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# Proof of nonexistence of free will

ACB

2
Thu 29 Jul, 2010 05:48 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:
However, if some theory states that I will walk 300 steps and I walk 301 instead, and I believed in that theory, then both my belief was false and that theory is wrong.

Yes, this is exactly what I am saying.
guigus wrote:
1. If you actually exist and your existence becomes impossible, precisely then you cease to actually exist: your actual existence and its necessary possibility are simultaneous.

2. If the possibility of your existence were identical to the actuality of that existence, then it would become its necessity, rather than its necessary possibility.

3. Hence, the possibility of your existence must be both different from and simultaneous to the actuality of that existence.

OK so far. To put it more concisely:

1. Actual existence requires possible existence (at the same time).
2. Possible existence does not require actual existence.
3. Therefore, possible existence is not identical to actual existence.
4. All actual existence is simultaneous to some possible existence.
guigus wrote:
Finally, for being both different from and simultaneous to your actual existence, your possible existence must exist: its nonexistence would require its being either identical or asynchronous to your actual existence.

This is very obscure. I cannot make any sense of the underlined passage. How can something be identical or asynchronous if it does not exist? (If two things are asynchronous, they both independently exist.) What are you saying, other than that possible existence must be an entity distinct from actual existence?

And how does this refute determinism? You have only demonstrated that possible existence is logically independent of actual existence, i.e. that one can conceive of a non-deterministic universe in which possible existence is more extensive than actual existence. But it does not follow that the actual universe is non-deterministic. It may be the case that, in our universe, possible and actual existence are (contingently) co-extensive.
ACB

2
Thu 29 Jul, 2010 06:10 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:
Now I must be definitely clear: the problem here is the duality of truth. Any certainty depends on your forgetting that it is also a belief, otherwise it becomes doubtful.

Not at all. I am certain that I exist, and that 2+2=4; when I introspect and consider that these are my beliefs, I am still certain about them.
guigus wrote:
So your problem is not with the word "know": you are in trouble with the dual nature of truth. When I know that I will walk 300 steps tomorrow (by no matter which theory), I forget this is my belief. Then I remember that I can still walk 301 steps tomorrow, by which I remember that my "knowledge" was also my belief, hence doubtful.

But it wasn't knowledge. (Not even if you put it in quotation marks.)
guigus wrote:
And stop trying to capture this with symbolic logic: you won't, since for symbolic logic truth is unary.

I am not trying to capture it with symbolic logic. I am only pointing out the established meaning of the word "know". Knowledge implies truth. If you invent your own definitions of words, it simply causes confusion. The English language is rich enough to express even the most complex or subtle concepts without the need to change the meanings of words. Try to be clear and concise.
guigus

1
Sun 1 Aug, 2010 06:01 pm
@ACB,
ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
However, if some theory states that I will walk 300 steps and I walk 301 instead, and I believed in that theory, then both my belief was false and that theory is wrong.

Yes, this is exactly what I am saying.
guigus wrote:
1. If you actually exist and your existence becomes impossible, precisely then you cease to actually exist: your actual existence and its necessary possibility are simultaneous.

2. If the possibility of your existence were identical to the actuality of that existence, then it would become its necessity, rather than its necessary possibility.

3. Hence, the possibility of your existence must be both different from and simultaneous to the actuality of that existence.

OK so far. To put it more concisely:

1. Actual existence requires possible existence (at the same time).
2. Possible existence does not require actual existence.
3. Therefore, possible existence is not identical to actual existence.
4. All actual existence is simultaneous to some possible existence.
guigus wrote:
Finally, for being both different from and simultaneous to your actual existence, your possible existence must exist: its nonexistence would require its being either identical or asynchronous to your actual existence.

This is very obscure. I cannot make any sense of the underlined passage. How can something be identical or asynchronous if it does not exist? (If two things are asynchronous, they both independently exist.) What are you saying, other than that possible existence must be an entity distinct from actual existence?

As you actually exist, the possibility of your existence could be nonexistent either by entirely incorporating itself into your actual existence (that is, by being identical to it) so as to be, precisely, nothing else, or by being asynchronous to it, so as to belong either to the past or to the future, being, while you actually exist, nonexistent. Got it?

ACB wrote:
And how does this refute determinism? You have only demonstrated that possible existence is logically independent of actual existence, i.e. that one can conceive of a non-deterministic universe in which possible existence is more extensive than actual existence. But it does not follow that the actual universe is non-deterministic. It may be the case that, in our universe, possible and actual existence are (contingently) co-extensive.

For something to be possible it must be both possibly true and possibly false: in a deterministic universe no truth is ever possibly false and no falsehood is ever the possible truth it falsifies. That is why determinism depends on the assassination of possibility.

Possibility is not independent of actuality, be it "logically" or not, and I certainly did not prove that.

A universe where possibility and actuality were (contingently) coextensive would be not one, but two entirely independent universes, one as much absurd as the other.
0 Replies

guigus

0
Mon 2 Aug, 2010 05:02 am
@ACB,
ACB wrote:

guigus wrote:
Now I must be definitely clear: the problem here is the duality of truth. Any certainty depends on your forgetting that it is also a belief, otherwise it becomes doubtful.

Not at all. I am certain that I exist, and that 2+2=4; when I introspect and consider that these are my beliefs, I am still certain about them.
guigus wrote:
So your problem is not with the word "know": you are in trouble with the dual nature of truth. When I know that I will walk 300 steps tomorrow (by no matter which theory), I forget this is my belief. Then I remember that I can still walk 301 steps tomorrow, by which I remember that my "knowledge" was also my belief, hence doubtful.

But it wasn't knowledge. (Not even if you put it in quotation marks.)
guigus wrote:
And stop trying to capture this with symbolic logic: you won't, since for symbolic logic truth is unary.

I am not trying to capture it with symbolic logic. I am only pointing out the established meaning of the word "know". Knowledge implies truth. If you invent your own definitions of words, it simply causes confusion. The English language is rich enough to express even the most complex or subtle concepts without the need to change the meanings of words. Try to be clear and concise.

Both knowledge and truth can be false, which has nothing to do with the vernacular meaning of the words "knowledge" or "truth." In fact, you understood perfectly what I said, so the problem is not one of clarity: the problem is that you do not accept what I am saying, philosophically. But no dictionary can help you there.
0 Replies

guigus

1
Mon 2 Aug, 2010 05:29 am
@ACB,
ACB wrote:
The English language is rich enough to express even the most complex or subtle concepts...

...except the concept of knowledge as a belief, right? Unfortunately, the English language (or any other modern language for that matter) is perfectly capable of expressing this "complex" and "subtle" idea: truth is an actuality when you forget you believe it, and becomes a possibility when you remember you believe it.
0 Replies

ikurwa89

1
Thu 9 Sep, 2010 07:08 am
@litewave,
Think about the sub atomic world where the particles have no idea where they are going to go next!
0 Replies

north

1
Sat 25 Sep, 2010 09:54 pm
@litewave,
litewave wrote:

There are only 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action - then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action - then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action.

then what of instinct ?

an intentional action without depth of thought
0 Replies

kennethamy

1
Sat 25 Sep, 2010 10:10 pm
@litewave,
litewave wrote:

There are only 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action - then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action - then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action.

Why would you think that when I have a reason for doing what do, that I need be compelled to do it? Suppose my reason for going to a restaurant is a recommendation of a friend. Now I don't have to do to the restaurant if I choose to do otherwise. So why would you think that if I do go, I went under compulsion?
north

1
Sat 25 Sep, 2010 10:20 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

litewave wrote:

There are only 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action - then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action - then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action.

Why would you think that when I have a reason for doing what do, that I need be compelled to do it? Suppose my reason for going to a restaurant is a recommendation of a friend. Now I don't have to do to the restaurant if I choose to do otherwise. So why would you think that if I do go, I went under compulsion?

because the your decision not to do so is made by the complexity of reason
north

1
Sat 25 Sep, 2010 10:30 pm
free-will is more about the awareness that to have free-will is more about the ability to be not guided in action and/or thought by instinct alone

once one understands this then and only then can free-will be understood , fundamentaly
Fil Albuquerque

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 12:12 am
@north,
Are you referring to some sort of "metaphysical movement" ?
...Unguided action ???
You mean action with no axis ? no direction ?

Well, no wonder you don´t accept Determinism...
...you see...action is always guided !
Fil Albuquerque

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 12:47 am
I will try and clarify some words and concepts much needed, as there seams to be some confusion "rolling on" down there and such that Ken and the other formal logic guy´s, out of let´s say, "shocking perplexity" did n´t even found the will to address it...

1 - To Know = To be certain on what will happen out of possibility.

2 - To believe = That, which is my personnel conviction that may happen, but that must n´t necessarily happen.

3 - Knowledge may or may not imply belief, as I can actually Know and not be aware on my knowing...some people think it must imply...

4 - Belief alone, does not imply necessary knowledge as personnel conviction and guess work does not amount to certainty on knowing, although belief, it may well imply its possibility, given its true that you still can know.

People, feel free to correct any slippery detail that I might have missed given back here its 7:43 AM and I´m not in bed yet...guess I ´m out for today !
Asta la vista !
guigus

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 10:37 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:

I will try and clarify some words and concepts much needed, as there seams to be some confusion "rolling on" down there and such that Ken and the other formal logic guy´s, out of let´s say, "shocking perplexity" did n´t even found the will to address it...

1 - To Know = To be certain on what will happen out of possibility.

2 - To believe = That, which is my personnel conviction that may happen, but that must n´t necessarily happen.

3 - Knowledge may or may not imply belief, as I can actually Know and not be aware on my knowing...some people think it must imply...

4 - Belief alone, does not imply necessary knowledge as personnel conviction and guess work does not amount to certainty on knowing, although belief, it may well imply its possibility, given its true that you still can know.

People, feel free to correct any slippery detail that I might have missed given back here its 7:43 AM and I´m not in bed yet...guess I ´m out for today !
Asta la vista !

What makes all this much more complicated and problematic is that I can believe to know something without actually knowing that something. And if you stop to think seriously about it (which most people never do), you will see that knowing always involves believing to know, and all belief is subject to doubt, so the very distinction between belief and knowledge, which you try so hard to establish, starts to vanish. What men have been trying to do since the birth of philosophy in classic Greece more than two thousand years ago is to give belief some guidance, a secure foundation capable of telling truth from falsehood without depending just on belief. However, belief is always required, and guiding it is by no means replacing it. So far, men did not achieve that absolute criteria of truth, although for many times people believed (there it is) to have achieved it: Plato, Descartes, Marx, and so on. Science tries the same thing, and although the answer seems to approach more and more, it has also not arrived yet, and many scientists are starting to doubt science will ever get there. The closest we have from an answer is mathematics, but the status and nature of mathematical certainty is itself uncertain, and we are not quite sure about what mathematics means after all. Until we have an absolute criteria of truth, which demands knowing what the heck is truth after all, we are stuck with this symbiotic relation between belief and knowledge, in which nobody really knows where one ends and the other begins.
tomr

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 02:33 pm
@guigus,
Before we can have beliefs or knowledge about the world we must have meaning. The basic understanding about our environment that comes to us first through sensation and emotion. An example of this would be seeing the image of a color and also hearing the word green. The combination of the image and color brought together within the mind making an association based on their being experienced relatively close in time. A more complex relationship might be the perception of an object like a tree. The meaning of a tree might be understood as the sight of a gray to brown form, that is column-like to branching in shape, with a textural surface of a particluar range (the trunk) and massed above this the sight of greenery composed of smaller varying green shapes (leaves). This is the generalization of the meaning of a kind of tree based on many more basic percieved associations and is what I would call an example of knowledge of this type of tree.

An example of a belief would be to take the generalization of the trunk part of the meaning of our particular type of tree and assume that because for every memory of a trunk there accompanies with it a memory of green leaves above it, that all tree trunks have above them green leaves. In this case, the belief is not knowledge of things perceived but an attempt at generalizing possibility. Knowledge must be composed of associations made through perception and so this belief can never be known to be true since we must exhaust all possible perceptions of a trunk in the universe to find this. But it can easily be known to be false since one example to the contrary can show this. Of course, we can imagine a tree trunk without any leaves on it even if we had never seen a bare trunk before and take this as a clue that it is possible for a tree trunk to be without leaves.

The absolute truth of most beliefs about the world can never be known for the same reason the belief held about leaves and tree trunks can never be known to be true. Only by exhausting all possible cases can we know truth for certain. However if by some method we could eliminate false generalizations to the point that few possible cases exist then truth may be known, but this requires knowledge of the number of possibilities.

Mathematical knowledge is different from knowledge of the percieved world because mathematics can be judged to be consistent within its own rules. Though these rules are aspects of the percieved world, the functionality of mathematics does not depend on the percieved world, only its useful application does. So mathematical truths are certainly known because we create them.

guigus

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 04:08 pm
@tomr,
tomr wrote:

Before we can have beliefs or knowledge about the world we must have meaning. The basic understanding about our environment that comes to us first through sensation and emotion. An example of this would be seeing the image of a color and also hearing the word green. The combination of the image and color brought together within the mind making an association based on their being experienced relatively close in time. A more complex relationship might be the perception of an object like a tree. The meaning of a tree might be understood as the sight of a gray to brown form, that is column-like to branching in shape, with a textural surface of a particluar range (the trunk) and massed above this the sight of greenery composed of smaller varying green shapes (leaves). This is the generalization of the meaning of a kind of tree based on many more basic percieved associations and is what I would call an example of knowledge of this type of tree.

You are forgetting that any generalization of past experiences, perceptions, feelings, builds upon the belief that those past events indeed happened, which is always a belief, as also the belief on our knowledge of those past events. Without believing in our past experiences, or without believing we know them, we cannot build anything, any meaning. So meaning depends on belief and knowledge at least as much as knowledge and belief depend on meaning. For example, a child builds the meaning that her mother's body is near her, and utterly finds out that it was some other object. Were her perceptions or feelings wrong? Or was the meaning she gave them wrong? And why? The only answer is that she believed those perceptions and feelings to mean the presence of her mother's body, and she believed to know they meant that presence, but she was wrong. There is no direct path from perceptions and feelings to meaning, without the intervening aid of beliefs and knowledge: meaning without belief and knowledge is meaningless.

tomr wrote:
An example of a belief would be to take the generalization of the trunk part of the meaning of our particular type of tree and assume that because for every memory of a trunk there accompanies with it a memory of green leaves above it, that all tree trunks have above them green leaves. In this case, the belief is not knowledge of things perceived but an attempt at generalizing possibility. Knowledge must be composed of associations made through perception and so this belief can never be known to be true since we must exhaust all possible perceptions of a trunk in the universe to find this. But it can easily be known to be false since one example to the contrary can show this. Of course, we can imagine a tree trunk without any leaves on it even if we had never seen a bare trunk before and take this as a clue that it is possible for a tree trunk to be without leaves.

The difference between believing the past or the future resides not in the nature of either belief, but rather in the nature of the object of belief. We believe the past to be unchanging, but no matter how strong we believe on that, it is still a belief, and the belief in that we know, for sure, that the past is forever settled. Again, if a child mistakes any object for her mother's body, the past changes abruptly, from a caring, tender mother to a dead object: the meaning of a dead object cannot replace the meaning of a tender mother without a collapse on belief and a search for a new, believable knowledge of those events as a new meaning. Perceptions and feelings are in themselves already meaning, but only via belief and knowledge: belief, knowledge, and believable knowledge are what turns perceptions and feelings into meaning.

tomr wrote:
The absolute truth of most beliefs about the world can never be known for the same reason the belief held about leaves and tree trunks can never be known to be true. Only by exhausting all possible cases can we know truth for certain. However if by some method we could eliminate false generalizations to the point that few possible cases exist then truth may be known, but this requires knowledge of the number of possibilities.

Again, you are confusing a certain object of belief (possibilities) with the act itself of believing, which is inherent to all meaning, be it of possibilities or actualities.

tomr wrote:
Mathematical knowledge is different from knowledge of the percieved world because mathematics can be judged to be consistent within its own rules. Though these rules are aspects of the percieved world, the functionality of mathematics does not depend on the percieved world, only its useful application does. So mathematical truths are certainly known because we create them.

So here comes the old question: who judges the rules according to which mathematics can be judged to be consistent? As Godel showed, no useful mathematical theory can prove all the assertions it contains: there is always a starting point, an axiom, that is essentially an article of faith. No matter how useful it proves in practice or how sound it seems in theory, it is always as subject to doubt as anything else.

However, if anything is subject do doubt, then what I am saying is as well, so there must be something certain, even if we did not find it yet.
kennethamy

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 06:30 pm
@north,
north wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

litewave wrote:

There are only 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action - then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action - then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action.

Why would you think that when I have a reason for doing what do, that I need be compelled to do it? Suppose my reason for going to a restaurant is a recommendation of a friend. Now I don't have to do to the restaurant if I choose to do otherwise. So why would you think that if I do go, I went under compulsion?

because the your decision not to do so is made by the complexity of reason

Oh, of course. I should have thought about that myself. But besides explaining to me what "the complexity of reason" means, could you explain why if I have a reason to do something, that means I am forced to do it? Suppose my complexity of reasons for marrying Zelda is that she is beautiful, rich, and kind, and that I love her. How does that mean that I was forced to marry Zelda? Most people would say that was the very opposite of being forced to marry Zelda. Would they be wrong? Why?
0 Replies

tomr

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 07:10 pm
@guigus,
Quote:
You are forgetting that any generalization of past experiences, perceptions, feelings, builds upon the belief that those past events indeed happened, which is always a belief, as also the belief on our knowledge of those past events. Without believing in our past experiences, or without believing we know them, we cannot build anything, any meaning. So meaning depends on belief and knowledge at least as much as knowledge and belief depend on meaning. For example, a child builds the meaning that her mother's body is near her, and utterly finds out that it was some other object. Were her perceptions or feelings wrong? Or was the meaning she gave them wrong? And why? The only answer is that she believed those perceptions and feelings to mean the presence of her mother's body, and she believed to know they meant that presence, but she was wrong. There is no direct path from perceptions and feelings to meaning, without the intervening aid of beliefs and knowledge: meaning without belief and knowledge is meaningless.

I completely agree with you. I think we are just differing on the way we define meaning. I define it as the very basic relationships between sensory perceptions and/or emotions. Such as a red block of color covering one half of the visual field in relation to a green block of color being percieved on the other half. I use "meaning" because I could not think of a better word for the building blocks that make up one's knowledge. Possibly "information" would work but we might have a similar misunderstanding. So meaning in the way I defined it would not depend upon any belief since it is like information that we recieve either from memory or the perceived world. We can question the nature of this information: is it is real or imagined? but that does not conflict with the particular meaning I give. (By the way, I was just setting up a way for other terms to be defined from the ground up.)

I am defining knowledge then as a more complex relationship of meanings. A higher order term used for defining a collection of associations between "meanings" or "information" (as I have defined them). But these associations must be direct perceptions from either the external environment or from memory. They cannot be secondary to this, such as an assumption based on this knowledge as in the example of the tree trunk.This is what I would define as a belief. So knowledge as I have defined it cannot be held to be wrong or right. It just is. What can be questioned is the belief that is based on knowledge. A belief then is a jump from one piece of knowledge to another not given directly by associations between pieces of information.

Quote:
So here comes the old question: who judges the rules according to which mathematics can be judged to be consistent?

We judge them based on the common rules that we have given the subject. Like any game, we make mathetical rules that are known and can be judged to be self truths within the context of the subject. Now to apply those rules outside the pure subject is a different story.
north

1
Sun 26 Sep, 2010 08:05 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:

Are you referring to some sort of "metaphysical movement" ?
...Unguided action ???
You mean action with no axis ? no direction ?

Well, no wonder you don´t accept Determinism...
...you see...action is always guided !

at some point pure instinct , which is pure determinism , has been surpassed , by the beings ability to think for its self , and be aware of the larger picture
0 Replies

guigus

1
Mon 27 Sep, 2010 08:18 pm
@tomr,
tomr wrote:
Quote:
You are forgetting that any generalization of past experiences, perceptions, feelings, builds upon the belief that those past events indeed happened, which is always a belief, as also the belief on our knowledge of those past events. Without believing in our past experiences, or without believing we know them, we cannot build anything, any meaning. So meaning depends on belief and knowledge at least as much as knowledge and belief depend on meaning. For example, a child builds the meaning that her mother's body is near her, and utterly finds out that it was some other object. Were her perceptions or feelings wrong? Or was the meaning she gave them wrong? And why? The only answer is that she believed those perceptions and feelings to mean the presence of her mother's body, and she believed to know they meant that presence, but she was wrong. There is no direct path from perceptions and feelings to meaning, without the intervening aid of beliefs and knowledge: meaning without belief and knowledge is meaningless.

I completely agree with you. I think we are just differing on the way we define meaning. I define it as the very basic relationships between sensory perceptions and/or emotions. Such as a red block of color covering one half of the visual field in relation to a green block of color being percieved on the other half. I use "meaning" because I could not think of a better word for the building blocks that make up one's knowledge. Possibly "information" would work but we might have a similar misunderstanding. So meaning in the way I defined it would not depend upon any belief since it is like information that we recieve either from memory or the perceived world. We can question the nature of this information: is it is real or imagined? but that does not conflict with the particular meaning I give. (By the way, I was just setting up a way for other terms to be defined from the ground up.)

The hard time you are having so as to choose a word for what you describe results from that it is already "contaminated" with belief or knowledge. The central point is this: we cannot know what we perceive in the precise moment we actually perceive it. Knowledge always refers to a past perception: it is reflexive. And it can always be taken as referring to a possibility, in which case it becomes a belief. You can confirm, by introspection, that actual perceptions exclude knowledge, actual knowledge excludes actual perceptions, and possible perceptions imply belief, rather than knowledge. Meaning is the name of all these dual articulations.

tomr wrote:
I am defining knowledge then as a more complex relationship of meanings. A higher order term used for defining a collection of associations between "meanings" or "information" (as I have defined them). But these associations must be direct perceptions from either the external environment or from memory. They cannot be secondary to this, such as an assumption based on this knowledge as in the example of the tree trunk.This is what I would define as a belief. So knowledge as I have defined it cannot be held to be wrong or right. It just is. What can be questioned is the belief that is based on knowledge. A belief then is a jump from one piece of knowledge to another not given directly by associations between pieces of information.

There is no meaning without either belief or knowledge: meaning is the nexus between actual or possible perceptions or feelings and knowledge or belief.

tomr wrote:
guigus wrote:
So here comes the old question: who judges the rules according to which mathematics can be judged to be consistent?

We judge them based on the common rules that we have given the subject. Like any game, we make mathetical rules that are known and can be judged to be self truths within the context of the subject. Now to apply those rules outside the pure subject is a different story.

First you said we "create" mathematical truths, and now you say that we are its judges. No matter which one you chose the point remains the same: mathematical truth is not certain.
amer

1
Tue 28 Sep, 2010 11:47 am
@litewave,
litewave wrote:

There are only 3 possible ways your action can originate:

1) When you have reasons for your action - then the action is the result of those reasons.

2) When you don't have reasons for your action - then the action is unintentional.

3) Your action can be the result of a combination of 1) and 2).

None of those possibilities allow for free will because you are always compelled to your action and never in control of your action.

[@litewave - I think of free will differently -
1. Let us say you either receive cognitive input/s or you don't.
2. The input or no input is entered into a mind which is already processing many thoughts.
3. The input or no input (state of self processing in the brain) throws out a number of possibilities of action.
4. The mind assesses these and comes up with a reason to pursue each action or at least acknowledges the existence of the possible actions.
5. The mind chooses to effect one of those possibilities. It must be a cognitive process as it causes a physical process to follow.
6. The mind effects the action to commence.

For you to state that there is no free will, you will need to prove that steps (3) , (4) and (5) do not exist. In fact, in your model step (1) impacts (2) and results directly into (6). I think, that is quite a leap. Free will is not about unlimited possibilities, it is about coming up with options and having the ability to decide which option to pursue.

I do not believe you have shown that your input possibilities logically result in predetermination. You have not shown how your input conditions preclude the possibility of self processing, assessing and choice making in the mind.

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