From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@jeeprs,

Thanks for acknowledging your present circumstances, jeeprs. No rush, we're here, and look forward to further input when you are back from being on the road. (I've been there before too, and know how that can be)

Welcome to the thread, the discussion, and the debate, Escape ! I look forward to your input also. As for the following portion of what you have presented:

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Escape;101258 wrote:

And in fact some ethnic groups consider that this is just so : feelings originate from the heart, that is...

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[indent]I tend to think, as evidence fairly well demonstrates, that this is what I place in that catagory of[/indent] [indent][indent]

KaseiJin;100779 wrote:

. . . the more natural and basic (original, if you will) intuition-- . . .(par. 3, line 2)

[/indent][/indent] [indent][indent]although not referring to language, but just acquired intuition from early H. sapien social development (or before? . . . in that Cro-Magnon and H. Sapien neandrathalensis burials with symbolic, abstract-thought derived items have been found, meaning that such 'intuitions' most likely has earlier sources). It can be reasoned that such could be the imputus for heart removal from a living sacrifice for the sun god of the Aztecs, or as is evidenced in many artifacts and written works of older peoples--such as heart preservation by the Egyptians (while simply sucking the brain out through the nose, and throwing it in the garbage). However, it does very much show in the arts--especially poetry and music; such as Linda Ronstadt once sang, "Give one heart, get back two, that's the paradox of 'I love you'."

However, this intuition is incorrect; inaccurate. While the logic, as best I can tell, in and of itself is correct, the thesis' omission of much other pertinent, and very related data is what renders it incorrect. The heart is a muscle, pretty much like all the others (but it is a class of its own--cardiac muscle, and is also included in the endocrine system because of its containing certain cell types which secrete Atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP), but cardiac cells do not project as neurons do, nor do they support neuronal activity as astrocytes do, and, while the heart can be maintained alive and fully functioning, the organism's cells, and systems which can function due to having that required number of living cells working in that same system (whatever that number may be) being kept alive and working (by that pumping heart), that organism can have so low a level of brain conscious that it would be very, very difficult to suggest that that organism had the condition of consciousness (1)[/indent][/indent]

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Escape;101258 wrote:

Strictly speaking, the fact that no consciousness can be detected without a brain does not prove that consciousness originates from the brain activity.

[/indent] [indent]I would also think, at the same time, that if we were to go back to the definition element involved with extended consciousness (which is pack and parcel with our definition herein), we would find that by very definition, this thesis is incorrect. A living, pumping heart, can not be said to be aware of itself in temporal/spatial concepts in the same way that I am aware of what I ate for dinner on Saturday night, and on which beer I'm going to drink after I get home from tonight's private lessons I have to run off to in some 10 minutes or so. Therefore a living, active heart, does not have the condition of consciousness--and I'd add 'the condition of conscious' to that to boot . . . [/indent]

paulhanke;101308 wrote:

... I'm not sure if I understand what you're getting at here ... earlier, you provided a quote from Driver and Vuillumier stating, "Philosophy can of course help to sharpen intuitions and challenge preconceptions ..." ... in this paragraph, however, you appear to be dismissing just such a challenge ... is it that this particular philosophical challenge is coming from a "cowboyish radical", or is it that you aren't willing to consider any philosophical challenge unless it has already been run through the scientific method? ...

First of all, jeeprs has shed some light on that . . . and I thank you for taking notice of that, and responding, jeeprs ! :a-ok: Yes, the basic front there ('front' as in 'front lines of the battle zone' . . . to be humorous here) started somewhile back {sorry, no time to link here, although I know where they are}, and it is just as jeeprs has reported. Now, with that post, it might take a little standing back, away from it for a sec (as in looking a large work in an art musuem) to get the whole, after then looking close up, and then back again.

The overall thrust there was to demonstrate how it is that these two disciplines can work together to achieve a better, common good. (You may recall my earlier quotes from Edward Slingerland's What Science Offers the Humanities-integrating body and culture....sorry, again no time to link.) Then, in contrast to the voices which demonstrate that more 'level-headed' view, I had pointed out, as an example, the difference of the opposing point of view (although Alva Noe does kind of give lip service to such voice, there is no evidence of meat in that, no real action in that direction in the rest of that work).

While doing that, and in doing that, I had simply chose that one line to demonstrate that it is not the case that what the neurosciences have as a starting line, is something which has suddenly come up out of the blue--as Noe is completely silent on--but, quite the contrary, it is through scientific method, that these fundamental underpinnings are in place. Alva Noe's charge appears to have been reinforced, once having set aside a good bit of historical, empirical data, and in that way, has gone astray. The context of the point I had been making, was larger than that of dismissing the elements within, and being used for, the context. I hope this is clear, but if not, please let me know, and I'll explain further. It might be good to ask, as a simple question, rather than formulate a conception from what I have said, and then feeding that back in contrast so as to demonstrate objection to what I have said.

...Oops Sorry, I'll have to leave this as is. I apologize. I have just suddenly run out of time; completely.

1. This wording, which I had purposely intended, and had used in my #112 (2nd and 3rd lines from the bottom), and which Paulhanke had asked explanation of in his #113(last point), is basically pointing to a condition, a circumstance, or setting of state/function in an overall temporal/spatial way. This word is not used in the sense of a requirement for a next step, as in 'conditions for application acceptance.' ps...Paul, if you'd still like an explanation, I'd be glad to give it, but thought it had kind of taken care of itself...as least I came to that conclusion...but....just let me know.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

It turns out that the heart contains a system of neurons capable of acting as a brain, according to recent studies. Don't have a reference.

---------- Post added 11-03-2009 at 10:04 AM ----------

Quote:

A living, pumping heart, can not be said to be aware of itself in temporal/spatial concepts in the same way that I am aware of what I ate for dinner on Saturday night, and on which beer I'm going to drink after I get home from tonight's private lessons I have to run off to in some 10 minutes or so. Therefore a living, active heart, does not have the condition of consciousness.

No - your argument, if it holds, shows only that the heart does not have consciousness as you define it (dinner, beer etc), That's all.

1 Reply

@Whoever,

One first thing I'd like to plug in here, which I had forgotten to do in my above post, is give notice of the fact that I did edit a miswording in my #135, last paragraph, line 4. The meaning doesn't really change much, although the usage matter can perhaps be better seen now. I apologize for that miss--even though I kind of edit as I go, I occasionally run out of time at the end, and cannot final proof-read until later.

Whoever;101410 wrote:

It turns out that the heart contains a system of neurons capable of acting as a brain, according to recent studies. Don't have a reference.

Thanks for your bringing that out, Whoever. I do hope you can run down that source for us. If it were true that it were just now being discovered that there were neurons in the heart, I'd be extremely surprized. Not only that, it'd make some waves in the neurosciences. Can you please make some major effort to either locate that information source, or try to pin down a general location--say on the internet, from some magazine/newspaper, or from some textbook, resource book, or volume of books, or from some book. I'd like to check it out carefully, please. In the meantime, I reason that something is very much amiss in that claim. Of course, it might be that a memory slip has occurred, and the term 'neurons' had not been intended. It might also be the matter about circadian rythym setting element, where there is indirect feedback from the heart to the brain which sets off some neural adjustments.

Whoever;101410 wrote:

No - your argument, if it holds, shows only that the heart does not have consciousness as you define it (dinner, beer etc), That's all.

While I am very sure that the argument holds, what you have pointed out is true--which is one very major reason the argument holds. (We could, as touched on before, adopt a new sense for the word 'consciousness' which allows for other than what it more precisely does at the moment; which I tend to reason is not such a good idea. So I'd support the effort to find a new term for the other, wished for, applications). In the event that you may be unsure of the definition/description, it might prove good to double check those. Then, in the event that you wish to challenge them, I'd look forward to your presentation and arguments. By rather simply asserting, in so many words, that the definition of consciousness itself rules out the organ we call the heart, as being of the makeup of having the condition of consciousness, I'd tend to think that we'd simply be reaffirming the definition/description that we have presently--especially for this thread to date.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;101402 wrote:

While doing that, and in doing that, I had simply chose that one line to demonstrate that it is not the case that what the neurosciences have as a starting line, is something which has suddenly come up out of the blue--as Noe is completely silent on--but, quite the contrary, it is through scientific method, that these fundamental underpinnings are in place.

... I can't speak for Noe (I've never read him), but if he is critiquing unexamined preconceptions that still linger from, for example, Cartesian philosophy, then he is not alone ... nor do changes in perspective (dare I say paradigm?) necessarily require throwing out any fundamental underpinnings that may already be in place - merely their reinterpretation within the new perspective ... witness the transition in perspective from Newton to Einstein ...

KaseiJin;101402 wrote:

Alva Noe's charge appears to have been reinforced, once having set aside a good bit of historical, empirical data, and in that way, has gone astray.

... if Noe is indeed ignoring empirical data (as opposed to reinterpreting it), then so much the worse for his philosophy ...

KaseiJin;101402 wrote:

The context of the point I had been making, was larger than that of dismissing the elements within, and being used for, the context.

... and that is almost an answer to my question - that is, in your statement you are not simply targeting Noe ... so, here's a snippet of your statement again: "because of testing and checking it out to see if that's the way it is--in short scientific method. And, very much unlike that of some, like the 'cowboyish' radical" ... and here is my question again: does this imply that you aren't willing to consider any philosophical challenge unless it has already been run through the scientific method? ...

KaseiJin;101402 wrote:

It might be good to ask, as a simple question, rather than formulate a conception from what I have said, and then feeding that back in contrast so as to demonstrate objection to what I have said.

... this seems like a rather strange request ... it is what you say that conveys a conception - it is not me formulating a conception other than the one you have conveyed ... the reason I ask questions in paraphrase form is to see if you really meant the conception that you conveyed ... are you saying that I should not afford you the opportunity to clarify yourself? - that I should just jump right in with all objections blazing? ...

---------- Post added 11-03-2009 at 08:39 AM ----------

KaseiJin;101420 wrote:

If it were true that it were just now being discovered that there were neurons in the heart, I'd be extremely surprized. Not only that, it'd make some waves in the neurosciences. Can you please make some major effort to either locate that information source, or try to pin down a general location--say on the internet--

... it's called the intrinsic cardiac nervous system ... Google should give you plenty to digest ...

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

Incidentally, Alva Noe is not a 'cowboy' as such, he is actually Professor of Philosophy at UC Berkeley (although I do understand that when the prosecution calls in a killer witness, it is standard practise on the part of the defense to question their bona fides...)

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@paulhanke,

Let me first say that I of course know just who professor Noe is, and what position he holds, and such (in the event that pointing that out had not been simply for public notice). No problem there. I had used a figure of speech to explain how he emotionally seems to come off to me, in general. (regarding the subject area of neurosciences and consciousness)

Then, as for the matter of what Alva Noe is saying in that particular work as regards some neuroscience matters, as I mentioned before, there are points he makes which are correct, but the conclusion which he draws are lacking in some points which thus likely (or can be seen as) causing his conclusions to misguided. In other words, I could say that there appears to be a bit of 'picking and choosing' to reach some conclusions. However, to go into that here and now, will be going off track a bit, and if any would like to know more on the above, such as his conclusion regarding vision, I'll cover it when I get there--to vision, that is.

Then, I'd like to again impress upon all readers that I am working within the bounds of a practical range, and a 'more-so-determined-by-tested-evidence' range. For that reason, all assertions and claims will have to be tested--be they philosophical in nature, or religious belief-system in nature, or scientific in nature.

Thanks for that info, Paulhanke, I'll check it out since it's new to me . . . and of course see if I can find any information from hard sources too. And then, in regards questioning, or requests for clarification formating, I've decided to go PM with that, Paulhanke, since I yet feel something is missing (as I had said earlier).

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;101681 wrote:

For that reason, all assertions and claims will have to be tested--be they philosophical in nature, or religious belief-system in nature, or scientific in nature.

... unfortunately, by definition your criteria eliminates all claims but scientific claims ... as this is a philosophy forum, I think a more appropriate criteria is called for ... perhaps "all assertions and claims will have to be consistent with empirical data" ... this is still a pretty stringent criteria for a philosophical discussion, but as many philosophers of mind already toe this line I don't think it is an unreasonable one for this thread ...

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;101420 wrote:

Thanks for your bringing that out, Whoever. I do hope you can run down that source for us. If it were true that it were just now being discovered that there were neurons in the heart, I'd be extremely surprized. Not only that, it'd make some waves in the neurosciences. Can you please make some major effort to either locate that information source, or try to pin down a general location--say on the internet, from some magazine/newspaper, or from some textbook, resource book, or volume of books, or from some book. I'd like to check it out carefully, please. In the meantime, I reason that something is very much amiss in that claim.

I'm sure you can find it as easily as I can.

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Of course, it might be that a memory slip has occurred, and the term 'neurons' had not been intended.

If the word neuron is not used then the findings have no significance.

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While I am very sure that the argument holds, what you have pointed out is true--which is one very major reason the argument holds.

That figures.

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In the event that you may be unsure of the definition/description, it might prove good to double check those. Then, in the event that you wish to challenge them, I'd look forward to your presentation and arguments.

No, it's okay. I'm quite sure.

Quote:

By rather simply asserting, in so many words, that the definition of consciousness itself rules out the organ we call the heart, as being of the makeup of having the condition of consciousness, I'd tend to think that we'd simply be reaffirming the definition/description that we have presently--especially for this thread to date.

I was commenting on your definition, not anyone else's.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;101402 wrote:

A living, pumping heart, can not be said to be aware of itself in temporal/spatial concepts in the same way that I am aware of what I ate for dinner on Saturday night, and on which beer I'm going to drink after I get home from tonight's private lessons I have to run off to in some 10 minutes or so.

That may well be so - but we can never know, can we? Without a 'living pumping heart' you won't go home for dinner or do anything else, and the brain will be flatlining. So as far as the human is concerned, the brain and the heart always operate in conjunction? So where can you draw the line about which you can say 'consciousness only exists on this side'? On what basis you say that consciousness only consists of 'the component that exists in the head'? You might as well say 'the climate consists only of rain'.

As far as the brains situtation in 'the body' is concerned, how would it be possible to isolate those aspects of consciousness that occur in 'the neurons' without reference to their connection to the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system? Thinking is connected to feeling, as is evidenced by the fact that feelings, thoughts, hormones, enzymes, heart-rates, and so on, all influence one another and create feedback loops of various kinds. So this idea of isolating consciousness as the activity of the brain in particular is necessarily reductionist, is it not (i.e. reducing consciousness to the activity of the brain, when it fact the evidence would suggest it extends well beyond it, in many senses of the word.) So not necessarily 'neurons on heart' but 'neurons and heart are part of the larger whole.'

This is very much in keeping with the 'theory of embodied cognition' which states

Quote:

the fact that cognition is a highly embodied or situated activity-emphasis intentionally on all three-and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as actingbeings.This shift in focus from Descartes' "thinking thing", and the picture of human beingand subjectivity it suggests, to a more Heideggerian approach to being in the world,in which agency and interactive coping occupy center stage, is an extremely importantdevelopment, the implications of which are only just beginning to be fathomed.

Source

You ma well ask whether to say this about cognition is also to say that it holds true for consciousness. I am inclined to think that it does for the purposes of this argument.

What you're actually presenting is a model of consciousness i.e. consciousness as an attribute of the brain. But there are various philosophical grounds for asserting that consciousness in an important sense includes that, but also extends well beyond it.

Incidentally, I am wondering if you have any views on the experiment I quoted in the earlier post #55 about how imagining to practise piano actually can change the neural structure of the brain (which I would have thought was pretty good evidence for 'downward causality' from mind to brain.)

---------- Post added 11-06-2009 at 01:26 PM ----------

paulhanke;101747 wrote:

... unfortunately, by definition your criteria eliminates all claims but scientific claims ... as this is a philosophy forum, I think a more appropriate criteria is called for ...

Actually, KJ, no disrespect intended, because I do respect the amount of thought and consideration (and also references and so on) that you provide on the forum, and also your thoroughness and courtesy, but I think it is fair to say that your answers are pretty well always from the perspective of the neuro-sciences rather than from philosophy, as such.

As we have discussed before, you hold the view that the neuro-sciences are setting the pace and the humanities (philosophy being one) more or less have to keep up with what is being discovered by scientific research. We have also differed over the idea that philosophy is basically a lot of outmoded notions such as Aristotlean physiology or Galen's medicine, whereas I contend that there are certain 'perennial truths' in philosophy which exist independently of these kinds of matters (such as, for example, no matter how good a scientist you are, what does it take to be a good human being?)

So in all the many responses you provide, you provide very little, or maybe no, philosophical argumentation as such. You basically start from the position that 'consciousness is a matter of neuroscientific analysis' and then proceed to answer all the questions on that basis. Now of course it is your perogative to do that, but as Paul Hanke has pointed out, this is a philosophy forum, and I do notice that whenever you are dealt a philosophical question, you will basically play a neuro card.

I suggest that this 'embodied cognition' perspective, which is starting to gain a lot of traction in academia, as far as I can tell, actually might offer some very interesting new perspectives which combine many aspects of recent neuro-scientific discoveries, but also respects the fact that consciousness is, in many respects, for too important and mysterious a matter to be the sole province of the scientific community. It also provides a 'philosophical model', if you like, which I think you might find much more congenial with your outlook than my preferred perspective of 'generic and Eastern mystical philosophy' (which is nevertheless providing some other perspectives on the whole issue through such organisations as Mind and Life Institute).

Regards

j

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

That was well worded, jeeprs; demonstrating both good outline and exercise of essay writing. I hit upon a snag in my work, and some extra side activities since this past Thursday, and only have time for this now, so will give a full response a bit later. For now, I'd like to clarify my adjustment in understanding related to that matter of neurons in the heart.

Whoever;101410 wrote:

It turns out that the heart contains a system of neurons capable of acting as a brain, according to recent studies. Don't have a reference.

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KaseiJin;101420 wrote:

Thanks for your bringing that out, Whoever. I do hope you can run down that source for us. If it were true that it were just now being discovered that there were neurons in the heart, I'd be extremely surprized. Not only that, it'd make some waves in the neurosciences.

While it is no surprise at all in the neurosciences, it was to me--which is both encouraging and disappointing. (encouraging, in that it encourages me to be more thorough, and disappointing in that it emphasizes my time limitations [I did skim through much of the CNS branch information related to physiology]) While I knew of the enteric system, and some extra-CNS gangion nodes, and had been aware of the idea of a plexus, I was totally ignorant of there being a cardiac plexus (intrinsic cardiac system).

Another miss of mine, is that while knowing that the enteric system has occasionally been popularly called 'the little brain (most precisely and specifically, it is not a brain (1)), and that some ganglion centers existed external to CNS, PNS, and ANS, and that the very word ganglia implies neural in nature, I failed to register neuron outside of that which makes up CNS--especially as in cerebral, cerebellum. That was my bad.

At the same time, however, my investigation has shown that there is very little new about it--other than some internal signal afferent/efferent activity--as some studies are found from the '90s, and a number previous to the texts and books I have on hand, and papers I've pulled out. (2) In summary on this matter, so far, then, there is no contest in stating that the cardiac plexus does not amount to a system which reaches the level of activity that can be said to be that of having the condition (as in a state of circumstances) of consciousness. [/indent]

1. Neuroscience-Exploring the Brain, 3rd Ed. (2007); by Bear, Connors, Paradiso (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins); pp 495, 496;

2. Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, International Ed. (2006); by Tortora, Derrickson (John Wiley & Sons Inc.);

[indent]Anatomy & Physiology, (2006); by Seeley, Stephens, Tate (McGraw Hill);

D.J. Adams, A.A. Harper, R.C. Hogg, (2002) Neural control of the heart: developmental changes in ionic conductances in mammalian intrinsic cardiac neurons. Autonomic Neuroscience: Basic & Clinical, Vol 98; pp 75-78;

J.A. Armour et al., (2002) Long-term modulation of the intrinsic cardiac nervous system by spinal cord neurons in normal and ischaemic hearts. ibid., Vol 95; pp 71-79;

Wann-Yee Har, et al., (2000) Morphological study of cultured cardiac ganglionic neurons from different postnatal stages of rats. ibid., Vol 84; pp 89-97;

J.L. Ardell, et al., (2000) Differential effects of chronic cardiac decentralization on cholinergic receptor mediated responses within the canine intrinsic cardiac nervous system. Ganglia shorts. ibid., Vol 82, p 65:

J.B. Furness, (2006) Review: The organisation[sic] of the autonomic nervous system: Peripheral connections. ibid., Vol 130, pp1-5

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also see: General Practice Notebook

[indent]Functional interdependence of neurons in a single canine intrinsic cardiac ganglionated plexus

Physiology[/indent]

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;102417 wrote:

In summary on this matter, so far, then, there is no contest in stating that the cardiac plexus does not amount to a system which reaches the level of activity that can be said to be that of having the condition (as in a state of circumstances) of consciousness.

... if this is a dismissal of the intrinsic cardiac system as being relevant to consciousness, is it perhaps a premature one? ... that is, from one metaphysical standpoint (say, neuroreductionism), this may look like a safe and easy dismissal to make ... however, from another metaphysical standpoint (say, embodied cognition), dismissing the intrinsic cardiac system from a place in the overall processes of cognition (and consciousness?) could be seen as being as serious an error as dismissing the body from the same ...

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@KaseiJin,

In many cases, you don't really need an MRI scan to see what is on somebody's mind, do you? :bigsmile:

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@KaseiJin,

K - How would you define 'having a condition of consciousness'? It must be a very clear definition if you can hold such a strong opinion.

(Sorry - can't reply again - away for a bit)

1 Reply

@Whoever,

I still can't see how science can add that extra new 'dimension' to consciousness studies without including anecdotal evidence as primary evidence, rather than a pointer to objective study.

Conciousness as an emergent force of nature is surely linked to language, and without language itself as being part of scientific study then it seems to me that something major is being missed out. That doesnt preclude useful study, but how can language not be fundamental to mind and brain? Structuralism failed. There is good evidence that language may not be purely rational in its use or developement. It may be spontaneous and cultural, and as such a force of nature. Super systems are still maps unless something emerges mathematically from the complexity of a system. And if we concieve of the usefulness of systems studies to brain and consciousness, then surely the study of culture as a consciousness interaction, motivation and environment must also be included? Its part of the language system at least ....... and probably a great deal more such as identity.

Unless science takes anectdotal (language) evidence seriously, as potentially something fundamental then how can it ever avoid reducing consciousness itself to a map....... where the subjective experience itself is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the map? ie Subjective consciousness as something odd but scientifically redundant.

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@KaseiJin,

ah but this is not the Scientific Method. What you want is to understand consciousness as the property of an object - in this case, the brain and it's component parts. You understand the component parts, how they work together, and how they produce what we observe as consciousness in subjects. So the first-person account of consciousness is really tangential to this because by definition it cannot be analysed objectively. The aim is (if I understand it) to produce a working model which can then be tested against observable phenomena, same as any other kind of empirical discipline. And all of this in the context of evoutionary theory which provides the underlying account of how the brain came to be what it is today, and how (by adaption) it developed the capacities for consciousness we now observe.

J. B. Watson, founder of Behaviourism (now largely superseded by other approaches in psychology, but an instructive quote nonetheless):

Quote:

"Behaviourism claims that consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviourist, who has been trained always as an experimentalist, holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic."

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

well its not so much what i want jeeprs as what i think is concievably possible.

The subjective experience exists. Objectivity as now concieved and practiced can at best produce a model that predicts behaviour but reduces the subjective experience as irrelevant to the power of the model. If however we could include anecdotal evidence (and language) then maybe a rational theory, workable and evolving could develope.

....... of course it would still be a rationally/predictable biased theory. Not necessarily complete, but concievably better than the present rejection of such evidence and its medium of manifestation.

It is quite possible it seems to me for science to be able to model, measure and predict an aspect of physical reality with great precision, yet still be missing the understanding of aspects of that reality. Especially now that science is used to statistical forms arising in time measurement and thus riding the waves of chaos. All such a theory has to state in order to assert its completeness is that the chaos is true chaos ..... ie without hidden forms outside the scope of the model.

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@pagan,

pagan;102509 wrote:

The subjective experience exists. Objectivity as now concieved and practiced can at best produce a model that predicts behaviour but reduces the subjective experience as irrelevant to the power of the model. If however we could include anecdotal evidence (and language) then maybe a rational theory, workable and evolving could develope.

... personally, I think this is a problem to which philosophers of science should be giving a lot of attention ... new methods need to be developed for science that allow the incorporation of first-person data without compromising the epistemological soundness of scientific inquiry ...

pagan;102509 wrote:

It is quite possible it seems to me for science to be able to model, measure and predict an aspect of physical reality with great precision, yet still be missing the understanding of aspects of that reality.

... I think this intuition is demonstrable merely by looking at the effects of over-specialization in science ... each scientific specialty observes only a subset of what can be observed for a given phenomena, and thus each scientific specialty comes up with explanations that explain only those observations that they have chosen to make ...

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@KaseiJin,

From the editorial description of The Embodied Mind (Varela et al) on Amazon:

Quote:

The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

This is one of the source texts in the study of embodied cognition. Others sources include Maurice Merleau Ponty, Gregory Bateson's Steps To an Ecology of Mind, and the Buddhist Abhidhamma, which provides a phenomenological account of the basis of experience (among other things). See also Neuroanthropology.

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

I will respond, to a degree, and in a 'last-in-first-out' manner, to a number of points here, and will allow for some return on that, but will otherwise then go into my quite over due presentation entry (for this thread).

Whoever;102432 wrote:

K - How would you define 'having a condition of consciousness'? It must be a very clear definition if you can hold such a strong opinion.

If you would carefully consider the OP, and posts numbers #3, #60, #101, and #103, I am quite certain you will find the answer to your above question--plus in the presentation and argument to follow.

paulhanke;102420 wrote:

... if this is a dismissal of the intrinsic cardiac system as being relevant to consciousness. . .

It isn't.

Your presentation, jeeprs, in your post number 149, is well taken; your stance and frame of mind given fair credit for. It only remains for you to fill out that skeleton with muscle, flesh, and blood--and of course, brain, right?!

jeeprs;102088 wrote:

As far as the brains situtation in 'the body' is concerned, how would it be possible to isolate those aspects of consciousness that occur in 'the neurons' without reference to their connection to the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system?

If you were to carefully go over the outline, as hyperlinked above, I am quite hopeful that you'd recognize that 'consciousness' requires the condition of having conscious (that quasi-noun), and brain, as is, does (just as you point out) extend to those sub-systems. In nature, we do not find brains, or ganglion systems external to body systems, so I'm not sure of what the drive is, actually, in your mentioning that. (but I'll leave that as it is)

paulhanke;101747 wrote:

... unfortunately, by definition your criteria eliminates all claims but scientific claims ... as this is a philosophy forum, I think a more appropriate criteria is called for ... perhaps "all assertions and claims will have to be consistent with empirical data" ... this is still a pretty stringent criteria for a philosophical discussion, but as many philosophers of mind already toe this line I don't think it is an unreasonable one for this thread ...

That sounds pretty fair, indeed. As a rhetorical question, nevertheless, I'd tend to wonder; should we consider that the discipline of philosophy at large (and please note that 'at large' hue) would deny that the test of time and experience by all life forms on the planet, is something to be ignored?

NO; it is most evident that we have a much broader field of inspection than that which philosophy itself, in the broad sense, shares its umbrella with. For that reason, of course, we would be enlightened to look at elements of the philosophy of science, at pragmatism, and naturalism, and so on. . . Therefore, while this is a philosophy forum, philosophy at large will have to to stand the test of time and experience with all the earth.

Then, lastly (and please do take this adverbial seriously), as for the definition being employed here, please do check your basic English dictionary entries, as well as the OP of this thread (and the follow ups [linked above]). Also, please keep in mind that the definition of the common English adjective 'conscious' is quite fixed, and is a matter of brain--also, that the English term 'consciousness,' is a noun which is formed from the root, 'conscious.'. In the occasionally found expression, "We don't know what consciousness is," we are pressed (by the total of aggregate evidence) to understand that that is equal to our saying that 'we don't know what a single atom of potassium is,' and not equal to saying that we do not have a well established working definition of potassium--and in that line of reasoning, a definition for consciousness.

From here, I will go into the presentation (repeating a little); all the while allowing for cross examination (but I may not resond to all that . . . only what appears most 'productive-in-outcome')

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;103626 wrote:

If you were to carefully go over the outline, as hyperlinked above, I am quite hopeful that you'd recognize that 'consciousness' requires the condition of having conscious (that quasi-noun), and brain, as is, does (just as you point out) extend to those sub-systems.

... quick question for clarification: when you say "'consciousness' requires the condition of having conscious (that quasi-noun), and brain", do you mean "conscious" and "brain" are necessary and sufficient? necessary but not sufficient? sufficient but not necessary? ...

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From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

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