What The World Thinks of America (BBC program)

georgeob1

I think you probably spotted a general long-term trend fairly enough: that of inevitably diverging interests between the US and (W-)Europe. It is unlikely that the fates and interests of Western Europe and the US will ever again become quite as closely tied-up and intertwined as they were during the Cold War. That period of time will in the end be the exception to the rule, which is only logical considering the most exceptional circumstances. With the end of the Cold War, Western Europe instantly became far less dependent on US protection and it was therefore, I'd agree, a question of time before Europeans would gradually discover more how their interests differed from America's, and that there was nothing wrong with acting on that.

Thats where my agreement stops, though. You made the same point before and I think several of us more or less assented on it in general, but then you take some quantum leap in logic into declaring it all by itself a sufficient explanation for the really quite sudden and quite drastic changes in public attitudes here towards America, within quite a delineated time frame. And that doesnt make sense.

The development you sketch by nature is a gradual, long-term one. The drop in trust and sympathy for the US now is quite drastic. The trend you sketch may have created the potential for something like that to happen, but it didnt pre-ordain anything more than a gradual increase of self-confidence - nothing like this sharp a clash of sentiments. Something else has triggered it.

If this was merely the natural development of some long-term trend, you would have seen a curve of an increase from the nineties to now. But there was no such curve. Like I said, Clinton, Albright - they were extremely popular. There was hardly any ill-will against America, barring France's specific complexes of cultural insecurity. And suddenly, this. You cant credibly reason that away with refernces to some abstract long-term development that did not show up in the slightest before 2000, and "reject" outright any suggestion that "this is a result of the policies and bad manners of President Bush".

Listen, I live here. I dont know how it is in France, and it might even be different in Germany, but I dont know a single person who actively dislikes Americans, per se. There's prejudices, sure, like there are about Belgians - they're not so smart, easily impressed, lack reflection. Bla bla. (They're actually even some of the same prejudices). But none of that triggered any significant downturn in general indicators of trust or loyalty since the time of Reagan's nukes. And then Bush became president. And I know lots of people who deeply hate, resent or fear the America he represents. Not Clinton's America. Not the distant cousin's America. Not any America, in what would be a logical discovery of a basic difference in identity and interest. No, Bush's America. I think, in fact, many people here actually still believe America and Europe share many of the same interests. They simply believe that the Bush administration is not serving them - is harming them.

You were absolutely right when you referred, earlier, to the ICC, to Kyoto. We thought we had this big friend in Washington, who was like us - and then suddenly this guy got himself voted in with talk of how he would stand for no more of that wishy-washy feel-good stuff, and indeed, as soon as he got in power, started doing away almost systematically with the abstract common principles we had recognized ourselves in. And did so with a practically deliberate-looking bluntness - a disregard for diplomatic convention and cultural sensitivities that would by definition alienate us, and that seemed to have been adopted for that very reason, with the guy's electoral constituency lapping up his disregard for the effeminate Europeans as somehow "manly" behaviour.

The ICC and Kyoto are particularly important examples because in the rest of your posts, you emphasise how Europe chose to drift away - hell, to fight its way away from their past transatlantic loyalties. But it was Bush who tore up that social contract first, brandishing the rhetorics to his voters that from now on, America would go for its own cold, hard interest again, no more Somalias and UN stuff. Away with the weapons agreements, the environmental commitments, the endeavours on international justice, on with trade war and strongarm threats ('we will invade The Hague if necessary'). We didnt start that.

When's the first time any European country took deliberate steps away from what their prior policy conventions and commitments were, in order to strike out against US leads? Not much examples of that from before Iraq, from before Joschka's, "We are not convinced" - and that was years after the US broke away from the vulnerable consensus on environment and international justice.

Your "readily observable basic facts of the matter" basically come down to how respective "individual concepts of self-interest" have come to inevitably diverge, over time, since the Cold War. Fine. But it must take an act of supreme willpower to resolve to consider that, all by itself, a wholly sufficient explanation of even as radical a drop in stature as shown in such opinion polls as this one. Sufficient to such a degree, even, to be able to curtly "reject" any role of the Bush administration's style, policies and personalities in the matter, period.

The "basic facts" concern merely that sudden drop in stature and sympathy - first, after 2000, then, after having resurged after 9/11, again when the wars started coming. What you offered about that were no facts, but an interpretation. Quite a worthy one, in fact, but also an insuffucient one - and in the end it's just a certain spin on those "basic facts", claims of objective truth here are misplaced. But where it went over the top was in how it served to deflect any attribution of the problem (if thats what we consider it), whatsoever, to Bush, just a little too explicitly.

Nimh,

Interesting analysis. I don't particularly disagree with any of the points you make, though I believe there are other significant factors that bear on the matter and which may alter your interpretation.

First, the Clinton Europeans so admired failed to act on a number of fundamental issues that had and have broad support in this country: to some extent he merely avoided inevitable confrontations, without in any way contributing to their resolution - both the Kyoto and ICC treaties are cases in point. With both treaties some fundamental disagreements in the European and American positions had long been on the table.

With the ICC, the U.S. had long since objected to the vague definition of 'crimes against humanity'; had expressed concerns about frivolous misuse of the court; its lack of political accountability; certain procedural issues; and the claim in the Treaty of Rome that it would apply equally to signatory and non signatory nations - a feature contrary to long-held positions of this country. Our negotiations had been at an impasse for many months when, very late in his administration - when there would be no possibility of consideration of the treaty by the Senate - he (perhaps) impulsively signed it without resolving major objections our negotiators had already put on the table. I believe there never was a chance that our Senate - Democrat or Republican - would ever ratify such a treaty, which flies in the face of deeply held beliefs here. The only surprise in the process was that Clinton signed it at all, despite objections his own administration had repeatedly expressed about it. Clinton never once argued publicly in support of the treaty, and took no action whatever to facilitate its ratification.

The Kyoto treaty similarly involved numerous features the U.S.had objected to in the negotiations, including the reference year against which reductions would be measured (a very fortuitous choice for Europe); the complete waiver of obligations on former Soviet states and the rapidly industrializing nations where the greatest potential pay off existed for new investment; and some aspects of the formulas for atmospheric carbon absorbtion processes. The Senate in a non binding resolution, enacted by a near unanimous vote, indicated clearly that any such treaty would be summarily rejected by that body. Clinton signed the treaty anyway and then sat on it for more than 18 months without making any effort to either gather public support or to seek ratification.

Upon Bush's inauguration both treaties were already quite dead with no realizable possibility of ratification, no matter what he might do. This was well known here and cannot have escaped the notice of informed people in the governments of Europe. I was quite surprised at the explosion of European outrage that accompanied Bush's omission of CO2 from a draft list of gasses requiring regulation - the first palpable indication of the new administration's position on a matter about which the nation's sympathies had long been obvious. Let me emphasize - had Clinton been able to get a third term as President, both treaties would still have been rejected by our Senate by wide margins - even if he were to summon the political courage to submit them for ratification, something he did not do with Kyoto even though he had ample time to do so.

With all this in mind, I submit that the matter is NOT all about Bush. Clinton merely managed to hide the underlying issues and, in these matters as many, many others, deferred dealing with difficult, unpleasant issues.

Just a thought to toss in this ring, in polls in England in 1938 people when, asked to identify their enemies specifically named Hitler and his close associates. In 1942 answers to the same questions identified "the germans." As an historic process, it appears to me that while much of Europe began identifying Bush and his administration as a threat to world peace during the build-up to invade Iraq it would seem consistent that as the Iraq "war" rages on without a clear resolution in sight and even, more ominious, without a clear agenda/outcome, more and more we will see that America will be seen as the threat to world peace. From the lowly company commander directing his squat to "take that hill" to a President leading a charge of "well, that changes from day to day," there exists a morphious fog of just what the mission is, leading to the conclusion that "Mission Accomplished" is akin to the squad leader directing his men to "well, just go out there, somewhere, and kill the bad guys." As long as we (the US) can't seem to define what we are doing with measurable results that are a bit more concrete than "bring democracy to the middle east" the world is likely to regard the Super Power of America will more and more disquiet. But like I said this is just my thoughts at the moment.

Dyslexia,

I accept your point but don't believe it is the governing process in the issue under discussion.

The 'Clinton's America' for which Nimh has expressed so much admiration is, in my view, a minority slice of the whole and a somewhat discredited one to boot - and was to some extent an illusion. I suspect its most attractive features to Europeans stemmed from Clinton's generally clever evasions and stalling with respect to difficult issues. While it may have pleased Europeans to be soothed in their delusions that an international court could somehow stop the Milosivecs and Saddam Husseins of this world, or that a growing Islamist movement could somehow be placated by closing our eyes to international terrorism and casting our support to the Palestinians in the MIdeast stalemate, neither remedy dealt with the underlying issues. (Even Clinton had to finally force the Europeans to act in Bosnia - about two years too late for many though)

Nimh made a passing reference to "Reagans nukes", no doubt meaning the Pershing cruise missiles we installed in European NATO facilities, in response to the widespread deployment of Soviet SS-20 mobile ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe. The Pershings were a NATO nuclear deterrent, based in Europe that could strike Moscow. The political furor that accompanied their deployment in NATO was very great as the Soviets used all their influence and the various peace movements campaigned against our deployment of these weapons (but curiously not against the Soviet deployment). This, the general U.S. military buildup, and the threat of missile defense systems development, we now know were prominent among the factors that broke the will and resistance of the Soviet State, paving the way for its downfall.

Nothing new here. The French were blind to the danger posed by Hitler and inactive in opposing him as well. Imitating them may be pleasing to some in Europe, but it isn't good policy.

For good or ill I believe 'Bush's America' is very likely to be the majority view here for some time. Moreover I believe it wasn't far below the surface even during the Clinton years. Clinton at best provided Europeans a comforting illusion while he wasted time.

Well, although I might know -due to a couple of stays there- a little bit about the French re. the USA, it's truely not enough.

I do know, however, the situation here in Germany - and can remember it over a couple of years, too.

It is more or less the same, as nimh wrote about the Netherlands.
The main difference is that our government shows another attitude than of the Netherlands.

(To be honest, I think, the situation in Britain is very similar as well - at least, what I noticed during several stays there this year. Here, however, the main difference is that Britain historically doesn't seem to be an isle of the Europane continent, but the mainland of some former American colonies. :wink: )

Walter,

I think your observation about the historical role of Britain is correct. Britain was always the rival and often the enemy of whatever power attempted the domination of continental Europe. Perhaps in a perverse twist of history the United States will assume that role. (It will be interesting to see which side Britain chooses in this new chapter of history.) Perhaps this merely confirms French suspicions of 'les Anglo Saxons'.

I generally agree with the observations you and Nimh have put forward except that , in my view, it is the longer term trends that are most significant. I believe Clinton merely hid them from view by evading issues, while Bush has put them forward aggressively. The result would be the same even with different leaders.

My comments were not stones. I consider advocating negotiation with terrorists and terrorist regimes to be a sign of weakness, if not to us certainly to the terrorists.

This statement seems to be predicated upon a contention that the insistence of France and Germany that the inspection regime of U.N. weapons inspectors be allowed to continue before the adoption of any resolution authorizing military action against Iraq constituted negotiation with terrorists. This is specious for two reasons: the first and most obvious is that such a contention characterizes the inspection process as a form of negotiation, which it certainly is not. The second reason is that no link has ever been established between the Ba'atist regime in Iraq and terrorists. In fact, those who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Iraq and the Middle East as to be considered expert consistently deny such a link. What is presented in this statement is nothing but partisan propaganda. It certainly is conservative dogma to assert that France and Germany are "weak sisters" who would truckle with terrorists, and it is conservative dogma that Saddam and Co. were partners in crime with Al Qaeda-dogma it is, truth it is not.

Ah, but they weren't merely advocating continued inspections. And yes, I do think clucking about perpetuating a program at which Saddam had thumbed his nose for years shows weakness. After he laughed at the UN for so many years, France and Germany wanted us to say to Saddam, "This time we really mean it, mister!"

"Weak sisters", indeed! That is precisely what they are.

Geopolitics rarely condenses well into a puppet show, despite both the willingness of those in political debate to use such ploys and their attractiveness to thsoe with whom they agree.

And yet one can't simply not draw any conclusions, now can one? If capitulating and turning the other cheek worked with terrorists, Clinton's hands-off approach would have solved world terrorism rather than emboldening Bin Laden to strike directly on US soil. Those who don't learn from history, yadda-yadda-yadda...

Before learning from history, never forget the first step:

KNOW HISTORY!

George --

I don't want to chicken out on your question about the positive-sum aspects of Clinton's foreign policies. I think there are many examples but here are three of them.

1) Friends in Ireland tell me that Clinton was pretty helpful in moderating in the conflict in Northern Ireland. That helped the Democrats with the Irish vote, but it also helped the Northern Irish.

2) When Mexico experienced a balance of payment crisis, Clinton bailed them out -- in exchange for economic reform -- at considerable risk to his re-election. This helped Mexico because it had a stable economy ever since. It also helped America because it avoided contagion, helped keep financial markets calm, and preserved a trading partner that would otherwise have gone protectionist. Contrast this with the Bush administration's behavior (expecially Paul O'Neil's) during the crises in Argentina and (almost) Brazil.

3) More generally, in pursuing America's interests, Clinton went to great lengths to work with the international system, not against it. Unlike Bush, he was not a protectionist in trade, and not a unilateralist in military action. This was good for the rest of the world because it kept checks and balances on the world's most powerful nation. It was also good for America because it gave the rest of the world an incentive to apply their checks and balances through well-defined, reasonably transparent processes. Unlike today, nobody had an incentive to apply those checks and balances with nuclear weapons.

PS: In a later post, you say that 19th century England might be a good model for the kind of policy 21st century America might pursue with regard to Europe. I don't see the anology. Could you please elaborate?

Maybe I ought to explain why I don't see the analogy. From the standpoint of a selfish nation, imperialism made sense in the 19th century because land was the most important input to production. To increase its welfare, a nation had to get more land. And the only way to get get it was by conquerring territory from other nations. (Or to make pioneering advances in diking technology like the Dutch did. But even for them, imperialism worked better.)

Today, by contrast, land almost doesn't matter anymore as a source of wealth and power. Land-poor Hong Kong may well be more powerful than the entire, land-rich continent of Africa. The most important factors of production are now labor, capital and education (also known as human capital). Conquering these in a war is possible but inefficient. A much better way of getting them is by convincing people that your country is a good place to build factories in, work in, and apply your expertise in. This game is totally different from the 19th century, and it has completely different rules.

The most striking change in the nature of the game is that the wars of the 19th century were negative-sum games. My gain from winning a war against you is always smaller than your loss from losing a war against me. On the other hand, migrations of capital, labor, and education isn't a zero sum game at all. Take education: the increase in my mastery of the English language does not reduce your mastery of the English language at all. Free trade in labor, capital, and products does make some people better off and some people worse off, but on net everybody gains there too.

Ever since World War II, all American presidents -- Democrats and Republicans -- have understood this and acted accordingly. Bush is the first president who wants to go back to the antiquated era of negative-sum games. This is not a matter of Europe versus America -- on average, European politicians do a lot worse on free trade than American politicians. Neither is it about Democrats versus Republicans. Before Bush, good practice in international politics was observed no matter what party the president belonged to.

Just like with Bush's fiscal agenda, disagreeing with his foreign-policy agenda is a matter of common sense and best practices as opposed to fanatism. And this, not some deep shift in geopolitics, is what causes Europeans' recent divide with America under Bush.

Well, like elsewhere and at any time, the British politic in the 19th century wasn't of one voice and one single direction.

Palmerston's England might be one example, because his policy covers more than half of the century and is certainly not exactly that, what could be liked by others :wink:

Thomas,

I believe your game theory model is apt, but also subject to misinterpretations involving the specification of the boundaries of the game being played. Certainly WWI was a negative sum game by all definitions. However, I'm not sure the general proposition would withstand scrutiny as the participants in such struggles often have very different theories of what is at stake - difficult to establish an objective measure of the possible outcomes.

I do agree with you concerning the wisdom of Clinton's actions with respect to Mexico and Northern Ireland. In both cases there was already considerable political momentum in the policy directions he took (We were among those snookered by Carlos Salinas, and had a strong incentive to see the new president Zedillo succeed. Irish Americans had long since made themselves a force in American politics and by 1994 they were very well organized with respect to Northern Ireland.) - Clinton would have had a much more difficult time doing otherwise - but he made the right choices and acted decisively on them. Sen. Mitchell did a fine job as mediator for the new government in Ulster.

With respect to the general tone and tendency of Clinton's foreign policy, it is certainly true that he, usually skillfully, worked with international organizations and our allies in virtually all that he did. Moreover he was more adept at it than is George Bush. That is good, but not as a transcendental objective.

I fault Clinton precisely for failing to oppose the general drift of international organizations and our Allies in several grave situations that required it.

We should have called for UN or other action by the former colonial powers to address what has become permanent chaos in southern Uganda/Rwanda/ eastern Congo long before the massacres in Rwanda.

We should have shamed Europe into action in the disintegrating situation in Bosnia two years before we finally acted.

We should have made clear the fact that the dangerous behavior of North Korea is primarily a regional problem, one directly involving China, Japan, and South Korea - and not the United States, instead of attempting to bribe an evil bully and sending Madeline Albright to stroke him.

We should have addressed the growing and all-too-visible social and political revolution brewing in the Moslem world, reminding our European allies that it is the legacy of their own actions in North Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and south Asia. (The first attempt to take out the World Trade Center occurred during the first year of Clinton's first term as President. and other like actions followed it.).

We should have restrained the actions of the various Likud governments In israel that proceeded Barak's election in 1998. We should not have involved ourselves with the phoney deal offered the Palestinians by Clinton/Barak in 1999 - it was a palpable fraud, knowingly mislabeled as '90% of the West Bank' when it was only 40% (but 90% of what Israel considered negotiable), and would have created a collection of Palestinian Bantustands in the West Bank, with no water or air rights and each completely surrounded by Israeli territory. This fraud lost us whatever remaining trust we had among moderate Moslems.

I believe Clinton is a very capable individual, but recognize that, as a leader, he squandered valuable time and opportunity in failing to deal with grave and growing problems that were visible enough for him and others to see clearly. He consistently took the easy way out (a fact which much pleased Europeans) and set his successor up for very difficult problems. How does one explain Clinton's failure to take any action to gather support for or implement the Kyoto Treaty for almost two years in office after he signed it? How does one explain his last minute signing of the ICC treaty after his own negotiators had been at impasse with the European negotiators for over two years on long-standing U.S. objections to several features of the treaty?

Perhaps I stated my point badly or perhaps you just misunderstood my meaning with respect to the analogy with the British Empire. I was not making any specific reference to the 19th century, and I do not disagree with your interpretation of it. I was suggesting that the movement toward a united Europe under the dominant leadership of France and Germany may create the same combination of historical forces that, during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries led Great Britain to become the permanent rival and occasional enemy of any continental power that led or sought to lead continental Europe.

Yeah, and I'm going to learn it from you? Thanks, but no.

Scrat, no panic!
I'm no teacher but only someone who studied history :wink:

George - Well written. I respect your opinion, especially because you point out both strengths and weaknesses (as you perceive them) of Clinton's foreign policy.

You know, I realised upon reflection that my response to you was wrong. I do think you were implying that I don't know history, but I realize I may well not know it nearly as well as you, or at least may not know some things that you do, so what I should have written was that if you think there is something you can teach me about it, please feel free to share the information. If there's something in what I've written that leads you to believe I don't know some fact of which you are aware, help me fill in the gaps.