Yes, that's the one, LE. The Americans intended to do daylight precision bombing using that device, and it worked, despite the best efforts of United States Army Air Force intelligence officers to prove that it wasn't working. The idea was to put 10% of bombs within 1000 feet of ground zero. The first major trial was against Schweinfurt in Franconia, the ball- and roller-bearing "capital" of Germany. Our losses were appalling, more than 150 aircraft and their crews. The USAAF grounded our bombers for months, and intelligence officers pored over aerial reconaissance photos and pronounced the mission a failure. On the other hand, Albert Speer, then head of production in the Third Reich, arrived at Schweinfurt the next day, and estimated that 65% of German ball- and roller-bearing production had been lost for three months.
If you want to build a fight plane, you need ball and roller bearings. If you want to build a submarine, you need ball and roller bearings. If you want to build a bloody farmer's lorry, you need ball and roller bearings. The Schweinfurt raid was devastating and the Germans could not understand why the exercise wasn't repeated. They would gladly have paid twice the price to accomplish the same in a raid against England. Of course, the exercise was eventually repeated, and when Mustangs came along which could escort bombers all the way to Berlin and back (and have fuel for an old-fashioned shoot-em-up after), it was curtains for the Hun.
There is an excellent policy study on the subject, which i know is available in paperback (the link is for the hardcover edition, but look around, maybe you can get it through library loan).
Decision Over Schweinfurt
Winston freely admits in his book that he and Arthur "Bomber" Harris took the line that bombing workers' neighborhoods at night meant they would get no sleep and be unproductive the next day (when they weren't actually dead). The Brits long tried to convince the Americans to switch to nighttime bombing, and came within an ace of doing so. The Royal Air Force bomber crews used to call themselves "Arthur Harris and Sons, House Removers." Luckily for all concerned (except the Germans), the USAAF prevailed with their policy of daylight raids.
In late 1943, Eishenhower sought and obtained permission to take control of all 8th and 9th USSAF and Royal Air Force resources, and implement "the Transportation Plan." They started hitting bridges, highways, rail lines--all communications facilities in France and Germany. They tried to spread it around, but if you read
The Rommel Papers (ed. by Frau Rommel and B H Liddell Hart), you'll see that Erwin wasn't fooled. He looked at bombing patterns and pronounced Normandy as the Allied landing target. OKH wasn't having any of that though, because they had other plans and they just
knew that the Tommies and the Amies would think their way.
On D-Day, the Allies flew 14,827 sorties in France, almost all of them over Normany. The Germans flew 160 sorties in all of France, and just two of them over the invasion beaches. Kinda made the rest a foregone conclusion.