fresco wrote:Maturana would appear to be "a materialist" in as much that his biological substrates (autpoietic structures) operate at the "molecular level". Given that all systems need at least one axiom. this one does not seem to disagree with a nominal concept of "matter" though he might argue that any "measurement" beyond this level is a matter of consensual operations rather than indicative of an external "reality".
What an incredible concession. Really, it's absolutely baffling, especially coming from you,
fresco. I can understand how someone else -- even Maturana -- might admit that any formal set of propositions requires at least one axiom that is not provable by that set of propositions. After all, that's Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. But then Gödel relied on logic to show that his theorem was correct, and you've dismissed logic as just so much "seminar philosophy." Given your rejection of logic, then, the fact that you apparently now accept that Maturana's philosophy must rely on at least one outside axiom is indeed puzzling, but I suppose it merely highlights your general inconsistency in this and other philosophical matters.
As for Maturana accepting that biological structures operate at the molecular level, while arguing that everything else is just "languaging," that has to be one of the most idiotic things I've ever read. Maturana would be better off saying that everything is made of pixie dust or fairy droppings rather than molecules, since molecules differ only in size from other objects that are easily observed but which Maturana apparently thinks exist only in the observers' heads. Maintaining that everything is made of pixie dust would, at least, save Maturana from having to explain how realism works on one level of observation but not on another. In contrast, saying that everything is languaging
except molecules (or the structures that operate at a molecular level) makes absolutely no sense (in truth, Maturana must maintain that there is at least one other thing that isn't "languaging:" i.e. "languaging").
Furthermore, to contend that Maturana "might argue that any 'measurement' beyond this level is a matter of consensual operations rather than indicative of an external 'reality'" strains credulity. It's rather like saying that we may regard the constituent parts of a house -- the bricks, mortar, lumber, etc. -- to be real, but the house itself isn't. But then I've come to expect that kind of muddleheaded thinking from you,
fresco. It's why I always look forward to reading your posts.