Blair - had the power to rule that Iraq was not complying with its resolutions.
The Attorney General argued that in law, there was a strong case that the United Nations should determine whether Iraq had ignored the demand that its weapons of mass destruction be destroyed.
The paper is said to have warned that the UN security council, not individual members, should decide whether Iraq had complied with Resolution 1441, passed in November 2002. The resolution itself confirmed that Iraq "has been and remains" in material breach to earlier resolutions, but says further breaches would be reported to the security council "for assessment".
UN Security Council resolution 1441 might not be sufficient legal basis for war.
Lord Goldsmith's advice appears to have warned that the precise wording of resolution 1441 fell short of the legal definition required formally to authorise war. Resolution 1441 said that "the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations". However, the use of the term "serious consequences" is not as strong as the term "all necessary means", the international term for military action, which were the words contained in resolution 678 that authorised force in the run up to the first Gulf War a decade earlier.
Lord Goldsmith expressed caution about going to war without a second United Nations resolution.
Lord Goldsmith's opinion is said to have warned Tony Blair that, while he could go to war without a second UN resolution, it would be desirable and "safer" to obtain a resolution explicitly authorising military action.
At the time, ministers were still working frantically to secure a second resolution.
However, the Prime Minister was saying at the time it was London's "preference" to have a new resolution, whilst leaving the door open to action without such a resolution.
Mr Blair was told there were risks in relying on previous UN resolutions to justify military action.
Lord Goldsmith argued that it could be difficult to revive the authority for military action in UN resolution 678 in 1990, given that 678 authorised action to remove Iraq from Kuwait and did not explicitly authorise an invasion of Iraq. Such a caution is important because Lord Goldsmith's final opinion authorising war did revive 678, arguing that "Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the ... effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. All these resolutions were adopted under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, which allows the use of force for the ... purpose of restoring international peace and security."
Lord Goldsmith pointed to the latest work by Hans Blix and his team of UN weapons inspectors.
Lord Goldsmith's advice was written on 7 March, 2003 as Dr Blix reported that United Nations weapons inspectors were making some progress in Iraq. His report praised Iraq's decision to destroy 34 outlawed missiles as "substantial" and said inspections "may yield results." Dr Blix argued that some Iraqi actions were "active" or "proactive". He noted that inspections based on intelligence tip-offs had found "no evidence". However he did say that Iraq's moves "cannot be said to constitute 'immediate' co-operation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance."
Lord Goldsmith said that American statements on the legality of war were not applicable in Britain.
He said that the White House did not face the same legal problems as Britain after the United States Congress had given President Bush special powers to go to war. Mr Bush secured overwhelming votes in both houses of Congress giving the President the right to launch a military strike, even without the backing of the United Nations. They voted to allow him to "use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate ... against the continuing threat posed by Iraq". Washington had insisted that a second resolution was desirable but not necessary.
25 April 2005 01:06
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