Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

It is my belief - finding myself in agreement with Steve - that the Emperor would have been disobeyed by his hardliners even after the two nuclear attacks unless some "nod and wink" communications on his continuing status had been relayed to the Japanese military (aka government) prior to the September 2nd 1945 signature of unconditional surrender.

Can I prove it? Only those who were there can. I still say we should look for Japanese sources.

From: [email protected] (Thomas Hamilton)
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: How and Why Japan Surrendered (long)
Date: 10 Aug 1995 10:10:52 GMT

This is a brief account of how and why Japan surrendered.
The best account of these events is found in _Nihon no Ichiban
Nagai Hi_ by the Pacific War Research Society. The Society was
a group of 14 Japanese historians who spent years interviewing
every Japanese survivor involved in any way with the decision,
except Hirohito. Their book was published in 1965. It was
translated into English and published by Kondansha with the
title _Japan's Longest Day_ [JLD]. This is still the
authoritative book on the subject. This post is condensed from
JLD. If you have read JLD, don't bother with this post.
Otherwise, here are the Cliff notes.


Japan in the summer of 1945 was governed, in the name of the
emperor, by the Supreme War Council or Big Six. The SWC
consisted of representives of the Army, the Navy and the
civilian government. This body ruled by consensus. That is
the six would debate amoung themselves until they all agreed
on a course of action which could be presented to Hirohito.
The most powerful person on the SWC was the Army Minister.
It had become a rule of Japanese politics that the Army Minister
was chosen by the Army and no cabinet could exist without an
Army Minister. This meant that the Army could veto any decision
by having its Minister resign.

The issue on the table in late summer of 1945 was the surrender
of Japan. The SWC could not, did not achieve consensus.

It is a remarkable fact about the crisis which overtook the SWC
in August 1945 that no one changed their opinion. The SWC
members who advocated immediate acceptance of the Potsdam
declaration stayed pro-peace throughout. More amazingly, the
SWC members who opposed surrender before Hiroshima, continued
to oppose it right up till August 14.


SWC DOVES:

Foreign Minister Togo (the leader of the doves)
Prime Minister Admiral Suzuki (77 and very flaky)
Navy Minister Admiral Yonai

SWC HAWKS

Army Minister General Anami (the leader of the hawks)
Army Chief of Staff General Umezu
Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Toyoda


It is a curious fact that the Navy was so important, even though
it only had a few destroyers left.

Since these six people were unable to agree to end the war,
there were two other sources of authority which could possibly
break the deadlock, although, since Japan was already at war,
the hawks had no desire to break the deadlock.

THE ARMY

The Army was in physical control of the country and Tokyo. The
Army had a tradition of murdering political opponents. Many
middle level officers in the Army believed that the Army should
murder all the doves and take control of the country. This
would mean, in effect, kidnapping Hirohito. Many officers
viewed this as preferable to surrender. Everyone believed
that a surrender order would be followed by an immediate coup
attempt and assasination spree.

THE EMPEROR

Hirohito strongly wanted peace. In principle, he could have
ordered the Army to surrender at any time. Under the Meiji
Constitution he was explicitly Commander and Chief. However,
it was not clear that the Army would obey him. If he ordered
the Army to surrender, a successful coup would leave him a
prisoner. He knew he only had one shot. He would have to
stake his position and the lives of his fellow doves on one
attempt to bulldoze the Army. The question was, when to try it.
Hirohito was not isolated, he had the help of many senior
politicians. He had friends in the Army. It just wasn't clear
that he had enough to ride out a coup.



DOVE arguments:

Everyone agreed on the importance of protecting the 'national
polity'. Doves emphasized the importance of the Monarchy.
They argued that immediate surrender to the US was the best way
to preserve the Monarchy. Peace feelers to the US from doves
had been broken off at hawks insistence, but not before the US
had communicated to the doves that Japan could surrender and
keep an emperor. The doves also didn't like the Russians and
would have preferred ending the war before they occupied any of
Japan. (Even though Japan was still at peace with Russia,
indeed trying desperately to negotiate with Stalin, Japan could
see the Russians deploying massive forces on the border. The
Russian attack was not a big surprise.)

HAWK arguments:

The hawks accepted that the war, and empire, were gone. They
believed that the US would allow Japan to retain its government
structure and independence if it were clear that the price of
insisting on occupation was too high. They advocated a guerilla
war. They believed that even if the emperor were hiding in
the mountains with a few soldiers, that was preferable to
having the public humiliation of the emperor subordinated
to foreigners.

However, the hawks didn't think it would come to that. After
all, all they wanted was a little area around Tokyo where the
emperor and his soldiers could wave the flag unmolested. Was
this too much to ask in exchange for thousands of US lives?
The hawks thought US diplomatic concessions would be coming.

The hawks also thought the Soviets would help. They could
pressure the US directly, although that was unlikely. More
usefully, the Soviets could overrun Manchuria and Korea, scaring
the US into coming to terms.

However, the hawks main hope was for a US invasion. Until the
US invaded, Japan had no good way to kill Americans. However,
if the US fought Japan's 2 million man home army in Japan's
rugged terrain, Japan would kill plenty of Americans.


So, given this backdrop, lets look at some events:

POTSDAM PROCLAMATION:

The July 26 PP explicitly called for the "unconditional surrender
of the Japanese Armed Forces". The cabinet correctly interpreted
this as saying that the monarchy would not be eliminated. The
foreign office pressed for immediate acceptance. The Army
was unmoved. The SWC reached a consensus to do and say nothing.
(This was there most common approach to all problems).
Unfortunately, PM Suzuki said to reporters that the cabinet
would 'mokusatsu' the PP. This harsh language, which was a slip
from a well-meaning but senile dove, infuriated Togo because
he knew it would get a bad reaction from the US. How bad, he
couldn't imagine.

HIROSHIMA

Hiroshima was bombed on Aug 6. Nothing happened in Tokyo on
the 6th or 7th. On Aug 8, Hirohito informed PM Suzuki that
the war must be ended immediately. Suzuki was instructed to
call an immediate SWC meeting for that purpose, "but the
meeting had to be postponed because one of the members was
unavoidably detained by 'more pressing business' elsewhere."
[I, also, find this incredible, so I just quoted what JLD says]

RUSSIA

Russia declared war the afternoon of the 8th.

AUGUST 9

The doves woke up early this Thursday. Furious about the
meeting that had been blown off, leading to Russian entry, Togo
et al. managed to get an SWC meeting going by 10:30 AM.
Immediately, the SWC split into its two familiar factions
and started going over the familiar arguments. Halfway through
the meeting a message arrived saying that Nagasaki had been
bombed at 11:00 that morning. This changed no opinions.
The SWC meeting broke up at 1:00 PM with no decision having
been made.

That afternoon the arguments were repeated in a full cabinet
meeting lasting from 2:30 to 10:00 PM. The Home Minister
explicitly predicted that a coup would likely happen if the
government ordered surrender. The meeting had no result.

Suzuki then, after consultation with Hirohito, called a
SWC meeting for 11:50 PM, to be held _in the presence of the
emperor_, an unprecedented, although perfectly legal, procedure.

AUGUST 10

For two hours the SWC went over the same arguments it had been
arguing non-stop since mid-morning the day before. At 2:00 AM
Suzuki turned to Hirohito, saying "your decision is requested".
Hirohito said he supported Togo. He then left the room.

Suzuki then convened a cabinet meeting to prepare the formal
note of surrender. By 4:00 AM the note had been approved
by the cabinet and sent to the Foreign Office for translation
and transmission. The FO had one last trick. The cabinet had
demanded that the US respect "the powers of His Majesty".
The FO translated that to English reading "the prerogatives of
His Majesty." Since few hawks spoke English, they got away with
it.

Anami returned to the Army Ministry where he addressed senior
personnel and explained the developments. A young officer
demanded, "Is the Army Minister actually considering surrender?"
Anami silenced the officer by smashing the table with his
swagger stick. However, the young officers could still hope
that the Allies would reject the note and a coup would be
unnecessary.

The US delivered a massive bombing raid on Tokyo.

AUGUST 11

In Tokyo the leaders waited for the US reply. Anami made a
belligerent public proclamation. Young officers began drawing
up lists of doves to be killed.

AUGUST 12

The Byrnes reply came at 00:45. The FO diplomatically
mistranslated it as well, substituting "controlled by" for
Byrnes' "subject to" in the crucial phrase describing the
Hirohito's relation with MacArthur.

This was the signal to start the same arguments all over again.
There was now the added edge that the coup planning was in
full process. Anami hoped to use the threat of the coup to
prevent acceptance of the Byrnes note, but he also wanted to
make sure there was no actual coup.

AUGUST 14

The Allies dropped leaflets describing the exchange of notes.
This terrified the government. They were sure this would lead
to a coup. So by 10:00 AM the SWC and cabinet were assembled
for an Imperial Conference down in Hirohito's bunker. Hirohito
announced his decision to accept the Byrnes note. He asked the
cabinet to prepare an appropriate rescript for him to read to
the nation.

That afternoon Hirohito recorded the rescript

Anami forced the top Army officers to sign a statement of
loyalty. Anami was still consorting with the coup planners
but Umezu definitely decided he was against a coup.

That night Anami went to his house and committed sepukku.

The coup began with junior officers seizing the Imperial Guards
Division and the Imperial Palace. General Mori, commander of
the Guards, was murdered. Meanwhile, a series of assasinations
was attempted. PM Suzuki barely got out of his house alive before
soldiers came, searched it, and burned it in frustration. He went
into hiding at a friend's house.

AUGUST 15

Although the rebels had held the palace all night, the coup ran
out of steam in the morning. General Tanaka of the Eastern
District Army showed up at the palace. Hirohito and his
hosehold were safe. Most of the plotters killed themselves.

At 12 noon, Hirohitos voice read the rescript ending the war
on NHK.

Although sporadic mutinies contined for a few days, the
situation was stable when the US arrived. General Umezu signed
on the Missouri.

****************************************************************

John Ongtooguk ([email protected])

Note to Mouse--i have not once used the term interpret. If you're going to try to make a case about what i wrote, then don't try to make it based upon something which i did not write. I don't believe in the "interpretation" of history. History is not a foreign language which need be translated for the ignorant. I believe in ascertaining, as best one is able, the course of events, and the character of the people influencing events, and then offering one's own opinion. Having offered as faithful a description of said course of events and the characters of those involved as i am able, i fully expect that any reasonably intelligent person--which is to say, the great majority of the population--are as capable of coming up with an informed opinion as am i. If they filter their opinions through a politically partisan agenda, or their "social position," so much the worse for their understanding.

Revisionist did not in fact first arise with regard to the study of history. It was a term first applied to Socialists who were revising Marxist dialectic--most notably, Vladimir Ulyanov, known as Lenin. That term was only applied to historians much later by those who objected to denials of the holocaust in Germany in the Second World War. The term "court historian" was applied to historians by other (alleged) historians in the creation of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy thesis--those individuals only had the name revisionist applied to them retrospectively. So in fact, you have got it completely wrong. The Pearl Harbor conspiracy writers first applied the term court historian, just as you used it here, before anyone had even had the opportunity to have commented on what you'd written. These people only came to be known as revisionists long after they had attempted to do what you attempted to do--immunize themselves against criticism by condemning in advance any who might disagree with them, through the use of "court historian" as an epithet.

You preen yourself, apparently, on your knowledge of historiography. Yet you seem not to have done some basic work to find out the origin of the term court historian, nor that of revisionist as applied to (alleged) historians. Basic historiographical practice makes such homework necessary for those who would be taken seriously. I have less and less reason to take what you write seriously. Political and ideological "tugs-of-war" only take place between those who "interpret" history, and have an agenda to forward in the process. Those who do such things are propagandists, and they have poisoned their own wells of knowledge with the "history as tool" concept embodied in Marxist dialectic--one thing they assuredly are not is historians. I haven't denied that there might be an "official" version of events--i've just denied that such a thing constitutes history. Those who wish to forward their political agenda by issuing an "official version" of events are propagandists, not historians. Those who make it their business to forward their own agenda by denying such "official versions" are very likely to be engaged in the same sort of propagandizing. You have fun "interpreting" history for the ignorant masses. I intend to continue to work from the assumption that literate people are as capable as i am, and as you are, of coming to their own reasonable conclusions based on the available evidence.

If you can't take me seriously, then why have you continued to respond repeatedly?

As far as historiography, if it merely involved spitting out facts and dates then we wouldn't need to go through a painful process of the study of history and its cause and effect relationships and explaining the reasons for those events.

To think that history merely stands out in itself is a naïve assumption, and if that were so then we wouldn't have historians to begin with.

History is given meaning by man looking into the past and interpreting it as he was not a part of that past.

You mentioned "study of history" and "historical analysis" in your earlier post which I responded to. What do you suppose "historical analysis" and "study of history" entail, if not studying and interpreting the cause and effect relationships of events.

Any historian who claims that history is not based on interpretation is insulting the same profession he claims to represent.

Numbers, dates and events don't mean anything themselves. Only when they are put into a context, and the causal relationships are observed and the ramifications interpreted that we begin to understand history, which is, after all, a story that is being told.

And stories are told in a variety of ways based on different people and different interpretations. As I mentioned earlier, our knowledge and perception of the world is based on our own subjective experiences and thoughts.

Thus anyone who claims to be "objective" is expressing a great leap of faith. While we do live in an objective world, I believe we can never know that as all our experiences are subjective.

If you again claim history is not based on interpretation, then what do you suppose is it based on?

Analysis? What is analysis based on? The evidence? How do we analyze the evidence?

Individually, using our own subjective perceptions of the mind.

I apologize I cannot agree but as chaos theory suggests, this is a complex world and not everything is lowered to the common denominator.

You also chose not to address the point I raised about conspiracy, perhaps you thought it is marginal or childish and not worth your time as a "serious" historian, I do not know.

History is either accidental, or purposeful, i.e. conspiratorial.

The latter view is based on the premise of human action because man is rational. All action is planned as all action is the endpoint of all thought. Human action cannot exist without human thought. Hence humans plan and act purposefully.

History would be nothing with out human action, as there would be no one to set the gears in motion. So what I said is true if you approach it from this point of view. And the dropping of the A Bomb would certainly qualify as a planned and conspiratorial event, as it was a classified project. As Truman stated "Men make history and not the other way around."

Marxism is the antithesis of individual thought. I am very much a believer in the individual and the limits to which he/she can rise to. As far as what constitutes history, like I said before I will say it again, it is always been and always will be open to interpretation and argument as different people, different groups, will have different ideas and interpretations.

That you

There is no holy writ as to what constitutes history as different approaches and interpretations will get different results.

I like to think that it is always in a state of conflict and it never subsides. Disraeli once said you shouldn't read anything but biography, for that is life without theory. Thus theories are merely interpretations in a cloak. Anyone who has seriously studied history can testify to the amount of theories that are minced with the facts and events to weave together a narrative. Thus, if anything, all history is, is propaganda, as Gerald Ford said all history is bunk.

That you choose to think you are immune from exposing your subjective views to history, is understandable, but I disagree.

If you deny we are social beings, then you deny the humanity in man, as he cannot exist alone and independently of his social world.

Throughout the growth and upbringing of individuals, they are subjected to different families, cultures, schools, religions, countries, governments, institutions, philosophies and ideologies. To think that these leave no imprint on the thinking of an individual is short sighted in my opinion. To further think that historians are somehow impervious to extending their subjective views and experiences on interpreting history is even more so.

And I am not interpreting history for anyone but myself, as I am not a court historian, i.e. an official historian who interprets for the masses as you suggested.

>opinions are interesting, but facts are sacred.

>all we can ever do is build up a picture from what we know to be factual (in so far as truth can ever be known for certain).

>Now oralloy wrote

>"Before August 2nd, 1945, Japan wasn't willing to surrender at all."

>It might be unfair to pick out this one sentence and examine it, but in order for me to better understand the question under discussion, I would like to know is that statement true?

>July 24, 1945: "Japan seeking Soviet good offices to surrender." Ultra intercept, in PRO file HW.1/3784.

>July 25, 1945: "Japan seeking Soviet good offices to surrender." Ultra intercept, in PRO file HW.1/3785.

>from

>http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/Churchill/Japan_surrender_attempts/July_1945.html

>So was oralloys statement factually correct?