Another interpretation/opinion on the Woodward book.
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A Heady Mix of Pride and Prejudice Led to War
April 19, 2004
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI
In his engrossing new book, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward
uses myriad details to chart the Bush administration's
march to war against Iraq. His often harrowing narrative
not only illuminates the fateful interplay of personality
and policy among administration hawks and doves, but it
also underscores the role that fuzzy intelligence, Pentagon
timetables and aggressive ideas about military and foreign
policy had in creating momentum for war.
The chief of staff, Andrew H. Card Jr., describes the White
House as trying to perform a circus trick of straddling two
horses, the horse of war and the horse of diplomacy. It is
a task, this book shows, that the White House did with
difficulty and at times a good deal of disingenuousness,
with the horse of war rapidly outpacing the horse of
diplomacy. It is also a White House committed to the
"vision thing" in a big way (promoting risky, sweeping
ideas like exporting democracy and pre-emptive war) and the
avoidance of any perception of wimpiness, a White House in
many ways determined to avoid accusations once hurled at
the president's father.
"Plan of Attack" reveals that President George W. Bush
asked Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Nov. 21,
2001, to start a war plan for Iraq, and to do so in secret
because a leak could trigger "enormous international angst
and domestic speculation." Among the first to express angst
was Gen. Tommy Franks, who got the Iraq assignment while he
was busy prosecuting the war against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
The book also reveals that the director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, told President Bush in December
2002 that intelligence about Iraq possessing weapons of
mass destruction was "a slam dunk," but later told
associates that he and the C.I.A. should have stated up
front in that fall's National Intelligence Estimate and
other reports that the evidence was not ironclad, that
there was no smoking gun.
In addition "Plan of Attack" ratifies assertions made in
two recent controversial books. It corroborates the
observation made by the former Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill (in Ron Suskind's book "The Price of Loyalty") that
Iraq was high on the Bush administration's agenda before
9/11, in fact from its very first days in office. And
echoing accusations made by the former counterterrorism
czar Richard A. Clarke (in his book "Against All Enemies"),
it contends that prior to 9/11 Mr. Bush was focusing on
domestic issues and a large tax cut and had "largely
ignored the terrorism problem."
In the wake of Mr. Woodward's best-selling 2002 book "Bush
at War" - which presented a laudatory portrait of Mr. Bush
as a fearless and determined leader after 9/11 - the
president agreed to be interviewed in depth by the author
about how and why he decided to go to war against Iraq. Mr.
Woodward, an assistant managing editor of The Washington
Post, says the president also made it clear that he wanted
administration members to talk with him, and that he
interviewed more than 75 key players.
Thanks to this wide access, "Plan of Attack" has a more
choral-like narrative than many of the author's earlier
books, which tended to spin scenes from the point of view
of his most voluble sources. And while Mr. Woodward - who
has long specialized in forward-leaning narratives that are
long on details and scoops, and short on analysis - does
not delve into the intellectual and political roots of the
war cabinet, he does pause every now and then to put his
subjects' actions and statements into perspective. The
resulting volume is his most powerful and persuasive book
in years.
In reporting that General Franks said in September 2002
that his people had been "looking for Scud missiles and
other weapons of mass destruction for 10 years and haven't
found any yet," Mr. Woodward adds: "It could, and should,
have been a warning that if the intelligence was not good
enough to make bombing decisions, it probably was not good
enough to make the broad assertion, in public or in formal
intelligence documents, that there was `no doubt' Saddam
had WMD." Vice President Dick Cheney had done exactly that
just days before.
Later Mr. Woodward observes that Secretary of State Colin
Powell warned the president in January 2003 that military
action against Iraq would leave the United States
responsible for rebuilding the country and dealing with
whatever global fallout the invasion might cause, but adds
that the president never asked his top diplomat for advice,
and that Mr. Powell never volunteered any. "Perhaps the
president feared the answer," Mr. Woodward writes. "Perhaps
Powell feared giving it. It would, after all, have been an
opportunity to say he disagreed. But they had not gotten to
that core question, and Powell would not push."
In contrast Mr. Woodward describes Mr. Cheney as having
been a "powerful, steamrolling force" for military
intervention, "a rock," in President Bush's words, who was
"steadfast and steady in his view that Saddam was a threat
to America and we had to deal with him." The
"self-appointed special examiner of worst-case scenarios,"
Mr. Cheney, who had been defense secretary during the first
gulf war in 1991, harbored "a deep sense of unfinished
business about Iraq," Mr. Woodward writes, and in January
2001, before the inauguration, he passed a message to the
outgoing defense secretary, William S. Cohen, stipulating
that Topic A in Mr. Bush's foreign policy briefing should
be Iraq.
During the buildup to war, this book contends, tensions
between Mr. Powell and Mr. Cheney grew so toxic that the
two men "could not, and did not, have a sit-down lunch or
any discussion about their differences." Mr. Powell is
described as thinking that the vice president had an
unhealthy fixation on Saddam Hussein and was constantly
straining to draw (unproven) connections between Al Qaeda
and Iraq. As Mr. Woodward puts it: "Powell thought that
Cheney took intelligence and converted uncertainty and
ambiguity into fact."
As for Mr. Cheney, he reportedly complains to hawkish
friends - at a dinner party he and his wife gave on April
13, 2003, to celebrate the Marines' arrival in Baghdad -
that Mr. Powell "always had major reservations about what
we were trying to do." He and his friends are described as
chuckling about the secretary of state, whom Mr. Cheney
characterizes as someone interested in his own poll ratings
and popularity.
President Bush, the object of so much jockeying for
position among cabinet members, emerges from this book as a
more ambiguous figure than the commanding leader portrayed
by Mr. Woodward in "Bush at War." In some scenes he is
depicted as genuinely decisive (as in his choice to go to
United Nations in 2002). In others he seems merely childish
(eyeing Gen. Henry Shelton's peppermint during a meeting
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, until the general passed it
over.)
Sometimes Mr. Bush comes across as instinctive and shrewd
(dismissing a C.I.A. presentation on weapons of mass
destruction as "not something that Joe Public would
understand or would gain a lot of confidence from").
Sometimes he sounds petulant and defensive (saying of Mr.
Powell, "I didn't need his permission" to go to war). And
sometimes he simply seems like someone trying to live up to
the "Persona" outlined by his political adviser Karl Rove
in a campaign brief: a "Strong Leader" with a penchant for
"Bold Action" and "Big Ideas."
Mr. Bush and the people around him - most notably Mr. Rove,
Mr. Cheney, Mr. Rumsfeld, the national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz - are constantly talking about the importance of
showing resolve, of standing firm, of talking the talk and
walking the walk. And as plans for war advance, this
posture becomes part of the momentum toward war. As Mr.
Bush himself says of the weeks leading up to the war: "I
began to be concerned at the blowback coming out of
America: `Bush won't act. The leader that we thought was
strong and straightforward and clear-headed has now got
himself in a position where he can't act.' And it wasn't on
the left. It was on the right."
Adding to the war momentum was the growing buildup of
troops in the Iraq theater, the approach of hot weather in
the gulf (which would make military operations more
difficult), promises made to allies like Saudi Arabia
(Prince Bandar, Mr. Woodward reveals, was told of the
president's decision to go to war before Colin Powell was)
and risky C.I.A. operations in the region.
In the final walkup to war, Mr. Bush repeatedly asks
associates: "What's my last decision point?" "When have I
finally made a commitment?" Mr. Rumsfeld eventually tells
the president, "The penalty for our country and for our
relationships and potentially the lives of some people are
at risk if you have to make a decision not to go forward."
By January 2003, this book reports, Mr. Bush had made up
his mind to take military action, but the book also
suggests that that decision was far from inevitable, given
the many vagaries of intelligence findings, domestic and
international politics, and the personalities and
maneuverings of the people closest to the president.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/19/books/19KAKU.html?ex=1083466318&ei=1&en=520575c1a00f7f91
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company