@tomr,
tomr wrote:Ughaibu wrote:This contention is refuted by the coin argument, which shows that the probability of my actions being determined is vanishingly small.
No you have not shown that nothing has forced you to pick what you did and I already explained why. . .
As you apparently still haven't understood the coin argument, I will explain it one more time.
1) if the world is determined, then all my future actions are fixed. So, if it is now 9:00am then my location at 11:00am is already a fact
2) given a Schrodinger's box type device, whether an incidence of radioactive decay will or will not occur, is random. This is to say that there is nothing in the surroundings by which we can state the result
before it occurs
3) set up the box so that the probability of decay by 10:00am is half
4) at 9:00 I state that it decay has occurred by 10:00, I will be in the White Horse at 11:00 and if decay has not occurred I will be in the Red Cow at 11:00
5) as my actions, in a determined world, are already fixed and as I cannot know what the result of the box will be, the probability of my statement in
4 being correct is half
6) if it is the case that I can act as stated in
4, for arbitrarily long sequences, then the probability of the world being determined becomes vanishingly small
7) but my statement in
4 is equivalent to observation, so if I cannot behave as in
4, for arbitrarily long sequences, then observation is unreliable
8) as any argument in support of realism about determinism must at some level appeal to an observation, any successful argument for determinism would refute itself by implying that it is unsound.
Notice that instead of radioactive decay, we can use an astronomical observation, as any information about the specified event is isolated from us by the limitation of the speed of light. Further thought shows that this consideration even applies to the toss of a coin.
tomr wrote:…or that free will is possible.
I have shown that free will is observable, and the only challenge that you've offered is that the world might be determined or that there might be other unspecified forces controlling the agent's actions. Both challenges have been answered. If you think there is some other reason to suppose that free will isn't possible, what is that reason?
tomr wrote:These forces would not just be preventing you from picking one option they would be forcing you to pick the option you did.
Obviously, and obviously false. For the third time, if such forces exist, then,
in principle, it would be possible to state, at 9:00, which pub I will be in at 11:00. But, if I'm told, at 10:00, which pub I will be in at 11:00, what is to stop me going to the other pub? There is nothing to stop me, and everybody knows that, including you. This is why denialism is such a contemptible position, the denialist is prepared to say things which they know to be false.
tomr wrote:You continually fail to show that your alternative options are realizable.
That the alternative is realisable is
guaranteed by essential principles of science. That neither course of action is determined is demonstrated by the coin argument. This has been fully spelled out for you and it's not difficult to understand, so, if you really don't get it, after so many repetitions over so much time, I will conclude that this discussion is beyond your abilities.