africa korps

Leaving aside for the moment any discussion of the relative merits of commanders of tank units, ignoring the fact tanks - tracked armored fighting vehicles - haven't been around for 100 years yet, reserving judgement on the effect a German victory at either 1st or 2nd el Alamein might have had as would regard the overall outcome of WWII, and disregarding Hitler's decision to launch Barbarosa when he did, I note you share with many a rather uninformed concept of the Wehrmacht formation commonly known as "The Africa Corps". It is possible no military unit other than the Knights Templar is subject to more misinformation, myth, and mystery than is DAK. If I may, and with all respect, I'd like to set a few things straight.

Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK) was not an army (although eventually it was a component of what became Panzerarmee Afrika), it was the Headquarters Staff (Aufklärungsstab) of a formation OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - roughly "Armed Forces High Command") hastily cobbled together in response to the Italian North African debacle. Originally Aufklärungsstab Rommel, named, as was German military practice, for its commanding officer, in this case at-the-time Colonelgeneral E. V. Rommel, was technically a Korps (English: "Corps") command in concept only - a Korps being 2 or more divisions - as its operational command establishment at time of activation pertained only to 5th Panzer Regiment augmented with a less-than-division-strength assortment of smaller units. Though slated for inclusion in Rommel's command, the newly-activated 15th Panzer Division, which had not yet completed fitting out and training, did not join the initial deployment.

On deployment to Africa, the command's elements were reorganized as 5th Light Afrika Division (Motorized), which was assigned to the Italian North African Command under Marshal Graziani (essentially remnants of the Italian X, XX, and XXI Corps - 2 armored divisions, the Ariete and the Littorio, 4 infantry divisions, the Brescia, the Pavia, the Trento, and the Bologna, a motorized infantry division, the Trieste, and a parachute division, the Folgore, along with smaller attached support units - all badly understrength and lacking a great deal of equipment due to the drubbing they'd been dealt by the British). Rommel's charge specifically was to not engage in offensive action, but rather to make the elements of his command available to stiffen the battered Italian's defensive positions, at Graziani's discretion and direction.

Rommel was appalled and dismayed by the beat-up condition, poor morale, and apparent lack of initiative characterizing the battle-torn Italian force to which he nominally was to be subordinate. He conducted an extensive personal survey of the battlespace, including ordering several reconnaisance-in-force missions. He concluded the opposing British forces would be vulnerable to immediate decisive offensive action.

On his own initiative, and, contrary to orders without consulting the Italian command, he launched his first offensive on March 24, 1941, throwing 5th Lt Afrika (Mot) and a small contingent of combat-capable Italian units against the very startled and unprepared British forces of Wavell's Western Desert Force (later redesignated XIII Corps). Using the Blitzkreig tactics he'd honed in Poland and France, Rommel regained, in a matter of weeks, nearly everything the Italians had lost in nearly half a year of defeats and retreats. In the process, Rommel's forces siezed large quantities of supplies and equipment, took thousands of British prisoners (among them 2 generals, Richard O'Connor and Sir Philip Neame), bringing about a very angry Parliament, a shocked British public, and a major shakeup of the British North African command structure.


Rommel's successes came at a cost, however, and losses coupled with logistics problems (basically, he ran out of fuel and supplies, even despite the materiel he siezed - but largely consumed - during the advance) forced a halt to his attack. In mid-April, his advance stalled and Tobruk, his primary objective, still in British hands, Rommel went over to the defensive in order to consolidate his gains and facillitate replacement and resupply.

It was then that 15th Panzer, along with badly needed supplies and replacements for 5th Lt Afrika (Mot), arrived, and Rommel first had at his disposal an operational Korps formation. It was then too that Aufklärungsstab Rommel officially was designated, by Hitler personally, Deutsches Afrikakorps. Over the summer, yet more German units were deployed to North Africa. In August a new command, Panzergruppe Afrika ("Gruppe" being the German designation for a formation roughly equivalent to an "Army as deployed by other contemporary militaries), was established, with Rommel, promoted to Generalfeldmaschall as befitting the expanded command, becoming overall Flag Officer, operational command of Afrikorps passing over several weeks through a couple of interim generals eventually, in mid-September, to General der Panzertruppen Ludwig Crüwell. Roughly coincident with this, 5th Lt Afrika (Mot) was re-equipped, assigned 2 armored regiments (regiments in name only; neither was much above battalion strength) and reorganized as 21st Panzer Division.

At this point, Afrikakorps proper, 21st Pz and 15th Pz, comprising a Panzerkorps was a component of an entirely German higher formation, consisting of 21st Pz Div, 15th Pz Div, 90th Infantry Division (Light), 164th Infantry Division, Parachute Brigade Ramcke, 2 Flak regiments, 2 Artillery battalions, 2 Engineer battalions, and a Field Police Battalion (for none of which I happen at the moment to remember names or designations, and I'm too lazy to look them up - sorry), along with the usual assortment of support units appropriate to the formation's makeup and mission. The Italian units, somewhat - but still inadequately - reinforced and re-equipped, had been detached, organized once more as their original Corps (X, XX, and XXI), under Panzergruppe Afrika command.

As the war progressed, Panzergruppe Afrika became Panzerarmee Africa (also known as 1st Italian-German Army) and finally V Panzerarmee. A Gruppe is a formation of 2 or more Korps, an Armee is a formation of 2 or more Gruppen, btw, and when the formation at discussion had been withdrawn from the African Theater (or, in German parlance, "Afrikafront"), it was redesignated V Panzerarmee.

If you care and you'd like, I would be happy to give you considerable factual detail relevant to WWII campaigns and the units involved therein, both Allied and Axis. The subject is pretty much a hobby of mine.


Meanwhile, let me recommed some books you might find useful:

Afrikakorps at War, Volume 1: The Road to Alexandria: Forty, G.
Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ont (2000)
ISBN: 1550680684

Afrikakorps at War, Volume 2: The Long Road Back: Forty, G.
Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, Ont (2000)
ISBN: 1550680927

Foxes of the Desert: The Story of the Afrikakorps: Carell, P.
Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA (1996)
ISBN: 0887406599

Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War: von Mellenthin, F., Betzler, H. (Trans.), Turner, F. (Ed.)
(German, 1956)
Ballantine Books, New York, NY [1956] (1971, 1985)
ISBN: 0345321588

The Rommel Papers: Liddle-Hart, B. H. (Ed.)
Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA (1982)
ISBN: 0306801574

Rommel and his Art of War: Leventhal, L. (Ed.)
Greenhill Books, London, UK (2006)
ISBN: 1853675431

that jou just say i know. on my language jou sey that i am not good at english. i croatia we do not have that many books about ww2 or africa korps. i read montgomery memoares, and some book of croaten writers. i can not to get this book, becaouse her we do not have that books. i just wont to say what would be when hitler no atack russia, and send enough fuel and supplies, reinforcmet...

Timber,

British forces and the Aussie 6th were withdrawn to honour committments to Greece.

The newly formed Australian 9th retreated to Tobruk.
thess men became known as THE RATS OF TOBRUK

On the morning of Easter Monday the Germans launched their attack by tanks. The familiar pattern employed by these "Blitzkrieg" experts was to have the tanks break through the defences - a deep armoured thrust - and through the gap would pour the infantry. In Poland, France and Belgium these tactics had never failed. Once the tanks had broken through it had always been the beginning of the end and the rolling up of the defences had been a matter of course - until Tobruk.

Here the enemy's tanks did not so much break through as they were let through. The Australians lay low until the German infantry appeared in the wake of the tanks. These were engaged by our fire with the result the tanks were left to advance without the support they had expected, and the further they advanced the more intense became the fire they encountered. For there was the secret of our defence - a defence in depth. The combined force of our artillery and tanks lay waiting for them. They were hit with every calibre weapon at our command capable of damaging them. The fire of our 25-pounders at point-blank range was particularly devastating. As the enemy armour in retreat poured through the gap they had made in our lines, they came under the fire of Brens, mortars, rifles and shells and terrible confusion resulted.

The heroic defence of Tobruk is a notable military achievement and a worthy addition to the long list of deeds of valour performed by Australian soldiers.

http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/tobruk/581.htm

That "Hitler failed to supply" the Afrikafront forces is a myth. The fact is that a steady stream of men and materiel flowed to the Axis-held North African ports, despite significant shipping losses inflicted by Allied air and naval forces. Hitler personally insisted that OKW expend every effort in the endeavor, and frequently praised Mussolini - who's ports, navy, and merchant marine were the Europrean anchor of the Afrikafront logistic chain - for Italy's tireless efforts in the face of daunting opposition.

Prior to Rommel's arrival in Africa, an OKW study concluded a maximumum of 4 mechanized divisions, which would be the equivalent of a large Korps or a modest Gruppe, operating up to 300 miles from the available African ports, could be supplied adequately to permit sustained offensive action. By the time of Rommel's second offensive, in May 1942, Panzerarmee Afrika disposed a force well over twice that size, and was operating as much as 500 to 600 miles from the ports. What may have been offloaded at a dock is of no use at all to a fighting force if the available transport and existing road network are inadequate to the task of getting it to where it is needed when it is needed.

Rommel, though a brilliant tactician, was neither a strategist nor a logistician. Beyond daring, he was impetuous, a gambler, and in the matter of what his forces could do with the materiel that could be gotten to their Shwerepunkt - the supply-ravenous fighting front of his advances - he gambled poorly. He pressed his troops further and faster than supplies could follow them. The luck of capturing Allied supplies staved off disaster a few times, but that's what it was; luck, and luck is not a sound basis for a battle plan.

In Poland in '39 and again in France the following year, Rommel's penchant for ignoring the constraints of logistic capabilities - pushing beyond the limits of practicable supply, ignoring orders and battleplan to create or pursue tactical advantage in disregard of strategic considerations - had brought him criticism from his rightfully alarmed superiors.

In Poland and France, he got away with it. In Africa, he didn't; he mounted operations beyond his logistic capacity, and in the end he and the forces under him paid the price. He was very good at winning battles, but he demonstrated little understanding of how wars are fought. That is the primary reason he was relieved of command and ordered back to Germany.


Oh, and by the way, its not your English I criticize, its your ideas and the manner in which you present them.

Good point, dadpad - and along with the valor of the Aussies, one must acknowledge the no less heroic contributions of the New Zealanders and Indians. Lacking any of them, the story surely would have been very different.

tactic in desert and europe is not the same. in desert jou must push jour army. rommel did what would did any general, besides italian. rommel push british when he sow that they canot defend ther lines. in desert jou cant stop because in desert jou cant defend line, jou must atack enemy and push forwerd. maybe rommel push too much. hitler too much look russia, and too small to africa. in book rommel africa korps, writer say that rommel never get enough reinforcemt, as british, who was superior in evrything besides comander.

The reason Rommel " ... never get eough ... " is not that it wasn't available to him, it is that he over-extended his logistic capability - he kept outrunning his supplies.

Yes, in the desert, one fights as one does at sea more than one does on land, in that there rarely is any terrain to shield one's flank or anchor a line. However, Rommel pushed too far, too fast, too often. That's what did him in. He underestimated the desert, and overestimated himself.

Now later - toward the end of '42 and into '43, the flow of supplies from Italy to Africa did shrink, but by that time, Rommel was no longer in Africa, he'd been relieved of command and ordered back to Germany.

timberlandko jou say : The reason Rommel " ... never get eough ... " is not that it wasn't available to him, it is that he over-extended his logistic capability - he kept outrunning his supplies.
Yes, in the desert, one fights as one does at sea more than one does on land, in that there rarely is any terrain to shield one's flank or anchor a line. However, Rommel pushed too far, too fast, too often. That's what did him in. He underestimated the desert, and overestimated himself.

in summer 1942 rommel recived an order from hitler, that africa korps must push fowered, to atack british lines. hitler orderer that africa korps can not retret from ther lines. because that rommel can not retret from el alemien util it was too late. that rommel wrote.

The tactic Rommel used was that he emplaced anti-tank guns in the sand with only the barrels above ground. Then he lured British forces by raiding a British camp with fast armour. The quickly assembled British response raced after them right into the path of the emplaced anti-tank guns. When Montgomery came in he had planes reconnoiter the region and realized Rommel's tricks and put a stop to it and chased the Desert Fox out of Africa.

for that tricks british need one year.