@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;157669 wrote:It doesn't matter what culture I'm in because "all moral truths are relative" is not a relative moral truth. The claim that "all moral truths are relative" is actually absolute and not relative. I'm not sure why you think it matters what culture I'm in when I say something that isn't relative to any culture.
That's exactly the problem. It as an allegedly universal non-moral truth about relative moral truths. So when uttered in cultural contexts ends up saying something it can't say about the truth value of moral truths in other contexts since the presuppostion of its truth entails a contradiction
in that cultural context. There's no way out of it.
More techinically it looks like this with respect to (1) and (2). If "all moral truths are relative" is true, then the following objective non-moral/non-relative truths hold:
(1) "'Killing innocent Jews is wrong' is true relative to culture A" is non-relatively true.
(2) "'Killing innocent Jews is not-wrong' is true relative to culture B" is non-relatively true.
The crucial part of this Reductio is the supposition that MMR
is objectively non-relatively true (since that is precisely the kind of Meta-Ethical thesis it is),
So
if "moral truths are relative" is
objectively, non-relatively true, then "not-wrong" as it is mentioned in (2) takes on the
same cognitive significance of not-wrong as it is used in culture A, not culture B, because you are asserting (2)
within culture A. Therefore, you are really asserting the following claim within culture A:
"Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is true.
But "Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is a contradiction relative to culture A. Therefore, "Moral truths are relative" is false relative to culture A.
That's sufficient to show the reductio if MMR is objectively, non-relatively true.
