@dalehileman,
dalehileman wrote:Quote:coin argument which proves beyond reason that the odds of free will being determined are vanishingly small...
Tomr I find this hard to understand
Bear in mind that Tomr is abusing the term
determinism. As explained here:
ughaibu wrote:tomr wrote:Determinism is local.
No it isn't. Determinism is the thesis that the world at all times has a globally definite state which can, in principle, be fully described, that there are laws of nature which are the same in all times and places, and that given the state of the world at any time, the state of the world at all other times is exactly and globally specified by the given state in conjunction with the laws of nature. Again, this is what philosophers are talking about. If you mean something else, call that thing something else, as this is a philosophy discussion board.
determinism has a clearly defined meaning, for philosophers. However, despite having had this pointed out, Tomr continues to use the term in some idiosyncratic sense.
This is a general problem in internet discussions about free will; often the participants don't understand what either of the terms: free will and determinism, mean. Worse, "determinism" is often used to mean different things at different times, even by individual posters.
dalehileman wrote:Isn't it contradictory to say, "free will being determined"
Compatibilists hold that free will is possible in a determined world. To remind you; an agent has free will on any occasion on which that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives. The problem for compatibilists is that, on the face of it, there are no realisable alternatives in a determined world. However, as it seems obvious to most people that we have free will, those who want to maintain the claim that we live in a determined world need some kind of story about compatibilism. Usually this amounts to interpreting
realisability in terms of logical possibility, or sometimes even physical possibility. I don't think that either approach stands on its own and any compatibilist position is met by the coin argument, which shows that the probability of the world being determined is vanishingly small.
dalehileman wrote:The more carefully controlled the conditions of an experiment the more consistent its result, seems to make the idea of free will vanishingly small
You're assuming that such an experiment can be undertaken, in short you're assuming that some relevant scientist has free will. In itself this already establishes that there is no experiment which can cast doubt on the reality of free will, because all experiments assume the free will of the experimenters.
Here:
ughaibu wrote:About the nonsense of exactly repeated conditions; experimental repeatability is an essential principle of science, and this is not the statement that given exactly identical conditions there is exactly one experimenter who can repeat a procedure. If the procedure is typing 01 and posting it on the internet, then this procedure can be repeated by any researcher with the ability to type, a suitable computer and internet access. It is exactly the point of experimental repeatability that other researchers in other times and places can perform the same actions. Obviously I am capable of typing 01 and have a suitable computer with an internet connection, so, equally obviously, typing 01 is an action which I can repeat, as already demonstrated. That I can repeat the given procedure is an essential principle of experimental science. I now similarly establish that typing 10 is a repeatable procedure and I have generated an option set: {01, 10}.
In an earlier post I defined "choice" and "conscious choice", I now choose a single member proper subset of my option set and make my choice set: {10}.
Thus I have made a selection from amongst realisable alternatives, by definition and guaranteed by essential principles of experimental science.
I now enact my choice and type 10, thereby completing the demonstration.
it was demonstrated that by appeal to essential principles of science, we can establish an option set, that means we are guaranteed
realisable alternatives by essential principles of science. From this and the definitions of choice and conscious choice given here:
ughaibu wrote:A "choice" is the construction of a set with exactly one member and which is a proper subset of an option set.
A choice is conscious if the agent has imagined future expectations for each option, compared those options and holds one as preferred before enactment.
it is trivial to demonstrate a
conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives, and as that is free will, by definition, it is trivial to demonstrate free will.
Nobody really doubts this, if free will were not observable then there could be no "illusion" of free will. But more importantly, the above demonstrates that free will is observable in a scientific sense, in order to deny the observability of free will the denier must give up essential principles of science. So, again, there is no scientific procedure that can consistently show free will to be in doubt.
