The necessary truth of any truth

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Why would the decision not to accept contradictions be an irrational decision? It seems to me to be a highly rational decision,

It is irrational just because you are "deciding" not to believe on something, like you decide not to believe in God, as if it were a personal affair or a matter of "taste": you chose not to believe in contradictions because you don't "like" them. But a contradiction arises from the nature of truth itself: Quito must be the capital of Ecuador for the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true. So you have a statement and a reality, and they are both different from each other (the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" is not the same as Quito actually being the capital of Ecuador) and identical to each other (the statement is true insofar as it is identical to Quito actually being the capital of Ecuador). This last identity is the true foundation of the identity principle, which erroneously denies the difference upon which it stands, a difference that constitutes one term of the contradiction.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

To say that a belief (or a statement, or a sentence, or a proposition; depending on what you think is the truth-bearer) is true is to say that there is a relation, and that one term of the relation is the truth-bearer (belief, if you like) and the other term of the relation is something not the belief (etc.) namely some fact, or some state of affairs in the world. So truth is the name of a dyadic relation between what is true, and a truth-maker, as I just said, a fact, or a state of affairs. Of course, just what that relation is requires more (a lot more) specification. Philosophers often call that relation, "correspondence" and so, that vies of truth is called the "correspondence theory" of truth.

That relation is, on one side, a difference: the truth-bearer is different from the truth-maker. However, nothing can be a truth-bearer by being just different from a truth-maker, otherwise truth vanishes entirely. So that relation is, on the other side, an identity: the truth-bearer is identical to the truth-maker, which is its only way of “bearing” the truth. Philosophers have tried in vain to express this transparency of the truth-bearer, by which it lets the truth-maker pass through it as if the were simply not there. Despite all their efforts, they keep failing, just because they keep denying true identity. They search for a magic word capable of describing the identity between the truth-bearer and its truth-maker without accepting their identity. It is time to admit that, instead of a “correspondence,” what we have here is a contradiction between difference and identity: the relation between a truth-bearer and its truth-maker is a relation in which difference depends on identity and vice-versa.

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

So would it be appropriate to think of 'truth' as a kind of interface between a true belief and an actual state of affairs? A kind of bipolar abstract object linking the two, such that when its subjective 'belief' pole is in the 'on' position (i.e. registering 'true') its objective 'state of affairs' pole is also in the 'on' position (registering 'actual'), and vice versa? When one pole is 'on', the other is automatically also 'on', but nevertheless the two poles are distinct?

Or is that too fanciful an analogy?

Maybe your metaphor is a little fancy, but you are getting it quite right. Marx also used this "poles" metaphor to talk about exchange value versus use value, so why couldn't you? The fact that you arrive at such a metaphor shows that you got it. You capture both aspects of truth with your metaphor:

1) Truth is a whole, so trying to isolate subjective and objective truth from each other is useless: subjective truth makes as much sense isolated from objective truth than objective truth does isolated from it.
2) Although they do not exist without each other, they are also irreducible to each other: whenever we try to reduce either one to the other we miss the wholeness of truth.

As long as physicists do not find a magnetic monopole (which they are seeking now for a long time) - and perhaps even if they do, given the rarity of that - your metaphor will still be valid. The only correction I could make to what you said is about this whole truth being an "abstract object." In fact, a whole truth is neither abstract nor concrete, or it is both: it is precisely the link between abstract and concrete. We have been talking about subjective versus objective truth, but we could equally talk about abstract versus concrete truth, or about ideal versus material truth - it would be all the same. Which is why my general assertion is that " if any truth were untrue, then it would not be a truth: every truth must be true." It is neither strictly necessary to qualify truth as abstract, ideal, or subjective, nor its being true as concrete, material, or objective, although there is nothing wrong in saying that. However, we must extract all consequences of this understanding: it all means that truth holds within itself a contradiction between difference and identity. It is precisely that contradiction that classical logic tries to get rid of all the time. Truth is at once different from and identical to itself, this is its "polarity" as you would put it. It is this contradiction that we must explore to understand what the heck is truth: the necessary truth of any truth is just the beginning (no matter how difficult).

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

To say that a belief (or a statement, or a sentence, or a proposition; depending on what you think is the truth-bearer) is true is to say that there is a relation, and that one term of the relation is the truth-bearer (belief, if you like) and the other term of the relation is something not the belief (etc.) namely some fact, or some state of affairs in the world. So truth is the name of a dyadic relation between what is true, and a truth-maker, as I just said, a fact, or a state of affairs. Of course, just what that relation is requires more (a lot more) specification. Philosophers often call that relation, "correspondence" and so, that vies of truth is called the "correspondence theory" of truth.

The problem of this "correspondence" theory is that it usually tries to reduce both the truth-bearer and the fact that makes it true to objects: its concept of necessity is external and an unary operator that applies to whatever is true as a property. The very idea of a "correspondence" already betrays that you are objectifying both sides. What I am telling you is something different: although there is "a truth," on one side, and its "being true," on the other side, there is no "correspondence" between them, but rather one side (a truth) needs the other (its being true): instead of "correspondence," I talk about necessity. Once you see this, you realize that what we need is not to specify this necessity (which by the way admits no further specification), but reflexively follow the contradiction it implies.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
To say that a belief (or a statement, or a sentence, or a proposition; depending on what you think is the truth-bearer) is true is to say that there is a relation, and that one term of the relation is the truth-bearer (belief, if you like) and the other term of the relation is something not the belief (etc.) namely some fact, or some state of affairs in the world. So truth is the name of a dyadic relation between what is true, and a truth-maker, as I just said, a fact, or a state of affairs. Of course, just what that relation is requires more (a lot more) specification. Philosophers often call that relation, "correspondence" and so, that vies of truth is called the "correspondence theory" of truth.

The problem of this "correspondence" theory is that it usually tries to reduce both the truth-bearer and the fact that makes it true to objects: its concept of necessity is external and an unary operator that applies to whatever is true as a property. The very idea of a "correspondence" already betrays that you are objectifying both sides. What I am telling you is something different: although there is "a truth," on one side, and its "being true," on the other side, there is no "correspondence" between them, but rather one side (a truth) needs the other (its being true): instead of "correspondence," I talk about necessity. Once you see this, you realize that what we need is not to specify this necessity (which by the way admits no further specification), but reflexively follow the contradiction it implies.

If that is the only problem with the correspondence theory, I'll live with it. Whatever it is.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

If that is the only problem with the correspondence theory, I'll live with it. Whatever it is.

This little problem simply means that this theory is wrong. Sure you can live with a wrong theory. What you cannot do is to defend it once you know it is flawed. And it is even worse if you give up on searching for the right one, that is, for the truth.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

When I say that "every truth must be true," what exactly am I saying? First, I am referring to a "truth," which means a truth-bearer, but a truth-bearer insofar as it is true, that is, a truth-bearer taken in the context of its relation to its truth-maker. Although we can take a truth-bearer in isolation from its truth-maker - as if it could exist on its own - this is an illusion: a truth-bearer without its truth-maker is no longer a "truth." Hence the "pole" metaphor: a "truth" is the truth-bearer "pole" in the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Then, I say that such a truth "must be true," by which I refer to its truth-maker, but insofar as it can make a truth-bearer true, that is, insofar as it can be the truth-maker "pole" of the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Somehow each one of these "poles" refers to the whole truth, since each one must carry the other within itself: the truth-bearer contains the truth-maker by depending on its actuality, while the truth-maker contains the truth-bearer by depending on its possibility. Hence, for being the same as the truth-maker, the truth-bearer becomes more than possible - despite remaining less than actual - and for being the same as the truth-bearer, the truth-maker becomes less than actual - despite remaining more than possible. Finally, since being more than possible but less than actual is the very definition of being necessary, by being each other the truth-bearer and its truth-maker become the necessary truth of any truth.

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

being more than possible but less than actual is the very definition of being necessary

Sorry, I don't understand what you mean here. Less than actual?

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Why would the decision not to accept contradictions be an irrational decision? It seems to me to be a highly rational decision,

It is irrational just because you are "deciding" not to believe on something, like you decide not to believe in God, as if it were a personal affair or a matter of "taste": you chose not to believe in contradictions because you don't "like" them. But a contradiction arises from the nature of truth itself: Quito must be the capital of Ecuador for the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" to be true. So you have a statement and a reality, and they are both different from each other (the statement "Quito is the capital of Ecuador" is not the same as Quito actually being the capital of Ecuador) and identical to each other (the statement is true insofar as it is identical to Quito actually being the capital of Ecuador). This last identity is the true foundation of the identity principle, which erroneously denies the difference upon which it stands, a difference that constitutes one term of the contradiction.

But I have very good reasons for rejecting contradictions. You make it sound as if the rejection of contradictions was an arbitrary decision, or a matter of taste. Wherever would you have got such an idea?

2 Replies

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
If that is the only problem with the correspondence theory, I'll live with it. Whatever it is.

This little problem simply means that this theory is wrong. Sure you can live with a wrong theory. What you cannot do is to defend it once you know it is flawed. And it is even worse if you give up on searching for the right one, that is, for the truth.

Well, since I have no clue what the problem is (since the language in which you pose it is your own version of philosophese, a language I do not understand) I suppose I will just have to live with the correspondence theory until an objection in plain English (a language I do understand) is made.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Well, since I have no clue what the problem is (since the language in which you pose it is your own version of philosophese, a language I do not understand) I suppose I will just have to live with the correspondence theory until an objection in plain English (a language I do understand) is made.

Ok, so help me then. Did you read my post #4,170,634? I believe I made myself clear enough in it, so please tell me what you did understand of it. Is that fair enough?

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@guigus,

guigus wrote:

When I say that "every truth must be true," what exactly am I saying? First, I am referring to a "truth," which means a truth-bearer, but a truth-bearer insofar as it is true, that is, a truth-bearer taken in the context of its relation to its truth-maker. Although we can take a truth-bearer in isolation from its truth-maker - as if it could exist on its own - this is an illusion: a truth-bearer without its truth-maker is no longer a "truth." Hence the "pole" metaphor: a "truth" is the truth-bearer "pole" in the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Then, I say that such a truth "must be true," by which I refer to its truth-maker, but insofar as it can make a truth-bearer true, that is, insofar as it can be the truth-maker "pole" of the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Somehow each one of these "poles" refers to the whole truth, since each one must carry the other within itself: the truth-bearer contains the truth-maker by depending on its actuality, while the truth-maker contains the truth-bearer by depending on its possibility. Hence, for being the same as the truth-maker, the truth-bearer becomes more than possible - despite remaining less than actual - and for being the same as the truth-bearer, the truth-maker becomes less than actual - despite remaining more than possible. Finally, since being more than possible but less than actual is the very definition of being necessary, by being each other the truth-bearer and its truth-maker become the necessary truth of any truth.

Truth-bearers and truth-makers don't contain each other. Truth-makers are facts which exist "out there" in the world independently of their truth-bearers. Truth-bearers also don't have to be true. The proposition "it is raining inside my house" is a truth-bearer but it is also false.

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@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

guigus wrote:

When I say that "every truth must be true," what exactly am I saying? First, I am referring to a "truth," which means a truth-bearer, but a truth-bearer insofar as it is true, that is, a truth-bearer taken in the context of its relation to its truth-maker. Although we can take a truth-bearer in isolation from its truth-maker - as if it could exist on its own - this is an illusion: a truth-bearer without its truth-maker is no longer a "truth." Hence the "pole" metaphor: a "truth" is the truth-bearer "pole" in the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Then, I say that such a truth "must be true," by which I refer to its truth-maker, but insofar as it can make a truth-bearer true, that is, insofar as it can be the truth-maker "pole" of the "dipole" truth-bearer/truth-maker. Somehow each one of these "poles" refers to the whole truth, since each one must carry the other within itself: the truth-bearer contains the truth-maker by depending on its actuality, while the truth-maker contains the truth-bearer by depending on its possibility. Hence, for being the same as the truth-maker, the truth-bearer becomes more than possible - despite remaining less than actual - and for being the same as the truth-bearer, the truth-maker becomes less than actual - despite remaining more than possible. Finally, since being more than possible but less than actual is the very definition of being necessary, by being each other the truth-bearer and its truth-maker become the necessary truth of any truth.

Truth-bearers and truth-makers don't contain each other. Truth-makers are facts which exist "out there" in the world independently of their truth-bearers. Truth-bearers also don't have to be true. The proposition "it is raining inside my house" is a truth-bearer but it is also false.

Hmmm. Is that what he was saying? How could you tell?

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

Truth-bearers and truth-makers don't contain each other. Truth-makers are facts which exist "out there" in the world independently of their truth-bearers. Truth-bearers also don't have to be true. The proposition "it is raining inside my house" is a truth-bearer but it is also false.

I must remember you I am talking about a truth-bearer insofar as it is true, or in the context of its relation to its truth-maker. I took the care to stress from the beginning that:

Quote:

Although we can take a truth-bearer in isolation from its truth-maker - as if it could exist on its own - this is an illusion: a truth-bearer without its truth-maker is no longer a "truth."

That is, "it is raining inside my house" is not a "truth" when it is not actually raining inside my house. If you keep ignoring what I say, you will never understand it.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Hmmm. Is that what he was saying? How could you tell?

One starts by asserting that "truth-bearers and truth-makers don't contain each other," and to support this he says that "truth-makers are facts which exist 'out there' in the world independently of their truth-bearers." Unfortunately, a truth-maker that has no possible truth-bearer can make no truth, hence ceases to be a truth-maker. Which is why I said that "the truth-maker contains the truth-bearer by depending on its possibility." Finally, one says that "truth-bearers also don't have to be true." Once again, if you are talking about truth-bearers, that is, whatever is a "truth," then you are talking about something that must be true. A truth-bearer considered as not being made true by its truth-maker is as an absurdity as big as a truth-maker that cannot make any truth-bearer true.

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@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper wrote:

Truth-makers are facts which exist "out there" in the world independently of their truth-bearers. Truth-bearers also don't have to be true. The proposition "it is raining inside my house" is a truth-bearer but it is also false.

Try concentrating on the very moment in which a truth is true, and in that precise moment, consider its truth-bearer and its truth-maker, and you will see the relation between them as a contradiction between difference and identity. At any other moment (than that in which a truth is true), its truth-bearer and its truth-maker become nothing more than fictions.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:
Truth-makers are facts which exist "out there" in the world independently of their truth-bearers. Truth-bearers also don't have to be true. The proposition "it is raining inside my house" is a truth-bearer but it is also false.

Try concentrating on the very moment in which a truth is true

No need, all truths are true. That is a tautology. So, you needn't worry about it.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

That is, "it is raining inside my house" is not a "truth" when it is not actually raining inside my house.

Well, who would disagree with that? If it's not raining inside my house, the proposition "It is raining inside my house" is not true.

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the necessary truth of any truth , comes in two fundamental perspectives

first , is whether it matters that we exist or not , ........to the Universe

second is whether we can understand the truth of implications of my above statement

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@north,

north wrote:

the necessary truth of any truth , comes in two fundamental perspectives

first , is whether it matters that we exist or not , ........to the Universe

second is whether we can understand the truth of implications of my above statement

It does? I never even thought of that. Actually, I have come to the conclusion that the Universe hardly ever thinks about me. And to tell you the truth, I return the favor.

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The necessary truth of any truth

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