The necessary truth of any truth

ughaibu wrote:

1) if Kennethamy isn't necessarily mortal, then he is possibly immortal
2) take the case in which Kennethamy is immortal in all worlds other than the actual world
3) lacking a reason to limit possible worlds to a countable infinity, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero.

what is relevant is this: it does not follow from: (1) Necessarily, if p then q, that (2) Necessarily q.

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

1) if Kennethamy isn't necessarily mortal, then he is possibly immortal
2) take the case in which Kennethamy is immortal in all worlds other than the actual world
3) lacking a reason to limit possible worlds to a countable infinity, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero.

what is relevant is this: it does not follow from: (1) Necessarily, if p then q, that (2) Necessarily q.

How is that relevant?

The priciple of identity: "A is A" holds even when "A happens to be A" instead of "A must be A". Do you recognize this?

Every truth either happens to be true or must be true but it's a mistake to claim that all truths are exclusively in a single category.

Here's the point your reasoning fails:

(c) If something is identical to itself - A is A - then it cannot be different from itself, since nothing can be different from itself while being identical to itself.

Because this is false. A is A means that it doesn't happen to be different from itself since if it were it would not be A. There's nothing necessary there.

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Let me say something a bit less vulgar about "it happens"...there is nothing more necessary then it. Is self NECESSARY!
( if not to be caused thats what FACTS are! )

I'm not convinced of that and I don't think there's any logic behind it. From what I can see, all physical states of affairs are contingent, that is, there's nothing necessary about the existence of the universe, the rising of the sun or the orbits of electrons. There could be absolutely nothing at all but by chance, there isn't. There is something. The only things that are necessary are those things that are logically necessary such as "all bachelors being unmarried men".

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

The only things that are necessary are those things that are logically necessary such as "all bachelors being unmarried men".

But what does this mean? As far as I can see, all it means is that a thing can only be said to be that which it is said to be, and that appears to be a trivial observation.

It can be said that all sound deductive arguments are trivial.

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Sure it's trivial but it's still useful since it makes explicit that which was once only implicit.

ughaibu wrote:

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Okay. Does this mean that Socrates "is" necessarily mortal?

No.

So the conclusion of the argument should be something like "Socrates is mortal but might not be"?

Might means if, but if does not apply does it?

If Socrates isn't necessarily mortal, then there is a possible world in which Socrates is not mortal. Those who support the idea of necessity seem to be faced with a choice; either hold the position that Socrates is possibly immortal, in which case the cliched syllogism seems a little silly, or forget about claiming that some species of nebulous appeal to contingency accounts for questions of fallibilism, regularist laws, etc.

Why is the syllogism, all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, so Socrates is mortal silly if it is possible that Socrates is immortal. The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth. You seem to be committing the modal fallacy too. It does not follow from the fact that the proposition that Socrates is moral necessarily follow from the premise, that the conclusion itself is a necessary truth. In other words:

Necessarily, if all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal which is true, does not entail that necessarily Socrates is mortal. It could not, since the first (conditional) proposition is true, and the second proposition is false, and a true proposition cannot entail a false proposition.

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

As a matter of form, are you confirming the conclusion that Socrates is mortal but might not be?

I don't know what you are asking.

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

As a matter of form, are you confirming the conclusion that Socrates is mortal but might not be?

I don't know what you are asking. But as a matter of fact, since Socrates is dead, he was mortal, but since the proposition, "Socrates exists" is a contingent proposition as all propositions that imply existence are, and all true contingent propositions might not be true, therefore, the proposition that Socrates exists might not be true. But what is relevant is that although the proposition, if all men are mortal, and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth, it does not follow from that, that the proposition Socrates is mortal is (itself) a necessary truth. To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

As a matter of form, are you confirming the conclusion that Socrates is mortal but might not be?

I don't know what you are asking. But as a matter of fact, since Socrates is dead, he was mortal, but since the proposition, "Socrates exists" is a contingent proposition as all propositions that imply existence are, and all true contingent propositions might not be true, therefore, the proposition that Socrates exists might not be true. But what is relevant is that although the proposition, if all men are mortal, and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth, it does not follow from that, that the proposition Socrates is mortal is (itself) a necessary truth. To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

Tell me, what would be for something to be necessarily true "in itself"? Doesn't necessity always need something in relation to which something else becomes necessary? How could poor Socrates be necessarily mortal "in himself," and not in relation to his human condition, to his physiology, to the physical world, and so on? How could his mortality be an absolute necessity? Weren't you the one to say that existence in itself is contingent?

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

As a matter of form, are you confirming the conclusion that Socrates is mortal but might not be?

I don't know what you are asking.

He's asking if you agree that Socrates is mortal but might not be.

Night Ripper wrote:

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Let me say something a bit less vulgar about "it happens"...there is nothing more necessary then it. Is self NECESSARY!
( if not to be caused thats what FACTS are! )

I'm not convinced of that and I don't think there's any logic behind it. From what I can see, all physical states of affairs are contingent, that is, there's nothing necessary about the existence of the universe, the rising of the sun or the orbits of electrons. There could be absolutely nothing at all but by chance, there isn't. There is something. The only things that are necessary are those things that are logically necessary such as "all bachelors being unmarried men".

And a false truth is like an unmarried bachelor, so every truth must be true.

the proposition that Socrates is mortal is a contingent, not a necessary, truth.

kennethamy wrote:

the proposition that Socrates is mortal is a contingent, not a necessary, truth.

In other words, there is some world where Socrates is immortal, so, in that world the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is false, despite the fact that it follows from the preceding premises exactly as it does in a world in which it is true. In fact:
1) all living men are mortal
2) ughaibu is a living man
3) ughaibu is either mortal or immortal.

kennethamy wrote:

the proposition that Socrates is mortal is a contingent, not a necessary, truth.

In other words, there is some world where Socrates is immortal, so, in that world the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is false, despite the fact that it follows from the preceding premises exactly as it does in a world in which it is true. In fact:
1) all living men are mortal
2) ughaibu is a living man
3) ughaibu is either mortal or immortal.

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

the proposition that Socrates is mortal is a contingent, not a necessary, truth.

In other words, there is some world where Socrates is immortal, so, in that world the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is false, despite the fact that it follows from the preceding premises exactly as it does in a world in which it is true. In fact:
1) all living men are mortal
2) ughaibu is a living man
3) ughaibu is either mortal or immortal.

What does it matter that in some possible world it is false that Socrates in mortal?

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

the proposition that Socrates is mortal is a contingent, not a necessary, truth.

In other words, there is some world where Socrates is immortal, so, in that world the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is false, despite the fact that it follows from the preceding premises exactly as it does in a world in which it is true. In fact:
1) all living men are mortal
2) ughaibu is a living man
3) ughaibu is either mortal or immortal.

What does it matter that in some possible world it is false that Socrates in mortal?

If the conclusion of the argument is that Socrates is mortal and possibly not mortal, then there is a possible world in which the argument is correct and Socrates isn't mortal.

that is not the conclusion of the argument

kennethamy wrote:

that is not the conclusion of the argument

Okay, then you do not accept that the conclusion of the argument is that Socrates is mortal but might not be. So, what are you saying that is relevant to my post addressed to Night Ripper?

Why should I?