THE US, THE UN AND THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES, V. 7.0

Bush is articulate and so is my one year old granddaughter. And I will fight anyone who says she is not. twisted:

If anyone saw the tape of when Bush made {read} the statement about Al Qaeda wanting to do the US harm and so do we {Not the exact statement} He did not bat an eye. It was obvious that he did not have the slightest idea what he was saying. I must wonder how he would do on a reading comprehension test. In NY City inorder for a child to go from the third to forth grade they must pass among other things a reading comprehension test. Simple George is lucky he did not have to or he would still be mired in third grade.

Underlying the debate about the wisdom of the US-led intervention in Iraq lies the deeper issue of when, in an age of unconventional threats, to use military force and whether that force must meet some broadly accepted standard of "legitimacy". Americans in this presidential election year remain deeply divided over this issue—as do their transatlantic allies and much of the rest of the world. These divisions will not disappear under a new US president, for they reflect the realities of today's world far more than the desires of a particular American administration.

Debate—in the US and globally—over Iraq accentuated sharply different views on this critical issue. Two positions, equally unsatisfactory, have emerged. One holds that, except in a clear case of self-defence in response to an actual or tangibly imminent attack, the decision to use force requires explicit authorisation by the United Nations Security Council. The other argues that, in an age of large-scale terrorism, waiting for others to strike first is suicidal. The right to self-defence must include the right to act pre-emptively, before a real threat has fully materialised; this includes the right to act unilaterally when international organisations, notably the UN, fail to act.

Neither of these positions is sustainable. Giving the Security Council or any other international organisation an absolute veto would be unacceptable to many nations if they believed their vital security interests were at stake. Even when justification for the use of force is more complex, involving both security and humanitarian dimensions, as in Kosovo, the diversity of national perspectives on the Council may make a timely consensus difficult to achieve. Nor is it self-evident that lack of consensus on the Council renders a decision to act inherently illegitimate, given the Council's now historically anomalous composition and the fact that some members themselves lack full democratic legitimacy.

The flaws of the UN system, however, go deeper than these procedural weaknesses. They include the very foundational principles of the system itself. The UN operates on the Westphalian assumption (enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN charter) that the primary concern is aggression by one state against another, not what happens within states. Yet, in our increasingly interconnected world, the main threats to international security derive more from developments within states than from external behaviour of states. Indeed, the last three wars fought by the US, Britain and others were all in response to such internal developments—the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, the provision of a terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan and the presumed development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

It is increasingly difficult to square adherence to the principle of non-intervention with the evident need to forestall threats arising from internal developments. The Bush administration, well aware of this dilemma, has provided an answer that is equally inadequate. George W. Bush has insisted that Washington will not wait for a "permission slip" to act and will define for itself which internal developments constitute a sufficient threat to justify early intervention. Under this principle, however, any state that perceives a possible future threat from another state would be justified in intervening militarily. That is more a recipe for international anarchy than for international order. In practical terms, moreover, this policy may well prove self-defeating, as Iraq has shown. When a country acts without perceived international legitimacy, it will fail to rally the international support that is inevitably required to do the job properly.

The most pressing issue, then, is to devise both substantive rules and institutional arrangements to govern the use of force in this new era. Fashioning a new consensus will not be easy, as the continuing debate around the world makes evident. Even a November electoral victory by John Kerry, who, in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention last week repudiated the more extreme versions of the doctrine of unilateral pre-emption, would not resolve the question, as the existing alternative is no more workable than the Bush doctrine.

Whoever wins the presidency should therefore make a concerted effort to forge a new international consensus on force and legitimacy. Aided, perhaps, by the work under way at the high level panel appointed by Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, to consider reform of the UN system, the goal of this effort must be to develop principles accepted by a broad range of nations with different perceptions of the threats we face today. Such common ground will be difficult to achieve, but we believe an appropriate starting point might lie in age-old concepts enshrined in the "just war" tradition (including principles governing the justification for going to war and actions that are justified in war). Further to this is the need for recognition that, even when a strong argument can be made for unilateral action, wide international support will render long-term success more likely.

Such an approach lacks the comfortable clarity of the black-and-white positions that characterise the current debate. Nor does it provide the simplicity of solutions that depend exclusively on either "procedural legitimacy" (what institution authorised the action) or substantive claims of justice (where the ends justify the means). But this pragmatic approach is far better suited to the evolving international environment, in which countries around the world are struggling to come to grips with how to address new threats ranging from catastrophic terrorism to genocide.

Foxy
If that is so it is probably because
his father had more influence and paid more.

“Perhaps we have more in common with our neighbors than we do with the United States," a labor-union leader told me as we smoked a water pipe in a Kasyeri café. Across Turkey, many intellectuals and journalists express the same sentiment.

There has been a profound shift in Turkish foreign policy. The ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi [AKP] has sought to reorient Turkish policy away from the United States, toward both Europe and the Islamic world. Turkey's press, much of which makes the BBC look levelheaded and unbiased, happily cooperated. The first victim of Turkey's shifting diplomacy has been Israel. The late President Turgat ?-zal forged a strategic partnership with Israel. The Turkish-Israeli relationship was based on both the common threat posed by Iranian and Syrian-sponsored terrorism, as well as shared democratic ideals.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to diminish the Turkish-Israeli partnership. Following the targeted killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Erdogan condemned <http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200406%5CFOR20040601b.html> Israel's "state terrorism." He has since repeated the charge on a number of occasions. During a May 2004 meeting with Israel's infrastructure minister, for example, Erdogan, compared <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=10159> Israel's treatment of the Palestinians to the Spanish Inquisition. As the Israeli army moved to seal Palestinian weapons-smuggling tunnels, Erdogan declared Israel a "terrorist" state. On June 8, 2004, he briefly recalled Turkey's ambassador to Israel. Last month, Erdogan snubbed Israel when he could find no time to meet Israel's visiting deput! y prime minister, but found time to see Syria's prime minister the same day.

Neo-Ottomanism
Several businessmen and parliamentarians, including those from the AKP, suggested that Erdogan had ratcheted-up his public condemnation of Israel in order to win trade concessions from the Arab world and Iran. "It's a simple calculation," one parliamentarian told me. It's a calculation that is paying dividends.

On July 14, Erdogan and Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri agreed to double Turkish-Syrian trade to $2 billion annually. Two weeks later, Erdogan visited Iran. He and Iranian President Muhammad Khatami agreed to boost bilateral trade to $5 billion. Today, traffic in the central Anatolian city of Kayseri is snarled as workers dig up the main road in order to lay a natural gas pipeline from Iran. Merchants in central Turkey say there has been a rise in tourists from Syria, Iran, and even Iraq. Turkish foreign-affairs and national-security correspondents privately discuss linkages between increased Saudi subsidies and Turkey's abrupt shift in foreign policy. On June 15, after significant AKP lobbying and deal making, the Organization of Islamic Conference selected the Turkish professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as its new secretary general. AKP officials point to the Ihsanoglu appointment as a sign of Turkey's increased prestige among Islamic countries.!

Several Turkish politicians and analysts suggest that behind rhetoric of bridging East and West, the AKP is enacting a policy of "neo-Ottomanism." The idea that Turkey should bolster ties with its neighbors is not new. The influential Turkish journalist Çengiz Candar coined the term in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. In 1993, he told the Washington Post, "I think Kemalism makes Turkey turn in on itself. The time has come to reconsider the policy." A decade later, Ali Bayramoglu, in the Islamist daily Yeni Safak, wrote that the partisans of "neo-Ottomanism...are increasing every day."

The danger is that while Turks consider the concept benign, Turkey's regional neighbors have a far different perception of Turkey than Turks have of themselves. On July 11, the Bulgarian independent daily Trud lambasted Erdogan's demands that Bulgaria do more to preserve its Ottoman heritage. "Erdogan's arrogant behavior in Sofia left no illusions about the development of Turkish policy toward Bulgaria.... The direction is neo-Ottomanism," columnist Ognyan Minchev wrote. On September 5, 2003, Khurshid Dalli warned in the United Arab Emirates' daily al-Bayan that Turkey's support for "neo-Ottomanism" was extremely sensitive, especially when "historical nationalist sentiments are mixed with oil-related aspiration." Arab nationalists retain a deep anti-Turkish bias, which they display whenever Turks leave the room. Libyan strongman Muammar Gadhafi relished his role as spoiler when, in 1996, Turkey's last Islamist premier visited Turkey only to have G! adhafi call for a Kurdish state live on Turkish television. Iraq's Kurds, may welcome expanded business ties with Turkish companies, but they have made their views toward their northern neighbor clear <http://www.kurdmedia.com/reports.asp?id=1263> .

Erdogan may adopt the rhetoric of Islamic brotherhood but, even if he is sincere, his partners are not. Dictators across the Middle East cloak rhetoric in pan-Islamic ideals, even as they work to undermine their neighbors. Neither Syria nor Iran has honored pledges to stop support for terrorism. Despite the warmth of the Iranian people, the Islamic republic at its heart remains an ideological construct. The Iranian leadership is uncomfortable with the juxtaposition provided by the more successful — and secular — Turkish republic. Iran may have temporarily decreased its support for the PKK <http://www.nationalreview.com/rubin/rubin200408051220.asp> , but the Iranian security apparatus continues to sponsor Ansar al-Sunna and the Kaplanists, both of which have planned to conduct terror in Turkey.

Some AKP deputies say they have no choice but to reorient their foreign policy. "Our constituency demands it," one explained. But, their constituency does no such thing. Turks, like Americans, vote with their pocketbooks. Even in Turkey's most religiously conservative cities — Konya and Kayseri — and in conservative Istanbul districts like Sultanbeili and Bayrampasha, residents talk not about foreign policy, but rather about economic issues like unemployment and the planned January 2005 transfer to a new currency.

Lasting damage
Turkey has been a staunch U.S. ally for more than a half century. Turkish troops fought and died alongside Americans in the Korean War. While countries like France and Germany talk, Turkey acts. In the last 15 years, Turkish soldiers by the thousands have contributed to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Georgia, and Afghanistan. For more than a decade, Turkey enabled the no-fly zone which provided a protective umbrella for several millions Iraqi Kurds.

The damage done by Erdogan's positions extends far beyond hurt diplomatic feelings. His grandstanding has done lasting damage to Turkey's security. Speaking at a June 12, 2004, American Academy of Achievement panel in Chicago <http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_edition/06_14_04/dom.htm> , Erdogan dismissed the existence of "Islamic terrorism." With one flippant answer, he undermined Turkey's response to the very real threat which self-described Islamic terrorists pose to the Turkish state. The AKP's positions have also set precedents which harm Turkish security in other ways. By labeling Israel's antiterrorism actions "state terrorism," Erdogan has opened the door for European governments to do the same when the Turkish military confronts the PKK. Erdogan's decision to condemn Israel's construction of the West Bank barrier at the July 21 U.N. General Assembly played well in Damascus for more than one reason. A! s Ben Thein points out in a forthcoming Middle East Quarterly article, Syria still disputes Turkey's sovereignty of the Hatay province. The fence and minefields which mark the border are therefore constructed on disputed land. No serious scholar supports Syria's territorial claims — the population of Hatay voted overwhelmingly to join Turkey — but Erdogan has given Syrian nationalists ammunition with which they can harass their traditional adversaries to the north.

Turkey and the United States have for a half-century maintained a special relationship. But, the relationship is now strained. Both Washington and Ankara have made mistakes. The U.S. needs to deal much more seriously with the PKK. It is simply unacceptable to speak about a war on terrorism, and then turn a blind eye to a group that attacks a democracy and murders civilians. On the other hand, the Turkish parliament's March 1, 2003, decision to not support the liberation of Iraq in retrospect appears more a symptom than a cause of the downturn in relations. Regardless, far greater damage potentially looms on the horizon. It is easier to ruin relations than to build partnerships. The AKP need not tear down the trilateral relationship with democracies like the United States and Israel to build ties to countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria. After all, the United States maintains good relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, despite the hatred that the tw! o have for each other. Turkey should not submit to blackmail, whether from the Middle East or Europe. Trumpeting Tehran trades short-term gain for long-term ill. Parroting Paris will not win European Union membership; France is interested in other things <http://www.iht.com/articles/530566.htm> . If the AKP gambles established friendships for the ephemeral promises of Iran, the Arab world, and Europe, it may find itself uncomfortably alone. That is a risk Erdogan should not take.

You've got to be joking, ican. You believe Bush is ARTICULATE?

Piffka, it's tough to sound patronizing about someone not understanding while demonstrating a lack of understanding. (Is that irony?)

ican stated he thought Bush was "adequately articulate". That is hardly claiming Bush to be the same as Chomsky.

That must really be a problem, then, as the Shrub is only marginally articulate and a liar into the bargain.

I thought it ironic that ican referred to a less-adequate, truth-telling guy... was that also supposed to be Bush?

Bush is adequately articulate.

I've always preferred the less articulate truth tellers to the more articulate liars.

This is a good story of an amazing coincidence; enjoyable by all, even Ican. Please look it up and read it, I found it most curious ...