The French have a longstanding fear of being controlled by other Powers. In today's world, however, they have insufficient power of their own, militarily, diplomatically, or economically, to assume any sort of Global Leadership. Further, French Self Interest generally manages to unravel any coalition The French manage to assemble.
The French attitude toward The US has its beginnings at least as far back as the early stages of WWII. They felt The US abandoned them in the face of the German Invasion, and that The US should have taken a more proactive stance re: German expansionsim in the late '30's. Matters were helped not in the least by The Allied sinking of The French Fleet in North Africa, and Allied hostile actions against other "Free French" forces in that theater at the time. The French were perturbed that The Allies did not directly engage The Germans on French soil untill the middle of 1944; they had lobbied vigorously for a much earlier Continental Invasion. France also felt slighted by Post War Partitioning, and they felt that other European Nations were given preferential treatment as regards rebuilding during The Marshal Plan Era.
The French requested US assistance in their Colonial Wars in North Africa and Southeast Asia, but received far less help than they had wanted. In the 1957 Suez Crisis, they were highly upset by US opposition to Anglo/French aims to appropriate The Suez Canal.
During the 50s and 60s, The French distanced themselves from both The US and Nato, becoming increasingly insular and exerting as much independence as they could manage, going so far as to develop their own nuclear capability and to pursuing an almost entirely home-based defense posture,designing and producing everything from their own tanks and planes to their own radios and missiles. It was The French supposition that they could no longer risk their domestic security to the benevolence of Allies ... twice in a quarter century, France was ravaged by wars she could neither prevent nor avoid, despite the "security" ostensibly provided by he allies. At one point, in the late 60s-early 70's, they even resisted, more or less unsuccessfully, the international convention which made English the Global Default Language for Civilian Air Traffic Control.
The reunification of Germany and the collapse of The Soviet Union posed unique challenges to The French. Both new nations possessed far greater resources and potential than did The French, and this was seen as another threat to French Autonomy and European Influence. Much effort was expended in the matter of expanding French Commercial interest in both emerging nations, hopefully thus gaining some measure of influence over the policies of the two. Results were good in this regard, and The French Economy is closely tied to that of Germany, with less but still considerable ivolvement with Russia. Thiese considerations strongly influence French Policy today.
While The oviet Union balanced the power of The US, France had a greater position of global, and European, influence than today. A "United Europe" was a French goal, ever moreso with the end of The Cold War, and France was key in the development of The EU. This was a "Hobson's Choice" for them. A unified Europe was not likely to allow France the prominence she once had enjoyed, but it would serve to limit the potential for US influence over Continental Affairs. Despite her concerns for her own sovereignty, economic reality drove French geopolitical policy. It was, and remains, The French hope that she might be the dominant polity in that United Europe. France has not fared well since the end of The Cold War, and the rise of US influence since 9/11 has further alarmed The French. They fear being rendered irrelevant. Much to their own chagrin, they see themselves forced into coalition with Germany and Russia to stem rising US influence, something they see as directly threatening French Autonomy.
From a recent Stratfor Analysis:
Quote:France wishes more than anything to be sovereign. Its sovereignty, however, is insufficient to guarantee its national self-interest. By itself, it cannot control its destiny; it must be part of something greater. But in being part of something greater, the temptation to make that large thing uniquely French strains the edifice. Without that impulse, however, France's nightmare comes to the fore -- saving itself by losing itself to something more important than France. Paris' behavior is neither mysterious nor unpredictable. It is, however, incapable of shaping history. France is caught between decisions it cannot make.
Iraq represents to France at least two vital National Interests:
First, there is The French Investment in Iraqi Oil, markets, and defense.
Second, France correctly perceives that US occupation of Iraq would further shift balance of the already enormous US Global Power further to US favor.
The French find themseloves caught between Iraq and a Hardcase, so to speak.
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