Oh dear, so many myths written by those who do not do their research. Ask Kevin why he has not read the 1762 report by Gribeauval nor the only primary source on the Gribeauval system - the 1792 Table 93 vols with 125 diahgrams).
But let us start in the US. Kevin and others decry Jomini because he calls Bertheir a chief clerk. This is perhaps unfair as Berthier did have some logistical input, although the 1800 and 1812 campaigns showed his incompetence. in terms of the modern NATO G1 - G5 system (logistics being G4), Berthier had no other input and was indeed just a scribe. However, Jomini's place is best summed up by another former USMC officer Hittle: "The well-worn battlefields of the Old World were the test tubes in which N mixed the ingredients that produced our modern concept of war" Hittle's introduction to a condensed version of Jomini (p.396 of the 1982 Stackpole reprint). He then goes on with the usual stuff about how Jomini synthesised N's methods and ACW Generals carrried the book in their pockets. Thi of cours eshould also tell you about the US military's view of its own heritage (well until the Iraq war perhaps??). If you read the works of Elting, Graves and others, loosely known as the West point/princeton schoola s they all mixed in this way, you will find the common thread - that all modern developments came from Napoleon, the Allies "reacted" and copied it and thus Moltke's system of modern war is justa stage on the road from N to now. Trouble is, these are claims made by people, who have not read their German material.
Let us start with the claim above about Charles and the korps system - it is a myth put about by such theorists, based on an outline design of 1st March 1809 as part of the war planning. In fact corps had existed sionce the 18th century meaning either "something bigger than a division" or a force with a detached task, and as such you will find it in many documents by all European armies. The Austraisn called their regts out and allocated them to various formations under a comamnder with an appropriate staff. However, since 1757, Austria had a system of chiefs of staff and trained staff officers (France simply rotated officers from the line until 1816) and by revealing the strategic concept behind the orders, allowed the junior comamdners to act in accordance with it. The system developed until 1811, when Radetzky became the first modern chief of staff (see A Horsetzky) and as the Prussians were developing along similar lines, Radetzky could direct hte Allied armies to concentrate on Napoleon's army at Leipzig (Berthier of course famously lost his head in 1809). The French simply made their "corps" permanent in Boulogne as their whole nation was ona permanent war footing - however, Elting's claim that France had permanent divsions in the 1780s is another of these badly defined terms copied repeatedly - they grouped regiments into administrative districts and the units did not go to war together, so it was no different from Prussia's cantons and the Austrian general Kommando proivincial system.
However, it si this repetion, which gives rise to myths in the artilelry sphere - I would again point out that reading Duffy: Instrument of War and Hennebert's biography tells you the truth about htis man, a miner and bad gunb designer, whose systemw as swiftly replaced by Napoleon where it mattered. As a test, let me ask again - as the bricole is clearly shown in Austrian service in 1757, how did Gribeauval manage to "invent" it before then? There is a clue in both the 1792 Table and se Scheel's treatsie, which talk about G's changes post-7 Years war. While G did introuduce some change, there is no System, just a cocked-up attempt to modify Prussian designs in line with lichtenstein - and on the siege guns, have a look at Chartrand's Osprey where he notes the G siege guns have long carriages and use a quoin. Indeed, G's 8pdrs were not used by N himself unless absolutely necessary, as he used the Yr XI/Lichtenstein captured 6pdrs. Don't ask me - ask a Napoleonic gunner! L certainly did adopt certain features, but his change was the systematoic approach and the 12pdr being light enough for effective field use. Gribeauval did not even grasp the physical theory of moments and finsihes up with one man with two short spikes stuck square behind the trail end whereas an L gun could be moved from the side by a man with a long traversing spar.
As I said above, much of the myth comes from not doing the reading. In the US, the G guns were adopted (in the sense of taken on) in the AWI and they looked good compared with old French and UK designs, being replaced later with Congreve trails and rifled barrels etc. That is why the myth began - not an examination of European artillery. The French readopted Gribeauval post 1815 as they had a system - having lost most of their Yr XI pieces, but it was replaced as soon as cash allowed. the claim made by some French gunners that the Yr Xi was too fragile is just that - a claim - and Allix noted that there was no documented case.
Kevin claims above that windage has no effect on the force behidn the projectile - oh really? What do you suppose happens to some of the explosive force if it can get between the projectile and the inside edge of the tube. However Kevin has also said he didn't understand why there was a min range - well, Kevin, modern guns can absorb recoil, but Napoleonic pieces did not, thus on firing the projectile flew in an arc. An anaonymous officer from IR42 describes how the French fired over his unit in just this way at Wagram and it is the reason why the Austrains used canister at Lodi (Nosworthy being another who does not understand Napoleonic ballistics).
On the battalion guns, the Austrians and everyone else used them in the 18th century to augment the line (some sources suggest they were worth 300 men with muskets) and it was Napoleon who reintroduced them in 1809. Austria had relied since the 1780s on her punch coming from the batteries in the Reserve - hence the HQ staff having direction of them in a battle. Guns were massed from 1808 at briagde level, but this was in part diue to them being 6pdrs, which were not really practical for battalion use.
Battalion guns started off leading their unit's advance to soften up the opposition line and when the lines closed, they supported the lines volleying. Austrian 1769 regs limited the number of gaps to two per regt (5 or 6 guns) and so batteries were appearing as a result as well as all armies massing guns at key points on the battlefield from their reserves. However, hte French were somewhat behind - as Lauerma (1956) notes, the batteries and general French gun deployments at Jemappes (1792)and Neerwinden (1793) were too lateral (ie: spread out along the line and not focusing their fire). However, the French massed their guns in lines ahead of the infantry columns and broke through by sheer numbers at Jemappes. When numbers were equal, they tried the same thing at Nerwinden and cam dramatically unstuck - Smola took his battery and some other guns forward witha cavalry escort to pin down hte French left on the main road. Then at Famars (1793), the Austraisn placed a Cavalry battery on hte front of each of four columns and smashe dtheir way through the French lines. the French tried to respond with a similar tactic at Wattignes in October 1793 but failed on day 1, so they resorted to their stock tactic of a mass column with artillery lined up in front and were successful, thus crystalising the Jemappes sledgehammer, which you see repeated at battles like Friedland and Wagram. The problem was that the enemy tended to fire back and it was very costly on hte infantry formed up right behind (Senarmont's claim to have been out on his own comes only from him and is countered by Girod de l'Ain's memoir of being in 9e Legere right behind and indeed standard French tactoics, described above).
Thus batt guns were infantry support weapons, but the tactic they used was adopted by the French with their batteries to create the sledgehammer, so I suppose the tactic could be said to have decided battles when the French broke through.
