guigus wrote:Is "bats have wings" and instance of the principle of identity? How is that?
No, but it is an example of a contingent truth. You know, the sorts of truth people think you're claiming do not exist.
guigus wrote:What I mean is "necessarily, all truths are true" or "all truths are necessarily true," which are the same to me, and not "all truths are necessary," which would be a form of determinism.
This is the problem. You're not understanding why "necessarily, all truths are true" and "all truths are necessarily true" are not identical. They are not identical because the different positions of the modal operator, "necessary", change the meaning of the sentence.
The first sentence, "necessarily, all truths are true" is tautologous, and Swartz calls the necessity in this first sentence "relative" necessity, and what he means by this is that the necessary condition in that sentence is, the truth is true. Given that condition, the truth is true! And that's all that sentence means. The second sentence, "all truths are necessarily true", however, means, as you say, "all truths are necessary". It means that contingent truths do not exist, and that every truth is a necessary truth. And this is false.
The problem seems to be
not that you believe that all truths are necessary, but that you cannot understand the difference between these two sentences. I have no clue how the discussion got this out of control, especially if this is the only issue. There's no need to talk about possible fathers, actual fathers, fat fathers, thin fathers, or sex with fathers.