Congress report: no link Al-Qaeda and Saddam regime re 9/11

Veteran pollsters say the persistent belief of a link between the attacks and Saddam could help explain why public support for the decision to go to war in Iraq has been so resilient despite problems establishing a peaceful country.

C.I.A. Warned White House That Links Between Iraq and Qaeda Were 'Murky'Citing Close-MindednessOverreaching Conclusions

Before the war, the intelligence community's major conclusions about Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programs far exceeded what could be drawn from available intelligence and overstated the judgments of intelligence analysts, the Senate committee concluded in its report on Friday.

The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate stated that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons." But the Senate panel found that conclusion "overstated both what was known and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons holdings."

The Senate report also rejected the contention that "all key aspects" of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program had been active before the war. Information reviewed by the committee showed this conclusion was "not supported by the underlying intelligence."

While the intelligence did show that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been "associated" with Iraq's biological programs and was engaged in research that had biological applications, "few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related" to biological warfare.

The Senate report strongly criticized the handling of information about Iraq's supposed mobile biological weapons facilities provided by a source known as Curveball, finding that the C.I.A. failed to disclose important information about the source's reliability.

In addition, the intelligence community assessment that Mr. Hussein had probably stockpiled 100 metric tons of chemical weapons agents, and perhaps as much as 500 tons, was based on an analytical judgment and not on intelligence reporting, the committee said.

However, the panel found that available intelligence did support a conclusion that biological and chemical weapons "were within Iraq's technological capability" and that Iraq was trying to obtain material that could have been used to produce them. Findings about Iraq's capability to produce and weaponize biological agents were "for the most part supported" by intelligence, the committee found. Richard A. Oppel Jr. (NYT)

Mixed on Missiles

The Senate panel said the intelligence agencies' assessments of Iraqi efforts to build medium-range missiles were "reasonable" and had a "clear foundation" in available information. But the panel said the agencies "overstated" Iraqi efforts to develop pilotless drone aircraft or their potential use in dropping biological weapons on the United States.

The Senate panel said the intelligence agencies had solid reasons to conclude that Iraq was in the final stages of developing the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range missiles, both of which would have violated United Nations' prohibitions on Iraqi missiles capable of traveling more than 150 kilometers, or about 90 miles.

The panel also said the intelligence agencies used "reasonable judgment," based on available information, that Iraq was developing a medium-range ballistic missile that could have traveled even further.

But the committee concluded that the intelligence agencies did not have a basis for concluding that the drones were "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents." The committee noted that Air Force intelligence officials were skeptical about Iraqi plans to use the drones in biological warfare and had inserted a footnote describing that kind of mission as possible but unlikely.

"Other than the Air Force's dissenting footnote, the intelligence community failed to discuss possible conventional missions," the Senate panel said, even though these less deadly purposes were "clearly noted in the intelligence reporting and which most analysts believed were the U.A.V.'s primary missions."

The panel also said the C.I.A. refused to share information with other intelligence agencies that raised doubts about the claim that Iraq was intending to use drone aircraft to attack the United States. "This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported," the panel said. Edmund L. Andrews (NYT)

Artificial Intelligence

CASE PRETTY MUCH CLOSED: On page 66 of the 9/11 Commission's report, the ten commissioners render their verdict on Iraq's relationship to Al Qaeda:

Quote:

Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Laden or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Laden a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Laden declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with Al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.

At the press conference yesterday, Steve Hayes of The Weekly Standard--the most tenacious proponent of a connection between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein this side of Laurie Mylroie--asked the Commission what it made of the Iraq-Al Qaeda allegation. "There's no question in our minds that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda," answered Commission Chairman Thomas Kean. "At one point, there was thought maybe even Al Qaeda would find sanctuary in Iraq. And there were conversations that went on over a number of years, sometimes successful, sometimes unsuccessfully. ... So I think we are very careful in our wording in using that word collaborative relationship.' I mean, that's what we found. It's language that's evidence-based." Added Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, "I think there's a very large distinction between evidence of conversations that might have occurred between Iraq and Al Qaeda, on the one hand, and an emerging strategy or emerging assistance -- concrete -- on the other. And what we do not have, as the chairman said, is any evidence of a concrete collaborative operational agreement. Conversations, yes, but nothing concrete." Furthermore, Commissioner Bob Kerrey told a bunch of us TNR reporters later that day, "We had to get language that all ten of us could support."

There are many interesting details that the Commission unearthed and was able to publish. (Which, I have to admit, I didn't think was going to happen.) About intelligence reporting in the mid-1990s that bin Laden sought training in bomb-making from the Iraqis while in Khartoum, the commissioners write in a footnote (note 55 to Chapter two, found on page 468):

Quote:

The source claimed that Bin Laden asked for and received assistance from the [Iraqi] bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. The information is puzzling, since Bin Laden left Sudan in May 1996, and there is no evidence that he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received "third hand," passed from the foreign government service that "does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service." The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Laden's Sudan farm in December 1995.

Even more interesting is footnote 76 to the same chapter, found on page 470. That's the footnote attached to the conclusion above. It cites, among other intelligence reports, a DIA analysis called "Special Analysis: Iraq's Inconclusive Ties to Al Qaeda." The commissioners write:

Quote:

We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004. Two senior Bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between Al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of [Khalid Shaikh Mohammed] and [Abu] Zubaydah, 2003. (Cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum, "Requested Modifications to 'Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003)," Dec. 10, 2003, p.5) (Emphasis added.)

We knew about what KSM and Zubaydah said about non-existent Iraq-Al Qaeda ties before, but this business about chemical weapons training coming from an Al Qaeda detainee who recanted it is new. Finally, in case you were wondering, the Commission answers the question of the Atta meeting once and for all. After noting the first really, really big problem with this canard--that it came from a single source, a Middle Eastern student informant to the Czech intelligence service, who "remembered" seeing Mohamed Atta meet with an Iraqi intelligence officer five months after it supposedly happened, when he suddenly saw Atta's face all over TV post-9/11--the Commission writes, "The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting." (Interestingly, the Commission adds what I think is new information: "According to the Czech government, Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta, was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8-9 and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M.")

In light of the 9/11 Commission's findings--similar in this respect to what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found earlier this month--the options left available to those who argue for a link are few. They can successfully argue that the Commission reaffirms contacts, conversations and points of mutual interest between Iraq and Al Qaeda throughout the 1990s. (The CIA has done so all along through this debate.) What they can't successfully do is make the jump to say that those contacts, conversations and points of mutual interest had much significance. I suppose they could argue that the pattern of contacts suggests a risk that they could have at some future point developed into a collaborative relationship, but that rather speculative point was contradicted by Hamilton. Unless some sudden, unexpected information emerges later--which, to be fair, is always a possibility--it may be time to close this case.

what we do not have, as the chairman said, is any evidence of a concrete collaborative operational agreement. Conversations, yes, but nothing concrete.

This Commission finding goes very far in proving the possibility that the DID work together--not that they didn't.

The Vice-Chairman of the 9/11 Commission wrote:

what we do not have, as the chairman said, is any evidence of a concrete collaborative operational agreement. Conversations, yes, but nothing concrete.

Sofia wrote:

This Commission finding goes very far in proving the possibility that the DID work together--not that they didn't.

is any evidence of a concrete collaborative operational agreement. Conversations, yes, but nothing concrete.

collaborative, operational agreement.

What would that be? A video, with a translator? Saddam pointing to maps, and OBL going, "BOOM!"