From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@pagan,

With the cloudy skies of the burden of being overly busy slowly thinning, I am able to actually post again. I wish to extend my warm, and truly heartfelt gratitude to you all for patiently acknowledging my circumstances. (of course, there is still a degree of cloudiness, so . . .) Also, please do understand that I'm in a kind of 'time lock' state, and will be responding to earlier points, as well as simply continuing where I had left off at.

salima;94207 wrote:

i think we are having a difference of opinion on what the definition of consciousness is. if it is as agreed upon in prior threads 'the sum of experience' then you cannot know if a person who is unable to relate to you that he is experiencing anything is in fact experiencing anything or not, as in the case of terry schiavo-and kj was able to explain away as insignificant all the bodily responses that her relatives were interpretting as life signs. but at the same time, that to me is not quite enough to prove the consciousness has ended, or cannot be revived.

[INDENT]While I am still in process with this . . .
[INDENT][INDENT]

KaseiJin;94531 wrote:

I would like to now (as mentioned in the OP) bring in some posts (maybe 3, and one at a time to prevent automerge) which will deal more closely with the understanding of 'consciousness' as a defined thing, .

[/INDENT][/INDENT]I'll insert at this point that I am simultaneously arguing that we have a better, more practical and accurate definition/description of conscious, and thus by extension, consciousness, than what had been put forward on earlier threads.

[/INDENT]

jeeprs;94370 wrote:

In 1995 a study was published in the Journal of Neurophysiology which examined aspects of nerual structure through transcranial magnetic stimulation in relation to the acquisition of new fine motor skills.

[Journal of Neurophysiology, Vol 74, Issue 3 1037-1045]

[INDENT]That study by A. Pascual-Leone et al. was one of the earlier studies done, but not the only one--and a number have been undertaken, and followed up on from that one, since then.(1) The neurons which lead to motor activity fire with that 'imagined' or 'invisioned' act as well, and there is some attribute of this which is described in the 'mirror neuron' theory. (which interpretation evidence is strong, yet there are still some interpretations towards the negative such as in Angelika Lingnau, et al., (2009) Asymmetric fMRI adaptation reveals no evidence for mirror neurons in humans. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci, Vol 106, no. 24, June; pp 9925-9930, where they sum up on page 9928, "Our findings are compatible with the view that activation in mirror neuron areas reflects the faciliation of motor programs as a consequence of action understanding." {which tends to speak against 'direct matching'}

Thoughts put forward in that post, along with those related to this in essence--in especially posts numbers #69, #77, #74 through #79 --I will touch on along the way, as this pertains to part of one major clarification I am arguing; viz. the continuum of conscious which is the distiction of ganglion/brain build.
[/INDENT]

paulhanke;94653 wrote:

... so to summarize, you are moving forward with the assertion that the following observations are sufficient to circumscribe consciousness:

1. Evidence of wakefulness
2. Body language indications of "background emotions"
3. Evidence of attention
4. Evidence of concentration (to the exclusion of attending to something else one might otherwise attend to)

[INDENT]I am pretty sure that reconsideration of the original context in whole will not allow us to arrive at the word 'circumscribe', and wish to point out here, that through a number of preliminary steps which have been omitted in the opening arguments (due to the understanding that there is no need to restate was is most obvious, so as to save room) we are focusing on entities which house a brain. This is true in that while what you have said about the 'first-place-subjective-understanding' of the active brain at that level being a first step, that is included in what need not be restated. Then, from that perspective, it will do us more good to go from the objective view in order to understand whatever involvement there may be of brain. One further reason for the pragmaticality of this procedure is simply that each of us, as an individual (the subjective entity), will be in opposition with, yet in great similarity of active-zone with, all other brain housing entities.

It goes without saying that it is most evident that if we were to remove the cortical sheet of a 'bigger brained' entity, we would still have something going (we can say 'conscious' here), but that if we decide to remove everything down to the floor of the medulla, we will have nothing in the way of conscious. (this is something that those such as Alva Noe, even [though it's a bit hidden under stuff] would not deny, it appears) Therefore, it can be seen to be most efficient to understand the subjective brain by study of brain objectively in the first place.

[/INDENT]
Then, in picking up: in continuation, we would want to look at the inner aspect, the subjective (or first person) aspects which the third party will be observing and measuring (as in acting/reacting towards, with, or against). Here, most unfortunately, is where we can run into a mine field which requires all kinds of acrobatic tip-toeing; 'can,' I point out (it can also be avoided). There is a way to avoid that, if a person so wishes, and yet arrive the desired location of having an adequate understanding of the definition/description of consciousness.

One first large and arguably ambigious umbrella of a description is phenominal consciousness and access consciousness. It must firstly be observed that these ideas, mostly propogated earlier on by Block, are both talking about the singularity of a state of consciousness (as of an outcome, or result of being in that state).

The former will be the result of an event of sensory input acknowledgment--say the trace of the sweetness of a ripe strawberry, the degree of tone, hue, and brightness of the redness of it, the sharpness of the sting that the wasp's stinger made you suddenly aware of, and so on. The latter will be the result of a (potential) event of, for example, relating the events of the day verbally, drawing up an emotion memory of that particular strawberry picking episode, when reflecting on it after having seen an ad in a magazine for whipcream, and so on. (multiply system integration)

We can find ever so slightly overlapping and hued definitions such as creature consciousness, talking about that basic definition of being awake and aware, transitive consciousness, and state consciousness (Rosenthal, 2009). Additional, along the same line as above, we can find terms such as meta-self awareness, private & public self-awareness (two catagories under the compound noun), consciousness, and (as we would expect with the language we've had up to now) unconsciousness. (Morin, 2006; Silvia, 2001; etc)

After that, if we were to dance among the mine ladened field of flowers, we will find all kinds of theories and models being presented, and a seemingly never ending 'hornet's nest' (to borrow a term given a certain location on the battlefield at Shiloh [Mississippi, USA--Civil War]). Globalist to localist accounts from the most specualitive (globalists McFadden, John; localists Hamerof, Penrose) will be found along with the more 'hard-data-based,' such as global neuronal workspace (Baars, 1988); carrying more accuracy.(2) We find things like core consciousness, primary consciousness, implicit/explicit consciousness, and first-order theories, high-order theories (HOT), and then some.

We will surely find that elements that are being looked at by all this will overlap, and are real neuronal events, and thus we can screen and boil it all down into a more practical understanding without worrying too much about hard problems or easy problems, hard questions, or easy questions--although such do make for good philosophy (as a discipline).

In hopefully only one more post, I will try to narrow down and solidify the definition/description of consciousness (and in agreement with the general dictionary average entry provided in the OP) as well as clarify the argument of conscious continuum. After that (and as mentioned earlier, I will bring some posts of mine from the previous thread) I will give presentation to support the understanding being presented and argued here. From time to time, I will provide source material, but not feel it is that necessary. I simply offer an example in the citations below. Major source material up to this post, and the post to come.(3)

1. P.G. Martin, et al. (2009) Reproducible Measurement of Human Motoneuron Excitablilty With Magnetic Stimulation of the Corticospinal Track. Journal of Neurophysiology Vol 102, issue 1, July; pp 606-613;

Marc H. Schieber (2002) Training and Synchrony in the Motor System. Journal of Neuroscience, Vol 22, issue 13, July; pp 5277-5281;

Katja Stefan, et al. (2005) Formation of a Motor Memory by Action Observation. Journal of Neuroscience Vol 25, issue 41, October; pp 9339-9346;

Karin Rosenkranz, et al. (2007) Differential Modulation of Motor Cortical Plasticity and Excitability in Early and Late Phases of Human Motor Learning. Journal of Neuroscience Vol 27, issue 44, October; pp 12058-12066;

Bjorg E. Kilavik, et al. (2009) Long-Term Modifications in Motor Cortical Dynamics Induced by Intensive Practice. Journal of Neuroscience, Vol 29, issue 40, October; pp 12653-12663;

A couple of other related studies come to mind, but I happen to have one in front of me at the moment, by Denise J. Cai, et al. (2009) REM, not incubation, improves creativity by priming associative networks. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. {This is short for Proceedings of the National Acadamy of Sciences of the United States of America} Vol 106, no. 25, June; pp 10130-10134

2. We can find elements of accuracy, and overlap, in almost all of these, but the better theories will have the least 'real-time' problems--as I take and understand them in relation to hard data from the neurosciences.

3. A. Revonosuo, (2009) Altered and Exceptional States of Consciousness. Encyclopedia of Consciousness, vol 1; pp 9-21;

D.B. Edelman, (2009) Animal Consciousness. Ency. Consc., vol 1; pp 23-35;

V. de GArdelle and S. Kouider, (2009) Cognitive Theories of Consciousness. ibid.; pp 135-146;

D.M. Rosenthal, (2009) Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness. ibid.; pp 157-169;

A.K. Seth, (2009) Functions of Consciousness. ibid.; pp 279-293;

S. Kouider (2009) Neurobiological Theories of Consciousness. Ency. Consc. vol 2; pp 87-100 {{This author looks like a Buddhist monk...completely clean shaven head...}}

W. Seager (2009) Philosophical Accounts of Self-Awareness and Introspection. ibid.; pp 187-198;

R. Saxe (2009) Theory of Mind (Neural Basis). ibid.; pp 401-409;

J.F. Kihlstrom (2009) Unconscious Cognition. ibid.; pp 411-422;

K.C.A. Bongers and A. Dijksterhuis, (2009) Unconscious Goals and Motivation. ibid; pp 423-432;

A. Morin (2006) Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol 15; pp 358-371;

J. Lesley (2006) Awareness is relataive: Dissociation as the organixation of meaning. Consc. Cog., Vol 15; pp 593-604;

J.H. Fecteau, et al. (2004) Hemisphere differences in conscious and unconscious word reading. Consc. Cog., Vol 13; pp 550-564;

D.M. Bowler, et al. (2007) Factors affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of adults with Asperger's syndrome. Consc. Cog., Vol 16; pp 124-143;

A.K. Seth, et al. (2005) Criteria for consciousness in humans and other animals. Consc. Cog., Vol. 14; pp 119-139;

A.K. Seth, B.J. Baars (2005) Neural Darwinism and consciousness. Consc. Cog., Vol 14; pp 140-168;

E. Norman, et al. (2007) Graduations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task. consc. Cog., Vol 16; pp 809-837;

S. Topolinski, F. Strack (2009) Scanning the "Fringe" of consciousness: What is felt and what is not felt in intuitions about semantic coherence. Consc. Cog., Vol 18; pp 608-618;

S. Dehaene, L. Naccache (2001) Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, Vol 79; pp 1-37;

N. Kanwisher (2001) Nerual events and perceptual awareness. Cognition, Vol 79; pp 89-113;

A.K. Seth, et al. (2008) Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vo. 12, No. 8; pp 314-321;

B.J. He and M.E. Raichle (2009) The fMRI signal, slow cortical potential and consciousness. ibid, Vol 13, No. 7; pp 302-309;

((OOPS...ran out of time here...while I had wanted to list some eight to ten other papers, and an additional handful or so of books and reference works...but I guess this is enough to explain that I am quite serious in my studies))

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@KaseiJin,

Ninjavideo.net - BBC: Horizon - The Secret You (Flash)

i found this other link to the horizon programme "the secret you" just broadcast. There are divx versions on this site to. This link is not restricted to the uk like the bbc media player.

1 Reply

@pagan,

Here, I will add to the build towards the definition/description of consciousness which, in a practical way, would better be maintained for the purpose of this thread (and, not stopping there, I would urge, and argue, that it be maintained at large) and then recap in summary; from there, I'll bring up other, earlier posts and points in an on-going presentation of further postings. (much of which will be a bit involved and tedious, and, [I apologize in advance] slow; but shouldn't we all, to our individual capabilites endevor to post in such mode?)

From time to time, one will come across mention of the most secure understanding that 'most (sometimes put at 80%, but without any clear empirical data to support it) of what goes on in the brain, goes on without us knowing of it--thus unconscious activity. We will also run across the likes of:

[indent][indent]It is perhaps unfortunate that the word unconscious is used to describe both lack of consciousness, as during sleep or a coma, and mental processes that lie below the level of consciousness during waking.(italics his)(1)

You should note here an important point: Attention and consciousness are two different animals. First off, cortical processors control the orientation of attention. Although there may be top-down vountary control, there may also be bottom-up unconscious signals of such strength that they can co-opt attention. We experience this all the time.(italics his)(2)

Conscious and unconscious processing differ on several dimensions, including depth and spedificity of processing. Action can be initiated without consciousness and some aspects of preception or memory can also take place without consciousness.(3)

. . . to understand consciousness we need to compare at least its presence to its absence; consciousness without unconsciousness is meaningless.(4)

Neither attention nor consciousness are monoliths but rather occur in levels and grades, from simple (core consciousness) to complex (extended consciousness).(5)

Multiple stimuli are continuously being processed in parallel by the sensory systems, eliciting a brief transient sensory response which in most cases fades after [a] few hundred milliseconds, without reaching working memory, executive control and consciousness.(correction mine--indefinite article missing in original)(6)

Conscious level: applies to a whole organism and refers to a scale ranging from total unconsciousness (e.g. death and coma) to vivid wakefulness.(7)

In the present experiments, we show that unconscious signals are processed more elaborately (probably activating brain areas further downstream) when the current task demands it than when they are irrelevant for the task at hand. This is in line with the idea that the depth and scope of neural processing of masked stimuli is modulated by top-down settings of the cognitive system. However, more importantly, our results go one step further by showing that cognitive control processes itself can be triggered unconsciously. So . . .unconscious stimuli seem able to exert a form of cognitive control.(8)

There is no obvious qualitative transformation in either the anatomy or the physciology of the central nervous system of human or non-human animals, no phylogenetic Rubicon in the animal kingdom. Similarly, there is no clear ontogenetic line that is crossed as the brain grows in the womb, no single event or change in brain physiology, and certainly not a birth, when consciousness might be generated in all-or-none fashion.(bold mine)(9)

Unconscious operation of the brain is thus the rule rather than the exception throughout evolutionary history of the animal kingdom. It's a linguistic quirk, or a revealing cultural assumption, that the older (unconscious) processes are defined as negations of the newer one (consciousness). Language isn't perfect.(10)[/indent][/indent]

And I am sure that many will fully understand, and agree with that very last observation--'language isn't perfect.' However, it is pretty much most of what we have and use to communicate, so we should best be careful with it, as well as make efforts to decrease as much dead weight within it, as we use it. This leads into one area which I have been presenting all along, namely, that consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of conscious activity, and that conscious activity is a brain thing. One major factor, if not THE major factor, which determines this, is that brain projects signaling (whereas, for example, other cell types do not). I use the term 'project' in the very literal sense of neuron axonal properties and activites.

Therefore the condition of having any of the activity events, above the molecular level (for more practical reasons), that occur in the brain, by brain, and of brain, is better termed conscious activity--even if it is not acknowledged cognitively in the range which is the condition of having consciousness. Thus we can more efficiently term this overall condition as the condition of conscious (and this is a noun here), and we can fairly demonstrate that conscious is peculiar to ganglion/brain, and is a continuum across species from a certain level especially, as well as within the total of the organ's condition. This understand will be demonstrated by further postings.

So to go back over the presentation towards building a working definition/description for consciousness (for the purposes of this thread, yes, but for a more overall application as well) we can confirm the usefulness of refined catagorial descriptions such as phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, and, core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core consciousness is when second-order neural maps act on and correlate first-order neural maps (which are those of a percieved object/event and the organism percieving). It can be seen as coming into formulation when the brain generates a non-verbal account of how the organism's representation is affected by the organism's processing of an object, and when this process enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context. We can hold the second-order mapping as being 'the knowing.' Core consciousness will result in what has been termed the 'proto-self.' The posteromedial cortex (PMC) is hypthesized as playing a major role here, likely in connection with midline cortical structures.

The latter, extended consciousness, is seen to depend on core consciousness; since it requires (episodic and semantic) explicit working and long term memory. Extended consciousness builds towards the 'autobiographical self,' and encompasses a wide array of brain regions. It holds, along with memory, language and reasoning.

For the level of conscious brain activity we can call consciousness, therefore, it can very well be stated that mental acknowledgment is essential. If the nerve fibers leading from the right foot are cut, the tack that we just stepped on will lead to little result. With eyes fully intact, extremely little, if any at all, vision will be created with the visual cortex is fully disabled. This also carries across to memory recall (even with inattended factors playing possible roles in certain functions or results of a state of consciousness) in that it is acknowledging content held in the synaptic structure of brain tissue. It would be responsible for self-detection, self-recognition, theory of mind (TOM), as well as that autobiographical self.

Mental acknowledgment, in turn, has its roots in the basic operation of certain brain structures. Certain damage to the agmydala will leave one unable to mentally acknowledge fear from other faces, for example, or damage to a certain association area of the parietal cortex causes sensory neglect. The genetical aspect of the 'hard wired' elements of brain build also play a role.

In short then, we need sensory input and its acknowledgment upon which and by which object/event memory is formed, which is at the core of self-autobiographical content. All of this very much appears to require integration of systems and brain areas which means a certain level of conscious (as described above). To have consciousness, therefore, is to have the condition of conscious above a certain level of brain tissue activity, with degree of conscious descending as brain tissue is redistributed or removed, with the total lack of conscious (death) being the final outcome of full removal. What we continually see here, is that brain is a requirement for consciousness--by definition/description !!

As Ned Block closes his contribution in The Cognitive Neurosciences (Fourth Ed. 2009)(11), speaking of a paper by Dennett(12) concludes that, and his whole paper, by saying, "Although Dennett resists the obvious conclusion, it is hard to avoid the impression that the biology of the brain is what matters to consciousness--at least the kind we have--and that observation favors the biological account."

Consciousness, by definition/description (as seen from the total of posts building towards that in this thread, but not this thread alone, by any means) requires conscious. Conscious, in turn, requires brain, as both an organ, and modules of tissue within the organ. Therefore for our definition/description of consciousness, brain is a must, and all entities which do not house brain (a level above mere ganglion) cannot be said to have the condition of conscious; and thus a lack for the potential of consciousness. (to label new terms for such other conditions will prove to be most efficient, as this domain is complete already)

1. Rodney Cotterill, (1998) Enchanted Looms-Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers, p 296-footnote;
2. Michael S. Gazzaniga, (2008) Human-The Science Behind What Makes Us Unique, p 286;
3. A. Cleeremans, (2001) International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol 4, p 2588;
4. Bernard J. Baars, (2003) Consciousness, Cognitive Theories of. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Vol 1, p 738;
5. Antonio Damasio, Kaspar Meyer, (2009) Consciousnes: An Overview of the Phenomenon and of Its Possible Neural Basis.The Neurology of Consciousness-Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology, p 5;
6. Ariel Zylberberg, et al., (2009) Neurophysiological bases of exponential sensory decay and top-down memory retrieval: a model. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience-Original Research Article, Vol 3, Article 4, March; p 1 (of 1-16);
7. Anil K. Seth, et al., (2008) Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol 12, No. 8, August; p 314-glossary (of 314-321);
8. Simon van Gaal, et al., (2008) Fontal Cortex Mediates Uncounsciously Triggered Inhibitory Control. Journal of Neuroscience, Vol 28, no. 32, August; p 8060 (of 8053-8062); [indent][also see hakwan C. Lau, Richard E. Passingham, (2007) Unconscious Activation of the Cognitive Control System in the Human Prefrontal Cortex. Jour. Neruosci., Vol 27(21), May, pp 5805-5811; Dario J. Englot, et al., (2009) Cortical Deactivation Induced by Subcortical Network Dysfunction in Limbic Seizures/ ibid., Vol 29(41), October, pp 13006-13018; Ruth Abulafia, et al. (2009) Cerebral Activity during the Anesthesia-Like State Induced by Mesopontine Microinjection of Pentobarbital. ibid., Vol 29(21), May; pp 7053-7064; ][/indent]
9. Susan A. Greenfield, Toby F.T. Collins, (2005) A neuroscientific approach to consciousness; The Boundries of Consciousness; Neurobioloby and Neuropathology, Progress in Brain Research, Vol 150, pp 11 (of 11-23, 586, 587);
10. Joseph LeDoux (2002) Synaptic Self-How Our Brains Become Who We Are, p 11;
11. Ned Block, (2009) Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness. The Cognitive Neurosciences, MIT Press; pp 1119, 1120 (of 1111-1121);
12. D. Dennett, (2001) Are we explaining consciousness yet. Cognition, Vol 79; pp 221-237.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;99780 wrote:

To have consciousness, therefore, is to have the condition of conscious above a certain level of brain tissue activity, with degree of conscious descending as brain tissue is redistributed or removed, with the total lack of conscious (death) being the final outcome of full removal.

... not that I would be one to argue that the human brain isn't at center stage with respect to human consciousness, but if I'm reading this right this particular argument seems to be a little off ... are you saying that a child that has had half their brain removed as a last-resort treatment for epilepsy is only "half conscious"? ... that people with bigger brains are "more conscious" than people with smaller brains? ...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

paulhanke;99999 wrote:

... if I'm reading this right this particular argument seems to be a little off ... are you saying that a child that has had half their brain removed as a last-resort treatment for epilepsy is only "half conscious"? ... that people with bigger brains are "more conscious" than people with smaller brains? ...

This would surely be found to be mostly a matter of linguistically based concepts, perhaps. The reason I say 'perhaps' here, is because we may be able to recognized it without language as well--although I tend to think that it is mostly the language- rooted element which gives rise to the concern; at the moment.

Firstly, as far as the evidence that we have, it would be hard to discount the validity of the conclusion that it tends much more so to lead to; which evidence and conclusion would have to firstly be countered by other evidence and data. So, for us to take up a position which challenges that evidence's (and conclusion's) correctness, we would more expectedly have to present counter evidence against it, I would argue. Can we presently verify that the understanding is off?

As best as I can tell, the conflict here appears to be 1) in the expression, 'half conscious,' 2) in the matter of actual, historical cases of lobotomy, and 3) the presented and argued concept behind the word 'conscious' here.

Regarding the term 'half,' one thing that comes to mind is the 'negative baggage' which any 'half' expression carries in English language cultures: half (as in a child from an international/racial couple) half arsed, half truth, etc.. If we were to carry out a lobectomy for epilepsy or schizophrenia, and actually remove a section of brain (rather than simply cut connection to it, as in leukotomy) we would have to admit that that brain would have lost some volume of tissue. To that degree, it would not be off to say that the patient would then have less brain than before surgery. Now, to word that as the 'the patient has half a brain,' would simply be adding unnecessary negative baggage, so we would want to avoid that.

Then, as far as I have studied, there have been no surgical procedures where actually some half of the actual brain tissue of a brain has been removed from within the cranal cavity. And of course, surgical case histories where some major degree of tissue has been removed, as in the case HM (to be presented later), there has been an easily noticable degree of conscious loss--when compared, of course, to the pre-surgical brain build/state. (Please do note that the condition of having degrees of consciousness is not meant here.)

Which brings us to the concept that the usage of conscious in this sense is--once again. We can have a patient who has lost little brain volume, yet which brain has lost a major degree of conscious--most evident in the lack of that range which falls into that of having consciousness--as in the persistent vegetative state. Then, we can find examples where there has been a more noticeable amount of brain tissue loss, but where hardly any effect can be detected at all in degree of conscious. We will also find cases where simply areas of brain have been disconnected. These will present with various degrees of conscious difference (compared to pre-surgery, infarction, insult), and often not enough to be detected without certain measuring methods.

As per argument and evidences, there is no sound reason to reject the more efficient application of this sense of the word conscious, and in line with that, there is no sound reason to construe that a loss of working brain volume, will not mean a loss of that much conscious material. Therefore cases where a person has lost some degree of brain due the various reasons, we can say that that person has lost that degree of conscious potential. That may, or may not affect the condition of having the potential for a certain degree and/or quality of consciousness, but often does--in various degrees and qualities.

It is more practical and efficient to implement the word conscious in this sense which is being presented, although it may take some getting used to. In this sense, however, we can say that a normal human brain has a higher volume for conscious than a normal cat brain, than a normal rat brain, than a normal fly brain. We can also say that a person who has had some brain removed, has less conscious than before the removal, but there is no use, nor leverage, in expressing it in that way. Why cast it in a negative tone, when it is simply neutral in nature?

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;100015 wrote:

Then, as far as I have studied, there have been no surgical procedures where actually some half of the actual brain tissue of a brain has been removed from within the cranal cavity.

... the procedure is called a hemispherectomy: Strange but True: When Half a Brain Is Better than a Whole One: Scientific American ... and the young patients who have had the procedure demonstrate as high a degree of consciousness as anyone with a whole brain ... I think this calls into question the assertion that "consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of conscious activity" ... to the depth that you have described it thus far, "conscious activity" is merely a synonym for "brain activity" ... and so if your hypothesis is that consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of brain activity, then your hypothesis would appear to be falsified by the evidence of hemispherectomy ... that is, cases such as this clearly demonstrate the relatively low correlation between the simple volume of brain tissue/activity and consciousness ...

KaseiJin;100015 wrote:

Why cast it in a negative tone, when it is simply neutral in nature?

... because brain-volume-based claims (if that is indeed the thrust of your claim) harken back to naive (and negative) 19th century claims that people with bigger brains are more intelligent ...

2 Replies

@paulhanke,

If I may interject, I think you two are actually promoting the same concept of consciousness but, unfortunately, such language barriers/restricitions are inadequate at fully explaining one's stance towards this particular idea -that being levels of consciousness.

We would agree that consciousness definitely has a sort of hierarchical structure or degree that encompasses perceptual awareness and this is noted by "alterations" to the brain. Again, I understand the vague and ambiguous terminology here is quite irritating so perhaps some examples will help. To take some illustrations from Ramachandran, people who have Capgras Syndrome believe that friends, family members, and sometimes even themselves, are actually impostors posing as their identical friend, family member, etc. Everything else about them normal except this delusion they have. The studies conducted by Ramachandran et al. show that this delusion is the result of "damage" to the brain (more specifically the connections from the temporal lobes and the lymbic system). The neuronal connections between these two locations have been severed, thus resulting in a loss of "awareness." The man/woman doesnt have the ability to associate certain people with emotional content. Damage to the brain results in a lack of cognitive capabilities.

Likewise, in Synesthesia there are more connections or cross-wiring involved in the fusiform gyrus which thus results in an increase of cognitive capabilities (which some of the perks would be associating sounds with colors, numbers with spatiality, and so forth). And this is further noted by ourselves in that of our prefrontal cortex and the abilities it bestows upon us. So to highlight, there isnt a loss of consciousness per se but rather the level or degree of consciousness has either declined or increased. A cat is still conscious and has subjective experience but doesnt have near as much "consciousness" as we do.

I hope this is relevant and that I didnt write all this for nothing. Smile

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

Kielicious;100175 wrote:

A cat is still conscious and has subjective experience but doesnt have near as much "consciousness" as we do.

... which, unfortunately, exposes one of the traps laid by KJ's noun-ification of "conscious" - the conscious you refer to here is not KJ's conscious ... and it is ridiculously easy to misconstrue what KJ is saying due to this new use of a common word within the domain of discourse in which it originated (somebody stop me before I misconstrue again!) ... anyhoo, as best as I can make out, KJ's "conscious" is more or less a synonym for brain activity ("Therefore the condition of having any of the activity events, above the molecular level (for more practical reasons), that occur in the brain, by brain, and of brain, is better termed conscious activity--even if it is not acknowledged cognitively in the range which is the condition of having consciousness. Thus we can more efficiently term this overall condition as the condition of conscious") ... so whenever I read KJ's posts I try to remember to replace "conscious" with "brain activity", but there's a trap there, too - KJ uses "conscious" interchangeably as an adjective or his new noun form without a whole lot of warning ... so to rephrase your sentence the KJ way, "A cat still has conscious ..." by virtue of having an active brain ... in fact, a cat with half a brain, or a third of a brain, or a thousandth of a brain still has conscious, as long as that sliver of brain tissue can still "project signaling" (something only brain tissue does, according to KJ - but I think the endocrine and immune systems might take exception to that characterization Smile

) ... so where do we stand with KJ's presentation? - "brain" (tissue) gives rise to brain activity (aka "conscious") which at a certain threshold of general activity is otherwise known as consciousness (and then beyond that mind?) ... what seems to me to be lacking in this train is the systemic perspective: a brain situated in a body situated in the world give rise to brain activity which in a certain complex dynamic organization is otherwise known as consciousness ... now, in his most recent post KJ seems to be starting to tip his hat to the systemic nature of consciousness ("We can have a patient who has lost little brain volume, yet which brain has lost a major degree of conscious--most evident in the lack of that range which falls into that of having consciousness") - so perhaps it will turn out that I have jumped the gun in finding things to object to (or perhaps it was KJ who jumped the gun in rolling his deductive train out of the station before laying all the tracks Smile

) ...

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@KaseiJin,

The trouble with this search for a definition of consciousness is that we are utterly reliant on first-person reports. The nature of our reports will depend on how extensively we have explored our own consciousness, and so we can expect a variety of views.

Science, or what we usually call science, is incapable of establishing the existence of consciousness. It can study only behaviour. As Varella puts it, we have as much chance of finding consciousness by digging into the brain as we have of finding gravity by digging into the Earth. If we have no scientific test for consciousness then what are we trying to define?

What bothers me is that there is all this talk of theories which, if true, would render Buddhist doctrine false. Yet this is unfalsifiable. Ergo, these theories will never be more than conjectures vulnerable to reasonable objections. It seems to me that in modern consciousness studies we do not study consciousness and are basically, if you'll pardon the vulgarity, pissing in the wind.

Chalmers has concluded that we need another ingredient in our mind-matter theories, and without it must settle for naturalistic dualism. This pragmatic theory treats both mind and matter as fundamental, neither being epiphenomenal on the other, and this nonreductive approach seems to me to be the only alternative to an earthquake scale paradigm shift in the 'western' worldview.

Hmm, maybe I've wandered off topic here.

According to Kant, Hegel and mysticism there is such a thing as conceptually unstructured awareness. For Kant this is the proper subject of rational psychology. Do we include this in the definition, or is this something other than the consciousness we are trying to define?

1 Reply

@Whoever,

Whoever;100272 wrote:

Ergo, these theories will never be more than conjectures vulnerable to reasonable objections. It seems to me that in modern consciousness studies we do not study consciousness and are basically, if you'll pardon the vulgarity, pissing in the wind.

... scientific theories are by definition nothing more than conjectures vulnerable to reasonable objections - that is the nature of science ... the great thing about scientific theories, though, is that they are so grounded in observation as to allow us to make highly accurate predictions (some of which are with respect to inherent un-predictability, e.g., the uncertainty principle) Smile

... so do consciousness studies study consciousness? - probably no less so than material studies study materiality ... the issue is that observations of either are mere projections of "objective reality" as mediated by physical senses/instruments and conceptual traditions/paradigms ... what is interesting here is that we as individuals may actually have a higher degree of access to the "objective reality" of our own consciousness than we have to the "objective reality" of materiality - the implication being that our metaphysics of consciousness could actually be closer to "objective reality" than our metaphysics of materiality ... and since metaphysics provides the raw ideas for science, a science of consciousness could actually be closer to "objective reality" than a science of materiality ... the logical conclusion being that if we're just pissing in the wind with a science of consciousness, then we're really just pissing in the wind with a science of materiality! Smile

...

Whoever;100272 wrote:

Chalmers has concluded that we need another ingredient in our mind-matter theories, and without it must settle for naturalistic dualism. This pragmatic theory treats both mind and matter as fundamental, neither being epiphenomenal on the other, and this nonreductive approach seems to me to be the only alternative to an earthquake scale paradigm shift in the 'western' worldview.

... while this is non-reductive in the sense that fundamental matter is not reducible to fundamental mind (and vice versa), isn't it still highly reductive/eliminative otherwise? ... that is, isn't everything above fundamental matter and fundamental mind still epiphenomena? - the human body is simply an epiphenomenon of fundamental matter? - the human consciousness is simply an epiphenomenon of fundamental mind? ... not to mention the problem of how these two epiphenomena could possibly interact ...

Whoever;100272 wrote:

According to Kant, Hegel and mysticism there is such a thing as conceptually unstructured awareness. For Kant this is the proper subject of rational psychology. Do we include this in the definition, or is this something other than the consciousness we are trying to define?

... I think the modern equivalent to this in scientific circles is to look at the universe from a systems perspective ... given the degrees of freedom of the universe, there is a phase space of possibilities ... this phase space is almost infinitely large relative the the actual historical trajectory that the universe has taken to-date through that phase space ... that human "awareness" is a possibility that falls within the universe's phase space of possibilities cannot be doubted - we are the the existence proof ... but unlike for Kant, Hegel, and mysticism, in the systems view the fact that human awareness exists now does not imply that it has always existed nor was inevitable ... human awareness is but one vanishingly small possibility amongst an infinitude of other unimaginable possibilities ...

2 Replies

@paulhanke,

I have always believed the brain could be just a device for amplifying thoughts. Our psyche acts as bridge between the material world and the spirit world. Nothing in science can remove that possibility for me.

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@paulhanke,

Thanks for getting back, Paul--and nice to read your posting there too, Kielicious. Also, tipped hat to you, Whoever.

paulhanke;100091 wrote:

... the procedure is called a hemispherectomy: Strange but True: When Half a Brain Is Better than a Whole One: Scientific American

Thanks for presenting back up information there. Actually, I had erred in taking your wording only as being emotional in nature (not without a degree of cause, however) and the idea of hemispherectomy didn't come to mind at all ! It is also a rare event, however (see above), even as lobectomies are rare enough, and I have little information in it.

I'd like to spend a little (not too much) time on this, to see if I can catch more of the field you are playing on, so as to understand both your emotional objection, and whatever possible mental insertion may be blocking the corridor; since . . .

paulhanke;100208 wrote:

... that I have jumped the gun in finding things to object to ...

this appears to fall in line with a previously noted tendency.

I would like to ask you to please more precisely expound on what the following would mean to yourself:

[indent]

paulhanke;99999 wrote:

.. a child that has had half their brain removed as a last-resort treatment for epilepsy is only "half conscious" ...(edited for purpose by me)

[/indent]

Then, if I may (for the purpose of trying to grasp your internal concepts better), I'd like to ask you to please more precisely expound on what you might have been pointing to as regards any connection between 'consciousness,' and 'general level of brain activity.' if you were to have said the following:
[indent]

paulhanke;100091 wrote:

....the hypothesis is that consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of brain activity, (edited for purpose by me)

[/indent]

And lastly, if you would, could you please tell me how you might term that condition of neural activity which is in slow-wave sleep, if you do not term it as a condition of having consciousness?

This much for now. I am still fairly tied up with a number of different things, and there's no need to rush, anyway. Thanks ! KJ

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;100472 wrote:

I would like to ask you to please more precisely expound on what the following would mean to yourself:

... actually, your response to that question clarified things - you would not assert that a person with half a brain has "half-conscious"; on the other hand, you would assert that a person with half a brain has half the conscious potential ... this idea of "conscious potential" could be interesting, in that it does not take the neuronal wiring of a human brain as the only possible wiring - the potential wirings of a blob of brain tissue the size of a human brain are huge ... and one can only imagine the results of such potential wirings ... but in fact, one could easily imagine rewiring a blob of brain tissue the size of a human brain to do what a desktop computer does, given that "computer tissue" does the same thing as brain tissue: both "project signaling" ... so does that mean that according to your definitions that a computer "has conscious"? Smile

...

KaseiJin;100472 wrote:

Then, if I may (for the purpose of trying to grasp your internal concepts better), I'd like to ask you to please more precisely expound on what you might have been pointing to as regards any connection between 'consciousness,' and 'general level of brain activity.' if you were to have said the following:

... that you don't recognize this as a paraphrasing of one of your own statements - "consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of conscious activity" - indicates that the paraphrasing is off ... so could you precisely expound on what you mean by your statement? ...

KaseiJin;100472 wrote:

And lastly, if you would, could you please tell me how you might term that condition of neural activity which is in slow-wave sleep, if you do not term it as a condition of having consciousness?

... just to be clear, did you actually mean to type "condition of having conscious"? ...

EDIT:

... actually, inserting "condition of having conscious" into your sentence and then doing my usual translation results in "how you might term that condition of neural activity which is in slow-wave sleep, if you do not term it as a condition of neural activity" ... as this makes no sense, I'm guessing that you really did mean to type "condition of having consciousness" Smile

... anyhoo, is slow-wave sleep an attractor of neural activity that can be classified as a conscious (old sense) attractor of activity? - probably not ... it probably can't even be classified as subconscious attractor of neural activity, as what we generally refer to as subconscious are interactions with the world that are not conscious (unless something surprising happens) ... so perhaps slow-wave sleep is best referred to as, well, a sleep attractor of neural activity Smile

...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

Hi Paul

I agree that scientific theories are by definition nothing more than conjectures vulnerable to reasonable objections, and that this is the nature of science ....'. But I was not suggesting that mysticism is a scientifc theory in this sense. What I meant was that if the metaphyscial scheme of Buddhism is unfalsifiable, then any theory which claims otherwise must be logically absurd. If this is not the case then the philosophy of Buddhism, more generally mysticism, would not be unfalsifiable in the first place. By 'vulnerable to reasonable objections,' I meant contrary to reason.

I agree that that consciousness studies studies consciousness probably no less than material studies studies materiality. Funny how both phenomena seem to be not there when you look closely.

As to whether we might have a 'higher degree of access to the "objective reality" of our own consciousness than we have to the "objective reality" of materiality,' I think this must be a category error. There could only be one objective reality.

Perhaps a metaphysics of consciousness would be closer to objective reality than a metaphysics of materiality, but it would have to explain both consciousness and materiality. It is clearly impossible to explain them one at a time.

Your question about 'fundamental mind' and 'fundamental matter' assumes that mind reduces to matter or vice versa. The claim of mysticism is that this is a misconception. There would be a phenomenon from which they emerge, in dependence on each other.

---------- Post added 10-29-2009 at 08:47 PM ----------

xris;100445 wrote:

I have always believed the brain could be just a device for amplifying thoughts. Our psyche acts as bridge between the material world and the spirit world. Nothing in science can remove that possibility for me.

I've wondered the same. To say that it is a device for doing something is too teleological for me, but perhaps it is a consequence of our desire to amplify them.

1 Reply

@Whoever,

Whoever;100556 wrote:

But I was not suggesting that mysticism is a scientifc theory in this sense. What I meant was that if the metaphyscial scheme of Buddhism is unfalsifiable, then any theory which claims otherwise must be logically absurd. If this is not the case then the philosophy of Buddhism, more generally mysticism, would not be unfalsifiable in the first place.

... but isn't the appeal of Buddhist philosophy precisely that it makes falsifiable predictions (and demands the attempt at falsification - "If you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha"), at least on a personal level? ... that is, if you understand the Four Noble Truths and follow the Eightfold Path you can lessen (if not end) suffering in your world - isn't this a prediction you can empirically attempt to falsify for yourself? ...

Whoever;100556 wrote:

As to whether we might have a 'higher degree of access to the "objective reality" of our own consciousness than we have to the "objective reality" of materiality,' I think this must be a category error. There could only be one objective reality.

... ah - I didn't mean to imply that I was talking about two objective realities ... I should remember next time to phrase it more along the lines of "a higher degree of access to the part of "objective reality" that relates to our own consciousness" Smile

...

Whoever;100556 wrote:

Your question about 'fundamental mind' and 'fundamental matter' assumes that mind reduces to matter or vice versa. The claim of mysticism is that this is a misconception. There would be a phenomenon from which they emerge, in dependence on each other.

... actually, I was critiquing Chalmers' naturalistic dualism by pointing out that it is still a highly reductive/eliminative metaphysics (even if fundamental mind cannot be reduced to fundamental matter, nor vice versa) - it is just a dually reductive/eliminative metaphysics (with all of the interaction problems that any dualism entails) ... monism, on the other hand, I can see less reason to argue with, as long as it's a nonreductive monism (of which a process metaphysics seems to be the only real option) ...

2 Replies

@paulhanke,

Paul, I have to admit that I am more overswayed by a tinge of disappointment, than not, but do appreciate your getting back with me. I'm quite pressed for time at this very moment, and cannot deal with the whole of your post, however wish to pinpoint one trouble which has arguably, quite possibly been haunting our exchanges.

paulhanke;100533 wrote:

...
... that you don't recognize this as a paraphrasing of one of your own statements - "consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of conscious activity" - indicates that the paraphrasing is off ... so could you precisely expound on what you mean by your statement? ...

It is not the case at all, that I did not recognize the source of your paraphrasing, and I'm momentarily at a loss as to how you might have actually been of such understanding, really. I simply used it as you had written it, in order to ask a specific question. What I had been seeing (please do take note of the power cast on the sentence by the past perfect tense application) as a prospective concern regarding presentations (both that of mine, and that of yours) is what I am trying to extract so as to examine. It is for that reason that I had specifically couched everything in my prior post the way that I did . . . and I was, and yet do, hope for answers (even if--as in your above response to my first question--it means expounding on thoughts that had been in your mind at the time of your first objection to that point in my presentation).

Sorry for the rush here, and I do hope to get back tomorrow (and if I'm lucky, tonight?) Thanks !! and I'll catch you 'round !! KJ

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

paulhanke;100565 wrote:

... but isn't the appeal of Buddhist philosophy precisely that it makes falsifiable predictions (and demands the attempt at falsification - "If you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha"), at least on a personal level? ... that is, if you understand the Four Noble Truths and follow the Eightfold Path you can lessen (if not end) suffering in your world - isn't this a prediction you can empirically attempt to falsify for yourself? ...

Quite, but not within the domain of how 'empiricists' define 'empirical', because in the case of the Buddhist discipline, you yourself are the subject. Empiricists generally will never allow this. That is kind of what they mean by 'empirical' - no 'first person' knowledge allowed. Anyways, this is off-topic, and I have lost interest in explaining consciousness, so I will but out, but quite happy to pursue that topic in the relevant thread....

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;100592 wrote:

. . . and I was, and yet do, hope for answers (even if--as in your above response to my first question--it means expounding on thoughts that had been in your mind at the time of your first objection to that point in my presentation).

... so then unless I'm mistaking you yet again, "I'd like to ask you to please more precisely expound on what you might have been pointing to ... if you were to have said the following:" is your way of asking someone to elaborate on their understanding of a statement of yours? :perplexed: ... um, okay ... ... ...

Anyhoo, back to your statement: "consciousness is a threshold above a certain, general level of conscious activity" ... I'm not sure there's much here for me to "precisely expound" upon ... to paraphrase it one more time, "as general conscious activity increases, there is a point at and above which it can be classified as consciousness" ... does that make my understanding any clearer?

---------- Post added 10-29-2009 at 11:10 PM ----------

jeeprs;100596 wrote:

Empiricists generally will never allow this. That is kind of what they mean by 'empirical' - no 'first person' knowledge allowed.

... yet isn't it interesting that each and every observation is first and foremost a first-person experience? Smile

...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

paulhanke;100565 wrote:

... but isn't the appeal of Buddhist philosophy precisely that it makes falsifiable predictions (and demands the attempt at falsification - "If you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha"), at least on a personal level? ... that is, if you understand the Four Noble Truths and follow the Eightfold Path you can lessen (if not end) suffering in your world - isn't this a prediction you can empirically attempt to falsify for yourself? ...

Ah. By 'unfalsifiable' I didn't mean untestable. Perhaps I'm misusing the term. It makes testable predictions which are unfalsifiable in practice. For example, Kant's claim that all selective conclusion about the universe are undecidable (which is a prediction of Buddhism and more generally mysticism) is testable and unfalsifiable. I should tidy up my terminology.

Quote:

... actually, I was critiquing Chalmers' naturalistic dualism by pointing out that it is still a highly reductive/eliminative metaphysics (even if fundamental mind cannot be reduced to fundamental matter, nor vice versa) - it is just a dually reductive/eliminative metaphysics (with all of the interaction problems that any dualism entails) ... monism, on the other hand, I can see less reason to argue with, as long as it's a nonreductive monism (of which a process metaphysics seems to be the only real option) ...

Ok, but dualism is nonreductive and unless the universe is paradoxical it is false. Chalmers does not disagree with this, but he concludes that we have to put up with mind-matter dualism for pragmatic reasons. For a complete theory we would need another ingredient, just as mysticism has always proposed.

Monism would be no improvement since it is dualism is disguise. This is why it cannot be made to work. For mysticism the universe would be a unity, but it would not be numerically one. Hence the use of the term 'advaita' in Hinduism and elsewhere, which means 'not-two' but does not mean one.

As well as dualism and monism there would be nondualism.

1 Reply

@Whoever,

Whoever;100624 wrote:

Monism would be no improvement since it is dualism is disguise.

... I've never heard that claim before - so how is monism simply dualism in disguise? ...

0 Replies

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