@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;159059 wrote: It's weird how you can see that the above claims about the King of France don't violate the principle of bivalence yet you can't see how "X is wrong outside all cultures" and "X is not wrong outside all cultures" doesn't either.
Hello. If "P" and "~P" outside all cultures, then this is a contradiction.
And what you just said here is too
ambiguous. Do you mean that X is wrong outside all cultures, but it is not the case that X is wrong outside cultures? Or do you mean, X is wrong outside cultures and that X is not wrong
inside all cultures? Or do you mean,
"Either X is wrong or not wrong outside all cultures"--if you mean
this, then I agree because it is an instance of LEM, P or ~P, and is trivially true.
What are you even saying here??
I just want to know
which proposition you are actually asserting. If you think "all moral truths are relative" is
TRUE, then I want to see an
instance of that formulated in a
truth-valuable proposition.
E.g., "All moral propositions are true or false, but not both"
An instance of this would be,
"Killing Jews is wrong" is true or false, but not both.
"Killing Jews is right" is true or false, but not both.
And, "It is not the case that P and ~P"
If you can't even formulate an instance, write it down on paper, then you haven't even said anything.
Night Ripper;159059 wrote:There does not exist a King of France and there does not exist wrongness outside of all cultures.
This is not the same thing. Like I keep saying, quantification has nothing to do with truth-relativity!
And is this true inside cultures? If it is not, then we just reintroduce the same problem again about what it is that you are actually claiming and your assertion is empty.