The necessary truth of any truth

No, you're wrong. These are two different words with two different meanings, "must" and "is". The word "must" implies necessity but "is" implies actuality. To conflate the two means that you are ignoring contingency. Some truths are contingent and others are necessary. Please come up with some kind of argument that doesn't rest on this ambiguity.

You need to acknowledge the difference between "happens to be" and "must be". A is A because it happens to be A or it because it must be A. A is A doesn't imply either all by itself.

No, you're wrong. These are two different words with two different meanings, "must" and "is".

The word "must" implies necessity but "is" implies actuality.

To conflate the two means that you are ignoring contingency.

Some truths are contingent and others are necessary.

Please come up with some kind of argument that doesn't rest on this ambiguity.

You need to acknowledge the difference between "happens to be" and "must be".

A is A because it happens to be A or it because it must be A. A is A doesn't imply either all by itself.

Let me say something a bit less vulgar about "it happens"...there is nothing more necessary then it. Is self NECESSARY!
( if not to be caused thats what FACTS are! )

The only things that are necessary are those things that are logically necessary such as "all bachelors being unmarried men".

Night Ripper wrote:

The only things that are necessary are those things that are logically necessary such as "all bachelors being unmarried men".

But what does this mean? As far as I can see, all it means is that a thing can only be said to be that which it is said to be, and that appears to be a trivial observation.

It can be said that all sound deductive arguments are trivial.

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Sure it's trivial but it's still useful since it makes explicit that which was once only implicit.

Night Ripper wrote:

It can be said that all sound deductive arguments are trivial.

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Sure it's trivial but it's still useful since it makes explicit that which was once only implicit.

Okay. Does this mean that Socrates "is" necessarily mortal?

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

It can be said that all sound deductive arguments are trivial.
1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.
Sure it's trivial but it's still useful since it makes explicit that which was once only implicit.

Okay. Does this mean that Socrates "is" necessarily mortal?

No.

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Okay. Does this mean that Socrates "is" necessarily mortal?

No.

So the conclusion of the argument should be something like "Socrates is mortal but might not be"?

Might means if, but if does not apply does it?

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Night Ripper wrote:

1. All men are mortals.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Okay. Does this mean that Socrates "is" necessarily mortal?

No.

So the conclusion of the argument should be something like "Socrates is mortal but might not be"?

Might means if, but if does not apply does it?

If Socrates isn't necessarily mortal, then there is a possible world in which Socrates is not mortal. Those who support the idea of necessity seem to be faced with a choice; either hold the position that Socrates is possibly immortal, in which case the cliched syllogism seems a little silly, or forget about claiming that some species of nebulous appeal to contingency accounts for questions of fallibilism, regularist laws, etc.

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

kennethamy wrote:

The conclusion of the syllogism is not that Socrates is mortal is a necessary truth.

As a matter of form, are you confirming the conclusion that Socrates is mortal but might not be?

I don't know what you are asking. . . . . To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

kennethamy wrote:

I don't know what you are asking. . . . . To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

1) to be mortal is to be subject to death
2) Socrates is dead
3) those who are dead aren't subject to death
4) therefore Socrates isn't mortal
5) all men are mortal
6) Socrates isn't mortal
7) therefore Socrates isn't a man.
Obviously the argument, as it stands, is nonsense. So, let's take a different case:
1) all living men are mortal
2) Kennethamy is a man
3) therefore Kennethamy is mortal.
There are, under classical logics, two possibilities, either Kennethamy is necessarily mortal or Kennethamy is not necessarily mortal. I assume that it's at least established that Kennethamy is possibly mortal.
1) if Kennethamy isn't necessarily mortal, then he is possibly immortal
2) take the case in which Kennethamy is immortal in all worlds other than the actual world
3) lacking a reason to limit possible worlds to a countable infinity, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero.

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

I don't know what you are asking. . . . . To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

1) to be mortal is to be subject to death
2) Socrates is dead
3) those who are dead aren't subject to death
4) therefore Socrates isn't mortal
5) all men are mortal
6) Socrates isn't mortal
7) therefore Socrates isn't a man.
Obviously the argument, as it stands, is nonsense. So, let's take a different case:
1) all living men are mortal
2) Kennethamy is a man
3) therefore Kennethamy is mortal.
There are, under classical logics, two possibilities, either Kennethamy is necessarily mortal or Kennethamy is not necessarily mortal. I assume that it's at least established that Kennethamy is possibly mortal.
1) if Kennethamy isn't necessarily mortal, then he is possibly immortal
2) take the case in which Kennethamy is immortal in all worlds other than the actual world
3) lacking a reason to limit possible worlds to a countable infinity, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero.

Sorry. As the patron King said to Mozart in Amadeus about one of his compositions, too many notes. Could you please get it down to an argument I don't have to spend a couple of hours on? You have so much time in the East. We are busy Westerners. However, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero: from your mouth to God's ears.

kennethamy wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

I don't know what you are asking. . . . . To think it does follow is to commit the modal fallacy.

1) to be mortal is to be subject to death
2) Socrates is dead
3) those who are dead aren't subject to death
4) therefore Socrates isn't mortal
5) all men are mortal
6) Socrates isn't mortal
7) therefore Socrates isn't a man.
Obviously the argument, as it stands, is nonsense. So, let's take a different case:
1) all living men are mortal
2) Kennethamy is a man
3) therefore Kennethamy is mortal.
There are, under classical logics, two possibilities, either Kennethamy is necessarily mortal or Kennethamy is not necessarily mortal. I assume that it's at least established that Kennethamy is possibly mortal.
1) if Kennethamy isn't necessarily mortal, then he is possibly immortal
2) take the case in which Kennethamy is immortal in all worlds other than the actual world
3) lacking a reason to limit possible worlds to a countable infinity, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero.

Sorry. As the patron King said to Mozart in Amadeus about one of his compositions, too many notes. Could you please get it down to an argument I don't have to spend a couple of hours on? You have so much time in the East. We are busy Westerners. However, the probability of Kennethamy being mortal is zero: from your mouth to God's ears.

If you dont understand, then you can observe from the sidelines. You dont have to post on every thread, stick within your field of expertise.