@Debra Law,
Debra Law wrote:
Hi Thomas:
I apologize for not responding sooner. I read your post yesterday and tried to respond, but was interrupted several times.
Because marriage is a legal status that may only be entered into or dissolved in accordance with the law, delegating control over this legal status to religious organizations is out of the question.
There are two separate issues: 1) Constitutionality of the official state ban on same sex marriages under the due process clause; and 2) Constitutionality of the official state ban on same sex marriages under the equal protection clause. The first deals with liberty interests; the second deals with discrimination among similiarly situated classes of persons.
I.
Under the due process clause, the Constitution protects the entire universe of liberty interests (or rights). After all, the primary purpose of a constitutional republic is to secure the blessings of liberty against arbitrary government infringements. Again, our forefathers did not create a pure democracy under which individual rights would be insecure and at the mercy of shifting (and often arbitrary, capricious, oppressive) whims of mob rule. This is referred to as "substantive" due process because, in essense, we look to the substance of the law itself and determine whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
(Justice Scalia often scoffs at substantive due process. He claims "due process" means "procedure" and nothing more. Scalia has often expressed a view, if a law was duly enacted in accordance with proper procedures, that's all the "process" the people are entitled to receive. His view would be accurate if our framers designed a pure democracy.)
Here is one of my "favorite" cases because it recognizes that due process clause protects freedoms both great and small:
http://www.ahcuah.com/lawsuit/federal/hodge.htm
Quote:CONCLUSION
This case involves a seemingly trivial matter, the wearing of one's baseball cap backward or forward. However, it raises important issues concerning the extent to which government officials can regulate any activity that might be an indicator of gang presence. Courts have noted that the due process clause protects freedoms "both great and small." See Karr, 460 F.2d at 615, fn. 12. In this case, in the County's effort to prevent any possible problems at the Fair, the County impermissibly infringed on Jerry's liberty to wear his cap as he saw fit. For this reason, the Court will find in favor of Jerry and against the County.
(I'm out of time right now, will continue later!)
Because the due process clause protects freedoms both great and small, our courts generally apply a balancing test based on the importance of the liberty interest involved and the government interest involved.
Some rights (or "great" freedoms) are considered "fundamental" to our concepts of ordered liberty. Thus, if a law (or regulation) denies or disparages a "fundamental right," our courts conduct judicial review of the law using a test called "strict scrutiny." First, the law must serve a compelling state interest. Second, the infringement must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The Supreme Court stated the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars arbitrary or wrong (unjust) government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
The Court stated:
Quote: Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. [/u]Second, we have required in substantive due-process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest[/u]. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997).
But, let's look at
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
http://supreme.justia.com/us/478/186/case.html
This was a 5 to 4 decision.
(WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 478 U. S. 196, and POWELL, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 197, filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 199. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 214).
The majority opinion which yielded 5 votes erroneously stated:
Quote:The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal, and have done so for a very long time.
The Majority fails to understand that the Constitution does not confer rights. The Constitution secures the entire universe of liberty interests--great and small--against arbitrary government intrusions. It makes no difference whether the liberty interest encompasses a child's wearing of his cap backwards at the state fair--or a adult's engaging in a sex act with another consenting adult in the privacy of your own home. The issue is NEVER whether the Constitution confers rights. It is the injudicious and inappropriate use of language in cases like this that causes the ignorant public to erroneously believe that the Constitution confers rights and, if a right is not enumerated therein, then the right doesn't exist.
With respect to liberty interests secured by the Constitution, the issue is whether the state has a legitimate government interest in regulating the sexual conduct of consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes and bedrooms. Does the government have any legitimate business in being omnipresent in the private bedrooms of its adult citizens and dictate to them the sex acts that they may or may not perform on their adult partners? Of course not! The government has no legitimate interest whatsoever in regulating the use of our mouths and dictating to us what parts of our partners' bodies that we may or may not lick with our tongues.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. Blackman wrote:
Quote:This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante at 478 U. S. 191, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)....
The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases dealing with various decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of governmental interference "bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case." Ante at 478 U. S. 190-191. While it is true that these cases may be characterized by their connection to protection of the family, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 468 U. S. 619 (1984), the Court's conclusion that they extend no further than this boundary ignores the warning in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 431 U. S. 501 (1977) (plurality opinion), against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself, and not others nor to society as a whole.'" Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 476 U. S. 777, n. 5 (STEVENS, J., concurring), quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub.Affairs 288-289 (1977).
And so we protect the decision whether to marry precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 486.
We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful and multiply. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra, at 476 U. S. 777, n. 6 (STEVENS, J., concurring). And we protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 500-506 (plurality opinion). The Court recognized in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 619, that the "ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." Ibid.
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality," Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 413 U. S. 63 (1973); see also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 431 U. S. 685 (1977). The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 637 (1980); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 405 U. S. 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 153.
In a variety of circumstances, we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices....
BASED on the foregoing, the issue is NOT whether the Constitution confers upon homosexuals the right to marry. Again, the Constitution does NOT confer rights. It secures rights.
MARRIAGE is a fundamental right. The right is objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if the right to marry was sacrificed. It embraces the right to marry the person of your choice. (Loving v. Virginia.)
Thus, the only question that remains is determining who is included and who is EXCLUDED from excercizing the fundamental right to marriage. We evaluate the issue of inclusion and exclusion under the Equal Protection Clause.
II
Equal Protection Clause
Gay couples are choosing to live together and form families. The Courts
protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households. The Equal Protection Clause looks to classes of people whom are similarly situated. Families headed by gay couples and families headed by straight couples are similarly situated. If an entire class of people are denied a fundamental right that is granted to others similarly situated, or if an entire class of people are treated differently on the basis of race or national origin in comparison to others similary situated, then the Courts apply the strict scrutiny test.
The state has no legitimate interest, let alone compelling interest, in depriving families headed by gay couples of the same dignity and respect that the State affords to other families through the operation of our laws that regulate marriage & families. Depriving gay couples of the right to marry does not serve any compelling state interest.