From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@paulhanke,

I am in hopes of not getting too tangled up in any emotion of arguing merely to be arguing--as it often enough leads to less forward motion that could otherwise be made--yet hope to also be clear enough, so will see if I can state this so as to get it across better? maybe?

The word choice of mine is without any real problem, and shouldn't cause any deep concern in respects to the presentation. The areas of brain, in the way of an example, here, which carry their own identity and name, namely the basal ganglion (and usually labelled in plural, yet talked of in singularity), is not the brain. This statement is fine.

Then, these structures, the basal ganglion, are areas of the brain, and in that sense, are of brain. The same holds for M1, SMA, PMA, pons, and cerebellum. The motor cortex areas, working with the skeletal loop, controls major body movement, whereas the non-loop areas do not. All of this is brain, as opposed to something else. However, there is nothing incoherent in saying that the caudate nucleus, as an example, is an area of brain, or a section of brain, or a structure of brain, or an area of the brain, or a section of the brain, or a structure of the brain, depending on sentence and contextual usage.

The starting statement:
[INDENT]

KaseiJin;104841 wrote:

It is most clear, however, that brain controls body movement.

[/INDENT]is without any real problem when taking the intention of reasoning, and the unspoken 'in opposition of,' into account. It is not something (without going below a practical level of inquiry) which is not brain which moves those muscles, thus moving the body.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;107514 wrote:

Then, these structures, the basal ganglion, are areas of the brain, and in that sense, are of brain.

... that clarifies things for me Smile

... and since it was the curious phrasing that threw me off, perhaps it would be better in the future if you simply referred to brain areas as "brain areas" (vs. the more easily mis-construable phrase "areas of brain") ... in fact, that would have worked for the original statement, too: "It is most clear, however, that various brain areas control body movement." ...

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@paulhanke,

Thanks for helping out with working on clarity, paulhanke. I would yet--all the while heartily accepting the suggestion given--entertain the hope that some educating process may also occur, in my usage in that original line (last sentence in #174). There is a certain imagery construction which the collective, non-countable noun 'brain' gives us, and this imagery better fits that which the evidences are yet showing us, and also gives better leverage of explanatory power. (It is somewhat, though, an English matter alone; I know.)

While those diagnosed with PD (which entails a spectrum) will have disturbance with the dopermagenic structures, and inability to willfully produce motor commands, HD patients will have difficiencies in GABAergic and acetylcholinergic neuron structured areas, and will have involuntary motor activities not commanded by the state of consciousness.Those diagnosed with Tourette's Syndrome (TS) will present involuntary tics (sudden, fairly continual and repetitive body movements or vocal activity(1)) along with a degree (over a range of severity) of obsessive activities. TS symptoms overlap with Obsessive-Compulsive disorder (OBC) and Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It is a neurological condition for the most part, but can be seen, in a degree (and in a sense) as a neuropsychiatric condition. Again, the basal ganglia is usually somewhat involved.

One factor which can lead to TS is a genetical one, with evidence for Slit and Trk-like 1 (SLITRK1) on chromosome 13--a de nova inversion. Also, the concordance rate for monozygotic twins ranges from around 50% to 90% (as best discerned from the evidence), with some 1:2,000 ratio for males, and 1:10,000 for females. Another considered factor leading to the disorder in some cases, or in connection with possible genetic lean, is environmental in nature. Observations that the development of TS following cases of streptocaccal infection (strep infection) strongly appeared to be the cause in some cases (and there is evidence of anti-basal ganglia antibodies (immune system fighting strep infection) misidentifying and destroying some neurons in the basal ganglia.

While the basal ganglia is a source of TS symptoms, there is also good evidence of D2 (dopamine) receptor and dopamine transporter (DAT) excess in the caudate nucleus, excess of alpha-adrenergic (a-2A) receptors in frontal regions, and evidence of dynorphin A level disturbances had been demonstrated. (this evidence is by a number of methods of investigation with the firmer evidence being through post-mortem studies) The overall effect is frontal cortical abnormality brought about by (in various combinations of cases) reduced caudate, pallidum and left lentricular nuclei volume, an unusual and material reduction, or increase, in corpus callosum area, among a few other things.

What this means in terms of cognitive results, actions, and personality, and its bearing on evidence for understanding one element of the 'continuum of consciousness,' will be touched on a little in the next post.

1. Often worded as repetitive sterotyped movements, echolalia, and echopraxia.

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@KaseiJin,

One fairly common myth, so it seems, amongst those who basically know of TS, is that those with the disorder go around blurtting out obscenities, or curse words (coprolalia). While of course some patients do let foul language come spilling out of their mouths, at the most of embarressing times even, or make obscene gestures (copropraxia), it is not true that all do; in fact, studies estimate that only from 10~15% of TS patients do so.

However a person with TS will most usually have tics, for example, they may make clicking noises, or grunts, or blurt out words or sentences over and over (more so in stressful situations). These do tend to wane and wax, and are of two types--simple and complex. One case study took note of how one patient would call his mother a slut, or tell her to f~ off, while shopping with her. At times the sexual vocalizations seem to be slightly environmentally casued--as when in a situation where there are girls around (in this case); also repeating portions of what has been said (1)).

Motor tics might be in head jerking, arm waving, scratching, touching, hitting, or pointing, amoung other things. One famous Canadian surgeon (who last I heard was still giving winter semester lectures at the U of Arizona), Mort Doran, would slouch in awkward, distorted positions, tapping colleagues on on their shoulders with his toes while discussing, for example, an up-coming operation. There are also cases of those who spit, such as John Davidson (Galashiels, Scotland) who would always do so during family meals...trying to hit everyone's plates. (but they put up 'shields' [only the father totally refused to eat with the family]).

It has been reported that there is a greater tendency (again, urban myth) that these things are totally voluntary; they can be controlled to a great degree for some period of time, but these activities (tics) are in no way voluntary (in the normal sense of the word). When professor Hollenbeck (Neurobologist at Purdue University [as of 2004]) taught his classes, the up and down movements of one arm, the twists of his head, and the barely audible sounds, all but disappear. He is quoted by Science (Vol 305, 3 Sept. '04; pp 1390-92) as saying that by the time the lectures were finished, the desire to tic was unbearable, and he'd rush back to his office to "tic, tic, tic" until that pressing urge had subsided--although tics were still there, but just that the urge that built up in stimulation had been released. When Dr. Doran goes in to do surgery, his tics are totally under control.

While it is a great incapacitation in many situations or cases, that is not always the case. Just as certain neurological abnormalities can give rise to greater function and capacity in other areas of brain build, TS does evidence a possible tendency to bring out an ability to concentrate (likely learned as a side task to conditioned suppression efforts) as seen in the areas of sports or music. John (above) was a very good basketball player, and his symptoms are at a lower level in game. Also, more famous sports people like Jim Eiesenreich (former Major League Baseball), Tim Howard (goal keeper for Manchester United), and Mike Johnston (relief pitcher for Pittsburgh Pirates), and Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf (former NBA player), as well as muscians like Michel Wolff, and another jazz drummer who says that TS really helps him focus in the rhythym, have TS. It is very possible that author Samuel Johnson may have had TS, and perhaps less sure, but possible, according to circumstantial evidence, that Wolfgang Mozart had had TS as well.

The 'urge' that comes up for the tics, and the OBC-like activity, is evidently the same that normal brain can, and has been shown to produce--a conscious (newer sense) brain thing, but not a matter of consciousness . . . not a voluntary execution of a command through a state of awareness and intent. (as has been demonstrated in open brain surgery). The fault most evidently strongly falls in inhibition loss in the systems that rely on, and make up, the basal ganglia.

The act itself, the tics and the persistent rituals are recognized and acknowledged by the state of consciousness having been activated, of course, and even the urge--the feeling that you just have to do it [perhaps like scratch that mesquito bite]--is cognized and recognized by the state of consciousness, but that sensation is brain working in an abnormal way which lies in the level of conscious brain which is below the threshold we call consciousness. (for this reason, the urge can not be surpressed, and builds up tension through spiking activity)

It has been contend that it is thinkable that the troubled girl who had formed the basis for the book (then movie) The Exorcist had had TS, and it had been misinterpreted by some observers as having had demonic possession. What appears (on the surface at least) to be contradictory in nature here, is that while brain is in control, the brain is not. That is because the element of cognizant volition in the realm of consciousness that is mind, is not able to execute inhibition of that part of the motor system that it otherwise can control through inhibition.

There are additional elements worth embedding, in the area of other sensory areas effects on M1, PMA, and SMA, before moving on with the outline, but a quick run-through of those systems might best be done firstly. I'm sure I'll be having a little more time to do so from the end of this week.

1. Often worded as repetitive sterotyped movements; that is, echolalia, and echopraxia.

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@KaseiJin,

hi kj! i was wondering when you would be back, mere bhai! i was waiting for you to do another blog entry too!

does stuttering fall into this category?

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;106392 wrote:

... personally, that's what makes sense to me ... the problem is in showing that this autopoietic network cannot be reduced (is not an epiphenomenon) ...

... biophysicist Robert Rosen takes this on in a book-length argument entitled "Life Itself" ... unlike many current philosophical approaches that address J. Kim's analysis of the subject, Rosen comes at it from a physics perspective ... as his is a book-length argument, I can't go into any reasonable level of detail here, but here are some "sound bites":

1. It is a basic fact of physics that you cannot solve an N-body problem by studying all N bodies in isolation and "summing" the results ... this basic fact is often obscured and overlooked when the subject matter becomes a system as complex as an organism.

2. Rosen constructs sets of relational models of systems that are reducible (i.e., are precisely the sum of their parts) ... these mathematical models always leave at least one system component inferentially unentailed - thus the inferential entailment of this component (or components) must be assigned from outside the system ... mapping these models to the real world, the inferential entailment in the model can be mapped to causal entailment in the real world ... material cause is what it is ... the inferential entailment of one component by another is mapped to efficient cause ... any components that are not entailed by other components in the system are mapped to final cause ... thus, under Rosen's models and their mapping to the real world, the assumption of reducibility requires either a creator or vitalism (or some such, to supply the final cause) ... with respect to organisms, Rosen finds neither of those options acceptable, and so concludes that organisms are irreducible.

3. Rosen then constructs sets of relational models of systems that are closed to efficient cause (i.e., do not require a final cause) ... these systems are characterized by multi-functionality and feedback (components perform different functions in different contexts and have bi-directional causal links to other components) ... within the set of models that describes such a complex causal network, some of the models may appear to reflect reducibility (i.e., could be a model of a mechanical-looking subnetwork of the complex causal network), but that is generally not the case ... with respect to biological plausibility, Rosen proposes the (M, R) system model (very similar to the autopoietic system model) ... M stands for metabolizing, R stands for repairing ... Rosen suggests that a new function, replication, can be introduced purely in terms of the existing functions and thus does not require the invocation of final cause to establish a new component to implement that function.

4. Rosen also takes mathematics itself to be one possible model of the real world ... in particular, Rosen takes Godel's proof that Number Theory as a theory cannot be reduced to the formal axioms of Number Theory - that is, the formal axioms of Number Theory are not (and cannot be) sufficient to account for the whole of Number Theory ... this model is mapped to the real world in the following way: Number Theory is taken to be a system (say, organism) and the axioms of Number Theory are taken to be components of the system (say, organs or cells or biochemistry or physics) ... so again, the model predicts the irreducibility of organism.

5. Rosen does not take this last step, but I will ... in Godel's proof, he shows the formal axioms of Number Theory failing precisely where Number Theory becomes reflexive - that is, where it tries to say things about itself ... this may or may not be true in general (the axioms may also fail in other ways that weren't useful to Godel in constructing his proof), but it is certainly provocative when the proof is taken to be a model of the real world Smile

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@KaseiJin,

i didnt think i understood much of what you said paul, but it sounded real good.
so.....does that mean:
6. we as conscious beings will never be able to understand or explain our consciousness if we try using the faculty of consciousness to do it?

or am i taking things way too far?

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@salima,

salima;112009 wrote:

i didnt think i understood much of what you said paul, but it sounded real good.
so.....does that mean:
6. we as conscious beings will never be able to understand or explain our consciousness if we try using the faculty of consciousness to do it?

or am i taking things way too far?

... I think one of the things that Rosen is trying to shine a light on is that pure syntax isn't sufficient - the syntax of mathematics isn't inferentially sufficient to explain Number Theory, and the syntax of physics isn't causally sufficient to explain organism ... so I think from Rosen's perspective, to say that "we as conscious beings will never be able to understand or explain our consciousness if we try using the faculty of consciousness to do it" would certainly be true if we ourselves were pure syntax - that is, if we ourselves were nothing more than mechanism ... but as Rosen goes to great pains to elucidate, organism is not mechanism ... not because of some vitalism that exists beyond physics, but because mechanism is simply a special case of a broader (and as-yet unrefined) theory of systems (much like Newtonian physics was discovered to be a special case of general relativity) ...

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;112207 wrote:

... I think one of the things that Rosen is trying to shine a light on is that pure syntax isn't sufficient - the syntax of mathematics isn't inferentially sufficient to explain Number Theory, and the syntax of physics isn't causally sufficient to explain organism ... so I think from Rosen's perspective, to say that "we as conscious beings will never be able to understand or explain our consciousness if we try using the faculty of consciousness to do it" would certainly be true if we ourselves were pure syntax - that is, if we ourselves were nothing more than mechanism ... but as Rosen goes to great pains to elucidate, organism is not mechanism ... not because of some vitalism that exists beyond physics, but because mechanism is simply a special case of a broader (and as-yet unrefined) theory of systems (much like Newtonian physics was discovered to be a special case of general relativity) ...

but if we ARE something other than mechanism, doesnt that mean there is some 'vitalism' existing beyond physics? if organism is not mechanism, what is it?

or is what you and rosen are talking about the fact that we cant use theories that apply to mechanism for the purpose of explaining and understanding organism, at least not totally, and we dont have all the theories yet. ?

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@salima,

salima;112262 wrote:

or is what you and rosen are talking about the fact that we cant use theories that apply to mechanism for the purpose of explaining and understanding organism, at least not totally, and we dont have all the theories yet. ?

... that is Rosen's position exactly Smile

... and it is similar to the position that we can't use the laws of thermodynamics for the purpose of explaining and understanding open/nonequilibrium systems, at least not totally (as the laws of thermodynamics are with respect to closed/equilibrium systems - i.e., we don't have all the theories yet) ...

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@paulhanke,

I enjoyed the exchange there...and it was good, in that I have not been able to keep up lately (as if that were anything new...har, har, har.......sorry folks), and in and of itself. I will buy that book (already looked it up on Amazon).

As far as the matter of the theme of this thread, while surely there will of course be found application of the argument Rosen is presenting, I presently (and of course this is not carved in marble anywhere) would say that we should use the material and points to help identify layer of analysis, and application towards 'overview' understanding which those layers plug into. Additionally, I wonder much more so than not, whether the points can make any difference to our present definition of consciousness, and/or mind. Here, however, I will continue with this further embedded portion of my overall presentation (as mentioned earlier post 204, above).

The textbook Neuroanatomy--text and atlas by J.H. Martin, 3rd. Ed., points out, on page 191, that . . . 'the complexity of the auditory pathways derives from the particular properties of natural sounds, with their diverse frequency characteristics, multiple sources of origin, and large dynamic ranges.' It also adds, 'an added measure of complexity is imposed on the human auditory system by the demands of understanding speech.' The point being that cortical connections, due to this fact of human speech, especially, also make a difference in the 'feedback', and not that speech sounds in themselves differ any from the many natural sounds around us.

We have the folds of cartilage which make up the pinna--so called because our visual ear parts seem to be just kind of 'pinned on'....hee, hee, hee...JOKE !! American JOKE!!.... What is interesting, is the thought that our far ancestors, pre H. Erectus, say, may or could have had pointed tips to the ears--a much better design, actually. So one problem is, why do we not look like Spock, the Vulcan on the Starship Enterprize? (also see Scientific American, If We Were Built to Last, pp50-55, March '01)

Sound waves are reflected and attenuated by the pinna, and to some degree enter the auditory canal. They then hit the tympanic membrane (ear drum) where in the air filled middle ear (to which the eustachian tube is connected) a mechanical process takes over with the malleus, incus, and stapes (hammer, anvil, and sturrup, respectively).

The vibrations of the ossicles (just mentioned structures) act upon what is generally termed the membranous labyrinth, especially affecting the oval window [which the president of the USA is looking out of...or at least would like to be in a position to look out of {thus in our heads} JOKE!! American JOKE !!...] of the cochlea--a little snail shell of a member. The ossicles increase the pressure which had come throuh the air filled cavities because now the waves must travel through a liquid filled cavity. The liquid in the scala media (with which we are more concerned here, for sending signals to the brain to get sound) is perilymph, a fluid resembling extracellular fluid and cerebrospinal fluid. Then we have the 'hair' nerves.

In the organ of corti there are the two kinds of cilia which form the auditory transductive apparatus, along with the basilar membrane (upon which the cilia rest) and the tectorial membrane (which cover them). The two types are the inner hair cells, and the outer hair cells. The inner cells are arranged in a single row, while the outer hair cells are arranged in 3 or 4 rows. There are more outer cells compared to inner cells (some 12,000 compared to 3,500) and the inner cells are responsible for frequency and other fine discriminations in hearing. The reason for that is basically a more direct connection with the cranial nerve XIII.

So in the cochlea (that little 'snail-like' structure), we have the cilia which are the fine 'hair-like' extensions of the hair cells--both inner and outer. These, along with their support cells, rest on the basilar membrane in the organ of corti. These fine cilia stand in rows with different heights for different vibration wavelengths and are connected by super fine tip links (thread-like fibers) from the insertional plaque of one (where the ion channel is) to tip of the next lower-in-height one.

The tectorial membrane covers the cilia and even rubs (or is practically attached to) the outer cells, while simply covering the more-important-for-higher-quality-sound inner cells. Motion in the liquid sets the basilar membrane into 'up and down' motion, which, through a little additional process, lean the cilia. A lean towards the shorter cilia prevents the ion channels from opening, and a lean towards the taller cilia open the channels resulting in up to 100% potassium and calcium intake (K+ and Ca2+) which in turn causes potential.

Each inner hair cell is innervated by (synapse to) around 10 auditory nerve fibers (bipolar), and each auditory nerve fiber contacts one, or at the most a few hair cells (maybe 20--which in this field is a few. Dallos, 1992) on the inner hair cells--it's a high-resolution system alikened to that of the fingertips and fovea. The outer hair cell structures are seen as being efferent structures for a type of feed-back system. (efferent refers to information flow away from a particular structure--in this case from the superior olivary complex.)

From here, the nerve projections, and the auditory cortex, Broca's area, Wernicke's area, and connections with motor cortical regions.

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@Aedes,

Aedes;94165 wrote:

All organs can heal and compensate for injury in certain ways. If you have a stomach virus it will also heal -- so if digestion is the functional output of the stomach and consciousness is the functional output of the brain, then why should the recovery from tissue damage be any sort of mystery?

I have thought about this quite a bit (the post was back in September). It was brought up in the context of neuroplasticity - how the brain can re-configure itself in the event of injury. The question in my mind is how can the body know how to heal itself. Then as Aedes points out, this is just the way organisms work. But the fact that it happens doesn't mean it is not mysterious. It seems to be part of the mystery of life, that they can heal. In fact, maybe the process of healing is really nothing other than the process of growing, the process of life itself, adapting to an injury. But when the brain heals, its purpose seems embedded in such a way that if part of it is damaged, another part will re-purpose itself. How does the organism do this?

This is what Aristotle meant by 'entelechy' - en, internal, telos, purpose. In other words, organs have their functional goal imprinted in them in such a way that should an injury occur, other cells and parts of the body will fulfil the function.

I discovered there was a German biologist and philosopher, Hans Dreisch, who

Quote:

proposed that the autonomy of life that he deduced from [the] persistence of embryological development despite interferences was due to what he called entelechy, a term borrowed from Aristotle's philosophy to indicate a life force which he conceived of as psychoid or "mind-like", that is; non-spatial, intensive, and qualitative rather than spatial, extensive, and quantitative.

This was proposed as a component of his 'theory of order'.

It seems sensible to me, but I would be interested to see what the scientifically-trained contributors think of it, and what the alternative (presumably orthodox) explanation of this capability is?

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@KaseiJin,

I tell you what, jeeprs, give me some time (say about as much as the distance between the quote and your present, above post, and I'll try to see what I can get on this. Of course, I will only look into, or deal with it, as it is relative to the theme of the thread at hand. I will be fair, as (for the most part, and at least as conscientiously as I always strive to be) I investigate and report on it. For now, however (and others will probably look at, and discuss this in the mean time), I'd like to stay more focused on my embedding part, which leads back into my forward line of presentation.

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@KaseiJin,

we do tend to wander off when you go away, mere bhai! but at least we havent wandered completely off the thread...you might say we are keeping it warm. Smile

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;112985 wrote:

... and what the alternative (presumably orthodox) explanation of this capability is?

... I'm not sure that there is an orthodox explanation - more like an orthodox description combined with an assumption that reductionism is true (i.e., in the end, physics will explain everything) ... and it is this orthodox view that Rosen's book is a response to ... as Rosen puts it:

Quote:

I can epitomize a reductionist approach to organization in general, and to life in particular, as follows: throw away the organization and keep the underlying matter. The relational alternative to this says exactly the opposite, namely: when studying an organized material system, throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization. (emphasis in original)

Rosen mentions Driesch by name a number of times in his book, always commiseratively in their common rejection of reductionism, but never in agreement with Driesch's conclusions regarding entelechy ... Rosen has his own ideas, and they are relational and circular (as opposed to postulating a universal life force).

In Rosen's relational models (which are closed to efficient cause), functions in the system are not simply the efficient causes of occurrences, but also (in combination through a complex network of relations) the efficient causes of other functions in the system ... in this light, when one function in the system is damaged, repair is a result of the remaining functions in the system that are its efficient cause ... and note that we are talking about functions here, not material realizations of those functions - the repair of a function may be effected by re-purposing other material elements of the system (depending upon the plasticity and/or multi-functionality of those material elements).

It is worth noting that Rosen is of the opinion that biology is clinging to a reductive worldview even while physics is in the process of letting the reductive worldview go ... not being a physicist, I can't speak to the truth of this claim ... but if systems engineering is any indication of what is going on in physics:

Quote:

The concept that a complex system can be progressively partitioned into smaller and simpler units, and hence into simpler problems, omits an inherent characteristic of complexity - interrelationships among the units. ("The Art of Systems Architecting")

Quote:

Even the most brilliant individuals really cannot comprehend anything more complex than "cause and effect." Contemporary systems theory has added "feedback," which means that the effect, in turn, affects the cause. As simple as this sounds, it is a breakthrough comparable to Newton's physics. This concept allows the scientific method to be applied to just about everything, not just a few curious anomalies like planetary motion and pendulum clocks. ("The Art of Modeling Dynamic Systems")

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@KaseiJin,

It is possible that 'the universal life force' is, in fact, jut life, and the reason scientists always reject the idea is that they can't quite work out what it is (i.e. reduce it).

This quite possibly has been going on for hundreds of years. But never mind. 'Life' goes on.

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@KaseiJin,

I do appreciate both posts, and the ideas presented. I also have seen that some degree of misconception of, or maybe more than one usage/application of (?), studying parts of things in the system at hand, out there. Feedback into a certain lobe, or mapped loop, for example, does play a role in overall performance, yet, modules hold their own to a large enough degree that what when it comes to consciousness, for example, we can see operative input from a number of modules, which resultant pressure, if removed, alters the overall state. This, I feel, is not really a 'reductionist' matter.

I think, jeeprs, that the general essence of your thought there is correct, or thinkable, but I'd be careful with the word 'universal;' it could lend to a misconception because we just (so far) don't see life anywhere but on this planet. Therefore, an 'life-earth process' title might fit the evidence better. Of earth the process is, from earth it has developed, with earth it maintains, and, to earth it becomes re-plowed. I am not sure all members of the science fields reject such, actually, even if it cannot be explained in the way two simultaneous sounds, heard in each separate auditory pathway, merge into a different cognitively acknowledged experience than each sound being split by a few milliseconds, is understood.

In picking up from post #211 . . .

The nerve fibers bundle and carry the conductive charges from neurotransmitter release of the hair cells along cranal nerve VIII to the ipsilateral (same side) medulla (of the Cochlear nuclei), where it synapses to Dorsal Posteroventral (horizontal localization of sound) and Anteroventral (hair cell sensitivity regulator) areas.

From here, the signal is picked up, post synaptically, and runs contralaterally (opposite side) to the superior olivary complex which also projects a smaller degree of the signal back to the ipsilateral area. Both branches run to the medial geniculate nucleus of the thalamus which sends it to auditory cortex of the temporal lobe--along with its several other associative and feedback loops. This basic 'final destination' we can kind of say, is the primary auditory cortex which lies on the superior (upper) surface of the temporal lobe ( lateral sulcus).

What we have here is that the auditory signal runs to both hemispheres--unlike that of visual and olfactory signals, however, the main bulk from the right ear runs to the left hemisphere and vice versa. There is a greater number of synapses along the route making it slightly more complicated, and putting the system at a higher malfunction risk, than would be if it were less interconnected. What happens from the primary auditory links comes next.

We here come up to the primary auditory cortex (pAC). This is in a 'belt region.' There is the primary, the first level of auditory association cortex, then the second level of auditory cortex (the parabelt region). The belt regions receive information from the primary auditory cortex and the dorsal and medial division of the medial geniculate necleus (in the thalamus).

The belt region is, in general, the secondary auditory cortex, and it deals with more complex sound than the primary cortex--in animals, species-specific calls, and humans, speech and language. This region can further be divided into a dozen or so sub-regions.

In a kind of simple explanation, the auditory cortex at large evidences two pathways to associative areas and other regions. These, being somewhat like the visual pathways, appear to be the 'what' and 'where' pathways. The 'where' (spatial) runs from the pAC to the caudial (means towards the tail; sometimes simply towards the back of the head) portions of the secondary and higher-order areas then to the posterior (here more specifically equals caudal) parietal cortex (PC) then towards the dorsolateral prefrontal (dPFC) and premotor cortex--with connections running parallel from the pPC to the dPFC.

The 'what' pathway runs from the pAC to the rostral (or anterior--thus in front of) area of the upper belts to both the orbital-frontal cortex (OFC) and the ventral (stomach side--basically front) side premotor cortex (vPMC).

The ventral frontal lobe in humans is the center for the motor speech structures. We find the cytoarchitetonic areas 42 and 22 on the left temporal lobe in the human brain make important substrates for understanding and producing speech--in most cases.(1) These are Wernicke's area and Broca's area.

Broca's area is primarily for speech production and has close connection with some speech motor memory sheets--especially sequence memory. Wernicke's area has more to do with speech comprehension, beginning, obviously (and closer to) the belt region. It deals with recognizing complex sequences of sounds. These areas, along with retrieval and associative areas make for a large, very complex and important hard-wired set up in the (especially, but not totally only) human brain and personality.

1. It has also pointed out in that in over 95% of right-handed people, the left is dominant for speech, and 70% in left-handed people. These figures are based on a fairly large study, but are still could have some room for shifting a little.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;113093 wrote:

Feedback into a certain lobe, or mapped loop, for example, does play a role in overall performance, yet, modules hold their own to a large enough degree that what when it comes to consciousness, for example, we can see operative input from a number of modules, which resultant pressure, if removed, alters the overall state.

... ah, but what Rosen brings to the table (beyond other thinkers who similarly stress the importance of understanding systems not only in terms of their constituent subsystems but also in terms of the larger systems of which they themselves are constituents) is his interpretation of his relational models to imply that a function in a system that is closed to efficient causation can at once contribute to the efficient cause of other functions in the system and at the same time be caused by other functions in the system ... this casts a significantly wider causal net with respect to consciousness than just the "modules of consciousness" ... that is, consciousness, looked at itself as a function that causally contributes to a number of larger systems (such as organism, culture, evolution, etc.) may be (if these systems are closed to efficient causation) related to other functions in these systems in the way described by Rosen ... that is, consciousness may be (in part) an efficient cause of other functions in these larger systems while at the same time other functions in these larger systems may be (in part) efficient causes of consciousness Smile

... in this respect, the feedback between the "modules of consciousness" is not the only feedback we need to be aware of - we also need to be aware of the feedback between the "modules of organism" and the "modules of culture" and the "modules of evolution", etc., as consciousness is entangled in each of these larger causal webs ...

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;113371 wrote:

... ah, but what Rosen brings to the table (beyond other thinkers who similarly stress the importance of understanding systems not only in terms of their constituent subsystems but also in terms of the larger systems of which they themselves are constituents) is his interpretation of his relational models to imply that a function in a system that is closed to efficient causation can at once contribute to the efficient cause of other functions in the system and at the same time be caused by other functions in the system ... this casts a significantly wider causal net with respect to consciousness than just the "modules of consciousness" ... that is, consciousness, looked at itself as a function that causally contributes to a number of larger systems (such as organism, culture, evolution, etc.) may be (if these systems are closed to efficient causation) related to other functions in these systems in the way described by Rosen ... that is, consciousness may be (in part) an efficient cause of other functions in these larger systems while at the same time other functions in these larger systems may be (in part) efficient causes of consciousness ... in this respect, the feedback between the "modules of consciousness" is not the only feedback we need to be aware of - we also need to be aware of the feedback between the "modules of organism" and the "modules of culture" and the "modules of evolution", etc., as consciousness is entangled in each of these larger causal webs ...

:a-thought: might i be so bold (or so foolish:bigsmile: ) as to suggest that the reason may be that consciousness is the common denominator, the cosmic glue, or unified field which is included in all systems?

perhaps i am getting carried away...

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;113371 wrote:

... ah, but what Rosen brings to the table (beyond other thinkers who similarly stress the importance of understanding systems not only in terms of their constituent subsystems but also in terms of the larger systems of which they themselves are constituents) is his interpretation of his relational models ...(bold mine)

I really reason that it goes too far, however. In this sense, it　crosses a boundary which is a matter of analysis which leaves us with a workable tool. Additionally, (and again, I do desire, and intend, to read the argument, and understand it) I presently sense a lack of reigning in, on his behalf (taken from what you have presented so far) of his desired application of that presentation. We can make many relatively-true-to-fact assertions about a matter, yet we must take care to work within the realms of the definitions we have provided.

Nevertheless, this is not to deny the element of feedback within systems, yet, is simply to clarify that environment, as well as social systems, exist without our definition of consciousness. Care must be taken there in order to, shall we say, keep a reasonable lid on our practical understandings.

I really have found, regardless of the emotionally appeal of the idea, salima chan, that the English definition of 'consciousness,' does not allow for any panpsychism model. If another term were created to be applied to such, I think it would be fine...but I simply keep running into dead-ends when the modern day English 'consciousness' is used so as to have that as a referent.

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From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

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