use of battalion guns

If you're looking for information on how field pieces (probably 6-pounders or lighter) were used on the battlefield:
For the Napoleonic Wars:

Gunther Rothenberg's [url=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0253202604/qid=1079544665/sr=1-3/ref=sr_1_3/102-8944234-0506525?v=glance&s=books]Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon[/url]; Rory Muir's [url=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0300082703/ref=pd_sim_books_1/102-8944234-0506525?v=glance&s=books]Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon[/url];

For the Seven Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession:

Christopher Duffy's [url=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0689119933/qid=1079544819/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-8944234-0506525?v=glance&s=books]The Military Experience in the Age of Reason[/url]; Brent Nosworthy's [url=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0870527851/qid=1079544938/sr=1-2/ref=sr_1_2/102-8944234-0506525?v=glance&s=books]Anatomy of Victory[/url]

I haven't read the Muir: I've read the others but I can't guarantee that they say much on battalion guns. Good luck.

Just a shorter survey here:

René Chartrand, Napoleon's Guns 1792-1815 (2) - Heavy and Siege Artillery
extract

During the war of the Spanish Succession, whatever may have been the theory of the use of artillery, there were no significant actions in which a major army faced specifically emplaced guns in a field situation. At the storm of the Schellenberg at Donauworth (sp?) in 1704, the fortifications which were being constructed by the Franco-Bavarians had not been completed. Althought the British infantry suffered heavy casualties, they were not raked by artillery fire.

Leignitz in 1760 is the only example of a battle of the Seven Years War in which i know that the commander (Frederick II in this case), had advance knowledge of the approach of the enemy (the Austrians under the command of Loudon), and placed artillery with the intention of tearing up the enemy's advancing columns. At Kunersdorf in 1759, Frederick launched an assault on the Russian guns which had been placed in battery to protect that flank, and which were quickly and easily turned to rip through the Prussian ranks. I don't think that Saltykov deserves credit for having created a grand battery for the purpose, however. The attack was one of Frederick's worst military decisions, and he made quite a few bad ones.

Joe has mentioned the 6-pounders--prior to the reforms in the French army late in the 18th century, that was about the largest field piece which could be moved quickly enough to keep up with an evolving battlefield situation. During the Seven Years war, Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval served with Maria Teresa's armies, and saw much service in Silesia. Returning to France, he found employment in the army, but little prospect of advancement, as he was not in favor at court. However, in 1776, he was made inspector of the artillery, and it was during his tenure that experiments were carried out demonstrating that a solid shot could be "thrown" the same distance and strike with the same impact with half of the powder charge which had been considered standard since the late 14th century. This allowed for much smaller, lighter weight gun tubes, and the 12-pounder became a standard "rapid deployment" field artillery piece.

Napoleon, considered to be a member of the petitie noblesse was qualified only to hold a commission in the artillery, and not the more desirable appointments to cavalry or infantry. At Brienne, he showed talents in history and mathematics. At the ecole royale militaire in Paris, he had one of the highest academic records of any student there, particularly in mathmatics. As an artillery officer, he would have been thoroughly trained in Gribeauval's newly introduced reforms, and St. Germaine's and de Broglie's new tactical systems. Napoleon used artillery in sections (one or two guns) to support infantry in the intervals of the "mixed order" formations which were the genius of the new French tactical systems instituted in the royalist days, and so successfully exploited in the wars of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. I've never come across the term "battalion guns," and i am only assuming that it refers to the use of the guns to support battalions in line in the mixed order. Grand batteries, however, were known, and commanders attempted to use them (usually without much success) in battles from the 17th century onward. I would suggest that you find a list of the battles of the Wars of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars, and then try to find sources for detailed descriptions of the individual battles.

The term battalion guns is problematic for another reason. As early as the 1620's, Gustavus Adolphus had assigned field artillery for use in protecting the flanks of infantry regiments. However, both the term regiment and the term battalion do not have the same meaning from one European army to the next. For the British, a regiment was an administrative organization (this description applies equally well to the Prussian doctrine), and a battalion was the name of the organizational unit which served in the field. A regiment might have one or two battalions. If two, the second was usually in England, and was a recruiting base and training unit with training officers seconded by the invalid soldiers who had not yet returned to the field unit. Some regiments during the Penninsular campaign had as many as five battalions.

For the French, the battalion was an organic unit of the regiment, typically, there would be three battalions to a regiment. Because of the St. Germaine/de Broglie tactical doctrine adopted just before the Revolution--based upon the experiences of the War of the Austrian Succession (and Maurice de Saxe's doctrines outlined in Mes Reveries), the Seven Years War and the American Revolution--the battalion became the crucial organizational unit, as deployment of a regiment's soldiers was based upon the task assigned to each battalion. The mixed order formations would see one battalion deployed in line of battle, with another detailed to provide skirmishers and flank companies. The third battalion would be held in colonnes d'attent--"waiting columns," on either flank and in rear of the battalion in line, covering the gap between that battalion and the battalion in line of the neighboring regiments. It was here that the sections of artillery would be placed, with the infantry columns in support. This is why i believe your reference to battalion guns may mean this placement of artillery, as opposed to simply organizing batteries into a higher level administrative unit know as an artillery battalion (which was, for example, how the guns were organized in the Army of Northern Virginia). I have a good book on musketry doctrine in this period at home, so if i remember, i'll give a reference for that. It explains, although not very clearly, how the new French tactical doctrine was applied on the Napoleonic battlefield.

You might want to read Jomini who discusses Napoleon's use of artillary in some detail Prior to the Napoleonic Wars field guns didn't have a very good reputation. They were far too heavy for the roads, and moving them was a tedious process. About the time of the French Revolution a number of technical advances made field artillary much more useful, and far less dangerous. The Napoleonic Wars themselves sparked a number of revolutionary developments both in the guns, and in artillary doctrine.

BTW, I second the comments above. The study of artillary, its evolution and uses is a fine way to approach the study of 19th and 20th century military doctrines.

Thanks, it is the use in mixed formations using the light 4pounder pieces. So far I have discovered-Some british infantry were trained to man these pieces during the penisular war. Adolphus developed the leather gun to aid manhandling at the speed of advancing infantry. These "battalion guns " seem to have been used to bolster morale, protect corners of infantry squares, or make up for a shorteage in short range musketry, however they do not seem have been mentioned specifically in turning a battle.

I doubt very much that battalion guns would "turn" any post-1648 battle, for the simple reason that they really aren't a "battle-turning" weapon. Let's face it: a four-pounder gun may be nice to have, but it wouldn't have as much effect as a musket volley.

And, if I recall correctly, Gustavus II Adolphus's leather guns weren't developed because of their light-weight but because of their low cost vis-a-vis cast-iron guns.

There is a very thorough discussion of the development of weapons during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus in Theodore Dodge's biography. Dodge contends that the standard support weapon used by the Swedes was a three-pounder.

Oh, and Dodge contends that the "leather" gun was discarded as unreliable.

I would also note that the use of artillery sections in mixed order formation may be said to have prevented a crisis in battle which could have "turned the battle" against the French and their allies. The artillery sections were typically supported in their turn by squadrons of cavalry, as well as the battalion in "waiting column." The most striking example of which i can think at the moment is the French line at Auerstadt, when Blucher lead a "charge at speed" against Davout's line (late morning, i believe), and the Prussian cavalry failed miserably, being repulsed with heavy casualties.

The leather gun was unreliable, although maybe not to the extent that we tend to believe. They were dropped as much because advances in gun founding made cast iron barrels cheaper as because the leather guns were inferior weapons.

Artillery development and Gribeauval myths
The development of artillery is an interesting question, which in its Napoleonic version is surrounded by much myth, notably the "innovations" of the Gribeauval system and supposed French tactical superiority. Like many myths, it has resulted from readings secondary sources and then applying an agenda - the worst feature of this being US writing, which has been distorted by US adoption of the Gribeauval system during the AWI, made worse by the West Point/Princeton school of thought (Elting, Craig, Graves and others) that they are the natural descendants of Napoleon's army - it gets round the awkward question of Moltke's development of modern war in the late 19th century.
Guns - as rightly said above - were basically infantry support weapons around 1700 and the main battalion gun (ie: attached to a specific infantry unit) was the 3pdr (the French used a heavier 4pdr calibre), which were just pop guns.

I did cover this in some detail in Osprey Warrior 24: Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry and additionally in New Vanguard 72: Austrian Napoleonic Artillery as an addition to Rene Chatrand's two Osprey New Vanguards on the French artillery (see above).

Basically, these guns would be about 100 paces (200-250ft) ahead of the main line and would soften up the opposing line. As the guns came under infantry fire, they would pull back into the main line to fire from there, usually firing canister at that stage to cover the infantry while they reloaded. That was always their role, so no, they did not decide anything, but added firepower.
The key problem was weight really, which prevented anything over 6pdr being in the field until the Lichtenstein guns of 1753 significantly lightened the carriage by paring down the wood and strapping it with iron, while the barrel was significantly reduced in length. At the same time, the development of horizontal boring from 1739 enabled L to reduce the windage significantly, so that the powder load could be reduced and placed in its own bag. This made the 6pdr more mobile and the 12pdr could be a field gun for the first time.
At the same time, the commanders were keen to reduce the number of holes in the lines for the guns and generally, an Austrian regiment massed its guns in two holes (see Warrior 24 p.32). Generally all nations were putting guns into batteries to protect the flanks and using them as reserves. In the & Years War, Frederick of Prussia began using horse batteries and by the 1780s most nations had some kind of horse artillery. Contrary to another myth, these guns did not go racing off with the light cavalry - just consider the weights! Their purpose was to add firepower at key points quickly.
The French had a slight cash problem from the AWI onwards and lacked a significant horse component until 1803. Their philosophy on how to break a Frederician line was to mass artillery in front of large formations of infantry and smash through - this began at Jemappes 1792 (see First Empire 77 or on Magweb) and you can see it in many battles including Lodi, Eylau, Friedland, Aspern and Wagram. Contrary to another Elting myth, Senarmont did nothing more than this at Friedland - the claim that he was out on his own comes from S himself and is countered by Girod de l'Ain of 9e Legere who describes being in square close behind, while S was pushing his 30 guns forward by manpower.
The Allies were however already on to this - Austrian gunner Smola was out on his own with a Cavalry battery and a few other guns plus a cavalry escort, when he ripped up Miranda's column at Neerwinden in 1793, and three months later, Rouvroy put Cavalry batteries on the front of 4 columns and smashed his way through the French position at Famars. Over the 1790s, you get large batteries up to 17-18 guns on both sides holding key points at battles like Wurzburg 96 and Marengo. As the armies get bigger so there is more artillery - the Russians deployed two 60 gun batteries at Eylau to destroy Augereau and by Aspern, Smola is using 200 guns to pour fire into the French. It is the increasing numbers of guns and to some extent better terrain (3pdrs were popular in Italy because it was mostly cut-up farmland and watercourses), which led to the mobile 6pdrs and the big 12pdr batteries (although these heavy weapons were rarely moved in the battle). Artillery became a softening up tool and part of the Napoleonic battering ram - but failed against steady infantry supported by able gunners from Aspern onwards.
As I mentioned above the big myth is that Gribeauval was the major development.

A summary of Gribeauval's own life is in Wurzbach (Biographisches Lexikon des kaiserthums Oesterreich 1856-91) best accessed at: http://www.literature.at/webinterface/library/ALO-BOOK_V01?objid=11809&page=334&zoom=3&ocr=

Jean Baptiste Vicomte de Griebauval was born in Amiens on 15th September 1715 and died in Paris on 9th May 1789. He joined the Royal Army artillery as a volunteer in Paris in 1732 and was commissioned in 1735. Above all, he devoted himself to the miners section and had advanced to Captain in the Miners in 1752. His reputation as a skilled miner was so great that the then Minister of War Comte d'Argenson selected him to study the Prussian artillery, which was then enjoying the highest reputation in Europe. Gribeauval undertook this task with great success and wrote a comprehensive report about the set-up on the Prussian borders and in its frontier fortresses. In 1757, as a Lt-Colonel in the Miner Corps, he accompanied Comte de Broglie to Vienna. At the start of the 7 Years War (1756), Empress Maria Theresa had asked the French King to transfer some able artillery and mining officers. Griebauval joined the Austrian army in 1758 as a General Major, serving with the artillery. In this post, Gribeauval demonstrated his exceptional knowledge, commanding the Austrian artillery in the siege of Neisse in 1758, improving the fortifications of Dresden in 1759, directed the siege of Glatz in 1760, and held a command in 1762 under FML Guasco in Schweidnitz (it had been captured in Oct 1761). The Prussians began their siege to recapture it on 6th August 1762. Frederick particularly mentioned Gribeauval as a key component of the defences and the Prussians were unable to counter Gribeauval's use of explosive mines. Frederick complains that the "Engineer Gribeauval" is always preparing new tricks against us. The fortress only fell on 9th October 1762 and that was only because a shell fell in the main magazine and ignited it. After initialling refusing to acknowledge Gribeauval, Frederick invited him to dine. Appointed a Feldmarschalleutnant by Empress Maria Theresa in 1763, he returned to France at the end of the war and in 1764 was appointed a Lieutenant General. In 1776, he became Inspector General of the French artillery He later fell into disgrace because of court intrigues, but was appointed Inspector General of the grand Arsenal by Louis XVI although he died soon after. He was involved in several changes in the artillery and mining service, eg: shortening the barrels to 18 calibres, the prolonge, the Wall carriages tested during the siege of Schweidnitz.


His efforts in this area were collected in "Tables de constructions des principaux attirails de l'artillerie, proposes et epouvees depuis 1764 jusqu'en 1789 par Msr de Gribeauval, executees et recueilles par Msr de Mauson, marechal dechamps, et par plusiers autres officiers du corps royal d'artillerie du France" (Paris 1792). (3 vols with 125 plates).

There is also a regulation called "Reglement concernant les fonts et constructions d'artillerie de France" although only 120 copies were produced of this.

The main source for this was Gaucher de Passac: Precis sur Msr de Gribeauval (paris 1816)

So, a few points come out of this. First Griebauval was actually a specialist miner within the French artillery. Secondly, he taught and directed siege tactics. Thirdly, his "collaboration" with the Austrians extends only to siege tactics and the testing of a new design of Wall Carriage (presumably the one with the runner on p.22 of New Vanguard 72: Austrian Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars) in 1762.
Then, there is no reference here to any "new siege gun design" of 1748 - when he was in fact just a captain in the artillery and focused on mining. The design seems to be something Austria was developing in the early 1760s for fortress work.
Most importantly, the actual primary work is "Tables de constructions des principaux attirails de l'artillerie, proposes et epouvees depuis 1764 jusqu'en 1789 par Msr de Gribeauval, executees et recueilles par Msr de Mauson, marechal dechamps, et par plusiers autres officiers du corps royal d'artillerie du France" (Paris 1792). With 125 plates, it should tell us most things - but the start date for Griebauval's changes is 1764, a full eleven years after the Lichtenstein system came in. It would also appear that G had a similar role to L as Artillery director - that is okay as we use L as shorthand and thus can also refer to the G system, but he is apparently not designing anything, as that work is being done by Mauson, marechal dechamps, and several other officers.

So, if we look at the Lichtenstein system, which G reported on in March 1762, we can see all the key features - the light carriages, shorter barrels, reduced windages, standardisation of designs and components including wagons, packaged ammunition, the bricole (in use in a 1757 print), the traversing spar at the trail end to aid sighting - which are normally attributed as Gribeauval "innovations" (note the key 1792 book above specifically states that G's changes date from 1765). While it is true that as Artillery Director, G did introduce the prolonge (rear drag rope) and the G system has a metal axle, these were hardly a step change in artillery. Going to Chatrand's Osprey on the heavy French guns, he points out in one picture "note the long trails" and then in the text that the guns were elevated by the older quoin (block moved by a screw system). These are in fact direct copies of the L heavy guns as will be apparent from a quick perusal of the relevant part of NV72.
The more interesting aspect is the field guns. Gribeauval copied the L guns in terms of their principles, but being a miner and siege technician, he had not had much to do with them directly and made a hash of it. If you look at the carriages, these are still in the old Swedish style with a three-way shape to them (this certainly persisted elsewhere until 1747 as the Austrian 3pdr on p.6 of NV72). Although the cheeks (or Germanic: walls) are pared down and strapped in line with L, they are still somewhat wider. The barrels are cut down on the same basis as L, but badly cast - the G 12pdr barrel weighs 880kg compared with L 800kg. By way of comparison, the L 6pdr is 380kg and the Yr XI French barrel is 390kg. Traditionally, the excuse has been that G had to take the larger French powder charge, but that is obviously wrong when we consider that captured pieces and the YrXI barrels took these charges. G also continued with the heavier French 4 and 8pdr barrels (plus the 12pdr), the 8pdr requiring the double movement/firing position. The 4pdr was withdrawn as other nations withdrew their 3pdrs, but the 8pdr was also abandoned as an ineffective weapon - it was simply too heavy (the G guns have a double ring on the trail end so two spars can be used to lift/move it). The other problem with the G system was that it was not standardised - it still required 23 different sizes of wheel (L required 5). G also left the ammunition box on the trail (a feature of L which was changed around 1780), which just added to the weight. The elevating system already existed on the French 4pdr. As mentioned above, Gribeauval introduced a larger charge - it seems an odd thing to do when one of the (false) innovation claims was that he reduced the windage - since doing so actually allows you to reduce the size of the charge as less of the explosive force is lost in the gap between ball and barrel. While this gave the French guns a greater range, as early as 1795, d'Urturbie noted that French 8 and 12pdrs should not be firing beyond 3000ft (950m) as targets get obscured and the projectile is more affected by wind. This is within the range of the L guns. These larger charges also meant that the minimum effective range of a French gun (ie: the point where the ball drops to man height is about 700 paces (450m), but the Austrians soon noted that if they could get within this and to about 500 paces, then the French guns lost accuracy as the barrel was below level. So, the French were fin when they advanced and could dictate the range and even better could fire masses of metal in the hope of hitting something (They fired 96,000 rounds at Wagram for Austrian total casualties from all causes of about 23,000), but once on the defensive, they experienced significant problems.
One of the earliest acts by Napoleon, when he came to power was to order a reform of the artillery, which resulted in the Yr XI system. The guns themselves were developed from the 60 captured by General Allix in Turin in 1800 ( a mix of Austrian and their related Piedmontese pieces). If you now look at the Yr XI system, you will see it is an exact copy of the L gun, except that the barrel is now smooth externally (a change which this system does not get the proper credit for). The carriage is lighter and the cheeks/walls are straight. Similarly, Frederick the Great adopted the L 12pdr and his guns (although Prussia did not have a system as such) are copies of the L system - see Osprey MAA381 pp.35-6. The French were short of cash by 1803 (YrXI) and so, only the 6pdr and 5.5in howitzer (the Austrian 7pdr) were introduced. Thus the G 12pdr stayed in service and the lighter weapons were either deployed to Spain and Italy or went back to the depots. It is quite likely that the French capture of the great Austrian foundry at Mecheln (Belgium) in 1794 also pushed them towards 6pdr barrels. However, by 1808, the French were getting seriously short of cash and following significant enemy gun captures (especially Austrian pieces), the decision was made to halt Yr XI production. After the losses in Russian however, the spare captured pieces and G guns were pulled back into service. After Waterloo, there was a lot of debate in France over what to do next - the shortage of cash meant that they reverted to the G system as they still had some of those guns! Although Ruty reported after the Nap Wars that the G system should be retained, General Vallee was intent on overhauling the system and in 1827, when cash allowed, the Congreve block trail was adopted and the 6pdr barrel became the main weapon. Allix had noted that the G 12pdr was too heavy to be an effective field gun in 1815.
Thus, the idea that Gribeauval was a gun designer is wrong, that innovations came in under his supervision is wrong bar the prolonge and metal axle and the only reason he has any status is because the US adopted his guns, when everyone else was taking on the L guns and later the Congreve block trail.

The five Osprey books cover French/UK/Austria very well and Alexander Zshmodikov's books on the Russian army include the Russian guns/tactics. I hope Osprey will produce a Prussian NV in due course, as it has been offered to them.

Beware of US books as they are all from this "national" heritage and despite recent events, remain so French-biased that they lack much objectivity (Nafziger aside in Imperial Bayonets, although he addresses tactics really).

Excellent post, though you might want to make your citations a bit more clear for those unfamiliar with the material.

Yes, really excellent, DaveHollins, thanks - and welcome to A2K!

Gentlemen,
It was an interesting and lengthy reply to a topic not usually covered well. Unfortunately, most of the information provided was incorrect.

The following might help on most of the major points:

-The United States Army didn't adopt the Gribeauval System of artillery until 1809, not 'during the AWI', and that was a partial adoption because of the plethora of gun calibers available in the country.

-There is no entity, de facto or de jure, entitled 'the West Point/Princeton school of thought.' That is fantasy and there is no official collusion between West Point and Princeton in the writing of military history in the United States. Of the three military historians mentioned, Col Elting taught at West Point for 11 years, never to my knowledge collaborated with Gordon Craig (both historians have different areas of interest and concentration), and Don Graves is a Canadian historian who specializes in the Niagara frontier during the War of 1812.

-No one in the United States that I know of, and certainly no one in a position of authority in the United States Army or in the History Department at West Point has claimed that the US Army 'are natural descendants of Napoleon's army.' That, again, is the product of an active imagination. The US Army does have ties to the French army, but that comes from the association during the American Revolution, not the French Revolution and Napoleon.

-Artillery deployment mentioned/discussed in the posting does not reflect either French doctrine or practice post 1763. If you read Rene Chartrand's 1st Volume on Napoleon's artillery in the Osprey series, you'll get a very different idea than that which was posted in this thread.

-Lichtenstein was not the first to field a 12-pounder as field artillery. The Prussians had done it and the French had done it as early as 1679. Lichtenstein took his field artillery calibers from the excellent Prussian light artillery that had beaten them in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) which was the catalyst for the Austrian reforms. Lichtenstein also copied the Prussian elevation system, the screw quion, which was also later adopted by the Russians in 1805.

-Gun carriages had been reinforced with iron work long before Lcihtenstein's new system in 1753. The French Valliere artillery system (1732) certainly had that feature on its gun carriages, as did earlier artillery in the 17th century. The excellent Prussian field artillery in the 1740s had it also. It was not an innovation in 1753.

-Reducing wingage (the distance between the round and the inside of the gun tube) has nothing to do with the size of the powder charge. The French mathematician Belidor figured out that a reduction in powder charge didn't result in shorter ranges. Windage has to do with accuracy.

-Horse artillery was designed to, and certainly could keep up with cavalry on the march and on the battlefield. Both Monhaupt, a Prussian artillery officer, and Kosciuzko in his treatise on horse artillery, state this emphatically. Louis de Tousard in his excellent American Artillerist's Companion (one of the best artillery manuals of the period) states that the Gribeauval 8-pounder was an excellent piece for use by horse artillery (so it wasn't too heavy for field use), and that in a pinch, the Gribeauval 12-pounder could also be used (therefore it wasn't too heavy for field usage either).

-Senarmont's cheveauchee at Friedland was unique
in that it was the first time artillery had been used as an independent maneuver unit and the main attack. They were not a supporting unit as usual, but the supported unit. They started their attack mounted and limbered up, later advancing under fire by prolonge and bricole until within 117 meters of the Russian center. Their attack, casualties, ammunition expended, and the makeup of the two fifteen gun batteries is in Victor's after action report, of which I have a copy.

-The Russian batteries at Eylau in February 1807 were made up of three large batteries of 70 guns in the center directly opposite the village of Eylau, with one of 60 guns on its right and one of 40 on its left. There were 60 guns in reserve. With the other guns assigned to Benningsen's army, the Russians had a total of 460 guns on the field.

-The idea that artillery failed against steady infantry from Essling [Aspern] onwards is incorrect. Lauriston's 102-gun battery at Wagram accomplished its mission. Drouot's large 80-gun battery at Lutzen destroyed the allied center as Senarmont's smaller battery had done at Friedland. There were also similar French artillery successes at Ocana, Raab, Ligny, and Hanau.

-The Encyclopedia of 1911 and Wurzburg, both available on the internet, are not the best reference material for Gribeauval, having significant gaps that leave out essential information. Gribeauvl was not a miner, but a school-trained artillery officer. He was a captain of miners at one time, but as the miners were part of the French artillery during that period, it was a normal assignment for an artillery officer. Neither was he an engineer. Familiarity with the education of a French artillery officer at the time might have been helpful for the information given on Gribeauval in the subject posting. The Austrians considered him a 'collaborator' and he was seconded to the Austrian army in 1757 (some accounts state 1758 or 1756) because they were short qualified artillery officers. He was chosen because of his outstanding reputation in the French artillery arm. He was noted for his technical competence and was a combat veteran. He was promoted in the Austrian service for ability, Maria-Theresa commending him and awarding him the Order of Maria-Theresa ('general de bataille, commandant en chef du genie, de l'artillerie, et des mineurs'). As the Austrian engineer arm was very poor at this time, Gribeauval had a hand in improving it during his tenure. He had already developed a new garrison carriage for artillery in 1748 and was undoubtedly working on a new artillery system for France before and during his tenure with the Austrians. He was influenced by Lichtenstein's system, just as he was by Valliere, the Swedes and the Prussians, whom he had observed in 1752. He took Prussian plans back to France with him and had at least one Prussian field piece constructed and field tested before going to Austria. His system was no copy of Lichtenstein's.

-Gribeauval's innovations were:
the iron axle.
a new fixed rear sight.
a fixed front sight.
the prolonge.
the bricole.
a new 'cat' or bore searcher.
artillery doctrine above the company level.
the elevating screw.
'no go' gauges for testing ammunition.
the screw vent.

Gribeauval also reduced the windage with his ammunition and gun tubes to half of what the tolerance was in the Lichtenstein system which greatly increased accuracy. Along with the new fixed rear sight and the elevating screw which increased speed of fire, the new guns were more accurate and quick-firing than any that had been designed before that time.

-Gribeauval's gun tubes were stronger and more durable that either the Austrian or Prussian gun tubes. They were new guns, constructed with 150 pounds of metal per pound of round, whereas the Austrian specifications were 120 pounds per round and the Prussian at 100. This allowed for longer tube life on campaign based on the number of rounds at full charge that can be fired down the gun tube. The AN XI 6-pounder looks nothing like the Lichtenstein 6-pounder. It fires a heavier round and the tube was constructed at 130 pounds per round and did away with the reinforce rings on the outside of the gun tube. The reduction in pounds per round was because of the advances in metallurgy between 1764 when the first Gribeauval gun tubes were cast and 1803-1805 when the AN XI gun tubes were being designed and manufactured. In 1815 after Waterloo the French army went back to the Gribeauval 8-pounder and the 12-pounder was kept in service. They were replaced in 1829 when the new Valee system was implemented, again with a 12-pounder.

Some references which might be of use if there is an interest in studying artillery are:

-The American Artillerist's Companion by Louis de Tousard.
-DeScheel's Treatise on Artillery edited by Don Graves.
-Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder.
-Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars by Kevin F. Kiley.
-Histoire de l'Artillerie Francaise by Michel de Lombares.

The last named has a detailed chapter on Gribeauval which fills in the gaps left by the 1911 Encyclopedia and Wurzburg.

There are others that might also be of interest and if anyone would like to ask I would be more than happy to supply more information.

Sincerely,
Kevin F. Kiley

Welcome Mr. Kiley,

Another fine posting on artillery. Though I've long been interested in the evolution of artillery and artillery doctrine, your scholarship certainly is better than mine. I did have some questions re. the lengthy posting by Mr. Hollins, but never quite got around to voicing them. Your name seems vaguely familiar, though I can't quite place it. Have you perhaps published in Parameters?

Dear Mr. Asherman,
No, never in Parameters, but I have had a lengthy letter in the Field Artillery Journal and book reviews in the Marine Corps Gazette, though both have been some time ago.
I have contributing chapters in two 'alternate histories' published by Greenhill (Cold War Hot and Dixie Victorious), however, and my first book, Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, has just been published by Greenhill.
I am now working on a study of Napoleon's generals which will be published by Greenhill in 2006. I also hope to do a Volume II on the artillery study, as the first one only covered field artillery, and also would like to do a similar study on Civil War field artillery in the same format.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I'm a regular reader of Parameters, but have only seen a couple of issues of the Artillery Journal. I will be looking for your book on Napoleonic artillery. I have a copy of "With Napoleon in Russia", and it gives wonderful insights into N's thinking. One might fill out an entire book just of Napoleonic bibliography.

I hope you will continue to favor us with remarks regarding artillery. Personally I'm not much for alternative histories. If by some small chance R.E. Lee had decisively beaten Little Mac during the peninsular campaign, would that have made a Southern victory more likely? If Stonewall had not died at Chancellorsville, would he have taken Meade's right flank at Gettysburg and caused a general Yankee retreat? What would have happened of A.S. Johnson had not fallen at Shilo? There is no end of speculation, and none of it amounts to a hill of pinto beans.

In re. The Cold War Hot, I suppose you relied heavily on Kahn's two seminal works on nuclear war. I've been looking to add both On Thermonuclear War and Thinking the Unthinkable for years without finding copies. I don't know why I didn't add both to the collection when they first came out. Oh yeah, I was a student at the time and didn't have any extra money. Oh well.

Great posts though I tend to get nervous when caught between battling artillery pieces.

Dear Mr. Asherman,
Thanks very much. I did see that there were some comments floating around the forums that maintained that Gribeauval also copied Lichtenstein's siege gun tubes. As Gribeauval first adopted Valliere's larger caliber guns as his siege guns, copying Lichtenstein wasn't a factor. It does lead one to believe, though, that if they looked alike, then Lichtenstein must have copied Valliere.

Gribeauval later modified the siege guns to his own designs, but they don't look like Lichtenstein's. I am always amazed at sweeping claims that could be settled with a little research. I have the plans for Gribeauval's pieces and of the Austrian 6- and 12-pounders, along with the Austrian limber and caisson-they don't look like Gribeauval's.

I wasn't a fan of alternate history until I read The Napoleon Options which really is very good. When asked to do the two I contributed to, I found that I had to do the same amount of research into the topic that I did with factual material, and that scenarios were changed or taken to another level and there might have been a more drastic outcome, but I kept mine within the realm of possibility.

I didn't use the volumes you mentioned, as I kept my chapter conventional and in Vietnam. What I did was an invasion of North Vietnam after the Son Tay Raid in 1970 and in conjunction with the invasion of Cambodia. It was a lot of fun and most of the research was on weapons' capabilities and orders of battle. Also a couple of dates were juggled. The 'new' dialogue was also fun. Peter Tsouras was the editor of both volumes and he is a pleasure to work with.

Sincerely,
Kevin