A perfect god can not exist?

@Extrain,

Extrain;157267 wrote:

The problem would be that if I say "Obama is president" I would be saying everything is president. What are the conditions for set identities? Sets don't tell us much about anything at all.

0 Replies

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;157268 wrote:

I have a crazy theory in that Identity comes from a "gestalt" effect from the Whole on its parts and its time independent...

But you have to specify which parts constitute the self-identity of something. Without that account everything just is identical to everything else--the universe is one. So when I say "Obama is president," I am actually saying "the universe is president" which doesn't inform me of anything at all. Does that make sense to you?

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 04:24 PM ----------

Fil. Albuquerque;157270 wrote:

But according to your metaphysical account that is what we are actually saying...

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157272 wrote:

But you have to specify which parts constitute the self-identity of something. Without that account everything just is identical to everything else--the universe is one. So when I say "Obama is president," I am actually saying "the universe is president" which doesn't inform me of anything at all. Does that make sense to you?

yes...

but let me be metaphorical, for instance perspective of a room...you can change your position and the room still is one...but its appearance changes to some extent when you change your observation position... just as all numbers are made from combinations of one...as chemical structures are all made of the very same atoms...quantities and combinations of quantities of the same thing bring up this differences, but to my view they all depend on the total length of the set, to be what they are at each moment...and they somehow contain the inflection of other things in their nature a priori...is this making some sense at least ???

1 Reply

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;157275 wrote:

yes...

but let me be metaphorical, for instance perspective of a room...you can change your position and the room still is one...but its appearance changes to some extent when you change your observation position... just as all numbers are made from combinations of one...as chemical structures are all made of the very same atoms...quantities and combinations of quantities of the same thing bring up this differences, but to my view they all depend on the total length of the set, to be what they are at each moment...and they somehow contain the inflection of other things in their nature a priori...is this making some sense at least ???

Unfortunately, this doesn't help. You are just saying that different things have different combinations of properties or are sets of other things....but this is trivially true, and I don't think anyone would disagree.

Two different non-numerically identical things have "sameness" of atoms--but those are same kinds of atoms, not the numerically identical atoms. The atoms in your body are not the atoms in my body. That is why we are two different things. So my question is, why are we two different things?

I want to know what makes a thing one thing and not two things. There are metaphysical conditions for this, and set-theory doesn't help us at all; it just says there are sets and more sets of things. But I want to know what a thing is, on your account, and what makes it one and not two throughout all its changes.

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157279 wrote:

Unfortunately, this doesn't help. You are just saying that different things have different combinations of properties....but this is trivially true, and I don't think anyone would disagree.

Two different non-numerically identical things have "sameness" of atoms--but those are same kinds of atoms, not the numerically identical atoms. The atoms in your body are not the atoms in my body. That is why we are two different things. So my question is, why are we two different things?

I want to know what makes a thing one thing and not two things. There are metaphysical conditions for this, and set-theory doesn't help us at all; it just says there are sets and more sets of things. But I want to know what a thing is, on your account, and what makes it one and not two throughout all its changes.

1 Reply

@Alan McDougall,

Extrain;157263 wrote:

Any claim that says "such and such kinds of truths are relative" is inconsistent.

Why? Where is your argument? If you claim it's in the SEP then cut and paste the relevant parts.

0 Replies

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;157284 wrote:

You lost me there....

I don't think extension, geometry, mass, energy, etc., are unanswerable, though. We have pretty good answers to some of these things, don't we?--of course, sometimes they may not seem to be the correct ones...

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 05:19 PM ----------

Night Ripper;157288 wrote:

Why? Where is your argument? If you claim it's in the SEP then cut and paste the relevant parts.

Where's yours? You just make stipulations.

I did paste the relevant parts from the SEP, and I already showed you 24 hours ago the inconsistency with MMR and you merely retorted with "I don't buy that argument." But just disagreeing with me is not a counterargument. It is just a stipulated contradiction. So what more do you want me to do? You're always changing the subject to non-cognitivism, too. Everything is in this thread, and you can start reading these things for yourself. I'm through pampering you.

2 Replies

@Extrain,

Extrain;157289 wrote:

You lost me there....

I don't think extension, geometry, mass, energy, etc., are unanswerable, though. We have pretty good answers to some of these things, don't we?--of course, sometimes they may not seem to be the correct ones.

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157289 wrote:

I did paste the relevant parts from the SEP, and I already showed you 24 hours ago the inconsistency with MMR and you merely retorted with "I don't buy that argument."

That was one sentence out of an entire paragraph. I've already explained how your argument against "all truths are relative" doesn't apply to "all moral truths are relative" and all you've done is asserted that it's still inconsistent. Why? Where is your argument for why "all moral truths are relative" is inconsistent?

0 Replies

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;157298 wrote:

I don't deny these things prove to be problematic--that's why they are so interesting. But I don't take the level of difficulties of these problems as as an excuse to abandon the question....and I'm sure you don't either.

I can think of a couple illuminating well-known philosophers/physicists to read about the philosophical significance of Minkowski spacetime, the Lorentz transformations, and Einstein's STR. Here's a few essays/books if you can find 'em:

Rudolph Carnap, "Non-Euclidean Geometries" and "Poincare vs. Einstein," in
The Philosophical Foundations of Physics: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. (1966)
George Marklin, "Standards of Measurement" physicist posted online.
Tim Maulin, Quantum non-Locality and Space-Time Structure (2002)
Laurence Bonjour, "Appendix: Non-Euclidean Geometry & Relativity" in In Defense of Pure Reason (1998)

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 06:16 PM ----------

Night Ripper;157311 wrote:

That was one sentence out of an entire paragraph. I've already explained how your argument against "all truths are relative" doesn't apply to "all moral truths are relative" and all you've done is asserted that it's still inconsistent. Why? Where is your argument for why "all moral truths are relative" is inconsistent?

I already addressed this yesterday. Start with post #395, and follow the discussion.

(1) You explicitly agreed with me that there was a contradiction in MMR Truth Relativism.
(2) You also said, "I don't buy that argument" several times without a substantive counter-objection. Instead, you moved onto non-cognitivism or other slightly related topics.
(3) Also, one of your responses to my arguments was "I have a few undergraduate credits from Oxford in philosophy" as if that were relevant.:rolleyes: Like we should all be appealing to your own authority on these matters or something.....your evasions are too frequent.

Moreover, entertaining your groundless stipulations simply doesn't matter to me unless you can tell me why I should believe them. What reason do I have for giving my allegiance to them without your offering any arguments? The SEP is overtly clear about this, too. There's no good argument for MMR anyway. In fact, there are many more reasons to think it is false than true, and that has been what I have been discussing. I have been using reductio-style arguments on the MMR thesis. So I am not required to refute every groundless idea you come up with. So where are your arguments against moral objectivism?

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157312 wrote:

(1) You explicitly agreed with me that there was a contradiction in MMR Truth Relativism.

No, I agreed that "all truths are relative" is self-refuting. That has nothing to do with "all moral truths are relative" because "all moral truths are relative" isn't a moral truth. It's a meta-ethical truth.

Extrain;157312 wrote:

2) You also said, "I don't buy that argument" several times without a substantive counter-objection. Instead, you moved onto non-cognitivism or other slightly related topics.

That's simply false and even if it were true that's irrelevant. You have an argument now that you refuse to address. You do have substantive counter-objections. Address them. In the time it took you to type all this you could have just given me what I've been asking for.

Extrain;157312 wrote:

(3) Also, one of your responses to my arguments was "I have a few undergraduate credits from Oxford in philosophy" as if that were relevant.:rolleyes:

You called me uneducated in an attempt to insult me. I simply pointed out that is far from the truth. If you wouldn't have tried to attack me personally I wouldn't have had to defend myself personally.

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;157328 wrote:

No, I agreed that "all truths are relative" is self-refuting. That has nothing to do with "all moral truths are relative" because "all moral truths are relative" isn't a moral truth. It's a meta-ethical truth.

Would you please go back and read that passage I put on here? MMR is a meta-ethical non-truth that is self-undermining. Do you not understand what the SEP is saying? It is talking about moral relativism, the claim that "all moral truths are relative." The charge is that it is presupposing there are different meanings of "objectivity" and "matters of fact." to make the claim that there are different meanings of these things--but this is precisely the presupposition that needs support--that there is a distinction between subjective and objective truth to begin with. It talks about linguistic frameworks in one breath, but then talks about moral truths in another. You can't consistently do this because you are presupposing you can talk outside all framworks to talk about truths that are dependent on those frameworks. But this isn't even possible if relativism is true. The problem is that MMR claims "'Hitler is right to kill 6 million Jews in German WWI context' is true". But this is presumably a framework-independent claim. So this can be said only within a framework if MMR is true. So MMR is self-underming such that "all moral truths are relative" is false. What do you not understand?

Night Ripper;157328 wrote:

You have an argument now that you refuse to address. You do have substantive counter-objections. Address them.
In the time it took you to type all this you could have just given me what I've been asking for.

What argument are you talking about? That "All moral truths are relative"? That's not an argument. That's a claim. Ok. I will address it: it's false. Do you not know the difference between an argument and a claim? Let me remind you. Arguments are sets of one or more premises with a conclusion that can be true or false, and the argument is either valid, invalid, sound, or unsound, strong, weak, cogent, or uncogent.

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157364 wrote:

Would you please go back and read that passage I put on here? MMR is a meta-ethical non-truth that is self-undermining. Do you not understand what the SEP is saying? It is talking about moral relativism, the claim that "all moral truths are relative." The charge is that it is presupposing there are different meanings of "objectivity" and "matters of fact." to make the claim that there are different meanings of these things--but this is precisely the presupposition that needs support--that there is a distinction between subjective and objective truth to begin with.

As I've explained before, it's relative vs. absolute and subjective vs. objective. You keep using relative and subjective interchangeably but they're not. A relative truth is a truth which is true or false depending on the utterer. There was an example given earlier by kennethamy involving milk and lactose intolerance. So, obviously, there are relative truths.

Extrain;157364 wrote:

It talks about linguistic frameworks in one breath, but then talks about moral truths in another. You can't consistently do this because you are presupposing you can talk outside all framworks to talk about truths that are dependent on those frameworks. But this isn't even possible if relativism is true. The problem is that MMR claims "'Hitler is right to kill 6 million Jews in German WWI context' is true". But this is presumably a framework-independent claim. So this can be said only within a framework if MMR is true. So MMR is self-underming such that "all moral truths are relative" is false. What do you not understand?

I can talk about other frameworks from within my own. What's wrong with that?

Extrain;157364 wrote:

What argument are you talking about? That "All moral truths are relative"?

No, the argument that it doesn't have the same problems as the claims that "all truths are relative" or "this sentence is false".

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;157366 wrote:

As I've explained before, it's relative vs. absolute and subjective vs. objective. You keep using relative and subjective interchangeably but they're not. A relative truth is a truth which is true or false depending on the utterer.

"Objective" cultural relativism about truth is just an extension in scope of subjective individual relativism about truth applied to cultures as individual units. So it just encompases a larger domain of people making moral claims.

So I understand the distinction fine, and I addressed those differences to Ken in one of these earlier posts with examples concerning the differences between them. If I am saying something incorrect, then you need to show that.

If you think "ice cream tastes good is true for me" is perfectly plausible to say, then this is an instance of subjective relativism. There is nothing objective about this at all.

Contextual truths are partly dependent on the utterer, yes, and they are still objectively true.--"You are tall" is an instance of this. But this isn't relativism. Moral-Truth-relativsm is the claim that the same contextual truths are false in some frameworks and true in other frameworks, and Moral relativism claims that framework-dependent truths are objectively true--but this is precisely what it CAN'T claim. That's the SEP argument.

And the notion of "subjective truth" is just nonsensical. Myself, and no other philosospher, can make sense of this, as in, "what is true for you may not be true for me."

Night Ripper;157366 wrote:

There was an example given earlier by kennethamy involving milk and lactose intolerance. So, obviously, there are relative truths.

No, you and Ken are confusing the truth-value of a proposition which is dependent on environmental or linguistic context with truth-relativism--they are two entirely different things. "Milk tastes good" is truth valueless as it stands. "Milk tastes good to me" is objectively and contextually (not relatively) true when you utter it if, in fact, milk tastes good to you, since I can assert the exact same proposition with the exact same truth value, namely, "milk tastes good to you."

Given this context, "milk tastes good to me"="milk tastes good to you." They are identical propositions. That's how "you" and "me" work as indexicals. So,

If "Milk tastes good to me" were true only relative to you, then if I said, "Milk tastes good to you" I would be saying something false. So, if truth-relativism were true, then even though the proposition expressed by "milk tastes good to me" is identical to the proposition expressed by "milk tastes good to you," truth-relativism says that this exact same proposition is false for me, but true for you.

But this isn't right, since I assert the exact same proposition as you which is true for the both of us. So truth-relativism with respect to this example is clearly false.

"Milk tastes good is true for me," on the other hand, is nonsensical and is an instance of subjective relativism--the logical fallacy. Here's why:

Milk tastes good. This is obviously truth-valueless since it doesn't specify to whom the milk tastes good. So it is not true or false at all. So suppose you claim,

"Milk tastes good" is true for me.

My question to YOU is this: What are you claiming when you say "milk tastes good"? Are saying milk tastes goodness? Is milk a sentient being who can taste goodness? It is not even clear to me that it asserts anything at all. There is no proposition that gets expressed by you. So you are not asserting any propositional content whatsoever. It is not the same as saying something like, "John tastes the wine," or "John tastes the new micro-beer." This is why "milk tastes good" is truth-valueless, and so to say "milk tastes good is true for me" is just nonsensical to boot since no one undestands what that means.

So the fallacy is that you are claiming something is true which is not even a proposition at all. "Milk tastes good" is what linguists call a *speech-act* of liking, similar to saying "milk, ummm...good" or the speech-act such as in "I promise," or an exclamation such as "ouch!"--it is not a proposition. So these words don't come together to make a proposition that can be true or false.

If a moral proposition is true, it is typically thought that the moral proposition is an objectively true non-relative claim. If you think objective truth can be relative to languages or persons (MMR) then you need an argument for that--because MMR is a non-relative objective claim presumably about the possibility of objective relative moral truths (those relative to culture). But it is shown to be inconsistent by the SEP.

Quote:

I can talk about other frameworks from within my own. What's wrong with that?

Not objectively with respect to whether moral judgments are relatively true or false if MMR is true. That's precisely the problem. Right/wrong/true/false have framework-dependent cognitive significance if moral relativism is true. So you can't meaningfully talk about the truth and falsity of moral judgments non-relatively if all moral claims about the truth and falsity of moral judgments are relative to a given framework. You can certainly try, but you will only succeed in contradicting yourself within your own framework since that is all you have. At best, MMR is wishful thinking.

Quote:

No, the argument that it doesn't have the same problems as the claims that "all truths are relative" or "this sentence is false".

Then show why, because I have continually showed the contrary and so does the SEP. Again, what arguement? Can you give me that argument?

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Subjective - mind-dependent
Objective - mind-independent
Relative - utterer-dependent
Absolute - utterer-independent

Therefore, subjective and relative are not the same thing and they don't imply each other. It's possible for something to be mind-dependent but utterer-independent and any other combination thereof.

When I say "milk tastes good" or "milk tastes good to me" those mean the same exact thing. I can use them interchangeably. When I say "milk tastes good" I am saying something true. When you say it, you might be saying something false.

Quote:

Then show why, because I have continually showed the contrary and so does the SEP. Again, what arguement? Can you give me that argument?

No, you haven't. I've shown you several times and you still haven't countered it.

You claimed that "all truths are relative" is self-refuting because it references itself in much the same way "this sentence is false" references itself. However, I'm not claiming that. I'm claiming "all ethical truths are relative" which isn't self-refuting because it doesn't reference itself. I'm right. You're wrong. QED.

1 Reply

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;157501 wrote:

Subjective - mind-dependent
Objective - mind-independent
Relative - utterer-dependent
Absolute - utterer-independent

Therefore, subjective and relative are not the same thing and they don't imply each other. It's possible for something to be mind-dependent but utterer-independent and any other combination thereof.

Sure. Relativism is "utterer dependent." But it is not contextualism. MMR is the view that the same proposition can be true in one culture and false in another even if it is a contextual judgment. The truth value changes across cultures, the context judgment doesn't change across cultures. The same individual can say "Hitler was right" in one culture and say something true, while being in another culture say something false. So moral relativism is not "utterer dependent" in the sense of being dependent on the indivual. The truth-value of the proposition depends on the culture one is in, not the individual who utters it.

Night Ripper;157501 wrote:

When I say "milk tastes good" or "milk tastes good to me" those mean the same exact thing. I can use them interchangeably. When I say "milk tastes good" I am saying something true. When you say it, you might be saying something false.

You are right about "milk tastes good to me." But it is not the same expressive act when you or I say "milk tastes good." What truth-valuble proposition gets asserted by saying "milk tastes good"? Can you tell me?

Night Ripper;157501 wrote:

No, you haven't. I've shown you several times and you still haven't countered it.

Yes I have. I said MMR is self-refuting. "All moral truths are relative" is self-refuting. You have a bad case of cognitive dissonance.

Night Ripper;157501 wrote:

You claimed that "all truths are relative" is self-refuting because it references itself in much the same way "this sentence is false" references itself. However, I'm not claiming that. I'm claiming "all ethical truths are relative" which isn't self-refuting because it doesn't reference itself. I'm right. You're wrong. QED.

LOL. Don't say "Q.E.D." if you didn't "prove" anything. Your argument is invalid.

It's not the case that "all truths are relative."
Therefore, "all ethical truths are relative"

This is invalid.

Q.E.D.

Q.E.D. quod erat demonstrandum, which means "that which was to be demonstrated". The phrase is traditionally placed in its abbreviated form at the end of a philosophical argument when that which was specified in the enunciation, and in the setting-out, has been exactly restated as the conclusion of the demonstration.[1] The abbreviation thus signals the completion of the proof."

1 Reply

@Extrain,

Extrain;157585 wrote:

"All moral truths are relative" is self-refuting.

You haven't given an argument for that. If you're going to deny this and claim that you have given an argument, please also give the argument again because I must have missed it.

Extrain;157585 wrote:

Don't say "Q.E.D." if you didn't "prove" anything.

I did prove something. That's why I said it. That's why people normally say it.

Extrain;157585 wrote:

It's not the case that "all truths are relative."
Therefore, "all ethical truths are relative"

This is invalid.

That's a straw man. Use the quote feature if you can't resist putting words in your opponents mouth. I'm claiming "all ethical truths are relative" isn't self-refuting because it doesn't reference itself. Do you agree with that, yes or no?

Stop with your pedantic quotations of Wikipedia. Almost everyone here knows what QED means. You're not special because you know a few bits of Latin.

2 Replies

@Night Ripper,

---------- Post added 04-28-2010 at 01:54 PM ----------

The disposition for Moral principles is generally Human, but the specificity culturally dependent of some moral orientations seems to imply relativity on the extension of its values...of course one can dispute if all the principles that we may think as Moral may in fact have other connotations...

---------- Post added 04-28-2010 at 02:07 PM ----------

Same is valid for other beliefs, for instance :

"Milk is good to me" has in fact Universal value...the Universal value that Milk is allays good to me and that all that know it, know it exactly for what it states, if I prove it to believe it, and if proves to be good capable...of course this does not has to mean that milk is good for everybody, but simply that milk can be good when someone appreciates the potential of it being good !

---------- Post added 04-28-2010 at 02:36 PM ----------

As for Ethic Truths they seam to be Universal as they rely on Human nature in general...

0 Replies

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;157594 wrote:

You haven't given an argument for that. If you're going to deny this and claim that you have given an argument, please also give the argument again because I must have missed it.

I did prove something. That's why I said it. That's why people normally say it.

That's a straw man. Use the quote feature if you can't resist putting words in your opponents mouth. I'm claiming "all ethical truths are relative" isn't self-refuting because it doesn't reference itself. Do you agree with that, yes or no?

Stop with your pedantic quotations of Wikipedia. Almost everyone here knows what QED means. You're not special because you know a few bits of Latin.

You're either completely dense, or too stubborn to think about what "all moral truths are relative" logically entails. It is the MMR thesis itself, which has been shown wanting by the reductio ad absurdum arguments offered by myself and the SEP. Suppose you are a person from culture A. And suppose you are asserting the claim that "all moral truths are relative" within culture A. Then you hold the following to be the case:

(1) "Killing innocent Jews is wrong" is true relative to culture A.
(2) "Killing innocent Jews is not-wrong" is true relative to culture B.

So if "moral truths are relative" is true, then "not-wrong" as it is mentioned in (2) takes on the same cognitive significance of not-wrong as it is used in culture A, not culture B, because you are asserting (2) within culture A. Therefore, you are really asserting the following claim within culture A:

"Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is true.

But "Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is a contradiction relative to culture A. Therefore, "Moral truths are relative" is false relative to culture A.

But if this scenario is false relative to culture A, what reason would you have to hold that this same scenario might be true relative to any culture outside your own? Very little, since it is more plausible to hold that contradictions are false in all cultures, not just in culture A. So, "moral truths are relative" is false in every culture in which that judgment is made.

Q.E.D.

2 Replies

@Extrain,

Quote:

entrain
(1) "Killing innocent Jews is wrong" is true relative to culture A.
(2) "Killing innocent Jews is not-wrong" is true relative to culture B.

"Not-wrong" as it is mentioned in (2) takes on the same cognitive significance of not-wrong as it is used in culture A, not culture B, because you are asserting (2) within culture A. Therefore, you are really asserting the following claim within culture A:

"Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is true relative to culture A.

But "Killing innocent Jews is wrong and not-wrong" is a contradiction relative to culture A. Therefore, "Moral truths are relative" is false relative to culture A.

i get the twist of this but it assumes an exclusive objective perspective and value system for truth and falsehood. It is possible to enter another culture B, know that it is not wrong in that culture, and return to culture A.

But every complex culture encludes many narratives, that differ from time to time within an individual, and can differ generally between individuals. eg within capitalist democracy it is ok to be christian or atheist. Truth is narrative relative. People can change from atheist to christian and vica versa. Someone who has only been an atheist will have different truths and falsehood compared to someone who has only been a devout christian. eg does god exist? It doesn't take a maths degree in logic for christians and atheists to know 'objectively' (so called) the difference. However, it takes a great deal more through feeling to know the difference. Feel is subjective (so called) and is outside objectivity. The person who has gained or lost faith, has a deeper sense of the god truth to those on the outside (from whatever camp) who simple hear of the difference anectdotally and rely on their imagination. (Imagination being a skill of widely differing abilities in and between cultures)

In extreme cultural differences however, there may be cases where cultures (not single narrative) are so radically different that there isn't any adequate language sharing to anectdotally express some narratives to the other. eg money based media industrial cultures to hunter gatherer 'primitive' (so called) cultures. Experience in order to understand the key truths, falsehood and values between them, becomes necessary ...... and is a long way from pure objectivity.

Experience is an important aspect of relativists truth, and is not entirely seperate from good imagination. The more experience the greater our imagination can be....... and our relativist perspective is widened by both. Side by side with the narratives of objectivity (so called).

1 Reply

A perfect god can not exist?

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