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The US, The UN and Iraq

 
 
Setanta
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 11:49 am
Yes, i would prefer to "babysit" Saddam for the term of his life, or for as long as he remains in power, if that is what it takes. Daffy Quaddfi was a serious threat as a promoter of terrorism for years, but the inoxerable grinding down of his power and prestige at home as a result of sanctions eventually lead to his cooperation with international tribunals. It can work with Saddam, as well. Sure, it's not the quick-fix, and it will win no votes for Bush. As for adding to the delay in solving the problem, i would point out that such a war bids fair to create a whole host of other problems which will be directly related to our war against international terrorism; and, further, that this administration had no problem with adding to the delay for more than a year and half. This is about oil, this is about pay back, it has nothing to do with the security of our nation.
0 Replies
 
trespassers will
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 11:55 am
Setanta wrote:
Yes, i would prefer to "babysit" Saddam for the term of his life, or for as long as he remains in power, if that is what it takes. Daffy Quaddfi was a serious threat as a promoter of terrorism for years, but the inoxerable grinding down of his power and prestige at home as a result of sanctions eventually lead to his cooperation with international tribunals. It can work with Saddam, as well. Sure, it's not the quick-fix, and it will win no votes for Bush. As for adding to the delay in solving the problem, i would point out that such a war bids fair to create a whole host of other problems which will be directly related to our war against international terrorism; and, further, that this administration had no problem with adding to the delay for more than a year and half. This is about oil, this is about pay back, it has nothing to do with the security of our nation.

The primary difference here is that when we bombed Qaddafi, he got the message and has largely behaved himself ever since. Saddam continues to thumb his nose at the world. I think allowing him to do so sends the wrong message to other depots and terrorists. I also disagree with your assessment that NK is the larger threat. NK has the greater ability to do us military harm, but I have no fear that they are stupid enough to do so. I believe Saddam poses the more imminent threat due to his willingness to use the tactics of terror.
0 Replies
 
HofT
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 11:57 am
Back to those U.N. resolutions:

Setanta - thanks, but if the answer to my questions could have been found on any of the U.N. links you kindly posted I wouldn't have asked. However here's the official statement from C.I.'s link:
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20020921-99664032.htm
_____________________________________________________
"....Until 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the Security Council issued 647 resolutions, ranging from the bland to the belligerent, on international disputes, humanitarian efforts and peacekeeping missions. According to an extensive analysis by researchers George A. Lopez and David Cortright, the Security Council has issued 787 resolutions in the 12 years since, including full or partial economic sanctions on Iraq (1990 and 2002), Yugoslavia (1991, 1992, and 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), parts of Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993), Angola (1993, 1997 and 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997) and Afghanistan (1999).
[.................]
"Marie Okabe, a spokeswoman in the U.N. press office, said the organization doesn't compile a list of resolution violators [..]
"That is not the kind of thing the U.N. Secretariat could even track," she said. "Whether a member is in compliance is really a judgment that must be made by the Security Council and by individual states."
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

So: Over a thousand resolutions, nobody at the U.N. knows who's in compliance, or cares enough to even TRACK.

"Charade" is far too charitable a term - a charade presupposes some organization <G>
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timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:04 pm
Setanta wrote:
This is about oil, this is about pay back, it has nothing to do with the security of our nation.


I understand your concerns as you state them, but, in all respect, I just don't share them, Setanta. I admit the position you hold is widely held, but as has been said before, the popularity of a notion is no measure of its correctness. Should events prove me wrong and you right, I will be most willing to admit and accept that I was in error. I don't expect that will be necessary. There will be many battles in "The War On Terrorism"; Iraq is but one of them. More will follow, in many forms. Developments following from the departure of Saddam and The Ba'ath Party will prove the point one way or the other.

Please understand our respective positions on this issue in no way diminish the respect and regard I hold for you. I believe you are convinced, sincere, and honorable in your intentions. I believe myself to be the same ... just not the same as you.



timber
0 Replies
 
Setanta
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:09 pm
trespassers will wrote:
The primary difference here is that when we bombed Qaddafi, he got the message and has largely behaved himself ever since. Saddam continues to thumb his nose at the world. I think allowing him to do so sends the wrong message to other depots and terrorists. I also disagree with your assessment that NK is the larger threat. NK has the greater ability to do us military harm, but I have no fear that they are stupid enough to do so. I believe Saddam poses the more imminent threat due to his willingness to use the tactics of terror.


Nor do i think that Saddam is that stupid. As for the Lybians, the US bombing of Tripoli probably helped Quaddafi politically more than harmed him. His big political blunder was the disasterously mismanaged attempt to invade Chad. The Chaddean army was certainly grateful to their former colonial masters for material and logistical support, but they wanted to fight that one out for themselves on the ground, and they ate up the Lybians. The French did take to the air to take out Quaddafi's "fertilizer factories" which the Germans had so obligingly built for him--and which were likely intended to produce the poison gas for what was believed would be a war of conquest in Chad. After the Chad debacle, Quaddafi no longer weilded the military might necessary for a tin-pot dictator to keep his grip on power, so ending the sanctions was the only way for him to get the cash to build up his "bodyguard." Unfortunately, given the situation with Turkey and Persia, we can't use the Kurds as clients in a similar manner.
0 Replies
 
Setanta
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:10 pm
I have no argument with you on those matters, Timber, other than those we've both already acknowledged.
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Steve 41oo
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:33 pm
Set yes vendetta is in the air.

How do I explain how our family got caught up?
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sumac
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:41 pm
Think of it as a recipe, with multi-determined ingredients. A little of that, a dash of that, an ounce or so of whatevermymom used. You can't try to understand this by only considering one issue at a time. No black and white thinking will prosper in this situation.
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:54 pm
The US/British/Spanish proposed resolution:

Quote:
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

February 24, 2003



The Security Council,

PP1: Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999 and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002, and all the relevant statements of its President,

PP2: Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

PP3: Recalling that its resolution 1441 (2002), while deciding that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations, afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions,

PP4: Recalling that in its resolution 1441 (2002) the Council decided that false statements or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq pursuant to that resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of, that resolution, would constitute a further material breach,

PP5: Noting, in that context, that in its resolution 1441 (2002), the Council recalled that it has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations,

PP6: Noting that Iraq has submitted a declaration pursuant to its resolution 1441 (2002) containing false statements and omissions and has failed to comply with, and cop-operate fully in the implementation of, that resolution,

PP7: Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighboring States,

PP8: Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

PP9: Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

PP10: Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions and to restore international peace and security in the area,

PP11: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

OP1: Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441 (2002);

OP2: Decides to remain seized of the matter.


Now, for a little Deja Vu All Over Again:

Quote:
S/RES/1134 (1997)
23 October 1997

RESOLUTION 1134 (1997)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3826th meeting,
on 23 October 1997



The Security Council,


Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, and in particular its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 1060 (1996) of 12 June 1996, and 1115 (1997) of 21 June 1997,


Having considered the report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission dated 6 October 1997 (S/1997/774),


Expressing grave concern at the report of additional incidents since the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997) in which access by the Special Commission inspection teams to sites in Iraq designated for inspection by the Commission was again denied by the Iraqi authorities,


Stressing the unacceptability of any attempts by Iraq to deny access to such sites,


Taking note of the progress nevertheless achieved by the Special Commission, as set out in the report of the Executive Chairman, towards the elimination of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction,


Reaffirming its determination to ensure full compliance by Iraq with all its obligations under all previous relevant resolutions and reiterating its demand that Iraq allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission to any site which the Commission wishes to inspect, and in particular allow the Special Commission and its inspection teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interferences of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make use of their own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission,


Recalling that resolution 1115 (1997) expresses the Council's firm intention, unless the Special Commission has advised the Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, to impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance,


Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq,


Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


1. Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities, as detailed in the report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, and especially Iraqi actions endangering the safety of Special Commission personnel, the removal and destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and interference with the freedom of movement of Special Commission personnel;


2. Decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996), and notes that the Special Commission in the report of the Executive Chairman was unable to advise that Iraq was in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997);


3. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance;


4. Demands in particular that Iraq without delay allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of the Special Commission, as well as to officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom the Special Commission wishes to interview so that the Special Commission may fully discharge its mandate;


5. Requests the Chairman of the Special Commission to include in all future consolidated progress reports prepared under resolution 1051 (1996) an annex evaluating Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997);


6. Expresses the firm intention - if the Special Commission reports that Iraq is not in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997) or if the Special Commission does not advise the Council in the report of the Executive Chairman due on 11 April 1998 that Iraq is in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997) - to adopt measures which would oblige all States to prevent without delay the entry into or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who are responsible for or participate in instances of non-compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997), provided that the entry of a person into a particular State on a specified date may be authorized by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its own territory to its own nationals or persons carrying out bona fide diplomatic assignments or missions;


7. Decides further, on the basis of all incidents related to the implementation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997), to begin to designate, in consultation with the Special Commission, individuals whose entry or transit would be prevented upon implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 6 above;


8. Decides not to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991) until after the next consolidated progress report of the Special Commission, due on 11 April 1998, after which those reviews will resume in accordance with resolution 687 (1991), beginning on 26 April 1998;


9. Reaffirms its full support for the authority of the Special Commission under its Executive Chairman to ensure the implementation of its mandate under the relevant resolutions of the Council;


10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.


Iraq, is, has been, and continues to be in material breach of numerous resolutions, consistently does no more than is required to deflect attention for as long as can be managed, and remains defiant and noncompliant. Obviously, the threat of "Severe Consequences" is of no consequence. It is time for the consequences, not further meaningless threats which have had no effect.



timber
0 Replies
 
trespassers will
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 12:59 pm
Timber - I am continually forced to wonder what part of:
Quote:
PP2: Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

so many people fail to understand.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:04 pm
Just some deficites in intellegence and a low IQ, trespasser, I suppose - "old", you know.
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:07 pm
I dunno either, Tres. This goes back to the original ceasefire agreement, which has never been fulfilled. No amount of pounding this point seems to drive it home. War is a terrible thing to be considered, and it is not considered lightly. For a dozen years, Iraq has done nothing but obscure, obstruct, and delay implementation of the provisions of the original ceasefire. Iraq herself has abbrogated the ceasefire terms, and must now face the consequences.


However, as expected, Iraq seems to be tossing just enough crumbs to keep the pack at bay. Reports now are that Dr. Blix is "encouraged" by Iraqi response to the most recent demands. Iraqi "Encouragement" has been going on for 12 years. Iraqi compliance has not.



timber
0 Replies
 
HofT
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:19 pm
There are 1,434 U.N. Security Council resolution in total; which part of the other 1,433 resolutions can we conveniently remember, post and re-post ad nauseam?

This question is addressed to all those quoting resolutions here. The answer matters even less than the resolutions though - summer temperatures and logistics of mobilization are such that by April 1st (an appropriate date) Saddam will be gone, one way or another.

The only open question is what else will be gone along with him, and at what cost in men, materiel, and the enormous new debt obligations acquired in building a coalition of the "bought-off".
0 Replies
 
HofT
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:25 pm
Correction - there WERE 1,434 resolutions as of September 2002 - see link posted by C.I. re-posted by me. I don't know how many more were added since.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:27 pm
In yesterday's LA Times, I've found this article, whic gives even some hints for most of our own behaviour here.
(Since registration is required, I've copied it)

Quote:
February 24, 2003

Ronald Brownstein:
Washington Outlook


When It Comes to Disarming Hussein, Even the Hawks Are Split


One line of division over the prospect of war with Iraq was vividly displayed on the streets of America and Europe nine days ago: the chasm between those who support the use of force against Saddam Hussein and those who marched to oppose it.

But another critical division has emerged over the war. This one is between two distinct groups of those supporting force. On one side are those who consider international cooperation the key to confronting new threats to global security. On the other are those who see Iraq as the opportunity to prove that the surest way to a safer world is for America to lead through assertive action, even if that increases friction with allies in the near term.

Over time, this argument over how to make war against Iraq may have more lasting implications than the debate over whether to invade. The odds are high that President Bush will make the question of whether to use force moot sometime in the next few weeks by ordering an attack. But the dispute over how to pursue war will have implications for years. It will color America's relations with its traditional allies in Europe long after the shooting stops in Baghdad. And it is likely to emerge as the central foreign policy debate in the 2004 presidential election.

These contending views are expressed in the purest form by two sets of foreign policy analysts. The go-it-alone case is made most aggressively by neo-conservative thinkers inside and outside of the Bush administration, such as Republican strategist William Kristol and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. Bush doesn't accept all their arguments, but his approach to Iraq, and the world more broadly, bears their clear imprint.

The bring-others-along argument is expressed most passionately by a group that writer Harold Meyerson, in American Prospect magazine, recently dubbed "tough doves" -- center-left Democrats such as Sen. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and retired Gen. Wesley K. Clark, the former NATO supreme allied commander. The dwindling band of Republican foreign policy moderates, such as Sen. Charles Hagel of Nebraska, holds similar views. The unquestioned international leader of this camp is British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Both sides agree Hussein must be disarmed. Both are willing to use force to do so. But the two camps are seeking to establish in Iraq very different precedents for how the world deals with new threats in the age of global terrorism.

The "neo-cons" want to demonstrate America's willingness to act decisively against potential dangers, with allies if possible, but alone if necessary. In Iraq, they believe, the United States can stamp the template for an international order built on the unapologetic assertion of American power. "The maintenance of a decent and hospitable international order requires continued American leadership in resisting, and where possible undermining, aggressive dictators and hostile ideologies," write Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan in their new book, "The War Over Iraq."

While the neo-cons wouldn't mind U.N. support for action against Iraq, they aren't willing to sacrifice much American freedom of action to obtain it. In the neo-con view, those in the United States and Europe demanding U.N. approval of an invasion are motivated primarily by a desire to restrain America "and the lingering suspicion that American self-interest and the interests of humanity are inherently incompatible," as Kristol and Kaplan write.

Rather than waiting for an illusory international consensus to materialize, the neo-cons argue, the United States should send in the tanks; however reluctantly, others then will eventually sign on. That appears close to Bush's thinking too. For months he's made clear that he will engage the United Nations only so long as it supports the military action he appears to consider unavoidable.

In stark contrast, the tough doves see international consensus, and the strengthening of international institutions, as sources of American power. While they don't rule out unilateral U.S. action in Iraq or elsewhere, they argue that the administration should make every effort to obtain U.N. support, to temper hostility toward American power and to foster the cooperation we'll need to confront other dangers, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation.

"We are far more likely to gain the support we need by working through international institutions than outside of them," wrote Clark, who's considering a bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, in Washington Monthly last fall.

Kerry, a leading contender for the Democratic nomination, made similar arguments in a major foreign policy address in January; likewise Hagel warned in a speech last week that invading Iraq in a way that divides the United States from its allies and undermines the U.N. could hurt America's security more than it helps.

"America must steer away from actions that could produce the unintended results of fracturing those very institutions that have helped keep peace since World War II," Hagel said.

Even the tough doves acknowledge that military action can't always wait for international consensus: Blair supported, and Clark directed, a war in Kosovo that lacked U.N. sanction (because of opposition from Russia). But at the price of difficult negotiation with allies over strategy and tactics, the United States did fight that war through NATO -- and Clark now argues the solidity of that alliance was essential to victory.

As Kosovo suggests, the real-world choices don't always divide cleanly between collaboration and autonomy. The debate is a matter of degree. The tough doves join the neo-cons in believing the United States can't wait indefinitely for U.N. authorization before moving against Iraq. But the tough doves believe Bush should have placed a higher priority from the outset on building international support, and are willing to wait longer than neo-cons to obtain it now.

In the end, the two sides are trying to make very different points from the same war. The neo-cons want to frighten the bad guys in rogue states by demonstrating U.S. power and resolve. The tough doves want to unify the civilized world against emerging dangers by demonstrating the value of what Blair has memorably called "a new doctrine of international community." The two camps are marching into battle together, but their own conflicts have just begun.
link to article
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:41 pm
The (conservative) German daily "Die Welt" publishes in its online version (quoted from SPIEGEL - online ) that German special forces are training together with British Special Air Service (SAS) and USA Seals in Kuweit a "Combat Search und Rescue". (German purpose: to rescue the German UN-forces in Iraq, who will operate there with 'Luna' [not sure with this translation: 'reconnaissance unmanned plane'].
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:41 pm
Walter, The basic question still remains; who is right, and who is wrong?
0 Replies
 
timberlandko
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:48 pm
c.i., Saddam is wrong. All the rest is window dressing. If Saddam had accepted and discharged his responsibilities in '92 (or earlier, for that matter), none of this would be a factor today. This is all Saddam's fault, Saddam chooses to play no part in the solution to the problem; Saddam has to go, the sooner the better (and cheaper, monitarily and in terms of lives) than later.



timber
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 01:59 pm
0 Replies
 
Tartarin
 
  1  
Reply Tue 25 Feb, 2003 02:12 pm
Setenta -- You are SO right in this, though I would say that "vendetta" doesn't cover all the territory! Nor even does the use of war as a distraction from worse problems even fully explain this administration's actions. The fact that the Bush administration has chosen to expend its energies on Saddam (a contained non-terrorist) rather than on bin Laden and, MOST important, on peace in Palestine/Israel -- the root of the mid-East problem -- shows an incredible degree of bad faith as well as bad politics.

His followers may well be just forgiveably stupid. But the worst among them seem to be willing to engage in war because they are impatient for a solution, and a Calvinist, quick-fix punishment for a bad guy they feel insults them. If I sometimes seem tetchy when I'm among these self-described conservatives, it's because I find their impatience and urge to war -- regardless of cost and outcome -- loathesome and immoral. Why? Because we have not suffered and are not suffering any harm due to the hypothetical existence of dangerous weapons in a nation controlled by a lousy dictator hemmed in by inspectors and troops.

Paul Krugman, talking about economic matters with Terry Gross on Fresh Air this morning, gave examples of the bait-and-switch policies of the Bush administration. The focus on Iraq is but another of these. We won't have all the facts and background until long after this presidency is over. Until then, it will be difficult to put together a full understanding of Bush's actions. But it's still really hard to understand how so many Americans could be fooled to the extent that they are now. And no, it's not because they are "right." And yes, thank god the number is steadily decreasing. Bush has put us in a very bad situation and it's getting very much worse every day. We badly need to get our economy back on track and we badly need to get at the root of the intelligence failures which led to 9/11 AND DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEM. Pouring money into a massive troop build-up in the Middle East is not doing a d*mn thing for our security. Instead, it's putting it at further risk.

While I'm here (stuck in an ice storm, as a matter of fact!) I'd like to reclaim the term "Conservative" as applied to political belief and ask which of those who claim to be Conservatives here can show that their attitudes about Iraq are "moderate, prudent, cautious"! Some are certainly Reactionaries -- "responding to a stimulus; opposing progress or liberalism." But I think in many ways they are Radicals, "favoring or effecting revolutionary changes..." I would certainly call the Bush administration far, far from Conservative (look at the spending, the federal deficit) and in every action (vs. speeches) that they've made, I believe that this is a wildly radical administration. Underline "wild." Fortunately the genuine conservatives among those who voted for him are beginning to catch onto this. The liberals didn't need to catch on. We already knew it while the guy was still campaigning.
0 Replies
 
 

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