From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@Aedes,

Aedes;93871 wrote:

People who have abstract, non-biological views of consciousness have never been able to account for the following points:

1) Damaging the brain will reliably alter consciousness

and

2) You cannot demonstrate the consciousness in a being that lacks a functioning brain.

Yes, questions are begged by the above, such as how do wo demonstrate consciousness. But let's accept that there is some common understanding of what consciousness is, as opposed to some idiosyncratic definition of it.

1. No, damaging the brain will not necessarily alter consciousness, but merely its content. The brain and the faculties for sensibility provide the input of content, but that does not mean those things are the cause of consciousness itself. If a have an incredibly clean, glass made out of the finest glass and I stand it on a table and pour ribena into it, I can see it, if I empty the glass, wash it out and put it back on the table, I might not be able to see it, nevertheless it will still be there. I think part of your problem is that you are thinking about consciousness as a substance which it is not: it stands behind, and out of, and is in fact the cause of time, space and substance, but is actually none of those things.

2. You cannot demonstrate it, but I believe things that don't have functioning brains have this thing called 'consciousness' ie plants for instance. Clearly the word consciousness is slightly misleading for a plant, because it is the minutest flicker compared with what we have, but in my belief they certainly are subjective experiencing beings.

We can never demonstrate consciousness because we can never experience the world from someone elses subjective viewpoint, however it is simply a fact that I subjectively experience, and so I assume all other living beings do so. I think the BEST definition of consciousness is 'the fact of subjective experience'.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;105293 wrote:

Does this not illustrate, in this case, the primacy of mind over matter?

... in the context of this thread (in which the bar has been set at empirically sensitive philosophy), it is an illustration of mind over matter only if you can also demonstrate that minds are irreducible to matter ... that is, if a mind can impact matter, but a mind is reducible to matter (i.e., a mere epiphenomenon of matter), then the placebo effect is really a just a case of matter over matter ... a good starting point might be to demonstrate the (temporal) primacy of process over matter ... for example, it is believed that in the early universe there was nothing but high-energy plasma - hydrogen atoms first appeared through a process of precipitation from that high-energy plasma, as driven by the process of expansion of the universe ... as another example, it is believed that the heavier elements first appeared in the universe through a process of star formation and super-nova explosion ... so it would seem that if nothing else, the existence of processes temporally precedes the existence of matter in this universe ... with this observation in hand, the (typically unstated and assumed) metaphysical claim that processes are mere epiphenomena of matter appears dubious - how can all processes be mere epiphenomena of matter if processes existed before matter? ... so, since a mind is a process (and if the theories of the early developmental phases of the universe are right), there does not seem to be any theoretical reason to adopt a metaphysics where a mind must be reducible to matter ... that still leaves open the possibility that a mind can be reduced to matter (even if it is not true that it must be), in which case the placebo effect becomes part of the empirical evidence that a mind is irreducible to matter ...

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke;105405 wrote:

... in the context of this thread (in which the bar has been set at empirically sensitive philosophy), it is an illustration of mind over matter only if you can also demonstrate that minds are irreducible to matter ... that is, if a mind can impact matter, but a mind is reducible to matter (i.e., a mere epiphenomenon of matter), then the placebo effect is really a just a case of matter over matter ... a good starting point might be to demonstrate the (temporal) primacy of process over matter ... for example, it is believed that in the early universe there was nothing but high-energy plasma - hydrogen atoms first appeared through a process of precipitation from that high-energy plasma, as driven by the process of expansion of the universe ... as another example, it is believed that the heavier elements first appeared in the universe through a process of star formation and super-nova explosion ... so it would seem that if nothing else, the existence of processes temporally precedes the existence of matter in this universe ... with this observation in hand, the (typically unstated and assumed) metaphysical claim that processes are mere epiphenomena of matter appears dubious - how can all processes be mere epiphenomena of matter if processes existed before matter? ... so, since a mind is a process (and if the theories of the early developmental phases of the universe are right), there does not seem to be any theoretical reason to adopt a metaphysics where a mind must be reducible to matter ... that still leaves open the possibility that a mind can be reduced to matter (even if it is not true that it must be), in which case the placebo effect becomes part of the empirical evidence that a mind is irreducible to matter ...

how does this plasma energy be accepted as a process? plasma is a substance, isnt it? and energy is energy, not a process, or so i thought...

i am bookmarking places on plasma theories, it may have appeared after i stopped looking...sounds interesting.

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

paulhanke;105405 wrote:

but a mind is reducible to matter (i.e., a mere epiphenomenon of matter), then the placebo effect is really a just a case of matter over matter ...

I don't know about that. A placebo, is, after all, wholly imaginary; it might as well not exist. It only works because it believed to exist. If you could convince someone they had been given a placebo while the slept, it would probably work. ANd nothing material has happened in this transaction, has it.

The Australian Aborigines are known to die if they have 'the bone pointed at them'. If they commit some transgression which requires the death penalty, one of the elders will 'point the bone' at them. And some time later, they will die, unless the elder performs the forgiveness ceremony and removes the curse. (I don't have a reference for this one, sorry).

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@salima,

salima;105493 wrote:

how does this plasma energy be accepted as a process? plasma is a substance, isnt it? and energy is energy, not a process, or so i thought...

i am bookmarking places on plasma theories, it may have appeared after i stopped looking...sounds interesting.

... "high-energy plasma" turns out to be a result of my mis-remembering the sequence of phases described by Chaisson in his "Cosmic Evolution" ... he does not call the initial state of the universe a high-energy plasma, but rather "pure energy" ... the plasma comes later, "... within a microsecond of its being, the Universe was filled with a whole melange of such free, unbound, fast-moving particles (hadrons) that must have populated every niche of the cosmos. Whence did they come? From radiation, pure and simple. Under the prevailing (though still somewhat surrealistic) conditions of (incredibly high energy density and temperature), these particles originated by a means of straightforward materialization - a creation - of matter from the radiative energy of the primeval fireball." ... from there, he launches into a short description of the process of pair production and how the conditions of the early universe allowed this process to continue to pump out matter until the density of the expanding universe reached a level at which the rates of particle materialization and decimation equalized ... so in answer to your question, the plasma is not a process, but the materialization of the plasma is, as are the much later phase transitions from plasma to atomic neuclei and finally to the atoms we know and love such as hydrogen ...

---------- Post added 11-23-2009 at 07:31 PM ----------

jeeprs;105501 wrote:

I don't know about that. A placebo, is, after all, wholly imaginary; it might as well not exist. It only works because it believed to exist. If you could convince someone they had been given a placebo while the slept, it would probably work. ANd nothing material has happened in this transaction, has it.

... but the point is that if a mind is a mere epiphenomenon of matter, then "a mind" is nothing more than a convenient way of describing at a macroscopic level what it is that matter does at the microscopic level (and not whether the placebo is real or imaginary) ... so even if I get sick and decide I'm going to fight it (similar effect to a placebo), from the epiphenomenal perspective that "decision" is simply a descriptive convenience for what can in principle be fully accounted for at a microscopic level ...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

paulhanke;105509 wrote:

... but the point is that if a mind is a mere epiphenomenon of matter, then "a mind" is nothing more than a convenient way of describing at a macroscopic level what it is that matter does at the microscopic level (and not whether the placebo is real or imaginary) ... so even if I get sick and decide I'm going to fight it (similar effect to a placebo), from the epiphenomenal perspective that "decision" is simply a descriptive convenience for what can in principle be fully accounted for at a microscopic level ...

I don't know if this is logical at all. This to all intents says that 'mind does not exist' because it equates mind with matter, so it is matter-over-matter, not mind over matter.

But think about this. Say I told you that I was going to treat you with a placebo, but in a language you didn't understand, and gave you something which you didn't recognise as a tablet. There could be no 'placebo effect' in this transaction. I could give you the same tablet and an instruction in english, leading you to believe in it, therefore it would have an effect. The only difference in the two transactions is that you understood one, and not the other. Yet one treatment was successful, and one was not; and the salient difference was 'understanding'. And this understanding has, in this instance, material consequences.

Now the same could be said about every transaction that occurs involving any kind of understanding, of anything. 'To read' is therefore, in your view, a material process. So all this view says is that there is no such thing as a mental process, only material ones. But all you have really done here is recapitulate behaviourism, (1) which for very many reasons, was rejected decades ago. It has been found to be unfeasible to posit the idea that consciousness does not actually exist or cannot be differentiated from its material substrate. I mean, can we really say that acts of understanding or cognitive acts generally, are material things? What if you grasp an abstract idea that has no material counterpart? I have no doubt that your understanding has a neural correlate but to what extent can you say that the neural correlate 'is' the understanding. (Strong sense of deja vue at this point.)

There are other consequences also but let's pause to consider that one.

(1) Behavourist to other behaviourist after making love:"That was wonderful for you dear. What was it like for me?"

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;105974 wrote:

Now the same could be said about every transaction that occurs involving any kind of understanding, of anything. 'To read' is therefore, in your view, a material process. So all this view says is that there is no such thing as a mental process, only material ones.

... I may be getting dangerously close to setting up a straw man here, but here is my understanding of a materialist (physicalist?) reductionism taken to its logical conclusion: all processes are, at bottom, simply epiphenomena of the properties of matter ... in that sense, it's not that there aren't any mental processes ... it's simply that mental processes are material processes ... again, matter is the primary phenomena and processes are merely derivative.

Now, if it could be shown that processes are not merely derivative of matter, then the game potentially changes ... Chaisson portrays a history of the universe where processes temporally precede matter - unfortunately, such theories of what the universe was like in the first milliseconds after the big bang are a pretty tenuous hook to hang your hat on ... however, physics itself keeps turning up evidence that fundamental particles aren't all that fundamental - the indivisible atom turns out to be a highly stable process of whirling electrons around a slowly decaying nucleus ... and even these smaller particles are processes that incorporate yet smaller particles ... all the way down to the metaphysics of vibrating "strings" (or perhaps just vibrations?) ... so if it's "processes all the way down", wouldn't that make processes the primary phenomena? ... and in that case, would it be (in)coherent to say that any one process is a mere epiphenomenon of another? ... that is, could the process we call matter be said to be any more "primary" than the process we call mind?

Anyhoo, back to playing the devil's advocate:

jeeprs;105974 wrote:

But all you have really done here is recapitulate behaviourism, ...

... not necessarily - Dennett comes up with a pretty mind-bending way of concluding that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive in his "Freedom Evolves" Smile

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

the problem is in the words. some people think everything is a procvess, some think some things are physical and some spiritual, some think human beings are part physical and part mental. but i dont see any difference in the reality of what they are talking about.

as for what is primary, what is that-the chicken and the egg again? somehow i think it is all primary...whether it is called energy or frequency, it might be even possible that everything in existence has all the capabilities, but we, according to our limitations, can only perceive some of them.

maybe all energy has a physical form, we just dont have any way to perceive it-and all physical things have mental forms and vibrations etc etc...

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@paulhanke,

I thought one of the main principles of reductionism of any kind (in this case, neurological) is that 'there is no downward causation'. Anythng that happens can be understood in terms of the activities of the lowest units of explanation - in this case, neurons. According to this view:

Quote:

Reductionism can be defined as the belief that the behavior of a whole or system is completely determined by the behavior of the parts, elements or subsystems. In other words, if you know the laws governing the behavior of the parts, you should be able to deduce the laws governing the behavior of the whole.

Source

So am I correct in thinking that a neurological, or biological, explanation of consciousness is the attempt to explain the act of thinking in terms of the activities of neurons? In which case, one would think that it must obey an 'upward causation' model, in that changes to the neurons caused by chemical etc could cause a change in thinking (upwards), but changes in thinking ought not to change the neurons (downwards).

If so, it would seem to me that any transaction which causes physical changes to occur (for example, the 'piano exercise' example, or the 'placebo' example) are clear cases of downward causation. And as a matter of principle, there is no reason why this ought not to have been occuring ever since anything had consciousness.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;106051 wrote:

I thought one of the main principles of reductionism of any kind (in this case, neurological) is that 'there is no downward causation'. Anythng that happens can be understood in terms of the activities of the lowest units of explanation - in this case, neurons. According to this view:

Source

So am I correct in thinking that a neurological, or biological, explanation of consciousness is the attempt to explain the act of thinking in terms of the activities of neurons? In which case, one would think that it must obey an 'upward causation' model, in that changes to the neurons caused by chemical etc could cause a change in thinking (upwards), but changes in thinking ought not to change the neurons (downwards).

If so, it would seem to me that any transaction which causes physical changes to occur (for example, the 'piano exercise' example, or the 'placebo' example) are clear cases of downward causation. And as a matter of principle, there is no reason why this ought not to have been occuring ever since anything had consciousness.

does causation have to be either upward or downward? if this is the principle of reductionism, there must be other principles that would include downward causation-or simultaneous, spontaneous causation-or no causation. isnt there?

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;106051 wrote:

So am I correct in thinking that a neurological, or biological, explanation of consciousness is the attempt to explain the act of thinking in terms of the activities of neurons? In which case, one would think that it must obey an 'upward causation' model, in that changes to the neurons caused by chemical etc could cause a change in thinking (upwards), but changes in thinking ought not to change the neurons (downwards).

If so, it would seem to me that any transaction which causes physical changes to occur (for example, the 'piano exercise' example, or the 'placebo' example) are clear cases of downward causation. And as a matter of principle, there is no reason why this ought not to have been occuring ever since anything had consciousness.

... but I think the reductionist response to this would be that since the thought was fully caused by the activity of neurons in the first place, there is no downward causation ... "thought" is then just a convenient description of a certain kind of collective activity of neurons (which in turn are just convenient descriptions of a certain kind of collective activity of organic chemicals, which in turn are just convenient descriptions of a certain kind of collective activity of atoms, which in turn ... ... ...) ...

---------- Post added 11-26-2009 at 09:49 AM ----------

salima;106068 wrote:

does causation have to be either upward or downward? if this is the principle of reductionism, there must be other principles that would include downward causation-or simultaneous, spontaneous causation-or no causation. isnt there?

... if I have it right, according to J. Kim's analysis (which denies downward causation), causation is neither upward nor downward but only laterally at "Level 0" ... that is, any apparent causal loop that begins at Level 0, goes up to Level N, and then back down to Level 0, can be fully explained at Level 0 ... therefore, everything above Level 0 is mere epiphenomena ...

EDIT: ... on the other hand, if it's "processes all the way down", then "material cause" is not unique, because matter itself is a process - that is, "material cause" is merely an instance of one particular kind of process (matter) having a causal effect on another ... and if it only ever is processes which have causal effects on other processes, then in addition to the linear "upward causation" we sometimes observe, we can also expect to see rather loopy causal networks such as "whole" processes that are causally affected by "constituent" processes but which in turn causally affect those constituent processes ... or processes that to some degree causally affect themselves ...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

I made a thread for all this 'causation' talk and your concern is legitimate jeeprs:

http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/secondary-branches-philosophy/philosophy-mind/5549-issue-mental-causation.html

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@KaseiJin,

My understanding is that reductionism generally can only accomodate upward causation - what is real is material, what we see are atoms in combination, and so on

In this thread, I think the 'upward causation' is articulated as evolution>brain>mind - evolution causes the brain to develop, which causes consiousness to have certain attributes. I am trying to show there is a feeback loop namely mind>brain.

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;106135 wrote:

In this thread, I think the 'upward causation' is articulated as evolution>brain>mind - evolution causes the brain to develop, which causes consiousness to have certain attributes. I am trying to show there is a feeback loop namely mind>brain.

... from a purely evolutionary perspective, what is it that evolution selects? - specific characteristics of specific organs, or the overall success of the organism/species? ... that is, perhaps at one point along the evolutionary path, an adaptive change resulted in a non-adaptive side effect: the first vestiges of something we might recognize as mind ... but once having appeared, and once having demonstrated its success potential (cognition, intelligence, sociality, culture, etc.), evolution may have begun selecting specifically for mind, with the brain more or less going along for the ride ... fast forward to today, and culture appears to be the primary means of human evolution Smile

... but with your piano example, I think you may have something more immediate in mind than the evolutionary perspective, yes? ...

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@KaseiJin,

well yes, but not only that. What if the effect of cognition, in the most basic sense - that is, some organism recieving information from the environment - also 'feeds back' into the material structure. I mean, this could be happening in principle, before we have what we would recognise as 'conscious thought' in human minds, could it not?

---------- Post added 11-27-2009 at 06:36 PM ----------

so we get back to where we were some time ago, the primacy of information and the notion that information cannot be said to exist with someone or something that is being informed by it. It is almost analagous to a circuit - electricity won't flow through it until the connection is closed.

---------- Post added 11-27-2009 at 06:58 PM ----------

paulhanke;106197 wrote:

an adaptive change resulted in a non-adaptive side effect: ...

I think this is what Stephen J Gould refers to as 'spandrels'

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;106294 wrote:

well yes, but not only that. What if the effect of cognition, in the most basic sense - that is, some organism recieving information from the environment - also 'feeds back' into the material structure. I mean, this could be happening in principle, before we have what we would recognise as 'conscious thought' in human minds, could it not?

... personally, that's what makes sense to me ... the problem is in showing that this autopoietic network cannot be reduced (is not an epiphenomenon) ... from a limited mind-brain context, I do not think this is difficult ... there is a growing body of evidence that the constituents of cognition are brain and body (and, more controversially, world) ... now, for mind->brain reduction to to be coherent, the feedback received by the brain from the mind must have been fully caused by the brain in the first place ... but if cognition is a facet of the mind and the constituents of cognition are more than just the brain, this does not seem to be the case ... and if it is not the case, then mind->brain reduction is incoherent and the mind can legitimately be said to exert downward causal effects on the brain in this limited context.

However, a reductionist response to this could be to expand the context ... that is, if the evidence points to the fact that the constituents of mind are brain and body (and local environment), then let's expand the context to brain and body (and local environment) ... in which case it can be said that any feedback received by the brain/body/world system from the mind was fully caused by the brain/body/world system in the first place, and thus mind->brain/body/world reduction is coherent ... so feedback alone does not seem to be enough to render reductionism incoherent.

Possible adjuncts to feedback:

- Nonlinearity: if a whole is in some way "more" than the sum of its parts, doesn't that imply that any feedback from the whole to the collection of parts is in some way "more" than what can be said to have been fully caused by the collection of parts?

- Constraints as downward cause: this is an approach taken by A. Juarrero (the primary material of which I have yet to read), where "downward causation" amounts to feedback from the whole placing limits on the degrees of freedom of its parts. (See http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/metaphysics/6461-theories-system-coupling.html#post102348 for a bit of elaboration on this approach.)

- Processes all the way down: already discussed in this thread, if every thing is a process can any one thing be claimed to be more "primary" than any other? (In which case is there any real difference between "feedforward" and "feedback"?)

jeeprs;106294 wrote:

It is almost analagous to a circuit - electricity won't flow through it until the connection is closed.

... I think this may be an apt analogy ... electricity won't flow until the electrical circuit is closed; and information won't flow until the autopoietic circuit is closed ... the flow of electricity creates a magnetic field; and the flow of information creates a field of meaning ... (but perhaps I'm stretching the analogy too far? Smile

) ...

1 Reply

@paulhanke,

Thanks for staying tuned, folks . . .

paulhanke;104908 wrote:

... what this last post makes clear is that it is the "normal build" of the sensorimotor loops in the brain that participates in the control of body movement ... the role of "brain" here seems to be of a more general and remote nature, . . .

I'm not 100% sure that I see the follow up of your concern, yet I'd like to make note that the quoted portion in the post (my #174), while summarizing not only that post and #172, though not mentioned, is very secure. Of course there is a specific, and most empirically sound reason why we have these cortical areas called M1, PMA, SMA(1), and in that same manner of application of the terms, there is a most empirically sound reason why I use the word form brain (as opposed to non-brain things) here.

paulhanke;104908 wrote:

... in addition, it seems that to make the claim "brain controls body movement" based upon a detailed analysis of the operation of the brain (as opposed to a detailed analysis of the operation of the organism) could be an overstatement. . .

I am presently of the position that the statement is not an overstatement. I think this will come out, as I go--to a clear enough degree--and will probably bring that up later.

jeeprs;106051 wrote:

So am I correct in thinking that a neurological, or biological, explanation of consciousness is the attempt to explain the act of thinking in terms of the activities of neurons?

As far as I have seen, this is not the so precisely-just-as-worded case. There is a fair enough effort to simply come to testable, workable understandings, interpretations, and models, for more pragmatic application. In the process of investigation, however, it has become quite clear that thinking, as commonly used in English, is especially a brain thing, and thus, largely enough (but not only-other cell types evidence being involved too) a neuron thing.

jeeprs;106051 wrote:

If so, it would seem to me that any transaction which causes physical changes to occur (for example, the 'piano exercise' example, or the 'placebo' example) are clear cases of downward causation. And as a matter of principle, there is no reason why this ought not to have been occuring ever since anything had consciousness.

There is probably no really justifiable (in the practical sense) reason for thinking of 'causations' in terms as seem to nuanced in your presentation--as Paulhanke has brought out, earlier. The study you again mentioned, about motor action being learned by picturing motor action, is just a brain thing (as I have been, and will continue to emphasize, what makes consciousness is very little of what brain does; and that may be confusing for some.

The placebo effect is very interesting--though not 100% effective either--and doesn't cover such a broad area of brain/mental problems (for example, frontal-lobe dementia, Alzheimer's, Parkinson's [and related types], Huntington's, aphasia, apraxia and dyslexia [of various forms], among others). I'll touch on that, and these, in more detail down the road (although I'll have to do some extra search, I tend to believe, on the placebo effect...meaning I don't recall having read any papers on it at the moment).

In the continuation of #172, and #174, looking at deficits in the normal build/state, will be useful. (this is repeat) With the removal of dopamine function from the basal ganglia we have Parkinson's Disease.

Parkinson's Disease (PD) is best to be thought of as a highly heterogeneous group of diseases, generally grouped as idiopathic parkinsonism, symptomatic parkinsonism, P-plus syndromes, and heterodegenerative disorders, and would include, therefore both genetically based forms (autosomal recessive juvenile parkinsonism (AR-JP), and familia parkinsonism (FPD)), and non-genetic based ones.

By a tragic 'underground' drug accident, it was further evidenced that MPTP (1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydrapyridine) attacks the DA neurons of the substantia nigra (SN), and results in PD symptoms. This is because the primary projector of PD symptom is the death of L-DOPA (dopamine (DA) precursor) cells in especially the SN area. Therefore in non-genetical cases--that is, from toxins in the enviornment, or cases caused by faulty metabolism, or (possibly) unrecognized infectious disorders--we find what appear to be possible upstream causes of PD, or PD-like disorders.

Evident causes of cell death in the genetic-based cases, give rise to the likelihood of missense and nonsense mutations in the gene encoding a-synuclein (a protein) which has a similar effect with the build-up of Lewy bodies (LBs) and Lewy neutries (LNs), and appears to work with molecular chaperone Hsp70. The bodies are filamentious inclusions, and result in a placque-like build up; as is often seen in Alzheimer's disease. PARK2, SNCA, UCHILI, and DJ-1 are seen to be genes involved in one way or another, with PARK2 (parkin) being most widespread. Parkin operates in the ubiquitin-proteasome (Ub-Pr) pathway, giving rise to a faulty protein degradation, and thus a collection of Poly-Ub substrates, which in turn, lead to cell apoptosis.

It has been seen that efforts to make up for DA system losses by estrogen increase (as a kind of repair function), and tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) upregulation occur naturally. There are likely other pathway events which also occur due to the loss of basal ganglion projection, but futher study will have to draw those out. These efforts to compensate are, of course, things that happen internal due to the natural tendency for homeostasis.

The effects are seen in a resting tremor (shaking head, hands, and so on) and 'cog' motion--a slow, rigid point-by-point motion as if a move depends on the turn of a cogwheel. There is also a degree of cognitive deficiency (2) in many cases, and dementia in later age ranges. In a number of cases, sexual disfunction or hypersexuality or aberrent sexual behavior (probably due to DA replacement therapy) is also seen. The main pharmacological is L-DOPA, a medication which replenishes the loss of the DA precursor. It is often taken in combination with some other chemicals which back up the desired result. L-DOPA will often result in sensitization, and dosage will have to be increased, and some patients do not seem to respond to it.

Another treatment is to replace damaged cells with fetal tissue. This has resulted in positive results. Recently, embroynic stem (ES) cells have been shown to be able to electrophysiologically and behaviorally lead to recovery of PD symptoms in mouse models of the disease. Another way which is still under study and testing, is gene therapy with glial cell line-derived neurotrophic factor (GDNF) injection. Then there is deep brain stimulation (DBS) which is proving to have a fair enough degree of efficacy, but which can cause (a least when first switched on) mood changes towards the depressive state. In the past, pallidotomies (surgical destruction of the GPi) was used for severe cases, and resulted in a degree of recovered movement, but in some cases made symptoms worse, or caused partial blindness (due to damage to the optic tract that lies right next door).

What is seen in PD, is a non-normal brain-build where (among some other possible, minor elements) a required level of neurons which project with DA in the basal ganglion system, resulting in the normal command controls for movement, is lost. This is all in an area of brain that has projections to and from areas which participate in cognitive decision making as well as thought--what we usually consider when we think of mind--and a degree of deficit can be found, to various degrees cognition, as well. As has been made very clear, in very many case histories, PD (especially earlier stages) can be alleviated from a very high degree at first, to almost nothing (in later stages and after habituation), and is the fullness of that particular biologically based brain build . . . in action and cognition.

1. M1=primary motor cortex (Brodmann's 4), PMA=premotor cortex (Brodmann's 6), and SMA=supplementary motor cortex (Brodmann's 7).

2. This often may mean simply a re-routing of cognitive funtions from a normal route used by non-PD brains, and thus an only slightly measurable reduction of accuracy in learning skills.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;107010 wrote:

I'm not 100% sure that I see the follow up of your concern, yet I'd like to make note that the quoted portion in the post (my #174), while summarizing not only that post and #172, though not mentioned, is very secure. Of course there is a specific, and most empirically sound reason why we have these cortical areas called M1, PMA, SMA(1), and in that same manner of application of the terms, there is a most empirically sound reason why I use the word form brain (as opposed to non-brain things) here.

... if the empirically sound reason why you use the word "brain" in "It is most clear, however, that brain controls body movement" is simply to indicate that brain tissue is involved in the control of body movement, then I have no argument with that ... (used that sense, it is just as empirically sound to say "It is most clear, however, that biochemistry controls body movement") ... on the other hand, if you are building up to a logical argument of the form "It is most clear that the control of body movement is the reason we have X, and since brain controls body movement then brain is the reason we have X", that's a different story altogether, because I do not think that a detailed description of how the normal build of a brain participates in the control of body movement properly singles out "brain" in the way that such a logical argument would require (that is, even if it can be said that M1, PMA, SMA, etc., are "the reason we have X", it has not been demonstrated that "brain" is the reason we have M1, PMA, SMA, etc.) ...

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@paulhanke,

Thanks for further expounding on that, paulhanke. While it is true that as far as I know, I am using the form of the word 'brain' in that sentence to also express, as you have presented in:
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paulhanke;107126 wrote:

. . . simply to indicate that brain tissue is involved in the control of body movement, . . .

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that brain (not the brain because that entails all the organ) is involved in the control of bodily movement, I am also identifying the control source of muscle activating delivery. (which may be a kind of strange way to word it, but I can't think of clear way to do so at the moment...I think this captures the process well enough without going into detail)

paulhanke;107126 wrote:

(used that sense, it is just as empirically sound to say "It is most clear, however, that biochemistry controls body movement") ...

Yes, I agree, yet only with a correction. Here, I'd argue that if we were to take the one element of the equation down to that level, we'd have to take the other element down to that level equally--thus making it, 'it is most clear, however, that biochemistry controls biochemistry.' That level does have its application and worth, of course (as a recent paper in Trends in Neurosciences Vol 32, issue 11 (Nov), pp 575~582 on the Cyclin-dependent kinase 5 (Cdk5)'s role in neurogeneration, and positive leads for dementia repair), yet would mostly lie beyond the scope of this thread.

Now, as for what had come next, in that post, you have piqued my curiosity. I would appreciate it if you wouldn't mind developing that line of thought a little more clearly as to how it might be considered to be presented...for example, maybe (and just for presentation of that argument) by filling an example of two of thinkable variables for 'X.'

In PD we find (especially in early onset cases of AR-JP) that one will have difficulty controlling the motor system so as to move. This usually progresses, and carries along with it, some slight cognitive loss. Falling is a common concern (and it has been observed that walking on a dark and light checkerboard flooring will often tend to improve walking movement) as the legs will sometimes not move at all to internal command even while in the midst of walking. (although there is often a greater tendency to continue walking if a smooth rhythm is obtained even in some later stage cases) Areas of brain which work together as mind have lost the ability to fully control the area of brain (skeletomotor system) that controls bodily movement (even so in the case of resting tremor). Huntington's disease is kind of the other extreme.

Huntington's disease (HD) is a chronic neurodegenerative disorder which is autosomal neuropsychiatrical in nature. HD entails a combination of motor, cognitive, and psychiatric symptoms which usually have an onset around the fourth or fifth decade of the patient's life. There are some rare cases of a much earlier, or much later onset, and there are studies which show that cognitive function is weakend in a likely good number of presymptomatic cases rather than later stages alone. After onset, the patient's condition follows a progressively dysfunctioning course, ending in death, over a 15 to 20 year span.

The short arm of chromosome 4 will have more than 39 repeats(1) in the Huntington gene (IT15, or Htt), with further increases producing a heavier effect. Childhood cases have shown that up to 70 or more repeats more likely leads to earlier onset. The primary area is, again, the basal ganglia with more specific focus on the GABAergic and acetylcholinergic neurons of the caudate nucleus and putamen. The caudate nuclei will always be severly degenerated, thus smaller than in normal brains. While there are a number of studies which show some detail of what's happening, one problem is putting a finger on which neuronal insult (used here in the sense of damage) is primary. The fact that neuronal inclusions are constant and early features of HD, appears to signify that dysfunction from molecular disturbance, rather than a primary process of cell death, is what initiates the process of neurodegeneration. It would be as though the cells are either starved to death, or are poisoned, rather than an 'on' switch directing cellular apoptosis being directly activated. The medium spiny inhibitory neuron axons are mostly targeted.

HD is not evenly spread throughout the world. Northern European populations have a higher incidence of HD--which until not too long ago, could only be diagnosed at onset. Japan, for example, has about a ten fold less number of cases. Also, some ethical issues surround the matter of genetical testing for the disease (in that the certainty of knowing is very, very high) such as those relating to marriage rights, child bearing rights among a few others. Most people who have a family history of HD, seem to not want to be tested for the mutant gene.

Being a hyperkinetic disorder, HD causes motor dysfunction which leads to 'dancing-like' (chorea) movements and jerks of especially the limbs and trunk. The movements will look like bits and pieces of an intended and purposeful act, but all totally out of context, and misarranged. While dementia becomes more noticeable in the late stages, as global brain atrophy occurs, there is at least some increment in the auditory system (compared to pre-symptom cases and normal controls), according to one study, which may be due to compensation plasticity--an effort by brain to keep some degree of homeostasis.

In Huntington's disease, like Parkinson's disease (just to a lesser degree), we do see very noticeable brain volume loss and mis-build (postmortem) and in HD--in that there is dysfunction in cortical connections and processes, as well as cell death in a large area of the brain--there is alteration of mind which is also distinguishable in grey and white area loss(2); we more easily recognize the motor dysfunction, of course, in early stages of onset, rather than the mind dysfunction that comes later, and can be determined postmortem.

Motor dysfunction, nevertheless, is as much a matter of brain build/state dysfunction as is any brain dysfunction, and therefore carries equal weight when investigating mind/brain matters. Abnormalities with the motor system also include intention tremor, hemiballism or ballism (uncontrollable and rapid ballistic-like movement of limbs) and, to a slightly less studied degree, but nevertheless overlapping, Tourette's Syndrome (TS). I'd like to point out TS next since it also deals with basal ganglia shortcomings to a degree.

Here again, it is most obvious that normal brain build is destroyed, and along with that, normal brain processing is destroyed. Additionally, we will find a degree of 'overlapped working space' incapacitated. Here, the loss of brain reaches all the way to that area of brain which is more involved with mind and consciousness, than in PD. Looking at Tourette's Syndrome will draw us even a bit closer to the strong connection between the biological function of brain and consciousness as founded in that.

(1) I have come across 'more than 36', and 'more than 40' in a few papers too, however, so we can say that there is a gradient range going into a point of more than 36 as leading into the' low-functioning-patient-after-full onset' range.

(2) This is quite deducible from the understanding and knowledge of what is fairly required for normal processes as evidenced from the results of normal brain build/state in vivo.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;107259 wrote:

Thanks for further expounding on that, paulhanke. While it is true that as far as I know, I am using the form of the word 'brain' in that sentence to also express, as you have presented in: that brain (not the brain because that entails all the organ) is involved in the control of bodily movement, I am also identifying the control source of muscle activating delivery. (which may be a kind of strange way to word it, but I can't think of clear way to do so at the moment...I think this captures the process well enough without going into detail)

... so, even if we are to accept that it is not "the brain" that controls body movement (because that is too large in scope), this does not logically entail that "brain" is the appropriate level (because in reality it is too small in scope) ... as an indication of that, the phrase "Areas of brain" that you deploy later in the post appears to logically invert the relationship between, say, M1 and "brain" (i.e., brain tissue) ... that is, there is no such thing as the M1 area of "brain" - there is only the M1 area of the brain ... stated more explicitly, brain tissue is a constituent of the M1 area of a human brain (as opposed to saying the M1 area of a human brain is a constituent of brain tissue) ... thus the phrase "Areas of brain" as you attempt to use it appears to be logically incoherent ...

KaseiJin;107259 wrote:

Yes, I agree, yet only with a correction. Here, I'd argue that if we were to take the one element of the equation down to that level, we'd have to take the other element down to that level equally--thus making it, 'it is most clear, however, that biochemistry controls biochemistry.'

... if that is true, then doesn't this observation/rule also apply to "brain"? - that is, if we are to take what is rightly the M1, PMA, SMA, etc., level down to the level of "brain", then can it only be said "It is most clear, however, that brain controls brain"? ...

KaseiJin;107259 wrote:

Now, as for what had come next, in that post, you have piqued my curiosity. I would appreciate it if you wouldn't mind developing that line of thought a little more clearly as to how it might be considered to be presented...for example, maybe (and just for presentation of that argument) by filling an example of two of thinkable variables for 'X.'

... I think you have already performed the filling in for me: "Areas of brain which work together as mind" ... here, "X" = "mind" ... and again, if this phrasing is intended to mean "Areas of brain such as the caudate nucleus which work together as mind", then the statement appears to be logically incoherent, as the caudate nucleus is not an area of "brain" but rather an area of the brain ... now, perhaps I have it all wrong - English is, after all, inexact ... perhaps you are not poising for a logical argument of the form "Since brain controls everything that constitutes X, brain is the reason we have X." ... perhaps when you say "Areas of brain which work together as mind" it is actually short-hand for "Areas that are constituted of brain tissue and which work together as mind" ... in which case, you should have no problem with rephrasing this as "Areas of the brain which work together as mind" (as this necessarily implies that the areas in question are constituted of brain tissue), yes? ...

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From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

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