For Set - Civil War question

Burnside had at one time been a "star" among Federal generals. He first came to favorable public attention when he headed an expedition to North Carolina, which succeeded in taking New Bern. Thereafter, his star seemed to rise, and he was eventually given command of the Army of the Potomac after McClellan's failure to destroy Lee's army at Sharpsburg (late 1862--usually referred to by northern writers as the battle of Anteitam), and the dilatory manner in which he pursued Lee after the battle.

Burnside then attempted to do what was expected of him, but he did it in a ham-handed manner. Using the superior firepower of the Federal army, he eventually pushed several pontoon bridges over the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg, and then launched an assault against the Army of Northern Virginia. The assault was more than a dismal failure, it was a horrible slaughter. On the Federal right, above the town of Fredericksburg, Federal troops attempted to storm the heights behind the town (Marye's Heights), where Confederate troops occupied a sunken road. The frontage was so narrow that Confederate troops stood five deep in the road, but protected by defilade from the Federal batteries, most of which were out of range anyway. Soldiers loaded their arms and passed them forward to the boys at the front, and a virtually continuous sheet of flame roared out and cut down the Yankees.

Forgotten because of this horrible slaughter is the other part of the battle, during which Federal troops exploited a glaring error in position on the part of Jackson's Second Corps troops, and managed to break through the Confederate lines. The situation was only saved by a bloody counterattack. The attack here on the Federal left was commanded by George Gordon Meade. Although the attack was eventually a failure, and it was overshadowed by the horrible slaughter on the right, the professionals don't forget the details of the event, and Meade was marked for advancement.

Federal casualties reached nearly 13,000, and Confederate casualties were fewer than 6,000. It might have been an even more lopsided butcher's bill had Meade's attack not enjoyed its initial success, which required a costly counterattack to drive him out of the little triangle of woods which Jackson's officers had left unguarded. The professionals also noticed this.

In the spring of 1863, Burnside attempted to recoup the situation by marching by his right, to cross above Fredericksburg, and get on Lee's flank in the Wilderness. (He had originally planned to cross south of the town, and get on Lee's right flank, but Lincoln learned of the plan and vetoed it.) It was not a bad plan, and it would soon be used again. But he made his march at the end of January, and the rain, the thaw and the bad roads turned it into a fiasco. It has been known ever after as "the Mud March." That was the last straw for Halleck and Lincoln, and Burnside was forced to step down. Neither an excessively humble nor arrogant man, he agreed, and also agreed to take service under another general, even though by then he outranked all the other Major Generals who were eligible for the office. He would wait a long time for a new command. Joe Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac, and threw away a brilliant opportunity in what became known as the battle of Chancellorsville. The week before the battle of Gettysburg, John Reynolds (Pennsylvania's military "favorite son," he would be killed outright in the first hours of the battle) turned down command of the army, and the Army of the Potomac was given to George Meade, who would command it for the rest of the war. Upon learning of his appointment, Lee is reported to have said that he knew General Meade, that he would make no blunder in his (Lee's) front, and that he would not fail to exploit any blunder which he (Lee) made. Burnside had become a military non-entity.

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Burnside was sent to East Tennessee, where he performed well, if not to say brilliantly, facing his old antagonist from Fredericksburg, James Longstreet, in the defense of Knoxville, Tennessee, the stronghold of Union men in the South. Transferred back to the eastern theater, he recruited his IX Corps to full strength, and then operated in cooperation with but separately from General Meade and the Army of the Potomac. He outranked Meade, and so Grant attempted to use the two forces in tandem. It didn't work out, and eventually Burnside agreed to waive his rank and serve under Meade as a Corps commander.

Meade was a competent commander, but he was also given to odd moods, and deep resentments--and he resented the fact that Burnside outranked him, and resented even more that Burnside had brought his Corps to a high degree of efficiency, and resented most of all that Burnside had accomplished this with black troops. These were USCT regiments, United States Colored Troops, and they were eager to display their martial qualities. One of Burnside's regiments (among the white troops) was the 48th Pennsylvania, and many of the men were miners. Their commander, Col. Pleasants, went to Burnside to propose digging a tunnel and building a mine under the Confederate lines. Burnside agreed, and put his staff engineers at Pleasant's disposal.

Meade thwarted Burnside at every turn. Although he did not forbid the plan, he did not cooperate. Army of the Potomac engineers did not render any assistance, and refused to provide equipment, especially the crucial theodolites, a surveyors tool with which to site the line of the tunnel. They also had available electric detonators, which they also refused to provide to IXth Corps. Burnsides USCT regiments trained for the assault in some abandoned fieldworks until they were letter-perfect in the plan to break into the Confederate lines and roll them up left an right.

Pleasants and his men managed to dig under the position of General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division in the Petersburg line, despite Confederate countermining efforts. They placed 8,000 pounds of high grade black powder in the galleries of the mine under the Confederate position. Without the electric detonators, they were obliged to lay old fashioned slow match fuses the length of the tunnel. Just before the attack, Meade vetoed the idea of the black troops leading the assault. His public reason (excuse, more like) was that they would inevitably fail (they were black, after all) and there would be a political firestorm at the slaughter of the black troops which must result. So one of Burnside's white divisions was given the task. The commander of this division did not brief his men, other than to tell them that there was a mine to be sprung, and then they would assault the Confederate line. He was said to have been drunk from the night before and throughout the battle, and was cashiered after the battle.

Pleasants lit the fuse, and the mine was to have gone up at about 3:30 a.m. Nothing happened, not simply because of the use of slow match fuse over so long a distance, but because, as was the case with everything else in the operation, Burnside's engineers had not been given even a good quality of that obsolete fuse. Two volunteers stepped forward, crawled into the tunnel and found the fuse burned out at a splice. They spliced in a new section of fuse, lit it, and crawled out again (rather quickly, one would think). The mine went up at about a quarter to five. Around 300 Confederates were killed outright, and a hole 170 feet long, about 70 feet wide and 30 feet deep was blown in the Confederate line.

The USCT troops of Ferrero's division had been instructed to and trained to move around the sides of the crater, and move out to right and left. The white troops of Ledlie's divison, who had had only the most cursory of briefings, ran straight ahead, and plunged down into the crater. General Mahone, to the right of Johnson's division, quickly moved in troops to shore up the line. Before he arrived, there was only a battery of 16 guns to protect the road to Petersburg (and therefore to Richmond). Ferrero's black troops had been trained to take this position, which was well-established, and was known to Burnside's staff. Ledlie's troops milled around the crater, uncertain of what to do next, and daunted by the prospect of climbing out of the crater under fire. So when Mahone's division arrived, the crater turned into a shooting gallery.

To the left (south) of Burnside was V Corps. It was to have advanced at the same time as Burnside's attack went in. It would either have fixed Mahone's division in place, preventing Mahone from marching to Johnson's aid, or it would have roared through the gap left when Mahone pulled out of the line. The V Corps, however, did not advance for hours, and when they did, although it was touch and go for Johnson and Mahone, they managed to hold them (the V Corps units were badly bled down at that point in the campaign) and to eventually drive them back.

When Ledlie's men bogged down in the crater, Burnside sent Ferrero's USCT regiments in, but ordered them to reinforce Ledlie's division, which meant that they piled into the crater, the "turkey shoot" as Mahone described it, along with the white troops who had preceded them. The black troops at least showed some elan, and attempted to implement their training by pushing left and right out of the crater. An extremely vicious hand to hand combat ensued as these blacks fought it out with bayonets and clubbed muskets against the now maddened Southerners. The dreaded slaughter of black troops took place anyway, and about 500 were made prisoner.

Burnside's career was over. Meade, who had done just about everything he could to ruin Burnside's plan, except to cancel it, was not even privately censured. More than 175,000 black men served in the Federal army in that war--the Battle of the Crater was probably their best chance for undying glory on the field of battle, and it was lost for them before they took one step toward the enemy lines.

Great story -- very well told, Setanta.

Thanks

Holy kerap - where does he get this stuff? Amazing.

he recreates every battle, thanks to the franklin mint :wink:

He's getting a feather duster for his birthday to help maintain it.

Thx Mr. Doggie Dude! I knew you'd have something on him!

Well, after all the nice things that people have said here, i am obliged to come back, with egg on my face, and admit that i was wrong. I was not wrong about Burnside, or Meade, or the Battle of the Crater. But i was wrong, nonetheless.

I saw that others had posted here, and when i dropped by to look in, i noticed that Fishin' was asking about an assault on June 17, 1864. The Battle of the Crater took place on July 30, 1964--and so, providing an answer for Fishin', i was wrong.

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Beginning in May, 1864, Grant determined to drive Lee's army back to Richmond, and to take the Confederate capital. He did this by constantly moving to his left, to take the right flank of Lee's army. (Meade continued to command the Army of the Potomac, but Grant was now commander of all Federal armies, and he accompanied Meade's army in this campaign.) So a series of battles were fought (or not fought, as events transpired). There was a terrible fight in the dense forest and brush of the Wilderness, where Joe Hooker had been embarrassed the year before. James Longstreet was wounded, and Lee became distraught, and may have been attempting suicide by combat, when Texas troops forced him to the rear as he tried to ride to the front lines. The Battle of the Wilderness lasted for about four or five days (depends on how you view it). Grant crossed the rivers on May 2, 1864, and formed up his army for the march south. Seemingly unopposed, once the Army of the Potomac was deep in the wooded nightmare of the Wilderness, Ewell's Second Corps and Hill's Third Corps attacked--they were trying to hold off the Yankees until Longstreet could arrive with the First Corps. The height of the battle was on May 6. Thereafter, Grant moved by his left, and Lee managed to steal a march on him, arriving near Spotsylvania Courthouse, where he established a defensive position on high ground. Unlike previous commanders, being tactically defeated did not phase Grant, who kept on pushing.

At Spotsylvania Courthouse, the Confederate position could be seen as an inverted "v," and there was a salient about midway in the Southern line, which they called "the mule shoe." On May 10, Col. Emory Upton was allowed to implement his new tactical doctrine of infiltrating the advance positions of the enemy with skirmish lines until he had built up twelve regiments, who launched a "shock troop" attack on the Confederate salient, with regiments attacking as far as they could without trying to maintain a line--and the effect was devastating. Lee was forced to eventually shorten his line, giving up the high ground, and abandoning the men still fighting in the mule shoe--the famous "Stonewall Brigade" ceased to exist for all practical purposes--fewer than 200 men survived the attack. It looked like stalemate, but Grant could better afford his losses than could Lee, and he simply bided his time, building up his units with replacements, and bringing up his train for the next Move. On the day following the attack on the mule shoe, J.E.B. Stuart was fatally wounded at Yellow Tavern, as he attempted to turn back a Federal cavalry raid on Richmond--to Lee, it must have seemed as if his commanders were falling right and left.

Grant moved again by his left, and Lee raced to stop him, which he was able to do at the North Anna River, two weeks after the battle at Spotsylvania Court House. Grant was once again tactically defeated, but Lee failed to take advantage of his position, for reasons about which one can only speculate. Grant moved to his left again. From the end of the month to the first week of June, both armies manoeuvered as Grant pushed Lee back on Richmond simply by the inertia of a larger army, and General Hancock's II Corps forced a crossing of the Totopotomoy Creek. Federal Cavalry took the crucial crossroads of Old Cold Harbor on June 1, and Lee's army had to fall back to protect the crossings of the Chickahominy River and Richmond itself. (The following is from Douglas Southall Freeman's R. E. Lee.) On June 2, Grant rode into the front yard of a Justice of the Peace near Old Cold Harbor. This man, being a gentleman, brought out cold drinks for the officers, even if they were the enemy, but he was ignored. He reported that Grant pulled out his watch and told his staff: "If i don't hear the Old Fox's guns in fifteen minutes, i've got him!" (Grant habitually referred to Lee as "the Old Fox.") The JP reports that ten minutes later, one could hear artillery fire raging all along the heights above New Cold Harbor.

On the morning of June 3, on Grant's orders, Meade launched an attack all along the seven mile front of Lee's line. The Confederates, by now the veterans of veterans, had spent all night digging in, and the slaughter was horrible. Federal casualties were 13,000 (roughly) and Confederate casualties about 2,500. It is estimated that 7,000 Federal troops were shot down in the first eight minutes of the attack, which if true, makes it the worst casualty rate in American history.

As i have pointed out, Grant was never deterred by a tactical defeat, no matter how bloody. By June 12, when he moved again, he had started with 110,000 troops, suffered 65,000 casualties, and had gotten 70,000 replacements--so he now had 115,000 troops, 5,000 more than he had begun with. Lee had started with about 65,000 men, had suffered 35,000 casualties, and had gotten 25,000 replacements--he was down by 10,000 troops. This is what Lincoln had meant throughout the war when he said he needed a general who understood the numbers. Grant understood the numbers.

On June 12, Grant made his most ambitious move by his left he had yet made. He moved almost his entire army across James River, threatening Petersburg, and therefore threatening Richmond from the south.

Several bitterly fought firefights had been unconclusive, including one in which Confederate troops brought up from North Carolina literally jumped off the trains and into the firing line. On the night of June 16, prodded by Grant, Meade told his corps commanders to prepare to assault the Confederate positions the next morning. When one of the Corps commanders asked how they were to coordinate their attack, Meade snapped back that they could attack when they chose, that they never listened to him anyway. Grant sat by and said nothing.

The attack on June 17, 1864 turned into yet another tactical disaster. The Federal troops were exhausted, their regiments, brigades and divisions either badly bled down, or filled with green replacements who had never fired a shot in anger. The Confederates were likely just as exhausted, but they had only to dig in and fight off the attacks--the Yankees had to cross open ground under heavy artillery fire to deliver the attack.

The IX Corps, Burnsides supremely efficient unit, actually succeeded in making a lodgement in the Confederate lines--specifically, General Wilcox's division. However, due to the uncoordinated attacks, there was no one to come to the support of IX Corps, and they were forced to abandon their position in the face of savage and bloody counterattacks by the defending Southerners, who were willing to pay the price to keep the Yankees out of Richmond. As Wellington said of Waterloo, it was a damned close run thing.

This must be that action to which Fishin' refers, in which his ancestor was killed.

You might need to check your own work here, Fishin'. I found this order of battle for IX Corps, Orlando Wilcox's Third Division:

1st Brigade


Col John F. Hartranft


* 2nd Michigan
* 8th Michigan
* 17th Michigan
* 27th Michigan
* 109th New York
* 51st Pennsylvania

Either you are mistaken about the 37th Michigan, or Wikipedia's order of battle is incorrect. I'll check further.

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According to this page, there was no 37th Michigan.

Perhaps it was the 27th Michigan--that order of battle shows the 2nd Michigan in Hartranft's brigade.

Wow.

Thanks for following up Set!

This paragraph in particular may very well be describing the incident the ancestor was involved in. Howe, in his book, which takes a very granular look at the battle and only discusses the impact on the 37th Wisconsin wrote:

"Wilcox's men roasted under the burning midday sun as they awaited the order to attack. Confederate gunners maintained a steady cannonade through the early afternoon. The 37th Wisconsin, a new regiment formed in the spring of 1864 and untested in battle, was one of the Federal units that endured enemy artillery fire.

At 2 p.m. Hartranft gave the order to Attack. Behind Hartranft, in support, were the men of Christ's brigade. General Nelson Mile's brigade of the II Corps supported Hartranft on the right. Although the V Corps was within supporting distance, Federal officers made no provision for Warren's men to help on the Federal left.

As Wilcox's men cleared the top of the protective ravine the Confederates let lose a "hailstorm of shot, shell, grape, cannister and minnie balls." Powder smoke enveloped the Confederate line. The tramp of men rushing forth at the double-quick over the dried soil of the cornfield threw dust into the air. Flying missiles pulverized the ground and clouded the air with dust. A member of the 37th Wisconsin noted that the entire field was "obscured by a heavy cloud... through which rebel works in front of us and their truculent looking butternut defenders were barely visible."

Hartranft's men surged forward into the face of intense musketry from the front. The left side of the brigade endured enfilading canister from a battery located opposite the Shand House. With no Federal support on Hartranft's left, the Confederate artillery and infantry fired unopposed into his brigade's left flank.

Pressing through artillery fire, musketry, dust and heat, Hartranft's men neared the enemy works; victory seemed within their grasp. The Confederate battery on their left, responsible for the enfilading fire, feared being overrun. Rebel gunners started to limber up and move to the rear. Just as the main Southern line wavered, disaster struck Hartranft's formation - the first line became disoriented and turned sharply to the right. In so turning the Union soldiers passed almost perpendicular to the Confederate line and presented their left flank to the full fire of the Rebels. The astonished defenders took advantage of the Federal error by pounding a tearing fusillade into the exposed Union flank.

Intense Confederate fire sent Yankees reeling to their right and rear. Exposed to such fire, Hartranft's brigade melted away in a moment. As the Federals broke to their right, they continued past the Confederate line, receiving a galling fire on their flank and rear. Rebel volleys wounded many Union infantrymen in their sides and backs. Fully cognizant of their precarious situation, many of Hartranft's first line panicked and raced rearward. This disorganized rush to safety became contagious as soldiers from the second line joined the unchecked retreat. Blown north and east by panic and musketry, a significant portion of Hartranft's brigade ended up as far right as Barlow's sector of the II Corps. Within moments Hartranft's brigade disintegrated.

Most importantly however, Wilcox's attack failed because his first line of battle was misaligned from the start. The 2nd Michigan's position - almost perpendicular to the line of attack - bore dire results.

Once forward movement started Col. Colwert Pier of the 38th Wisconsin reported that the regiments on the left of the line started to overlap each other. To correct this line, line officers moved the regiments more and more to the right. For example, as troops in the 37th Wisconsin approached the Confederate works, they heard an unbelievable order: "Half wheel to the right". The order confused union troops, for even the novice soldier realized that they were exposing their left flank to enemy fire. The Federal order elicited a yell of derision from the Rebels followed immediately by a devestating flank fire as Northern infantrymen executed their tragic maneuver."

My ancestor managed to survive that charge and the flanking silliness. he, along with two fellow soldiers managed to find protection back within the ravine after their retreat. The 3 of them, according to the sergeant who wrote his widow of his death, had been resting in the ravine for a few minutes after this episode and a cannonball was fired into the ravine, bounced off of several rocks and took the heads off of all 3 men as they sat there.

37th Wisconsin - not Michigan.

According to what I have Hartranft's first line was composed of the:
- 2nd Michigan
- 109th New York
- 37th Wisconsin
- 38th Wisconsin

They were backed up by a 2nd line composed of the:
- 8th Michigan
- 51st Pennsylvania
- 27th Michigan

Both of the Wisconsin units are listed as being present on June 15-18, 1864 and assigned to IX Corps acording to the National Park Service WWW site:
http://www.nps.gov/pete/historyculture/wisconsin.htm

I just found an ancestor of a friend who was in the Michigan 5th Calvary, Company L.
Kennedy, Leander W. Kalamazoo 23 .

It seems that he also spent about 3 years in Andersonville and survived.

From the 37th Wisconsin WWW page:

"The six companies went into camp on Arlington Heights, in the neighborhood of the Long Bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle joined regiment at Chicago, and took command. On the 17th, Companies H and I joined the regiment, here they were engaged in drilling. On the 30th, they embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded by way of fortress Monroe and York River to White House, Virginia, [located on State Hwy 301] which was at that time the base of supplies for the Army of the Potomac, on the 2d of June. Here they remained, guarding prisoners and picketing the line of the Richmond Railroad, until the 10th of June, when they marched as guard to a supply train, under the charge of Captain Samuels, of the 5th Wisconsin, reached Cold Harbor on the 11th, and were assigned to the First Brigade, General Hartrufth. Third division, Brigade General Wilcox, Ninth Army Corps, General Burnside. On the 12th, they took position in the first line of works, from the whence, on the evening of that day, they took part in the general movement of Grant's army across the James River, to Petersburg, before which place they arrived on the afternoon of the 16th. They were immediately ordered to move to the support of a charge of the Fourth Division against the enemy's works, which were taken, and the Thirty-seventh occupied them during the night. On the next day, the brigade formed in line of battle in a ravine, preparatory to another charge on the works of the enemy. These were situated in the middle of a cornfield, on the crest of a slight elevation. The position was a strong one, with rifle pits and batteries to the right and left, which could pour in an enfilading fire. In the afternoon, the order was given to charge, and the brigade rushed forward, under a perfect storm of shot, shell and canister. when about halfway across the intervening space, and were was given by some one to "half-wheel to the right," which produced confusion in the movements of the brigade, and exposed the left to an enfilading fire from the batteries, which made terrible havoc in the ranks of the Thirty-seventh. The brigade fell back, and the regiment returned to the ravine, where they remained till towards night, when they went to the support of the Second Division, and completed and strengthened a line of breastworks on the edge of the ravine, where they rested until morning. Early next morning, line of battle was formed, and the brigade advanced over the scene of yesterday's battle.

The rebel rifle pits were found vacated, and the command advanced beyond them and through a piece of woods, the edge of an oat field. Here they threw up a light line of breastworks, and awaited the arrival of additional forces. An order was given to move forward, and the command, under a sharp fire of cannon and musketry, pressed on across the field, towards a line of works, about half a mile in advance. The line moved forward as steadily as the uneven ground would permit, and the enemy's skirmishers fell back to their main lines. They soon came to a deep cut of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad, and there were met by a terrible fire, which swept the top of the cut. An attempt to charge up the opposite side was met by the same sweeping fire, and soon the rebel sharpshooters obtained a position on the right, where they could fire along the whole length of the cut. Under cover of an artillery fire, two charges beyond the railroad cut were attempted in the afternoon, but the men were obliged to return to the cut, where they remained until nearly night, when they were relieved by fresh troops, and the brigade returned to the works in the rear.

In these engagements, of June 17th and 18th, the Thirty-seventh suffered severely. Major Kershaw was shot through both legs, Captain Stevens, of Company A, and Lieutenant W. H. Earl, of Company B, were mortally wounded, and Second Lieutenant Freeman B. Riddle of Company C, was killed."

http://www.twsgraphics.com/genealogy/WIS37thInf.htm

I played bloody hell finding information for the 37th Wisconsin Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry, and i now see why they don't appear in the several orders of battle which i had found online.

You can read a history of the 37th Wisconsin Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry by clicking here. The regiment was formed in response to the call for volunteers of February, 1864, and the first six companies arrived at Washington City on May 1st, 1864. From this online regimental history, it appears that they did not join IXth Corps until June 11th, 1864, which would have been the day before Grant made his move to cross James River. This would, to my mind, explain why they do not appear in the several orders of battle for IXth Corps which i consulted. It is entirely possible that they do not appear in the O.R. until later in the month of June, or in the month of July.

Sorry about the dumb mistake of confusing Wisconsin and Michigan--that's two dumb mistakes today, so i'd better watch out.

Well, that's three dumb mistakes today, so i quit. In rereading your posts, i realize that i just linked you to the page you were quoting.

Good night.

It'll all be better after a good night's sleep!

But thank you anyway. It's been a help!