Bush Considering Sending....

dyslexia wrote:

Your search - vietnamwar.com/genwestmoreland.htm - did not match any documents.

It might help if you could read....or comprehend.

In point of fact, Desert Storm involved some 660,000 troops from 30 different countries, in an operation mandated and sanctioned by the United Nations. Operation Iraqi Freedom-- an operation NOT sanctioned by the UN and arguably violative of the UN charter-- a total of 263,000 troops including 100,000 from the US, 30,000 British and smaller contingents from a handful of nations styled as the Coalition of the Willing, were involved. Responsibility for the decision to invade and occupy Iraq with this lesser force ultimately rests with the "decider" and his minions.

It's also worthy of note that, even given the tremendous military force wielded in Desert Storm, we didn't invade or attempt to occupy Iraq for fear of finding ourselves (that is, the US and it's allies) in precisely the sort of predicament that we are in right now.

blacksmithn wrote:

In point of fact, Desert Storm involved some 660,000 troops from 30 different countries, in an operation mandated and sanctioned by the United Nations. Operation Iraqi Freedom-- an operation NOT sanctioned by the UN and arguably violative of the UN charter-- a total of 263,000 troops including 100,000 from the US, 30,000 British and smaller contingents from a handful of nations styled as the Coalition of the Willing, were involved. Responsibility for the decision to invade and occupy Iraq with this lesser force ultimately rests with the "decider" and his minions.

It's also worthy of note that, even given the tremendous military force wielded in Desert Storm, we didn't invade or attempt to occupy Iraq for fear of finding ourselves (that is, the US and it's allies) in precisely the sort of predicament that we are in right now.

Wrong we didn't invade and occupy Irag because Bush Sr. didn't have a mandate from the UN. There wasn't a worry about a current situation, it all had to do with the UN. Once again the UN failed the world when it was really needed.

Oh, nonsense. It was Daddy Bush's call and he made it. Any other answer is pure fantasy made up to cover a political position.

Oh, nonsense. It was Daddy Bush's call and he made it. Any other answer is pure fantasy made up to cover a political position.

No, you're right. The world is controlled by the UN. Watch out for those black helicopters...

Sheesh.

blacksmithn wrote:

In point of fact, Desert Storm involved some 660,000 troops from 30 different countries, in an operation mandated and sanctioned by the United Nations. Operation Iraqi Freedom-- an operation NOT sanctioned by the UN and arguably violative of the UN charter-- a total of 263,000 troops including 100,000 from the US, 30,000 British and smaller contingents from a handful of nations styled as the Coalition of the Willing, were involved. Responsibility for the decision to invade and occupy Iraq with this lesser force ultimately rests with the "decider" and his minions.

It's also worthy of note that, even given the tremendous military force wielded in Desert Storm, we didn't invade or attempt to occupy Iraq for fear of finding ourselves (that is, the US and it's allies) in precisely the sort of predicament that we are in right now.

Wrong we didn't invade and occupy Irag because Bush Sr. didn't have a mandate from the UN. There wasn't a worry about a current situation, it all had to do with the UN. Once again the UN failed the world when it was really needed.

In his memoir, "A World Transformed," written five years ago, George Bush Sr. wrote the following to explain why he didn't go after Saddam Hussein at the end of the Gulf War.

"Trying to eliminate Saddam...would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible.... We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq.... There was no viable "exit strategy" we could see, violating another of our principles. Furthermore, we had been consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-Cold War world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations' mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land."

In a 1996 Frontline Special on The Gulf War General Norman Schwarzkoph spoke these prophetic words.

Gen. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF: On the question of going to Baghdad_ if you remember the Vietnam war, we had no international legitimacy for what we did. As a result, we, first of all, lost the battle in world public opinion. Eventually, we lost the battle at home.

In the Gulf war, we had great international legitimacy in the form of eight United Nations resolutions, every one of which said, "Kick Iraq out of Kuwait." Did not say one word about going into Iraq, taking Baghdad, conquering the whole country and- and hanging Saddam Hussein. That's point number one.

Point number two- had we gone on to Baghdad, I don't believe the French would have gone and I'm quite sure that the Arab coalition would not have gone. The coalition would have ruptured and the only people that would have gone would have been the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

And, oh, by the way, I think we'd still be there. We'd be like a dinosaur in a tar pit. We could not have gotten out and we'd still be the occupying power and we'd be paying 100 percent of all the costs to administer all of Iraq.

NARRATOR: And then, just three weeks before the invasion of Iraq was to begin, General Shinseki was forced to take his internal fight with Secretary Rumsfeld public.

Sen. CARL LEVIN (D), Michigan: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq, following a successful completion of the war?

Gen. ERIC SHINSEKI, Army Chief of Staff, '98-'03: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements, but I think-

Sen. CARL LEVIN: How about a range?

Gen. ERIC SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground force presence.

THOMAS WHITE, Secretary of the Army, 2001-'03: So the next morning, I get a call from Wolfowitz, who is upset that Shinseki would give this number. And I forget exactly what I said, but I said, "Well, he's an expert. He was asked. He has a fundamental responsibility to answer the questions and offer his professional opinion, which he did. And there was some basis to the opinion because he is a relative expert on the subject." So a week later-

INTERVIEWER: So what does Wolfowitz say when you say that? I mean, that's-

THOMAS WHITE: Well, he's- he's- they're mad. They're upset.

REPORTER: Army chief of staff General Shinseki said it would take several hundred thousand troops on the ground-

DONALD RUMSFELD: There's so many variables that it is not knowable. It is- however, I will say this. What is, I think, reasonably certain is the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far from the mark.[/b]

PAUL WOLFOWITZ, Deputy Secretary of Defense: It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine.

THOMAS WHITE: All of us in the Army felt just the opposite, that there was a long history of that being absolutely true, that the defeat of the Iraqi military would be a relatively straightforward operation of fairly short duration, but that the securing of the peace and the security of a country of 25 million people spread out over an enormous geographic area would be a tremendous challenge that would take a lot of people, a lot of labor, to be done right.

PAUL WOLFOWITZ: In short, we don't know what the requirement will be, but we can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark.

THOMAS WHITE: So they discredit Shinseki. Then a week later, I get in front of the same committee. I get asked- I see Senator Levin before the hearing starts, and he says, "I'm going to ask you the same question." I said, "Good." I said, "You're going to get the same answer." And so he asked me the question, and I- exactly the same answer. And you know, and at that point, Shinseki and White are not on the team, right? We don't get it. We don't understand this thing, and we are not on the team. And therefore, you know, actions are going to be taken.

There wasn't a worry about a current situation, it all had to do with the UN.

NARRATOR: Over the years, they gradually took control and codified it into one particular doctrine. Designed to keep the military out of unwinnable quagmires and bring decisive force to bear, it would be named after one of its strongest champions, Colin Powell.

THOMAS WHITE: All of us were Vietnam veterans, and this business of the Powell doctrine was, "We're not going to do Vietnam again." And what we did in Vietnam is we kind of went in in an uncommitted way.

Gen. JOSEPH P. HOAR, Commander, CENTCOM, 1991-'94: The key thing is that you- you first of all have a clearly defined mission. It's not open-ended. You don't go there and do some things, you go to liberate Kuwait, is the great example of this. You have the support of the American people. The American people think that this is a meritorious task, that what we're doing is the right thing, that we're the United States of America, and we're contributing to stability, to peace, to democracy, whatever, that you have enough forces to do the job, that you don't do it piecemeal. Those are really the key elements of it.

NARRATOR: And there was the phrase "exit strategy," that politicians must tell the military how quickly they can get out of trouble spots.

Gen. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF: I'm now going to show you a picture of the luckiest man in-

NARRATOR: Those elements were fully in place when Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf led the combined American military into Desert Storm.

NARRATOR: In Washington, they were now taking sides. The odds-on favorite was Secretary Powell.

Gen. JOSEPH P. HOAR: It wasn't just Democrats, it was people on both sides that were concerned about this, people that thought Colin Powell had the right answer.

NARRATOR: But in the councils of power, Powell was losing.

Gen. JOSEPH P. HOAR: I am told that when you go to The National Security Council, that Colin Powell gets outvoted by Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cheney on these issues.

NARRATOR: From the outside, General Hoar supported Powell's position. Later he would join other military figures to oppose the war plan, and more recently, to support John Kerry. The forces of moderation took the fight public. Former NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft, the president's father's military man, wrote op-ed pieces, and the public climate of doubt began to build. Powell seized the moment. He lobbied for a private dinner with the president.

BOB WOODWARD: And his essential argument got down to what he called the "Pottery Barn rule"- you invade, you break it, you own it. And you have taken down a government that's been there for a long time. It was a warning to the president which the president, I think you can argue, should have said, "Time out. Stop the music. Here we have Colin Powell, 35 years in the military, secretary of state has just issued a dire warning. Let's reexamine."

NARRATOR: Then, as the president went on vacation, his senior cabinet officials were left to fight it out.

But surely, after all that conclusive sounding pronouncement that "we were only following the edicts of the UN", or some such - surely there would be some substantive comeback, and not just a sickly and spineless silence? Surely there would be some acknowledgement of error, or on the other hand some reinforcement of that bold position?