stalingrad

The Soviet WWII military casualty toll was a bit in excess of 10 Million, with some 12 to 15 Million civilian deaths on top of that, for a total in the vicinity of 23 to 25 Million.

Hitler pressed Fall Blau (lliterally, "Case Blue", or in English parlance, "Operation Blue), the Stalingrad misadventure, over the objections of his generals, even sacking OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres - roughly, "Army High Command" which organiztionally was subordinate to OKW - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or overall "Military High Command - [/i]) Chief of Staff von Halder, a staunch opponent of the plan who repeatedly voiced concern pertaining to dangerously over-extended flanks, replacing him with Zeitzler, a far less competent, but far more politically reliable general. von Paulus bears responsibility only for following stupid orders.

That the North and South flanks of his drive into the city were largely manned by non-German units reflects the reality that those units - for various reasons - were ill-suited for offensive action. However, they were not adequate in manpower or equipment to the task of securing the extraordinarilly long flanks of the Stalingrad push. In some cases, units no larger than understrenght battalions were responsible for scores of miles of frontage ... it was not uncommon for a single platoon to be guarding a mile or more. The Hungarian and Romanian commanders were well aware of the Soviet buildups on both flanks, and persistently lobbied for reinforcements. Hitler's battleplan however called for throwing the maximum available force at the city itself, to the expense of the advance's flanks.

When Soviet commander Zhukov sprang his offensive, on November 19, over a Million fresh, superbly equipped Soviet troops, three full Armys, heavy with armor, artillery, and air support, hammered a bare few miles of the German's thinly-defended Northern flank, overwhelming the 3rd Romanian Army in less than 24 hours. The following day, an only slightly smaller Soviet force, two full Armys and a major component of a third, nearly a Million mencrashed into a narrow section of the Southern flank, in a few hours thoroughly breaching the paper-thin defenses of the 4th Romanian Corps. The Romanian forces - primarily cavalry and light infantry, with virtually no armor, artillery, mechanized transport, or air support, hardly can be blamed for succumbing to the massive Soviet onslaughts; that their lines held even a few hours is remarkable.

In less than 2 days, the pincers of the Soviet Northern and Southern forces joined near the Don River town of Kalch, some 30 miles to the south and west of Stalingrad, and immediately set about preparing 2 massive defenses-in-depth, one set of positions facing inward, containing the more than Quarter Million Axis forces (most of von Paulus' 6th Army and a Korps of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army) inside the ring, one set of positions facing outward, preventing relief of the trapped Axis forces.

A German breakout and withdrawl could have been effected, at least as late as mid-December, but Hitler would have none of it. He declared the city of Stalingrad a "Fortress", ordering no breakout was to be attempted, insisting an air bridge would keep the trapped forces supplied untill an overwhelming relief force could be assembled and thrown against the Soviet lines encircling Stalingrad.

The idea of supplying by air anything near what would be required merely to provide life support to the trapped forces, to say nothing of maintaining them at combat efficiency, was ludicrous; the 6th Army alone was the largest formation of its type disposed by the Wermacht, roughly twice the size of any other German Army, it was indeed the largest formation of its type in the world at the time, and in the cauldron with it was nearly half of Hoth's also over-sized 4th Panzer Army. Under the best of conditions and circumstances, the Luftwaffe might have been able to supply perhaps half what would have been needed, but the conditions and circumstances never were the best and steadilly grew worse for the Germans. The trapped forces received at most something on the order of a tenth of the supplies they needed, and even that dwindled to nothing as the worst of winter set in, the Soviets built up their advantages, and steadilly shrank the perimiter around the doomed Axis forces.

On 2 February '43, when von Paulus surrendered, the Soviets took nearly 100,000 sick, wounded, and starving Axis prisoners, among them nearly 2 dozen generals. Of the survivors taken into Soviet custody, many died on the forced march from the city, and tens of thousands died in Soviet labor camps over the coming years, fewer than 6000 surviving to return to Germany, and the last of them were not repatriated for nearly 10 years following the end of the war.

i forgat to ask : what was name of russian trup fighting for germans? husky or something i do not know

You are perhaps referring to the German term "Hiwis" (short for "Hilfswillige" = persons willing to help).

Wikipedia entry in English.

(NB: Those above mentioned should not be confused with RONA or POA.)

grazie

if enybody knows, did enybody from 6 army escape from blockade, when started soviet operation discration of 6 army

Because of the poor quality of the English in this question, it is difficult to know precisely what you are asking, but i'll give this a shot.

Even after 6th army had been enveloped, some casualties were flown out, but not many, and it happened more rarely after the Soviet envelopment in late November.

However, the Germans had traditionally--since the time Great Elector's establishment of the cantonment system for his Prussian army--followed a replacement system similar to that employed by the classic Augustan legions. Each organization unit (legions for the Romans, regiments for the Prussians, and divisions for modern Germans) was based in a particular region. While not in active service, the unit was represented by a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers available to train civilians levied as a reserve for the unit. While in active service, men wouned would be returned for convalescence to their home region. While convalescing, and when able to leave a hospital bed, they would participate in the trainig of new levies. When sufficiently healthy to return to their units, such officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks would organize newly trained levies into "march battalions," which would then be sent to the parent division, and broken up as replacement to the constituent units of the division.

This process was in constant use, and all major formations of 6th Army hads officers and enlisted men convalescing in the home regions at the time that the Soviets cut off the army. Therefore, many of the units of 6th Army were rather quickly reformed even after the main body of the units were cut off at Stalingrad. So, for example, the 29th Infantry Division, the 305th Infantry Division and the 14th Panzer Division all were re-created from cadre at home, and took part in the early phases of the Italian campaign in 1943.

Sixth Army itself was reformed in late 1943--of course, it was quite different than the 6th Army which approached the Volga River in Autumn, 1942--but given the German replacement system, a unit never completely disappeared from the organizational roster, and could be reformed again and again. It was only in 1945 that the system broke down completely.

This was a perfect case of two dictators with massive pride. Hitler needed oil for his war campaigns so he headed towards the Caucacus region but with renamed Stalingrad just a few hundred miles diversion was something resist just to muddy Stalin's face by taking his city. Stalin also realizing Hitler's aims did a last minute shoring up of Stalingrad by sending in his best general.

becaouse my bad english sentata jou did not understend. i did not mean officer who escape by plane, or wonded, who olso escape by plane. when soviet 12 januray atack 6 army, does enybody escape from siege by car, tank, or on foot, and come to alive to germans lines. i know that is very inpasible, but.... many of huwies, and germans took soviet uniforms and try to get out. i am asking did enybady success?

how many people was in 6 army when ther was in siege?

Somewhat over 250.000 Wehrmact (mostly 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army) and Axis Partner troops were surroundwd when the Soviets secured the riung at Kalach. A very few individuals managed to penetrate the Soviet cordon during its first few days, but no organized units managed the feat (though nay units were outside the ring when it closed); for the Axis tropps, the only way out of Stalingrad was as a wounded evacuee. - and even that came to a halt by late December '42, early January '43. The last Luftwaffe evacuation filight (the only means of egress available to the Germans) was on Jan 23, ';43.

The 6th Army alone had 296,000 soldiers. You have to add (parts of) the 4th Tank Army, Croatian, Italian and Romanian troops.

Good catch, Walter - a bit of sloppiness on my part ... I mis-typed; should have been "" ... over 350,000 ... "

in siege ther can not been over than 300 000 people

Roughly 350,000 Axis troops were encircled in principle when the Soviet pincers closed at Kalach, about 35 miles west of Stalingrad. Some, not many, but some, managed to escape the encirclement before the Soviets managed to fully seal the pocket, the front of which initially comprised an arc, forming a ragged half circle approximately 125 - 130 miles in length, bulging to the West of the Volga. Viscious fighting ensued, both in the city and its immediate suburbs (the city proper was site of some of the fiercest, bloodiest close-quarter combat of the entire war - easilly on a par with the most murderous trench fight slaughters of WWI) and outside, as the Soviets pushed inward, forcing the Germans not already in the city to withdraw toward it, claiming perhaps as many as 50 to 75 thousand Axis lives between late November and mid-December.

By the time of the abortive December 20th breakout attempt (under Hoth, who's remainder of 4th Panzer Army had been reinforced with the newly arrived from France 6th Panzer Division - fit and well equipped) - mishandled from von Paulus' end - upwards of 250,000 to perhaps as many as 275,000 Axis troops, many wounded, all on near-starvation rations and short of materiel, were doomed irrevocably. As mentioned earlier, a mere 91,000 or so survived to be taken prisoner when the city finally was re-taken by the Soviets, and of those only about 6000 lived to be repatriated - which itself did not happen until the mid '50s.

Incidentally, also in mid-December, the 225,000-strong Italian 8th Army, a bit further to the North, was dealt a very similar fate by the Soviets in another swift, overwhelming, deftly-executed pincers attack; tens of thousands of Italians were killed or captured, and virtually all the Army's equipment was destroyed, captured by the Soviets, or merely abandonded when and where it broke down or ran out of fuel. The surviving escapees, numbering over 100,000, fled Westward in unstoppable disorder, even commandeering trains to aid their flight, and the Italian 8th Army ceased to exist. All told, Stalingrad and its directly associated November-December '42/January '43 battles cost the Axis somewhat more than 600,000 troops and virtually all of their equipment, along with consuming nearly 3/4 of the Luftwaffe's available air transport assets and close to half of its available ground support and air combat assets - and, of course, much of the associated aircrew. From those losses, the Luftwaffe never fully recovered.

The Soviets were never too concerned about their cannon fodder. Foot soldiers dressed in white were sent right through minefields put in place by the Germans. Soviet women drove the T-34s into battle, Soviet women dug ditches and had machine guns while the Germans had to heat the engines of their armored vehicles (panzers, whatever) in the sub-zero weather. Quite a battle.

soviet are a strange people. they defet swedesh, napeleon, and the german army. for that they pay a price of 20 to 30 milion people. ther is no country that after loses of 15 milion people and soldiers, are not totaly defeted. with no odds agenst nazi, they stop the germany army, and after 1 year they defeted nazi. the end of nazi germany is not 6 6 1944, the end of third rich is stalingrad and el almein.

Never attack Russia in winter! Napolean lost most of his men there and Hitler seems not to care for history so history repeated itself -another dictator bites the dust.

hitler did not atack russia in winter. the atack on russia was on 22 6 1941. in summer. but soviet defence hold until winter 1941. in summer 1942 germans atack agen, but they agen come winter.

By the time it finally went forward, Barbarossa, the operation against the Soviet Union, had been subject to several postponements, amounting to a delay of a couple months. First, logistic considerations prevented full assembly of the assault forces, their supplies and equipment, and their reserves. Coincident with, and in some measure component to, the logistic delay was anomalously inclement weather; an unusually sudden, wet spring not only mitigated against mechanized assault across the sodden steppes, but complicated transport of men and materiel from rear areas to the assault assembly positions, as well as presenting unacceptable operational difficulties pertaining to the air support critical to the attack plan. Further delay was incurred due to the unexpected necessity of having to conduct major operations, with conesquent significant asset realignment, in the Graeco-Balkan region.

Weather again played against the Axis a few months after the invasion; the assault forces were unprepared and unequipped for the unexpectedly sudden, severe onset of winter. Had the invasion gone off as originally scheduled, or even with just a few weeks less delay, the likelihood of gaining the initial campaign season's ultimate objectives, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, would have been inestimably higher.

Whether in the long run that would have made much difference is debatable; recall that Napoleon took - and sacked - Moscow. An asset common to the defenders in both 1812 and 1941 was the abilty to swap vast areas of territory in return for tactical and strategic advantage, advantage the defenders, despite major early setbacks, skillfully and effectively employed in both instances.

The interference of Hitler is obvious in all of the planning, though. Sound military operational planning method would have involved planning to take the major objectives before winter, and then providing for the contingency of failing to do so. But OKH was not prepared for winter at all, not with clothing, not with winterization for vehicles, not with horses and fodder (the expedient they were eventuall obliged to use), not with winterization of Luftwaffe assets. Hitler assumed the Soviets would collapse, forced the operation on planning staff who were not prepared to tell him that there were any drawbacks to the plan.

Another major factor was the that the Japanese "ally" did absolutely nothing for the Germans, and, in fact, greately hurt their chances of success in Russia. On April 13, 1941, Japan signed a five-year armistice with the Soviets, who agreed to recognize the borders of "Manchuko." It was not an immediate possibility, but as units disengaged and were pulled back from the front upon which they had previously faced the Japanese, the Soviest were able, by October, 1941, when winter began, to deploy nearly 40 divisions from the Far East. In contrast, although Japan had never done anything for Germany, and never would, Hitler declared war on the United States after the Japanese attack.

Hitler was an idiot--and the best friend, militarily speaking, that we had in continental Europe. If we had been obliged to fight the Wehrmacht without Hitler's interference, it would have been a much more difficult and bloody proposition.