From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@KaseiJin,

This issue is much misunderstood in western thought, where monism is treated as an alternative to dualism as if these two views exhaust the possibilities.

One way to think about it is to consider Kant and Hegel's claim that both the universe and the intellect require a ground that is not an instance of any category. If the universe is one then it is an instance of category, and thus monism would not be fundamental. Or, by reference to the One-Many problem. If the universe is One it cannot be Many. But mysticism says it is both One and Many, to put it clumsily, and this is only possible if these are both incorrect views and if the truth lies deeper than this. For Kant and Hegel the One-Many distinction must be overcome or 'sublated' for the truth. This idea is difficult to understand but it is consistent with our inability to make either dualism of monism work.

It may be better to think of mysticism as monism than as dualism but it is actually nondualism, which is neither. Hence the Sufi sage Al-Halaj warns that we cannot testify that God is One, since this would entail setting up another alongside Him, namely the individual who testifies. Bradley, who argues for the same view, which is his Absolute Idealism, warns that we cannot call the universe a unity if we mean it is One, but must use the term unity a different meaning.

Is that any help? I doubt it. I should brush up on this topic.

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@paulhanke,

I did spend at least some amount of time deliberating whether to do this here or by PM (as it might possibly be distractive in nature) and am doing it here. I'll take just the chronological flow on this thread alone, in this case (even though there'll naturally be a degree of bleeding from other threads in the past--we can't avoid it all)

In building towards a definition/description of consciousness for the purpose of this thread, I made four primary posts as a 'follow-through' whole; which can be linked for inspection as post number one, post number sixty, post number one hundred one, and post number one hundred three.

It was towards my last post in that line, Paul, that you raised an objection in your one hundred four. In that objection, you quoted the following line (in bold) within this context:

[indent]

KaseiJin;99780 wrote:

For the level of conscious brain activity we can call consciousness, therefore, it can very well be stated that mental acknowledgment is essential. If the nerve fibers leading from the right foot are cut, the tack that we just stepped on will lead to little result. With eyes fully intact, extremely little, if any at all, vision will be created with the visual cortex is fully disabled. This also carries across to memory recall (even with inattended factors playing possible roles in certain functions or results of a state of consciousness) in that it is acknowledging content held in the synaptic structure of brain tissue. It would be responsible for self-detection, self-recognition, theory of mind (TOM), as well as that autobiographical self.

Mental acknowledgment, in turn, has its roots in the basic operation of certain brain structures. Certain damage to the agmydala will leave one unable to mentally acknowledge fear from other faces, for example, or damage to a certain association area of the parietal cortex causes sensory neglect. The genetical aspect of the 'hard wired' elements of brain build also play a role.

In short then, we need sensory input and its acknowledgment upon which and by which object/event memory is formed, which is at the core of self-autobiographical content. All of this very much appears to require integration of systems and brain areas which means a certain level of conscious (as described above). To have consciousness, therefore, is to have the condition of conscious above a certain level of brain tissue activity, with degree of conscious descending as brain tissue is redistributed or removed, with the total lack of conscious (death) being the final outcome of full removal. What we continually see here, is that brain is a requirement for consciousness--by definition/description !!

[/indent]

In that objection, your posed the following:

[indent]

paulhanke;99999 wrote:

if I'm reading this right this particular argument seems to be a little off ... are you saying that a child that has had half their brain removed as a last-resort treatment for epilepsy is only "half conscious"? ... that people with bigger brains are "more conscious" than people with smaller brains? ...

[/indent]

In that you have expressedly stated that the particular thought seemed to be inaccurate, or incorrect (as we would most likely take the 'being off' terminology to signify), your question can very possibly be seen not as a natural question (request for information), but rather quite likely as leverage for your objection. This is so because nowhere in my presentation have I either expressedly stated, or paraphrased, such a thing. Then, Paul, as you had chosen those two particular points, we can but only reason that you would have had some concept in mind, with which you thinkably might have been posed to make the particular objection made. (otherwise, the leverage would have been empty, and the objection groundless)

It is most obviously the case that having read my presentation, you developed a vizualized concept within your mind, which concept led you to consider that I might have been promoting the understanding which involved within, those two questions you had used in your objection, had been implied, inferred, or following. What such would usually, automatically, entail, is that in the mind of the questioner, there will have already been formulated a concept of how the answer demanded by that same concept held by the questioner, would demonstrate that the concept the other party had been espousing--as held to be by the questioner--would be inaccurate, incorrect, or off.

Therefore for me to better be able to understand where you had been coming from, it would be good to be able to see the concept you had had in mind before having posed your question. That would best be answered by your firstly telling me what the questions asked, mean to you. So, it would surely mean something to you, to say 'that a child that had had half their brain removed would be half conscious.' What would that be? (is the question) [this posed question came from your conceptualized understanding of what I had been presenting, and not necessarily from my actually presentation, thus it has room for explanation] Likewise, it would surely mean something to you, to say that 'people with bigger brains are more conscious.' What would that be? (is the question)

If you were to go back and read the way I expressed my desire for asking, in my #112, second paragraph, I think you'd understand that my objective here is to try to be able to see just how it is that the concept you got, from my presentation thus far, was not in line with the concept being presented.

I have spent about an hour now, just trying to weigh out whether this post would serve towards any more positive-in-outcome result . . . perhaps too sleepy to really work it out...so'll go ahead and post it. The essence is, Paul, that you most likely would not have asked those particular questions if you had not had some concept in mind firstly. . . I'm trying to pick your brain to pull that out and take a look at it.

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@KaseiJin,

Paul - Here's Francis Bradley on the topic, from Appearance and Reality. Dualism would be false, and also any simple monism.

Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity. To suppose the universe plural is therefore to contradict oneself and, after all, to supose that it is one. Add one world to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each the finite appearance of a higher and single Reality. And plurality as appearances (we have seen) must fall within, must belong to, must qualify the unity.

We have an idea of this unity which, to some extent, is positive. It is true that how in detail the plurality comes together we do not know. And it is true again that unity, in its more proper sense, is known only as contra-distinguished from plurality. Unity therefore, as an aspect over against and defined by another aspect, is itself but appearance. And in this sense the Real, it is clear, cannot be properly called one. It is possible, however, to use unity with a different meaning.

[RIGHT] [/RIGHT]

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;100596 wrote:

Empiricists generally will never allow this. That is kind of what they mean by 'empirical' - no 'first person' knowledge allowed.

Based solely on my assumptions of what you mean by this Im going to disagree, but until further clarification I cant really make a detailed post and this could be seen as irrelevant to the topic anyway.

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@Whoever,

Whoever;100681 wrote:

It is possible, however, to use unity with a different meaning.

... and therein may lie the key Smile

... if the unity is not substance, but process, then doesn't the plurality all come together by each being a kind of process? ... and then any two or more processes no matter how apparently different can enter into a dance of coordinative dynamics with one another and create higher level processes resulting in new additions to the ever-growing plurality? ...

---------- Post added 10-30-2009 at 04:28 PM ----------

KaseiJin;100670 wrote:

"To have consciousness, therefore, is to have the condition of conscious above a certain level of brain tissue activity, with degree of conscious descending as brain tissue is redistributed or removed, with the total lack of conscious (death) being the final outcome of full removal."

... it is this simple: this statement taken on its own portrays a picture of "conscious" as a smooth continuum where the threshold of consciousness is but a point on the continuum and that you can move to and fro along that continuum simply by adding/removing brain tissue ... and as I stated in a previous post, your later comments have clarified that that was not the picture you meant to portray for "conscious", but that this still remains a correct picture as long as we are talking about "conscious potential" ...

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@paulhanke,

OK, then, Paul, I'll leave that at that, then--although I still kind of feel something missing, somewhere--and offer apologies for any time loss occurred. What I'll try to do now (as I said I'd work on this just little bit), is more clearly demonstrate the actual advantage in the paradigm shift which basically involves language alone.(1) I hope all participating in this thread take careful note of this.

We have a secure and practical enough definition/description of consciousness that we can always carry around with us, that most everyone understands and knows. With a little study and thought, we can see that refinements of that understanding have been made (and note that this is still within the above mentioned domain). The posts I have made are secure enough in that respect.

Language will always be touchy, because, for one reason, language is naturally a slippery thing, and yet ironically, a very entrenched thing, and for another reason, language often enough tends to oppose shifts from the more natural and basic (original, if you will) intuition--we know the sun doesn't rise above the earth every morning, actually, . . . but . . . Terms and expressions from days long gone by, are habitually still with us today, and, in the matter before us, can get in the way at times. One good example is the difficulty in escaping what is otherwise anthropomorphic terminology (c.f. #52; second line from bottom). This simply cannot be helped--because of language--and to apply overly strict non-contextual usage mediums to such usage, greatly appears to lead to conceptualizing obstruction. In neuroscience literature, one will occasionally find writers or particular papers which refect a type of 'homunculistic' description, but that is just a language thing which cannot be gotten around; such usage best helps get the idea of a process or function across because such 'homunculistic' visualizing is simply a more naturally basic intuition. There is nothing really wrong with this, and we must always use care when coming upon on such linguistic style--such usage--in order to prevent obstruction to visualizing presented concepts.

Now what I have presented up to my #103, is not a hypothesis, but a very secure theory. The linguistic matter, on the otherhand, is neither; it is a suggestion for a linguistic shift to better fit the paradigm which has emerged much, much later than the language had given room for. Of course, one can go on using the usual 'unconsciousness,' 'unconscious,' to describe things the brain, or areas of brain, or even (as it evidently seems in some cases) neuronal clusters do which can neither be subjectively acknowledged by phenominal, and or, core consciousious, nor reported on by access, nor elements of extended consciousness states.

I will try to be careful with my wording and presentation, as has been observed by some, can cause confusion. At the same time, I ask for the mental exercise which may be needed to better visualize the 'what' behind the terminology--here, especially, the usage of conscious in the sense of brain activity, but also in the usage of brain as a collective, uncountable noun. From time to time I will miss some things (as I did with my usage of lobotomy for lobectomy (#105), and not catching the literal intent of Paul's 'having half of a brain removed,' (2)

paulhanke;100208 wrote:

and it is ridiculously easy to misconstrue what KJ is saying due to this new use of a common word within the domain of discourse in which it originated (bold mine)

The statment section in bold can quite possibly be said to be in need of some adjustment. It is quite true, that the English word conscious has been used in regards to the mental condition/state, and for some good long while, although that has not always been so strongly the case (see 16th century usage). However, it is equally a fact that the more recently achieved understanding of brain and its processes, and all, give us a picture which was not there even as recent as the 5th decade of the 20th century. Since there is no terminology, other than negatives (as in using 'what is not' to describe and explain 'what is') to talk of processes and activities of brain which--to put it simply here, so please be careful--we don't know of subjectively of our own brain processes/activities. While, as pointed out and cited in my #103, a number of those in the field realize this, no one (as far as I know) has come up with the idea of creating a new sense for the word conscious--since the evidence more clearly demonstrates that brain activity/process is what leads to that cognitive acknowledgement we can call 'having a state (or condition) of consciousness.' (3)

While time does not permit further development here (and this will surely prove long enough) please allow me to close with yet another point in case (and please do recheck those in my #103). This is from the contribution by J.F. Kihistrom of UC Berkely, in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, Vol 2,(Academic Press 2009), pages 411-421, entitled Unconscious Cognition:

[indent]To avoid possible oxymoron in the negation of consciousness, James perferred to speak of 'co-conscious' or 'subconscious' mental states, rather than 'unconscious' ones. (p 412-413)[/indent]

As it evidently had appeared strange to William James in his Principles of Psychology to use 'what is not' to explain 'what is,' it is even more so the case today, and thus, I suggest adopting the better fitting sense provided by such understanding being attached to the word conscious--and this will of course be a noun (or quasi-noun) and an adjective, and will be determinable by contextual setting.

1. Although actually, a portion of my presentation to come, demonstrates this point.

2. In most cases, it appears that functional hemispherectomy, along with complete commissurotomy is the procedure of choice, and that is not, most specifically, 'half the brain.' Even in cases where some 90% of a hemisphere is resectioned, the cerebellum is still there, so again, not 'half of a brain.' Somehow, though I totally missed that . . . Surprised

3. While of course, we cannot, and should not, overlook how the basics of embodiment come play in acting on this condition, over focus there, in absence of evolutionary development understandings, is unbalanced. Also, of course when we speak of having the condition of consciousness, or having the condition of conscious, we are including processes . . . but I reason, and argue, that we need not go down below a practical level simply because there is no applicable usage of that in any practical, day to day living in your regular survival mode of being.

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;100708 wrote:

... and therein may lie the key ... if the unity is not substance, but process, then doesn't the plurality all come together by each being a kind of process? ... and then any two or more processes no matter how apparently different can enter into a dance of coordinative dynamics with one another and create higher level processes resulting in new additions to the ever-growing plurality? ...

Nicely put. I can go along with a dance of processes, but this unity cannot be a process. It must be a changeless state.

But we're wandering from the topic.

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@KaseiJin,

There is a difference between a neurological and a philosophical explanation of consciousness, although the difference may only be apparent to philosophers.

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@Whoever,

Whoever;100922 wrote:

Nicely put. I can go along with a dance of processes, but this unity cannot be a process. It must be a changeless state.

But we're wandering from the topic.

... maybe yes, maybe no - if mind is a process made up from conscious processes made up from subconscious processes made up from brain processes made up from life processes made up from chemical processes made up from atomic processes made up from subatomic processes, and so on down the line to vibrating strings, wouldn't that address the title of this thread? Smile

...

---------- Post added 10-31-2009 at 10:45 PM ----------

jeeprs;100933 wrote:

There is a difference between a neurological and a philosophical explanation of consciousness ...

... could this be because there is a difference between neurological and philosophical descriptions of consciousness? Smile

...

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@KaseiJin,

I think there is a difference. They ask different questions and are seeking for different answers. So I don't really think they invalidate each other. They are simply different. It only becomes irksome when neurologists claims that their understanding trumps that of philosophy 'because it is science' or that certain kinds of phenomena ought not to be considered 'because they are not part of the scientific worldview'.

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@jeeprs,

I can see that the language of different descriptions could vary widely, but all correct explanations of the same phenomenon must be equivalent, must be capable of translation between the languages of different disciplines. It would be impossible to explain consciousness in neuroscience while still not being able to explain it in metaphysics. Metaphysics comes first.

In the end I can't see what difference it could make where we choose to start looking for the explanation of consciousness, or how we go about it. If we're successful we're bound to end up all in the same place, and if our approach is scientific then the direction we take and the methods we use to get there will be dictated by the nature of the thing we are trying to explain, not by our preferences.

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@Whoever,

Whoever;101017 wrote:

I can see that the language of different descriptions could vary widely, but all correct explanations of the same phenomenon must be equivalent ...

... but if the descriptions vary widely not only in language but also in scope (e.g., phenomenology provides a description of time consciousness, which is - unless I'm mistaken - totally absent in neuroscientific descriptions; whereas neuroscience has produced its own third-person-based taxonomy of consciousness, which is - again, unless I'm mistaken - totally absent in phenomenological descriptions), then can explanations of those descriptions possibly be equivalent? - or will they be limited to the scope of the descriptions they started from? ...

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@Whoever,

Whoever;101017 wrote:

I can see that the language of different descriptions could vary widely, but all correct explanations of the same phenomenon must be equivalent....

...the direction we take and the methods we use to get there will be dictated by the nature of the thing...

And what 'thing' might that be? The major fundamental issue of consciousness is the circularity of references to it. It is in its very nature, not an object - hence not a 'thing'. Indeed from certain perspectives, there is indeed no such 'thing' as consciousness, and in a very real and cogent sense, it does not exist.

And as PaulHanke observes, understanding consciousness 'as a phenomena' might mean a completely different thing to a philosophical analysis of the nature of mind. A Plotinus might say 'mind precedes all phenomena' - which kind of rules it out for empirical science.

The very meaning of 'mind' and 'consciousness' and other related terms shifts constantly - as has already been said, this is partly due to language. But this ambiguity and shape-shifting is intolerable to science. 'For goodness sake' I hear the cry 'Can't we at least agree on what we are talking about here? How do you expect us to get any work done when you keep not only moving the goal posts, but the playing field, and the game?'

This is what I mean when I say there are different kinds of analysis in this topic. I think there is indeed a science of consciousness, but it must include the dimension of the Sacred - hence the term 'scientia sacra', or 'sacred science'. The Buddha has 'a theory of consciousness' which was described in the Abhidhamma. Patanjali's Yoga Sutra's constitute 'a theory of consciousness'. The perennial philosophers have many iterations of the 'theory of consciousness'. But the neuroscientists are always going to say, 'well let's attach electrodes to the cranium and see if we can make it show up on the EEG'.

And I'm OK with that. It is what they do, and maybe they will find it. Can't hurt to look, after all.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;100933 wrote:

There is a difference between a neurological and a philosophical explanation of consciousness, although the difference may only be apparent to philosophers.

But science (i.e. methodological naturalism) is a perspective of philosophy, unless your definition of philosophy is that of a priori destinations.

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@jeeprs,

One first thing I wish to place out in the open, here, may best be seen as a word of caution; in a sense. Regarding the title of this thread (the formulation of which of course has some degree of thought and data behind it), I would firmly suggest that it would be premature to automatically see it as asserting a linear matter--because it is not, but more likely best concieved of as a nested system. Additionally, while the thread's title does provide the best understood developments of occurrence in the spatial and chronological senses, it does not offer any details on that within, and of itself--that is to be developed in the presentation and argumentation that follows; naturally. It is true--and might be helpful to keep in mind while debating and discussing this--that this title does clarify that consciousness and mind are due to, are of, and, yes, do exist in brain(1) by mere definition (which is secure and practical).

While I see some embedding, and am enjoying, and have worries over that, I feel an ever-so-slight sensation to recall that one~three lined posts are often far less productive-in-outcome as more developed posts. (and in cases do lead to off-topicness, if care is not taken . . . and this is not to identify, complain, nor to direct, but simply to recall past developments over internet forum experience).(2) I am very steadfastly locked on the evidently far-greater-in-likelihood-correctness of the definition of consciousness which I have outlined thus far here. In this respect, we will fine efforts in many present philosophical teatsies to refine the explanations of what is involved in, or 'bracketed' by the condition of having consciousness, but no big great differences for the most part.(3)

We will see voiced opinions like those of Francis Crick in his book The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (MIT 1994), which point to the evidence which has led to the title and position being argued in this thread, and find the likes of:
[indent]

J. Driver; P. Vuillumier wrote:

There is much excitement about the possibility of relating awareness to neural substrates, and studies of neglect and extinction have much to offer this growing field. However, any pronouncement of 'consciousness explained' remain premature. Part of the problem is that neuroscientists wrestling with intriguing neurological or neurophysiological data often have, at best, only intuitive notions of what awareness constitutes in psychological or philosophical terms. Philosophy can of course help to sharpen intuitions and challenge preconceptions but we suspect that even the most sophisticated philosophies of mind may have to be revised drastically as the neuroscien progresses. [please recall that this was written in 2001, and there has been some progress--even be it little--which we can fairly and easily enough see as tipping the scales in favor of having to bring some things up to date in former philosophical treatment; see citation below, in note 3.]

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And then we can also find, for example, Michael Kubovy's observation in his contribution (Phenomenology) in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol 3, p 578:
[indent]

M. Kubovy wrote:

There is another way in which experimental cognitive science may interact with phenomenology. Features of conscious experience analyzed in phenomenology can may be confirmed and perhaps sharpened by results in neuroscience.

[/indent]

However, in that this thread has been rather set, discussion range-wise, to advance other definitions/descriptions of consciousness, I would like to ask that the ones set be firstly shown to be incorrect. One main reason for this is that we know that some philosophical ideas and teachings in days long gone by, have been shown to be inaccurate, or, in some cases, totally false, and the working definition we can get from the average of that which (fairly)holds in both fields, after some adjustment for practical applicability, is what is presented.

Optogenetic techniques, for example, are rather new, and offer some good input into how neural circuit organization (G. Miesenbock, (2009) The Optogenetic Catechism. Science, Vol. 326, (16, Oct); pp 395-399). Another example of how knowledge is increased which works towards making emirical knowledge cause some older views to further fade out, can also be seen in this same issue of Science in the paper by N.T. Sahin; S. Pinker; S.S. Cash; D. schomer; E. Halgen entitled Sequential Processing of Lexical, Grammatical, and Phonological Information Within Broca's Area. (pp 445-4499). Here, open brain surgery once again provided the opportunity with very precise electrode placement for epilepsy evaluation (Intracranial Electrophysiology ICE)). These can record with millisecond resolution, activity within a millimeter of resolution space, and can give local field potentials. Cross reference and comparison with fMRI, using gauging tests for normal system organization, and scalp-recorded potentials, the team demonstrated that while paralleslism, feedback, and interactivity are elements in Broca's area, the parsimony-based model (such as the Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (LRM) model) in which one portion of the language processing stream consists of spatiotemporally distinct processes corresponding to levels of linguistic computation. This had been elusive in earlier coarser-grained resolution investigations.

So we know that the brain is not a radiator for cooling the blood (Aristotle 384-322 BCE), nor that while somewhat closer to being factual, the cerebrum is solely the recipient of sensations, and the cerebellum commands the muscles (Galen 130-200 CE), nor that the pineal gland influences motor response in any very direct connection (Descartes 1596-1650). This is because of testing and checking it out to see if that's the way it is--in short scientific method. And, very much unlike that of some, like the 'cowboyish' radical (as I and someothers obvious see it) Alva Noe states, namely that 'the idea that we are our brains is not something scientists have learned; it is rather a preconception that scientists have brought with them from home to their workbenches.' (Out of Our Heads-Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (Hill & Wang 2009; p 181)(4)

1. Please do take notice that by wording this as 'consciousness and mind do exist in brain,' I am editorily bolstering, by looking at it from different angles (so to speak), the fact that by practical and applicable definition, consciousness and mind do not exist without brain. While one can anthropomorphize, and personify, all sorts of things, ideas, and processes, in order to better ascertain some sort of visualization, conception, or grasping of those things, ideas, and processes, it would be a fallicy (as touched on before) to automatically take that person to be asserting that such actual, factual attribute is an essential and proper substance of any of those things, ideas, and processes.

2. Yes, the internet forum medium is, far more often than not (could we not deny?), an entertainment medium; a way for folks to kind of let go, have fun, escape school, work, or (though it might be a shame) relationship boredom and pressures. I tend to mostly use it as a way to encourage learning and growth, both for myself firstly, and then for those out there in the world. It is for that reason, actually, that I always encourage linguistic quality, thought/presentation/debate structure development, etc. etc. (one will always notice a stark difference between a formal debate sub-forum thread, and a normal public thread, and yet I'd encourage that we all at least try to keep in mind that that gap could be narrowed a bit, at least in some threads on certain subjects--so forth and so on....)

3. The following is a further sample space solely for the purpose of offering evidence that I have, at least, looked into it some: of course, there is much more to investigate, I'm sure, but those who have written, have also done that (I will try not to overlap with citations in #101): (and I have read all of all of them, it's not that I just get abstracts off line or something...I have the journals in the hard--though some are from PDFs of on-line subscriptions I have.)

[indent]PierCarla; M. Bosinelli, (2001) Consciousness during Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol 10, no. 1; pp 26-41;
D.M. Rosenthal, (2002) How many kinds of consciousness?. ibid, Vol 11, no. 4; pp 653-665;
D. LaBerge, (2006) Apical dendrite activity in cognition and consciousness. ibid., Vol 15, 2; pp 235-257;
E. Pacherie; M. Green; T. Bayne, (2006) Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?. ibid., Vol 15, no. 3; pp 566-577;
G. Pinku; J. Tzelgov, (2006) Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge. ibid., Vol 15, no. 4; pp 655-661;
E. Schier, (2009) Identifying phenomenal consciousness. ibid., Vol 18, no. 1; pp 216-222;
P. Driver; P. Vuilleumier, (2001) Perception without awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and exinction. Cognition, Vol 79, no. 1-2; pp 39-88;
A.I. Jack; T. Shallice, (2001) Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. ibid., Vol 79, no. 1-2; pp 161-196;
N. Block, (2001) Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness. ibid, vol 79, no. 1-2; pp 197-219;
D. Dennett, (2001) Are we explaining consciousness yet?. ibid., Vol 79, no. 1-2; pp 221-237;
S.S. Obhi; P.J. Planetta; J. Scantlebury, (2009) On the signals underying conscious awareness of action. ibid., Vol 110, no. 1; pp 65-73;
R.C. Jennings, (1998) A philosophical consideration of awareness. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, Vol 57, no. 3-4; pp 201-211;
S. Bodoviz, (2008) The neural correlate of consciousness. Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol 254; pp 594-598;
G. Tononi; C. Koch, (2008) The Neural Correlates of Consciousness-An Update. The Year In Cognitive Science 2008; Annals of the New York Academy of Science, Vol 1124; pp 239-261;
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science(NPG, 2003) with several contributions in volumes 1 and 3 on consciousness and philosophical angles as well as brain science angles;
The Neurology of Consciousness-Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology(AP 2009) covers basics in the first contribution, especially;
and a few others, such as the two volume set on consciousness that I've mentioned before, and entries from our old friend the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that is on line for all.

4. Of course his whole argument in that work, regarding some of the scientific understandings, is not totally off, but the spin which he has very clearly put on some clauses within his arguments, end up making the whole proposition false; very emotionally involved, and that kind of spoils it too, I sense.
[/indent]

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;101081 wrote:

... but if the descriptions vary widely not only in language but also in scope (e.g., phenomenology provides a description of time consciousness, which is - unless I'm mistaken - totally absent in neuroscientific descriptions; whereas neuroscience has produced its own third-person-based taxonomy of consciousness, which is - again, unless I'm mistaken - totally absent in phenomenological descriptions), ...

Okay. I suppose I meant consistent with each other rather than equivalent.

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@KaseiJin,

Great work KJ. I am travelling at the moment and only able to drop by occasionally but will try and take that post in thoroughly later this week.

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@xris,

Strictly speaking, the fact that no consciousness can be detected without a brain does not prove that consciousness originates from the brain activity. Indeed, no consciouness can be found in a corpse (whose heart does not work), so, by the very same argument, you should deduce that consciouness also originates from the heart.

And in fact some ethnic groups consider that this is just so : feelings originate from the heart, that is...

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;101182 wrote:

So we know that the brain is not a radiator for cooling the blood (Aristotle 384-322 BCE), nor that while somewhat closer to being factual, the cerebrum is solely the recipient of sensations, and the cerebellum commands the muscles (Galen 130-200 CE), nor that the pineal gland influences motor response in any very direct connection (Descartes 1596-1650). This is because of testing and checking it out to see if that's the way it is--in short scientific method. And, very much unlike the some 'cowboyish' radical (as I and someothers obvious see it) Alva Noe states, namely that 'the idea that we are our brains is not something scientists have learned; it is rather a preconception that scientists have brought with them from home to their workbenches.' (Out of Our Heads-Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (Hill & Wang 2009; p 181)

... I'm not sure if I understand what you're getting at here ... earlier, you provided a quote from Driver and Vuillumier stating, "Philosophy can of course help to sharpen intuitions and challenge preconceptions ..." ... in this paragraph, however, you appear to be dismissing just such a challenge ... is it that this particular philosophical challenge is coming from a "cowboyish radical", or is it that you aren't willing to consider any philosophical challenge unless it has already been run through the scientific method? ...

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@KaseiJin,

I agree with your observation, Escape.

My reading of why KJ has brought up these examples from the Ancient Greeks is to show how our understanding of the function of the brain is more accurate :

KaseiJin;101182 wrote:

we know that some philosophical ideas and teachings in days long gone by, have been shown to be inaccurate, or, in some cases, totally false

This is of course perfectly true with regards to many aspects of Aristotle's 'philosophy' (which of course actually embraced all manner of subjects and indeed virtually the entire realm of knowledge possessed by the ancient world, as indeed many ideas concerning 'humours' and the like, all of which have been superseded by more recent discoveries.)

So again, with regards to the functioning of the brain, it must be acknowledged that scientists with precise knowledge of neuroanatomy and the arsenal of scientific instrumentation that we now possess will be able to produce an infinitely more accurate account of the complex matter of brain structure than an ancient philosopher contemplating the realm of Ideas. No contest, really. But in the realm of Ideas there are still many issues which are no different, and are no closer or further from being understood, than they were 2500 years ago, despite all of this.

However as I am travelling and in light of all the work KJ has put in by way of references etc, I need to get home and do some more work before any further ad libbing:bigsmile:.

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From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

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