fresco wrote:nolanguagenrlungs
Dennett wrote (debate with Chalmers) in advocating the by-passing of "conciousness"
" It still seems that the sun goes round the earth...., but we've learned not to credit those intuitions."
Italics=Dennett Bold=Me
It appears from this that Dennett could be making a fundamental error of assuming the heliocentic model has some intrinsic validity relative to the geocentric model, and by extrapolation that an "AI approach" to "thought" has a similar "validity". I will read more but this apparent error - of ignoring the "purposes of observation" makes me skeptical of his approach especially when he too simplstically relates the concept of "geocenticity" to the concept of "vitalism" ...thence "consciousness".
This would mean his argument is vacuous on two counts.
He didn't assume that the heliocentic model has intrinsic validity in concerning the
functionalism of the geocentric model. He doesn't assume that the "experience of" consciousness has any validity on the materialistic functioning either. He does however acknowledge qualia of what's it like to experience something. I came to the understanding that he is not truly an eliminativist. However I think I see what you're talking about...Break me free if I am wrong, but are you saying that he can be seen as inconsistent and can be refuted because his problem implies two options,
having the actual apprehensibiity of qualia without the intrinsicality
of qualia, ....and/or vise versa?
If that is what you mean, than I guess I'll be spending my reading time, re-reading.