Does " that temporal binding is a general phenomenon of which intentional action is just a special case" mean " that temporal binding is a general phenomenon,
and this general phenomenon is about that the intentional action is just a special case"?
Context:
"We already know that people are more likely to infer a causal relation if two things are close in time. It follows, via Bayesian calculus, that the reverse should also be true: If people know two things are causally related, they should expect them to be close in time," Buehner says. "Time perception is inherently uncertain, so it makes sense for systematic biases in the form of temporal binding to kick in. If this is true,
then it would suggest that temporal binding is a general phenomenon of which intentional action is just a special case."
More:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/10/121031142005.htm