From Brain to Consciousness to Mind--the biological basis

@salima,

salima;113483 wrote:

perhaps i am getting carried away...

... maybe a little Smile

... the reason it looks so central in that paragraph of mine is that it is the topic under discussion - if we were instead discussing something else, that something else might look just as central ...

---------- Post added 12-22-2009 at 10:35 AM ----------

KaseiJin;113530 wrote:

Care must be taken there in order to, shall we say, keep a reasonable lid on our practical understandings.

... at the same time one needs to ensure that any "practical understandings" do not distort the subject beyond recognition ... for example, if the set of "practical understandings" is by nature mechanical, and we project "consciousness" through that lens (stripping away the causal webs that consciousness is and is a constituent of and leaving only linear mechanical cause), then of course we are going to conclude that consciousness is mechanically caused (how can we not?) ... but as Rosen attempts to show with his relational models, the logical implication of that particular set of metaphysical assumptions is the requirement of a creator or vitalism or some such to provide final cause for the unentailed functions (which should come as no surprise, as that was Descartes' intent when he transformed the machine metaphor into metaphysics in the first place) ... so in this particular case there seems to be a point at which "keeping a reasonable lid on our practical understandings" becomes untenable - that is, it would be untenable to try and show that consciousness is not due to a creator nor vitalism by means of any set of practical understandings that logically requires a creator or vitalism ... that's not to say that scientists never employ untenable practical understandings - they routinely do, if just to provide some sort of metaphysical point of departure for hypothesis generation (something is better than nothing!) ... but that's science, not philosophy Smile

...

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;113530 wrote:

our definition of consciousness.

I would suggest that we don't have a definition of consciousness. What you have is a 'working model'. A working model is useful in situations where there are too many unknowns to confidently declare a definition. The meaning of 'consciousness' is such a situation, I would suggest.

Incidentally, to throw a bit of a cat among the pidgeons here, the sad news has been reported of the death of Kim Peek, at age 58. Kim Peek was the inspiration for the Dustin Hoffman character in the film 'Rain Man'. He was a 'prodigious savant' in other words, a person with damaged cognitive systems who had apparently prodigious capabilities. The following is from the Wikipedia article on his abilities:

Quote:

Kim Peek was born with macrocephaly, damage to the cerebellum, and, perhaps most important, agenesis of the corpus callosum, a condition in which the bundle of nerves that connects the two hemispheres of the brain is missing; in Peek's case, secondary connectors such as the anterior commissure were also missing. There is speculation that his neurons made other connections in the absence of a corpus callosum, which results in an increased memory capacity. According to Peek's father, Fran, Peek was able to memorize things from the age of 16-20 months. He read books, memorized them, and then placed them upside down on the shelf to show that he had finished reading them, a practice he maintained. He read a book in about an hour, and remembered almost everything he had read, memorizing vast amounts of information in subjects ranging from history and literature, geography, and numbers to sports, music, and dates. His reading technique consisted of reading the left page with his left eye and the right page with his right eye and in this way he could read two pages at time with a rate of about 8-10 seconds per page. He could recall the content of some 12,000 books from memory.

I guess it would make it difficult to develop a truly predictive model of neural functioning if you had to allow for the fact that an individual whom you might predict would be barely capable of remembering anything, on the basis of an ECG, in fact turned out to have a memory better than almost any 'normal' person.

There are many other cases of savant syndrome, including people who can tell you the square root of 6 or 8 digit numbers without any apparent calculation, or the weather on any day in the last 50 years.

Odd, isn't it?

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;113649 wrote:

Odd, isn't it?

... that savant syndrome is almost always attended by severe social disability makes me wonder if that in any way reflects upon the brainpower required to be a social animal ... that is, how much brainpower does a social disability "free up" for other purposes? - are the "social butterflies" the true geniuses of our species? (which would put me solidly in the "dumber than a doornail" end of the spectrum Smile

) ... at any rate, I do like the "working model" notion - so if we find ourselves barking up the wrong tree, we can move on to the next tree (and bark some more!) ...

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@KaseiJin,

heck, i always thought even a more than average amount of intelligence added up to social failure...but there is also a saying that the wise man can understand a fool (and talk to him) while the fool can only speak to another fool. seems like the intelligent should have less limitation on his choice of friends...

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@salima,

Thanks for that extra input there, paulhanke. I feel I understand the point made, may not so fully agree with each aspect of it, yet will let that be, at the moment, and come back to it at what I, at least according to the general framework I have lined up, would consider a good point in the thread.

We do have a clear enough, and practical definition of consciousness, actually, it's just that there has been some confusion along the way, which still tends to get in the way. However, it might be good to keep in mind that a definition of a thing does not state what a thing is, all the time. We have, for example, a clear enough, and practical definition of sleep, but by defining sleep, we are not saying exactly what sleep is, in the sense that we don't say what, exactly, an oxygen molecule (among others) is when giving the definition of air. It's a bit hard to word well, but we can say that we don't know what consciousness is, but we do have a definition of consciousness, just as we can say that we don't know what a stored memory trace is, but we have a definition of the term 'stored memory trace.'

That's sad news, indeed. I have autism lined up, and will do a full presentation on that, on down the road, as well.

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;93258 wrote:

The genesis of this particular thread formulated a good number of days prior to the date of this OP, and the underlying theme lies well within that of the the thread Consciousness is a Biological Problem. To that extent, the topic area is fairly much the same, with only a little expansion to include the matter of mind in relation to consciousness and brain, as well. Due to the above, therefore, I will bring in a collection of my posts from that thread, so as to reduce any need for linking or search. Also, I will later respond to some number of points which had been raised there--but only those which I reason reflect a proper element of relationship to the theme under discussion herein.

With the title, I am presenting the process of approaching the theme, along with the correlation of the three things--brain, consciousness, and mind--and their foundational situational basis, namely that of biological concern. This then means that we will approach the brain as an organ of a certain basic, yet distinct (when compared to other organs) constitution, and that because of this more natural and pragmatic approach, and because of all organs' being matters of biological concern, we have the brain as being of a biological concern. Consciousness--as generally used in this thread (as to be more precisely spelled out later on)--will then be that which can be shown in a position of having relation to the brain. We can thus (and for starters especially [see above]) take the aggregate of common English definitions in the raw, as follow, and apply them in general:
[INDENT]

[/INDENT]As further, slightly more precise definitions come onto the field, we will be able to consider mind in relationship to both consciousness, and come to understand areas of overlap, and difference, in broadness of term/concept. At the same time, we will be able to explore the depth and nature of correlation between brain and mind, and by extension the foundational, biological basis of mind and consciousness. Thus in summation on the approach, we first arrive at brain (evolutionary history), and in consideration of that (neurosciences and plausible philosophical takes) look next to consciousness, and then mind (subjective observation leading to subjective investigation). However, it would be good to work back down again, in an effort to further refine the 'what, why and hows' of the relationship between the three things. In this manner, I argue the position that mind, and consciousness are robustly involved with, and foundationally determined by, brain, and that thus it is more accurate and especially fair enough to contend that they are foundationally biological concerns.

To make it clear, while I invite all and any to join in and participate, and also have no qualms about some matters which had come up on the above mentioned thread (or other related threads), being brought up here too, I will be strict regarding 'on-topicness,' and will appeal (to the extent that I have rights) to moderation quickly for removal of none-performance, less-productive-in-outcome posting. I specifically ask all those who do join in to evidence thought before posting, to not post single or near single line posts, and to refrain from posting You Tube links or irrelevant pictographs.

In the book The Spiritual Brain the authors put forward a convincing argument for a non physical mind - based on the fact that they were documenting individuals thinking when there was no measurable physical brain activity present.

1 Reply

@amer,

Continuing from post number 217 on page 22.

Odorants are molecular particles that 'lock' into the receptors that they fit into--they are real objects. Sound, in its strictest sense, is not. Air consists of real objects and the compression and expansion of these make all the elements of what is taken by the brain as sound.

As I have come across it being mentioned, from time to time, with greater complexity comes greater possibility of malfunction. Along with that train of thought, it is of course most obvious that stopping up the ears, affects the brain's ability to receive the signal input used in acknowledging cognitively, the sound, and so, the sound acknowledged cognitively is not what is is when the hands are removed from covering the ears. There are a number of things that can go wrong:

[indent]I have come across one recorded case, presenting a condition of the ear being able to act as a 'speaker.' There had been one lady who complained of hearing wispering much of the time. No one took her seriously it seemed, but after one doctor did check it out, he did in fact hear a 'wispering' noise being produced from the ear. Another interesting report was that of a man who, while sitting along side his pet dog on one occasion, had noticed some humming. The man, in surprise, at first wondered if his dog had not been actually humming...as humans do. Upon checking around, he found that the humming noise had been coming from the dog's ear.

One common malfuntion of a similar nature is Tinnitus. This is a disorder which can be either be physical (vascular anomalies, muscular contractions, etc.) or non-physical (abnormal physiological activity in the inner ear or central nervous system (CNS). While this is basically a symptom of a number of (or collection of) disorders, rather than a disease, and affects a fair number of people at one time or another. That ringing sound in your ear (and not after extreme noise, such as at a concert) is Tinnitus. For about 6.2% of adults in the US, for example, it can even be dibilitating.

Of course, as people(1) age their hearing becomes ever more impared. That is because unlike the cilia of the olfactory system, those of the auditory system (within the cochlea) are not mitotically replaced. They lose their strength and even die out. This is also purely a mechanical function.

There are also CNS lesions, skeletal malformations (2)[/color], cranal nerve VIII tumors, Usher's Syndrome, Waardenburg's Syndrome, etc. which affect hearing and even cause hearing loss. I will touch on some of these down the road, more likely, as they relate to the matter of mind and consciousness.

I have decided to touch on the visual system to this same relatively detailed degree, and then just sum up the others, so as to speed things up a bit. I greatly appreciate the understanding and patience of those who may be following along with interest. KJ

1. In some animals, those cilia may be replaced.

2. In one example, where the middle ear bones grow over the oval window, fenestration, a surgical procedure where a hole is drilled through the bone material which has grown over the oval window, thus allowing transduction--hearing ability. (source material in part, listed below, for those interested)

amer, that will then make another book to look at (Although, in the event that you have read it, you might wish to make some detailed presentation of that in this thread, as a counter argument to the one I am making in this thread.) I very seriously doubt that there is any correctness to the claim being made by that book--if, in fact, that is the claim being made; viz. one can think without the brain[/i]. While I know of some of Dr. Beauregard's published papers with work on emotions and with Carmalite (sp?) nuns (as others have also looked at), am aware of his religious belief-system foundation, I am not aware of his yet making such a straightforward claim that thinking is something that happens with nothing but 'air'--so to speak. Some of his work has been cited in the Journal of Neuroscience, and Science, and I'm sure I'd find it in some others too, but none of these speak of what you have stated, so . . . let's see.

Source Material on auditory systems posts (not exhaustive, but primary):

Martin, John H. Neuroanatomy-text and atlas, pp 191~204; McGraw-Hill, Medical publishing Division (2003);

Bear, Mark F., Connors, Barry W., and Paradiso, Michael A. Neuroscience-exploring the brain, pp 343~376; Lippincott Williams & Wilkins (2007);

Baars, Bernard J. and Gage, Nicole M. Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness-Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience, pp 183~223; Academic Press (2007);

Lambert, Kelly, and Kinsley, Craig H. Clinical Neuroscience-The Neurobiological Foundations of Mental Health, pp 323, 324; Worth Publishers (2005);

Fain, Gordon L Sensory Transduction, pp 119~156; Sinauer Associates, Inc. (2003);

Brugge, John F., and Howard, Matthew A. Hearing, Encyclopedia of the Human Brain, Vol 2, pp 429~448; Academic Press (2002);

Beauchamp, Michael S., and Ro, Tony (2008) Neural substrates of Sound-Touch Synesthesia after a Thalamic Lesion. Jour Neurosci, Vol 28(50), Dec 10; pp 13696~13702;

Besle, Julien, et al. (2008) Visual Activation and Audiovisual Interactions in the Auditory Cortex during Speech Perception: Intracranial Recordings in Humans. ibid., Vol 28(52), Dec 24; pp 14301~14310;

Clark-Parbery, Alexandria, et. al. (2009) Musical Experience Limits the Degradative Effects of Background Noise on the Neural Processing of Sound. ibid, Vol 29(45), Nov 11; pp 14100~14107;

Chadderton, Paul, et al. (2009) The Synaptic Representation of Sound Source Location in Auditory Cortex. ibid., Vol 29(45), Nov 11; pp 14127~14135;

Wen, Bo, and Wang, Grace I. (2009) Dynamic Range Adaptation to Sound Level Statistics in the Auditory Nerve. ibid., Vol 29(44), Nov 4; pp 13797~13808;

Sadagopan, Srivatsun, and Wang, Xiaqin (2009) Nonlinear Spectrotemporal Interactions Underlying Selectivity for Complex Sounds in Auditory Cortex. ibid., Vol 29(36), Sep 9; pp 11192~11202;

Moser, Dana, et al. (2009) Temporal Order Processing of Syllables in the Left Parietal Lobe. ibid., Vol 29(40), Oct 7; pp 12568~12573;

Bendixen, Alexandra, et al. (2009) I Heard That Coming: Event Related Potential Evidence for Stimulus-Driven Prediction in the Auditory System. ibid., Vol 29(26), July 1; pp 8447~8451;

Loui, Psyche, et al. (2009) Tone Deafness: A New Disconnection Syndrome? ibid., Vol 29(33), Aug 19; pp 10215~10220;

Rohrer, Jonathan D., et al. (2009) Neologistic jargon aphasia and agraphia in primary progressive aphasia. Jour Neurological Sci, Vol 277, issues 1-2; pp 155~159;

Kim, Min-Jeong, et al. (2009) Neuroimaging features in a case of developmental central auditory processing disorder. ibid., Vol 277, issues 1-2; pp 176~180;

Miller, Lee M., and Recanzone, Gregg H. (2009) Populations of auditory cortical neurons can accurately encode space across stimulus intensity. Proc Natl Acad Sci, Vol 106, no. 14, April 7; pp 5931~5935;

Shahin, Antoine J., et al. (2009) Brain oscillations during sematic evaluation of speech. Brain and Cognition, Vol 70; pp 259~266;

Rosa, Christine, et al. (2008) Investigations of hemispheric specialization of self-voice recognition. ibid., Vol 68; pp 204~214;

Boatman, Dana (2004) Cortical bases of speech perception: evidence from functional lesion studies. Cognition, Vol 92; pp 47~65;

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@KaseiJin,

It could be observed that this thread contains barely anything of interest from a philosophical viewpoint. Having assumed that consciousness is brain function, it presents material from various neurophysiological journals, all of which 'prove' that certain parts of the brain behave a certain way under certain conditions. But this simply provides further illustration of the starting assumption, rather than proving anything further.

Over the last few months, there has been mention of various anomalous aspects of human consciousness which throw doubt on the overall cogency of the 'standard model' which is assumed here. These include phenomena such as:

Savant Syndrome, whereby individuals with apparent neural defects exhibit powers that verge on the paranormal and for which no explanation has ever been found.
Actual 'paranormal mental powers' including telepathy, clairvoyance and so on.
People that function with a large part (more than half!) of their brain missing due to accident, injury or congenital condition.
Cases where one area of the brain spontaneously changes its purpose to fulfil a completely different purpose than that which it usually performs, due to accident, illness or injury.

Documentation on all of these points can be produced, should there be any interest.

Now just to make my position clear, I am not 'anti-science' or opposed to neurological explanations of the brain, or any of the numerous benefits and discoveries that brain science and medicine have made and will undoubtedly continue to provide. However I will always argue against neurological reductionism. Among other things, I object to being made the object of scientific analysis for the purpose of explaining 'what makes us tick'. Further to which, many of the above-mentioned phenomena completely undermine the reductionist understanding, which is why scientific opposition to them borders on the hysterical.

One the one hand, consciousness does have clinical, medical and scientific dimensions, which are perfectly subject to experimental science and review. In a much broader sense, however, consciousness is indeed 'the ground of being', something I am sure that Western science and philosophy has barely begun to comprehend, let alone explain. Every argument, every position, and every explanation of consciousness can only proceed within that which it seeks to demonstrate. Consciousness itself is the ultimate a priori fact of existence.

Anyway, enough out of me. I will create a new thread in the next couple of days on the controversy over experimental paranormal science, as I had previously committed to do. (And I bet someone out there already knows what is going to be in it :bigsmile:)

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;115247 wrote:

One the one hand, consciousness does have clinical, medical and scientific dimensions, which are perfectly subject to experimental science and review. In a much broader sense, however, consciousness is indeed 'the ground of being', something I am sure that Western science and philosophy has barely begun to comprehend, let alone explain. Every argument, every position, and every explanation of consciousness can only proceed within that which it seeks to demonstrate. Consciousness itself is the ultimate a priori fact of existence.

hey, i like that!

i wonder if science isnt mistaking consciousness for thought...i mean they know a person is conscious or not and unconscious of being conscious etc etc...but consciousness perhaps is immeasurable, unverifiable, yet undeniably real. thought processes are not consciousness-thoughts indeed are products of the brain, such as memories, dreams, sensory integration, any number of processes and faculties. but consciousness as some of us are thinking of it is not really entering into this discussion at all.

this is why i thought it might be just as well to leave consciousness defined as kj proposes, but to go on and find a new name for that thing we are trying not to talk about here. not an old name that carries baggage, like 'the soul' but something entirely new. actually prana and chi fit the bill for me...is there nothing to equate that with in western terms? the word soul has a connotation of individuality while prana and chi are temporary portions of the BIG Prana or Chi...you know what i mean?

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

As I have often said, scientific and 'mystical' approaches are valid within their own domain. The scientific approach is perfectly valid within its own domain. It is only what materialists like Dennett infer on the basis of science that I object to. Science must begin on the basis of certain axioms and assumptions, the most fundamental of which is naive realism.

As for a word for 'consciousness as soul' each is highly contextual and situated within a matrix of meaning arising from the tradition in which it has been elaborated. However if you do a search on 'consciousness studies' a fair number of the sites and centres that are returned incorporate the 'mystical' as one perspective.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;115379 wrote:

As I have often said, scientific and 'mystical' approaches are valid within their own domain.

I never understand this idea. Mysticism says that a mind-matter-only theory would be dualism and predicts that such theories cannot be completed consistently. (Or, in other words, that all such theories are logically absurd). This would explain why the hard problem arises and indicate where a solution might lie. What has domains got to do with anything?

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@KaseiJin,

'Within their range of applicability' then. There are many issues that neuroscience can deal with, diagnose, analyse, and dissect. For such things as the treatment of brain tumours, the diagnoses of diseases and conditions of the brain, science is absoutely indispensable, and I never take issue with it. But philosophical inferences that are based on the scientific outlook are different.

I am reading a book [1] which goes into some detail on the way in which the brain processes images. It refers to the early (1980) PET scanner studies by Posner and Raichle which were conducted to ascertain the areas of the brain that were active in response to a simple word ('chair') and a simple association ('chair' and 'sit'). At the time the basic theory was that there was a specific area within the brain the processed language. However the responses in the PET scanner images showed that there were very generalised responses, involving diverse areas of the brain.

Quote:

The more complex task of associating the word 'chair' with 'sit'...proved to involve additional massive tracts of the frontal lobes, and the right hemipshere of the brain as well. This first...simple experiment confounded all previous assumptions about the workings of the brain by showing all those anatomical parts, such as the language centre, with their discrete functions, were all summated, like 'the ripples of a pebble on a pond' into a dynamic, integrated network of electrical activity.

Another observation was that with subjects who had previously rehearsed their word-association tasks displayed almost no electrical activity in the brain at all, implying that the neural fireworks were associated with the learning of a (very simple) task. (2)

Further analysis has downplayed the idea that the brain is literally like an image storage facility in which 'contains' images of objects in the way envisaged by representationalism. Instead the current theory is that the brain 'constructs' our image of the world. This is highlighted by Semir Zeki, Professor of Neurobiology at the University of London, who said

Quote:

As surely as the old systems of beliefs was rooted in the concept of a labelled image of the visual world received and analysed by the cortex, the present one is rooted in the belief that an image of the visual world is actively constructed by the cortex.

The visual stimuli available to the brain do not offer a stable code of information. The wavelengths of light reflected from the surfaces change along with the alterations and illumination, yet the brain is able to asign a constant colour to them. ...An object's image varies with distance, yet the brain can ascertain its true size.... (3)

The significance of this is many-fold. First, in my mind anyway, it validates Kant and Maurice Merlaeau Ponty, who reached similar conclusions on the basis of their analysis of consciousness and cognition, without access to any neural imaging devices whatever.

Second, it undercuts the 'representationalist' model of perception whereby the brain passively receives and processes data of the 'real world'. It actually goes towards supporting an overall model of consciousness far more like that proposed by phenomenological psychology than materialism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 'Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves', James le Fanu, Harper, 2009
2. ibid p 196
3. ibid p 200-201

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;115247 wrote:

It could be observed that this thread contains barely anything of interest from a philosophical viewpoint.

I regret that perhaps my last sentence (of the major block before footnotes [not citations]) has come back to me empty handed--as though having failed its mission). Why, jeeprs, are you going back to post 173, nay, why are you contradicting your post 63? I'm not quite sure of how to take this complaint, this time 'round; but have (for better or for worse) decided to handle it differently than I have so far, on this particular thread.

jeeprs;115247 wrote:

Having assumed that consciousness is brain function, it presents material from various neurophysiological journals, all of which 'prove' that certain parts of the brain behave a certain way under certain conditions. But this simply provides further illustration of the starting assumption, rather than proving anything further. (bold and color mine)

This emotion derived conclusion is mistaken. It's the same thing that LWSleeth had tried to present as having some weight behind it, but which it does not--for example:

[indent][indent]

LWSleeth;67040 wrote:

But we don’t know [that consciousness is due to neuronal activity]! Physicalists assume it a priori as they proceed with all their research, but a great many others dispute it. (additions for clarity mine)

[/indent][/indent]

It is not the case that some assumption has been firstly made at all !! It had not been the earliest of our H. sapiens ancestors who had 'assumed, a priori' that the state of consciousness must be a result of brain function, had it? We can check the indigenous people of your own geographical area, jeeprs, they are, in fair enough reasoning, understood to have some 40,000 year history. Did they automatically assume that the state of consciousness arose from the activity of their brains? Or, again, should we say that such an assumption had been toted around, a priori, by H. neanderthalensis, and we H. sapiens got it from them, or it was an invention of the H. heidelbergensis, the H. erectus, H. ergaster, or maybe it had been that unenlightened Ardipithecus ramidus (1)which had just assumed, without any evidence whatsoever, that the state of consciousness is due to brain function?

While other things you have mentioned in that post, from which I have quoted herein, are because of a lack of some certain degree on knowledge about brain workings, I am going to ask you to verify with substantial, quality, and quantitatively produced evidence, that the present understandings in the brain sciences, based on average of the better evidences, had been simply assumed in the first instance, and by whom, or what peoples, and when (or during which era, or age, or block of time).

Then, along with that, I am challenging you to adequately demonstrate that the matter of having the state of consciousness, as opposed to simple brain activity matters which lie below that threshold, had been merely, and without any investigation whatsoever, dreamed up as being a matter of brain activity result.

Your assertion, jeeprs, is incorrect.

1. See Science Vol 326, 2 Oct, 2009.

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@salima,

salima;115269 wrote:

this is why i thought it might be just as well to leave consciousness defined as kj proposes, but to go on and find a new name for that thing we are trying not to talk about here. not an old name that carries baggage, like 'the soul' but something entirely new. actually prana and chi fit the bill for me...is there nothing to equate that with in western terms? the word soul has a connotation of individuality while prana and chi are temporary portions of the BIG Prana or Chi...you know what i mean?

... Schopenhauer introduces his concept of the "will" and then develops what one could call a "will-organism identity theory" ... what's intriguing in his philosophical theory is that he treats mental volition and bodily action as two experiential projections of the same thing - that is, in his philosophical theory, it is not the case that mental volition occurs first and in turn causes bodily action, but rather mental volition and bodily action is simply how the will-organism experiences itself - the will and the organism are the same thing known in two different ways ... I'm still reading (and it's a secondary source), so I probably don't have this exactly right, but it's an intriguing thought nonetheless Smile

---------- Post added 12-29-2009 at 10:16 PM ----------

jeeprs;115247 wrote:

Having assumed that consciousness is brain function, it presents material from various neurophysiological journals, all of which 'prove' that certain parts of the brain behave a certain way under certain conditions. But this simply provides further illustration of the starting assumption, rather than proving anything further.

KaseiJin;115446 wrote:

This emotion derived conclusion is mistaken.

... it's not like the idea that "consciousness is a brain function" is the only hypothesis out there - there is growing interest in alternative hypotheses, such as embodied cognition ... in this light, I think that any argument that starts out by assuming the truth of one hypothesis over its serious competitors would be significantly more "emotion derived" than would be the questioning of such an assumption of truth ... and if such an assumption of truth is not the starting point of your argument, then you need to understand that your presentation thus far sure makes it seem like it is ...

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@KaseiJin,

It's OK, KJ, you win. Consciousness is the brain. I am tired of arguing the case. Any emotive attributions or expressions of frustration hitherto withdrawn and please carry on.

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@paulhanke,

To make an effort to clarify my standing on what you have presented, Paulhanke, what I have seen thus far in my studies, puts the argument that I am making here, in the better light. There of course are other hypotheses about consciousness, I have looked at some in the past, and little by little am looking at others too (such as the general embodiment theory). Even so, at the moment, the understanding I am presenting is the what the better of average tested evidence gives us. In this respect, it is not nearly so much an 'emotion derived' thing, paul, as the assertion to which I had directed that modifying phrase towards, right?! Again, it is not a matter of assuming any nearly as much as it is being charged with.

Jeeprs, I'm asking that you please demonstrate the validity of your assertion with substantial, quality, and quantitative evidence. Please. For one to make an assertion like that as a counter argument towards a position, that one is gonna hafta present the backing for it. I mean, that's just reasonable a request, right?!

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;115495 wrote:

To make an effort to clarify my standing on what you have presented, Paulhanke, what I have seen thus far in my studies, puts the argument that I am making here, in the better light. There of course are other hypotheses about consciousness, I have looked at some in the past, and little by little am looking at others too (such as the general embodiment theory). Even so, at the moment, the understanding I am presenting is the what the better of average tested evidence gives us.

... and I think that it is precisely this foundational philosophical thinking that would be of interest to folks like jeeprs and salima - it certainly would be to me ... but to use as your starting point only the result of this philosophical thinking and to simply rattle off neurophysiological datum after neurophysiological datum, you sound more like an acolyte reciting the central dogma than a philosopher ...

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@paulhanke,

While I appreciate your efforts at interceding, if I may make such a call, paulhanke, there are some things that we should all keep in mind, I would yet propose.

For one, what I have said in the opening two paragraphs of my post number 174 is without fault--which, with your background, I'm sure you'd fully understand (the importance of detail). It would be only fair, to also keep in mind that I had clearly enough stated my intentions in the very OP--as quoted in #174--thus my intentions, and attention to detail, should be free from realistic complaint, would you not tend to agree, paulhanke? So, no, I am not philosophizing at the moment (take note of this implication please), but I've been open about it, and that is fair play.

Then, with the general discussion heading being that of mind, and that sense being clearly (as is most obvious) regarding that of the human (then, maybe, animal) arena, I am, in this particular thread, focusing on and arguing, to the pragmatic degree, that much more secure understanding that consciousness, in which mind is nested, is a direct, and primary property of brain, and its build/state--thus a biological concern. Ted Block, who we do know to be a philosopher by profession, even acquiesces that much(1)...so presenting the detail, that most are not in a position to be exposed to, which leads to such a conclusion, here on this thread, in this sub-forum, should be of no complaint.

Additionally, I wish to set an example. When someone makes an assertion, or a claim, with the implication that such is seeable as a true fact of nature, I'd like to see valid, tested (and as often as possible peer-reviewed) support for that--and of course that may often entail balancing with counter-views amongst evidences, studies, etc., possibly at times even for, or towards, a particular submission of evidence used by the evidence used to support a forum member's assertion or claim. The Churchland couple are professional philosophers, and you can bet your bottom dollar that they do just that, so, asking for, and providing, evidence (be that datum or data), and doing so as exhaustively as reasonable for this medium, here in this sub-forum, should be of no complaint.

And more to all; let's please pause for a moment, and take a good, old-fashioned, down-to-earth, reality-check of a breather here. There is this thing called the dictionary; which of course prescribes how we should use the words in a language (English here), but also describes how we use words in a language. No dictionary will have all possible entries, but a good one, for example the multi-volumed Oxford Dictionary of the English Language, will have an unusually exhaustive outlay. Now, I'm sure we all have dictionaries, and we can look in our own copies--I'll look in mine here (2):

[indent]

Quote:

consciousness n. 1. the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own feelings, what is happening around one, etc. 2. the totality of one's thoughts, feelings, and impressions; conscious mind.

Quote:

conscious adj. 1. having a feeling or knowledge (of one's own sensations, feelings, etc. or of external things); knowing or feeling (that something is or was happening or existing); aware; cognizant 2. able to feel and think; in the normal waking state 3. aware of oneself as a thinking being; knowing what one is doing and why 4. same asSELF-CONSCIOUS 5. accompanied by an awareness of what one is thinking, feeling, and doing; intentional [conscious humor] 6. known to or felt by oneself [conscious guilt] SYN. see AWARE--the conscious Psychol. that part of a person's mental activity of which he is fully aware at any given time: see also UNCONSCIOUS, PRECONSCIOUS

[/indent]

There is no doubt whatsoever, that we have a definition of consciousness and conscious, in general. Then, as the elements of these have been refined, we have fuller descriptions/prescriptions of the terms. If one wishes argue for a new sense, that, of course, is fine. Again, I (at least) would hope for good presentation on the pragmatic value of adopting that sense...and that would tie in with this thread just fine. To assert that some something exists which made life's coming into existence necessary, and that something is consciousness, is simply a breech of definition...and another word choice is in line.

What I am doing here, is presenting the argument as to why this definition is the most likely fact of nature, and earlier religious belief-system rooted notions are least likely facts of nature. I am also working on, and towards (at the same general time), showing how some issues in the philosophical area, the mind/body thing, are incorrect in some ways, and cause unnecessary confusion in some other ways.

jeeprs, it is not a matter of winning something; such expression radiates with an application of emotion best held in check, does it not? However, I must thank you for your sticking with me this far, this time (now the 4th, as you will recall). If I were to go straight to the far better supported conclusions about points one, three, and four (in your post number 228), they are all brain build/event matters. There is nothing so mysterious about them...wondrous and awe inspiring, yes, of course...but they are understood enough to know that it's good old-fashion biology at work...nothing more, nothing less...and that's as close to fact as one can get.

If I were to look into item two, there, I'd argue that there is misinterpretation to a degree on some points, and unknowns involved on others--but that these unknowns, are unknowns which no human has gotten knowledge of, yet, and of course are no evidences that it is not the brain (esp. H. sapien, neanderthalensis, primate) that has the state (above a certain threshold) of having consciousness...not the intrinsic cardiac plexus, not the brain stem alone, of Mike the Headless Chicken, not the ganglion of the lowly earth worm, not the pebbles on the beach, the sun in outer space, nor the galaxy which houses our lowly planet earth. I patiently wait for you to provided support for your assertion that this thread (and by extension, the neurosciences) has first, a priori, 'assumed that consciousness is brain function.

1. And that is the MIT press, 4th (2009) edition of Michael S. Gazzaniga's The Cognitive Neurosciences which (since we are speaking of detail here) consists of 1,267 hardbound, college text sized pages (excluding the index). In his 9 page contribution, he acknowledges five people with help by way of comment, and gives 109 citations--support for his statements, assertions, and claims.

2. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 2nd. College Ed., 1976. Also, please see the OP.

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;115768 wrote:

The Churchland couple are professional philosophers, and you can bet your bottom dollar that they do just that, so, asking for, and providing, evidence (be that datum or data), and doing so as exhaustively as reasonable for this medium, here in this sub-forum, should be of no complaint.

... but the complaint jeeprs voiced is not that you are citing exhaustive evidential support as you present your philosophical arguments (as the Churchlands or any other professional philosopher would do) - his complaint is that you simply aren't providing any philosophical arguments ... I can sympathize with his attempt to untrack you from this data recitation rut you seem to be in - is there any way you can interleave your philosophical arguments with all of this data that is intended to support them? ...

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@KaseiJin,

Thanks for your response, paulhanke. For one, I am just not so sure, myself, that that which you have put forward, is quite nearly as much of the root of the complaint, when it all boils down, as might be a certain insistence on the acceptance of a given religious belief-system based view, as being a valid way of understanding what consciousness is, along with what is known and understood through the practices of the brain sciences. Do you recall, paulhanke, my having kind of spelled out this running conflict I have had with jeeprs before?

A second thing is, that I am not a professional philosopher, like the Churchlands, Block, Dennett, or Searle, so I can only do so much of that in a 'flow,' and, I might add, I tend to be pragmatic, and to that degree, we could say (I'd guess) am 'practicing' philosophically. (without making overt philosophical arguments for the benefit of pragmatism)

As for your suggestion, I can only say that I am willing to try--and I'm being honest here too. I'd love to be able to just pretty much something like,'the savant syndrome is understood enough to know that there is nothing mystically occurring from outside the brain that has given rise to that, so the proposal that it demonstrates something that brain alone cannot do, is moot,' and after discussion, and possible refinement of just what that entails, acceptance without impractical argumentation that that is the better understanding out there at the moment--then move on--but I am just not so sure it would happen. (based on past history, I say this)

As I have said before, to you personally, paulhanke, I am not that good at debating, or arguing, yet have always been stronger at presenting. That's just the way I am, and I guess it comes up to the top too easily. I like to lay out all foundations, so that when I do present the conclusion, the background, discussion, and 'methods' (like your normal paper), have already been done. I'll toss it around a little then, and see if I can come up with something that might be less rigid, then. And, whatever I come back with, will probably have to go . . .

AND....while I'm here...[size=3]HAPPY NEW YEARS [/size]to you, paulhanke, and all !!

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