Was it a war crime when US nuked Hiroshima & Nagasaki?

The Japanese absolutely knew what an atom bomb was and were working on their own at the time:

http://www.reformation.org/atlanta-constitution.html

Aside from that, they knew what the B29 was prior to the fall of the Mariannas, and the B29 and the little 7-lb firebomb is what ruined Japan and torched 75 of her cities.

Thank you I'm sorry, I guess I spoke too soon. Since my time is limited, would you give your opinion on the matter- yes or no?

However, my point still stands. And the reasons you have listed do not alter, lessen, or address the topic.

Although it's plain to see from all my posts and my support of Truman's decision, the US atomic bombing of Japan was not a war crime by any stretch. When an aggressor nation starts a war without warning, and refuses to surrender when given the opportunity, there isn't much sense in arguing about why the bombing was a war crime.

"The Japanese absolutely knew what an atom bomb was and were working on their own at the time"

-gungasnake

Let me clarify, they (the Japanese) had no knowledge that the US had in its arsenal an atom bomb; thus, they could not have known that the US was preparing to use it on the civilian Japanese population.

But the main topic is still avoided by you. You seem to want to side-step it, and argue (via implication) that they (the Japanese) deserved what they got because they attacked Pearl or that the dropping of the bomb and the subsequent killing of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians was the fault of the Japanese government and NOT the fault of the people who actually dropped the bomb. That seems to me a very odd and partisan view of events.

Anyway, by that rational, crimes against humanity (in cases of war) could only be committed by the "aggressive" belligerent (i.e. the Japanese), and that it would have been impossible for the US to commit any war crimes because it was the respondent to a violent act of war.

I do not agree with that.

I'm not sure how reliable the information in the following link is, but give it a shot. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=5387&start=15

Those who were intrigued by Snell's fantasies (per gunga's link) will be positively enchanted by this:

Japan's Secret War: Japan's Race Against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb: Wilcox. Robt. K.
(New York, NY: Wm. Morrow & Co. Inc., 1985)

On the otherhand, for those who prefer history to histrionics, here's a small compendium of rather more credible, authoritative treatments from writers with real credentials:

The United States in World Affairs, 1945-47: Campbell. John C.
(New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1947),

Memoirs: Volumes I & II: Truman, Harry S.
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955)

I Was There: Leahy, Flt. Adml. William H.
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co.Inc., 1950)

On Active Service in Peace and War: Stimpson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge
(New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1948)

Science at War: Crowther, G. and Whiddinton, R., Editors
(London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948)

Memoirs of the Second World War Volumes I-VI: Churchill, Winston S.
(Cambridge, UK: The Riverside Press, 1959)

Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence: Lowenheim, F., Langley, H, and Jonas, M., Editors
(New York, NY: Saturday Review Press/E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975)

The Truman Administration: A Documentary History: Bernstein, Barton and Matusow, A., Editors
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966)


Article: "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946": Bernstein, Barton J.
Organization of American Historians Journal of American History, Vol 50, No. 4, March 1974
(Bloomington, In: University of Indiana Press)

Article: "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb": Stimson, Henry L.
Harpers, February 1947, reprinted in SIAS Review of International Affairs, No. 1330, Summer-Fall 1985
(Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press)

Article: "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy,1941-1945": Sherwin, Martin
American Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, October 1973
(Bloomington, In: University of Indiana Press)

Article: "The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender and the Potsdam Declaration": Villa, B. L.
The Journal of American History, Vol. 63, No. 1, June 1976
(Bloomington, In: University of Indiana Press)

I could go on and on, but I figure there's prolly little point to doin' so; no matter how much documentation and validated evidence is presented, some folks prefer crackpot ideas.

The ONE thing I can think of which might have justified the use of the two A bombs against Japan would be the possibility that Japan might have been anywhere close to lighting off an A bomb over Guam, Saipan, or Manilla.

How close to that Japan might have been was probably not knowable for American decision makers at the time. Germany had been very close and there might have been good reason to think that the Germans might have made efforts to put highly enriched uranium into the hands of the Japanese in 44 or 45.

According to some sources, the Germans may have been ahead of us in enrichment:

http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg08978.html

There were many crimes Japan committed besides Pearl Harbor.

The Bataan Death March

Nanking

The medical experiments.

etc.



I'll agree that the A-bombings were war crimes. But it was Japan's actions which made these war crimes the best option in our attempts to stop them.

And the war crimes that we committed while trying to stop Japan, pale when compared to the war crimes Japan was committing.

That was our fear during the war, but it turned out that Heisenberg had made an error in his calculations, and had concluded that an A-bomb couldn't be done.

Because of this miscalculation, Germany's nuclear program focused on power plants.

Timber Glad my contention is welcome. Here is some evidence to support it.

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html

extracts:-

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"This memo showed that the Japanese were offering surrender terms virtually identical to the ones ultimately accepted by the Americans at the formal surrender ceremony on September 2
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Chicago Tribune, August 19,1945

JAPS ASKED PEACE IN JAN. ENVOYS ON WAY -- TOKYO

Roosevelt Ignored M'Arthur Report On Nip Proposals

By Walter Trohan

Release of all censorship restrictions in the United States makes it possible to report that the first Japanese peace bid was relayed to the White House seven months ago.

Two days before the late President Roosevelt left the last week in January for the Yalta conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin he received a Japanese offer identical with the terms subsequently concluded by his successor, Harry S. Truman...

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The authenticity of the Trohan article was never challenged by the White House or the State Department, and for very good reason. After General MacArthur returned from Korea in 1951, his neighbor in the Waldorf Towers, former President Herbert Hoover, took the Trohan article to General MacArthur and the latter confirmed its accuracy in every detail and without qualification.

US officials also knew that the key obstacle to ending the war was American insistence on "unconditional surrender," a demand that precluded any negotiations

America's leaders understood Japan's desperate position: the Japanese were willing to end the war on any terms, as long as the Emperor was not molested. If the US leadership had not insisted on unconditional surrender -- that is, if they had made clear a willingness to permit the Emperor to remain in place -- the Japanese very likely would have surrendered immediately, thus saving many thousands of lives.

the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (issued in 1946) stated in its official report: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets because of their concentration of activities and population."

An editorial entitled "America's Atomic Atrocity" in the issue of August 29, 1945, told readers:

The atomic bomb was used at a time when Japan's navy was sunk, her air force virtually destroyed, her homeland surrounded, her supplies cut off, and our forces poised for the final stroke ... Our leaders seem not to have weighed the moral considerations involved. No sooner was the bomb ready than it was rushed to the front and dropped on two helpless cities ... The atomic bomb can fairly be said to have struck Christianity itself ... The churches of America must dissociate themselves and their faith from this inhuman and reckless act of the American Government.

Shortly after "V-J Day," the end of the Pacific war, Brig. General Bonnie Fellers summed up in a memo for General MacArthur: "Neither the atomic bombing nor the entry of the Soviet Union into the war forced Japan's unconditional surrender. She was defeated before either these events took place."

Navy Secretary James Forrestal termed the intercepted messages "real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war." "With the interception of these messages," notes historian Alperovitz (p. 177), "there could no longer be any real doubt as to the Japanese intentions; the maneuvers were overt and explicit and, most of all, official acts.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945 [the date of the planned American invasion], Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of US Army forces in the Pacific, stated on numerous occasions before his death that the atomic bomb was completely unnecessary from a military point of view: "My staff was unanimous in believing that Japan was on the point of collapse and surrender."

General Curtis LeMay, who had pioneered precision bombing of Germany and Japan (and who later headed the Strategic Air Command and served as Air Force chief of staff), put it most succinctly: "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war."

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The skilled players, FDR, Truman and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson tried out their new military "toy," as Barnes described the A-bomb, without a scintilla of justification.

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Seems clear to me the war was prolonged to enable the atomic experiments to take place, and as soon as the bombs were dropped the war ended. Also please note there were two experiments, the first with a uranium gun-type device, the second, on Nagasaki with a plutonium implosion weapon. No doubt if there were other types that needed proving, that would have been done before the war was finally declared over.

Not a pretty picture...

Just for big picture reference, Mr Weber's (currently embattled, and suspended-for-various-reasons) IHR project, as cited a bit earlier by Steve, is a leading proponent of Holocaust Denial. Interestingly, among its chief contributors, and a principal, is David Irving, who has his own set of assorted academic and legal embarrassments.

Still not a pretty picture. Granted hindsight is 20/20 but in Truman's position, and other than for the possible fear of the Japanese themselves acquiring an atom bomb, I'd have saved the two A bombs for future needs, told the Russians they'd already done enough dying and their help was not needed with Japan, and told the Japanese to call me when they got hungry.

Questioning the number of Jews killed in Europe has got nothing to do with questioning the necessity of dropping the Atom bombs on Japanese cities.

Not the point at all, Steve - I merely presented insight related to the credentials of a source cited by way of support for an argument I happen to dispute.



That, however, pretty much is the point. The decision-makers of the time acted in good faith and out of sense of duty based upon their best assessment of the then-available information.

More quotes to support my conjecture

from http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/20/043.html

Adm. William D. Leahy declined to support use of the bomb. In his book, I Was There (1950), Leahy says:

"it is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so did the people involved. However, the Chief Executive made the decision to use the bomb on two cities in Japan."

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Fred Halstead writes:-

Live targets

This "test" on Hiroshima and Nagasaki cost, by the conservative American estimates, 110,000 dead and as many injured; and, by Japanese estimates, twice that many. The evidence strongly indicates that one major motivation of the A-bomb decision was precisely to test the bomb on live targets, so as to confront the postwar world with the proven fact of overwhelming U.S. military superiority.

Quote, "It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project." This quote by Leahy is not totally true; many scientists who worked on the atomic bombs were also against it's use.

Had they done so, they would be "asking for" surrender terms, not "offering" them.

But "the Japanese" had not asked for any surrender terms at all at the time.

The first time the Japanese government asked for surrender terms was August 10, after Nagasaki.





He may have received such a letter from a Japanese person, but the letter was not from the Japanese or their government.





Even if we had been willing to extend a guarantee that the Emperor would retain sovereignty, the Japanese still would not have surrendered, because they were still focused on getting even more terms through the Soviets.

But we were never interested in giving them such a guarantee. Even after Japan did try to surrender with such a guarantee, we didn't let them. We were about a week away from nuking them again when Japan dropped their demand.





Given Japan's fixation on securing the Soviets as mediators, he was clearly mistaken, at least on the part about the Soviets.





Alperovitz is an anti-American propagandist, and is misrepresenting the facts.

The intercepted messages he refers to involved one faction of the Japanese government operating in secret. They were not the acts of the Japanese government. And they were covert, not overt.

That said, there were later intercepted messages (just before the A-bombs) that indicated that the Japanese government was interested in getting out of the war.

The trouble is, they were still not offering to accept our terms.





The survey was an Air Force propaganda piece designed to convince Congress that the only thing needed to win any war was bombers loaded with conventional weapons.

It was clearly incorrect on the issue of the Soviets.





The war was prolonged until the Potsdam Declaration because the Japanese government would not consider surrender in any form before that time.

The war was further prolonged until after Nagasaki because the Japanese government insisted on hearing back from the Soviets instead of trying to surrender to us.

The war was further prolonged until August 14 because the Japanese were not asking to surrender on acceptable terms before that.





The A-bombings had nothing to do with proving a weapon type. The weapon types had already been proven before they were used.

And there were other types that were pending in a few months.

The reason the war ended just short of the third A-bombing is because that was when the government of Japan contacted us to surrender.

The one making the offer of surrender to end the war does not need to "negotiate." It's called, "nonconditional."

It's somewhat like some contracts. The person or company making the offer is not required to accept "conditions" to his offer.