Americans and Europeans share concern over global terrorism

TRANSATLANTIC PULSE: EUROPEANS COOL TO U.S.
Transatlantic Trends is designed to gauge the pulse of U.S.-European relations. For the first time since the survey began in 2002, Europeans' (EU9) warmth of feeling toward the U.S., on a 100-point "thermometer," is a lukewarm 51 degrees. Forty-six percent of Americans feel the transatlantic relationship has gotten worse in the last year, and the highest percentage of Europeans (41%) feel it has stayed the same. A majority of Europeans (55%, EU9) support a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs between the U.S. and the European Union (compared to 50% in 2004). The largest percentage of Americans wants closer relations, but this has dropped from 60% in 2004 to 45%.

IRAN THREATENING, DIVERGENCE ON RESPONSE
Seventy-nine percent of Americans and 84% of Europeans (EU9) agree that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only 15% of Americans and 5% of Europeans who see military action as the best option. If non-military options fail, 53% of Americans who support efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 45% of Europeans (EU9). Fifty-four percent of French respondents, though, would support military action if non-military options fail. Democrats and Republicans agree that efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons should continue but disagree should non-military options fail ?- just 41% of Democrats but 70% of Republicans would support military action under these circumstances.

SUPPORT FOR EU ENLARGEMENT
Sixty-three percent of Europeans (EU9) agree that further enlargement of the European Union will help it play a more important role in world affairs, and 62% agree that further enlargement will promote peace and democracy along its borders. Sixty-five percent of Europeans (EU9) support the creation of a European Union foreign minister, one of the key reforms put forth in the proposed constitutional treaty.

"The overall picture of the European public opinion emerging from this year's survey seems to contradict the current view of a growing skepticism, among Europe's citizens, about further EU integration," said Piero Gastaldo, Secretary General of the Compagnia di San Paolo. "The fact that a large majority of the interviewed are in favor of creating an EU foreign minister position is particularly striking ?- it is both a reason for optimism and a serious challenge for the European and national institutions and for those independent subjects, like foundations, that are committed to promote the involvement of citizens in the integration process and the development of an actual European identity."

BROAD TRANSATLANTIC AGREEMENT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISES
Majorities of Americans and Europeans oppose greater governmental authority to monitor citizens' telephone calls (59% for both continents) but support greater authority to monitor communications on the Internet (54% for both) and install surveillance cameras in public places (78% Europe, 71% U.S.). The two sides disagree about greater authority to monitor banking transactions (50% of Europeans support, 58% of Americans oppose). Majorities of Democrats oppose greater government authority to monitor telephone calls, communications on the Internet, and citizens' banking transactions, all of which are supported by a majority of Republicans.

Other Key Findings of Transatlantic Trends 2006:


Support for democracy promotion softening in U.S.: When asked whether they feel it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, 71% of Europeans (EU9) agreed, a figure nearly unchanged from 2005. Forty-five percent of Americans agreed when asked if it should be the role of the United States, a decline of seven percentage points from last year. As in 2005, breakdown by U.S. party affiliation shows a strong partisan divide, with only 35% of Democrats agreeing compared to 64% of Republicans. These percentages reflect declines in support in both parties, minus-eight percentage points among Democrats and minus-12 percentage points among Republicans.

Incompatibility between Islam and democracy due to particular Islamic groups: Fifty-six percent of Americans and Europeans do not feel that the values of Islam are compatible with the values of their democracy, but 60 % on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not Islam in general. Sixty-six percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans also agree that particular Islamic groups are the problem.

Turkey cooling, shifting: Since 2004, Turkey has cooled toward the United States and Europe but has warmed toward Iran. Turkish "warmth" toward the United States declined from 28 in 2004 to 20 in 2006 on a 100-point "thermometer," and from 52 to 45 toward the European Union. Over the same period, Turkish warmth toward Iran rose from 34 to 43. Younger Turks, however, have warmer feelings toward both the United States and European Union, with a thermometer reading among 18- to 24-year-olds above the Turkish averages at 27 toward the United States and 48 toward the European Union. While majorities of Turkish respondents continue to see EU membership as a good thing, the percentage of Turkish citizens who see Turkey's membership as a good thing has fallen each year from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006. When asked whether Turkey's membership in the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad, the largest percentage of Europeans continue to feel it would be neither good nor bad (40%, unchanged since 2004). Among those who have an opinion, however, those who see Turkey's membership as a good thing have fallen from 30% in 2004 to 21% in 2006, and those who see Turkey's membership as a bad thing have grown from 20% in 2004 to 32% in 2006.

NATO support declining, EU military role debated: European support for NATO remains positive overall but has declined from 69% in 2002 (EU9) to 55% in 2006, with large declines in countries traditionally perceived as strong supporters of NATO ?- Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey. Forty-six percent of EU citizens (EU9) feel the EU should strengthen its military power to play a larger role in the world, and just 42% of EU citizens agree that the European Union should use military force if it goes against their own country's interests.

China threatening: When asked to rate their feelings of warmth toward China on a 100-point "thermometer" scale, Americans and Europeans rate China virtually identically (46 degrees to 45 degrees). But 38% of Americans, compared with 27% of Europeans, feel that the rise of China is an "extremely important threat" in the next ten years. In the United States, the largest percentage of respondents is more concerned by the threat posed by growing Chinese military power (35%), while in Europe, the largest percentage of respondents is more concerned by the threat posed by the growing Chinese economy (37%). Among Europeans, the highest perception of the threat of the Chinese economy is in France (53%), Portugal (52%), and Italy (51%). Within the United States, Democrats are more concerned about the economic (37%) than military threat (28%), and Republicans are more concerned about the military (42%) than economic threat (21%).

For the full report and top-line data, see www.transatlantictrends.org

Nervous rulers have colluded with soldiers and businessmen throughout history to cite some ethnic or religious menace when needing more power and higher taxes. Political violence has become more promiscuous with suicide bombing and a consequent rise in kill rate per incident, but - as Matthew Carr shows in his book on terror, Unknown Soldiers - the change is one of degree.

Forty years after Alfred Nobel's invention of dynamite, Russian terrorists tried to pack a plane with the stuff and fly it into the tsar's palace. In 1883 Chicago-financed Fenians exploded bombs on the London underground, leading the Times to wonder if the tube could ever be safe. There has been little change in the preferred weapon of terror, the explosive device, or in the psychopathology of the bomber. The causes remain the same: separatism, and religious nationalism dressed up as holy war.

What has changed, grotesquely, is the aftershock. Terrorism is 10% bang and 90% an echo effect composed of media hysteria, political overkill and kneejerk executive action, usually retribution against some wider group treated as collectively responsible. This response has become 24-hour, seven-day-a-week amplification by the new politico-media complex, especially shrill where the dead are white people. It is this that puts global terror into the bang. While we take ever more extravagant steps to ward off the bangs, we do the opposite with the terrorist aftershock. We turn up its volume. We seem to wallow in fear.