georgeob1 wrote:No warnings or leaflets accompany the helicopter attacks on vehicles and homes, or most of the airborne and artillery attacks Israel launches on Palestinians.
This has been a 50 year war between the two sides, each of which uses the weapons available to it as they deem necessary. Israel has been consistently 10 times as effective in killing Palestinians as have they been in killing Israelis. However history strongly suggests the war will not necessarily be won by the side that can inflict the most injury, but rather by the one that can endure the most and persevere.
I think it obvious that the Palestinian Arabs will win sooner at the price of enduring fewer Palestinian Arab deaths by stopping their killing of Palestinian Jews.
What will the Palestinian Arabs win by such stopping? They of course will win the opportunity to build their own nation state without interference by the Palestinian Jews.
War Report Could Decide Israeli Premier's Fate
April 30, 2007
War Report Could Decide Israeli Premier's Fate
By ISABEL KERSHNER
New York Times
JERUSALEM ?- On the eve of the publication of an official report on the Israeli government's failings during last summer's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the main topic of public debate is whether Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be able to hang on to power.
Support for Mr. Olmert has been shaky since the war, which many Israelis consider to have been a failure. Current polls show his approval ratings hovering between 2 and 3 percent.
On Sunday, a well-informed senior official said Mr. Olmert did not intend to resign. But the official said that could change if the report stated that he bore "personal responsibility" for failures in the war.
The much anticipated interim report, prepared by a government-appointed committee headed by Eliyahu Winograd, a retired judge, is to be made public on Monday afternoon. It is widely expected to contain harsh criticism of the decision-making process leading up to the war and the performance of the prime minister; the defense minister, Amir Peretz; and the wartime army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz. General Halutz resigned in January, and Mr. Peretz has said he will leave the Defense Ministry in late May or soon after.
Over the weekend, the Israeli news media reported on what they described as leaks from the report indicating that the three were considered to have failed in their duties.
Opposition politicians from the left and right have already called for the prime minister to resign. A recently formed protest movement, led by a former national security official, is organizing a rally around the slogan "You've failed; go home," to take place in Tel Aviv on Thursday.
The war followed Hezbollah's seizure of two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid on June 12. The conflict lasted 34 days and claimed the lives of 160 Israelis ?- 119 soldiers and 41 civilians, according to officials. About 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, are believed to have died in the fighting. Israel was not able to secure the soldiers' release or to destroy Hezbollah.
The interim report deals with the period leading up to the war and its early days, until July 17. That is when Mr. Olmert made a speech in Parliament declaring that Israel was at war. The Winograd Committee's full report, dealing with rest of the war, is due this summer.
According to what were said to be leaks published in the Israeli news media, the interim report will accuse Mr. Olmert of acting hastily and injudiciously and serving in effect as a rubber stamp for the army. Mr. Peretz will supposedly be criticized for failing to understand the magnitude of the problem posed by his lack of experience in security matters and for failing to seek professional counsel. General Halutz will reportedly be taken to task for silencing dissenting views, for taking advantage of Mr. Peretz's lack of experience and for underestimating the strength of Hezbollah and the threat posed by its rockets.
The spokesman for the Winograd Committee, Eli Shaked, would not confirm the veracity of the leaks, saying there was a "strict policy of not responding to unofficial leaks."
The committee went to great lengths to keep its findings secret before publication, including printing the report at the headquarters of Israel's Shin Bet internal security agency.
On Sunday, several politicians from the right-wing opposition parties called for the prime minister's immediate resignation. Yossi Beilin, a lawmaker and the leader of the leftist Meretz Party, said that Mr. Olmert should not stay in his post "one more day" and that his "fate would be like that of Golda and her associates after the Yom Kippur war."
Mr. Beilin was referring to Golda Meir, the former prime minister, and her defense minister, Moshe Dayan, who were forced out of office because of public pressure in 1974, months after the end of the 1973 war. A state commission of inquiry, the Agranat Commission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court, had cleared both of any responsibility for the intelligence failure that led to the war, blaming the military instead.
Another official state commission of inquiry, the Kahan Commission, examined the Sabra and Shatila massacres in Lebanon by a Christian militia in 1982. It determined that the defense minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, bore some responsibility for the events and recommended his dismissal. He was forced to resign as defense minister soon afterward.
Because the Winograd Committee was appointed by the government rather than by the Supreme Court, some Israeli analysts have said it does not have the legal authority to make such decisive recommendations. The fate of the government will depend on the level of public protest and pressure after the report, the analysts said.
Mr. Olmert has been weakened, in part, because he is facing numerous corruption investigations, including one involving his role in the sale of the government's controlling share in a bank when he was finance minister.
The rally scheduled for Thursday is being organized by Uzi Dayan, a former national security adviser and a nephew of Moshe Dayan. Mr. Dayan has formed a protest group known as the Civil Coalition made up of reservists, bereaved parents of soldiers who died in the war, representatives of border communities in the north and the south and various movements for clean government ?- including his own group, Tafnit, whose name means "turning point" in Hebrew.
Speaking by telephone from his headquarters in Tel Aviv, Mr. Dayan said it was time "to let the people have their say." Mr. Dayan said that there was no money for organized transportation to the rally, but he added that he was heartened by a call he said he received Saturday from Motti Ashkenazi, who wanted to join the struggle. In 1974, Mr. Ashkenazi, then a 33-year-old reservist, led the public protests against Mrs. Meir.
I thought that Omert did a great job. He taught the Lebanese that they will pay a heavy price for the continuing attacks on Israel coming from their country. Hopefully, the Lebanese people will curtail Hezbollah so that the massive destruction of Lebanon is not repeated.
Advocate wrote:I thought that Omert did a great job.
Well, in that case is is really bad luck that you weren't a member in that Israelian government's own inquiry panel.
Exactly why, Advocate, don't you agree with that verdict that he started the war in Lebanon last year hastily and without a comprehensive plan?
And how did you get better information than they got?
I wager that politics is the reason for most of the attacks on Omert.
It was obvious that the Omert government had a plan before Hez made that last attack, and it was carried out very efficiently. Israel caused considerable damage in Lebanon, and suffered relatively little damage in return. Hopefully, the results of the attack will act as a deterrent to future Hez attacks.
Keep in mind that Hez had been unilaterally attacking Israel for about 10 years, and Israel had to do something drastic to deter future attacks. I think any self-respecting country would do the same thing under similar circumstances were it able.
Advocate wrote:I wager that politics is the reason for most of the attacks on Omert.
Seems, you either didn't follow the news or just decided again to ignore them.
I gave you my personal verdict on Omert. Are you just mindlessly accepting the official verdict? Do you have any ideas of your own on this issue?
I have my own opinion in this. But since I don't have the opportunities to see all the documents like the inqiry panel, I at least think they are more correct than you are. (Though I always have some prejuries in panels in any country which are set up by the "deliquent".)
It is pretty obvious that the only thing that may stop Israel's enemies is swift and very damaging retaliation. Preemptory action may sometimes be necessary. Israel will, of course, remain willing to sit down with the Arabs and negotiate peace. However, the country cannot negotiate with those who don't think Israel has a right to exist.
So you consider the Winograd panel - which is an Israeli government commission - to be a body which "don't think Israel has a right to exist"?
Quote:12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.
[..]
19. The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: Some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts.
20. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need to be prepared for 'real' war. There was also no urgent need to update in a systematic and sophisticated way Israel\s overall security strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength - political, economic, social, military, spiritual. cultural and scientific - to address the totality of the challenges it faces.
Your reading comprehension is suspect. I was referring to the Arab nations threatening Israel.
Advocate wrote:I thought that Omert did a great job. He taught the Lebanese that they will pay a heavy price for the continuing attacks on Israel coming from their country. Hopefully, the Lebanese people will curtail Hezbollah so that the massive destruction of Lebanon is not repeated.
Do you see any evidence that such a 'curtailment' is happening, or is likely to happen?
The last time Israel "taught the Lebanese they will pay a heavy price ..." they instead created a ten year war; enormous human suffering; the disaffection of whatever support they had remaining in Europe; and the organized support among the Shia in Labanon for Hezbollah.
How many more "lessons" of this sort can Israel afford?
* Israel didn't support anything.
* Israel will teach as many lessons as necessary until the students learn.
Are you aware of the irony implicit in your expressed attitudes towards the unter mensch who surround the master race in Israel?
As Martha Stewart would say, that ridiculousness doesn't deserve a response.
The irony exists, whether you respond or not.
Here is a good dose of the truth.
Dead-End Paths to Middle East Peace
by Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post, April 27, 2007
The world's approach to the Middle East is largely based on resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Thousands of diplomatic hours, plane tickets, innocent reams of paper, and posh hotel rooms are being devoted to this effort. The pace of time, cost, and attention is accelerating.
But what if the problem cannot be fixed, at least for decades? Doesn't this require serious thought?
Instead the actual, unpleasant, reality is denied. This approach, while ultimately unsatisfactory and even dangerous, makes some sense. Spending lots of time trying out various unworkable options might keep these issues from becoming worse. It also covers those who do so from being blamed for the inevitable failure and future crises we can expect.
Still, there should be a lot more people explaining the true situation. Here is what we are told about the range of current policy options:
Talk a lot. A good dialogue never hurts and they might even serve food. So Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will meet Palestinian Authority nominal chief executive Mahmoud Abbas every couple of weeks. No harm. Let's both sides look cooperative and eager for peace. But nothing will come out of this either.
Throw in lots of money. Estimates are that around $1.2 billion was given as aid to the PA last year. This is more than during several previous years before the declared sanctions against the Hamas-led regime, not including money smuggled in by Hamas itself. Palestinians are the biggest per capita aid recipients in the world, even in a period when aid has supposedly been reduced.
And yet this does not mean that Palestinians are living well. The aid disappears into corruption or paid to PA employees who do nothing useful or as welfare payments to people prevented by bad regime policies and chaos from anything economically productive. At best, aid maintains the status quo, thus preventing material pressure for change (a more moderate government, peace with Israel, a crackdown on corruption and lawlessness). At worst it subsidizes terrorist gunmen, schools that teach Jews are sub-humans who should be killed, and continued Hamas rule.
Sanctions to put pressure for moderation, peace, and change. See previous item. If such sanctions have failed it is partly because so much money is being provided any way. While there is an attempt to target the sanctions against Hamas itself, funds can simply be moved around too easily to really fulfill this goal. European governments seem to feel that aid originally provided on condition that the Palestinians achieve a full and lasting peace with Israel should continue after they have rejected this option.
Build up "moderate" Fatah to counter radical Hamas. This is a clever strategy which would be very appropriate except for one small problem - Fatah does not support it. Of course, in saying this I don't mean that Fatah opposes Western help to itself (in fact, it is largely waiting around for outsiders to solve its problems and put it back into power).
The first problem is that Fatah is not doing anything to help itself. Since Hamas took power in January 2005 it is impossible to detect any effort by Fatah to reform itself, strengthen its leadership, fight corruption in its ranks, or develop its unity. All the shortcomings that led Fatah to defeat in the January 2005 elections are still present. Nobody can save an organization that acts as if it is so bent on its own destruction.
The second problem is that Fatah's main strategy in "combating" Hamas is to imitate it. Not that everyone in Fatah is radical and certainly not Islamist. But aside from the statements of a few, including Abbas himself, there is no big difference between them.
The third problem is that Fatah has accepted a role as Hamas's junior partner. The two groups are rivals. But at present they are allies.
Make Hamas moderate. Take one percent of Hamas leaders' statements in English. Discard the rest and everything said by them in Arabic. Throw in the belief that no one can really be radical. Ignore the fact that they think they are divinely directed and need not change since they are winning. Mix well with ignorance and - voila, Hamas Moderation Stew, makes millions of portions.
So if the two-state solution won't work, what does one do? Here, too, there is a bad back-up plan: the one-state solution. Since the Palestinians have produced a failed state, this brilliant concept proposes that having wrecked Palestine one might as well wreck Israel, too. Sort of expand outward the corruption, hatred, violence, and chaos. No, thanks.
However, the good news is that since this is unsolvable, the Middle East, with whatever appropriate help from the world, could try to solve a few other problems like terrorism, dictatorship, economic and social backwardness, inequality for women, inadequate educational systems, and so on.
georgeob1 wrote:The irony exists, whether you respond or not.
wHAT IRONY EXISTS WHETHER ADVOCATE RESPONDS OR NOT?
What I see is not an irony but a failure of so many to deal with the clear truth that the Israelis
fear the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs
hate the Israelis.
If you think the Israeli fear is unjustified, please explain why you think that.
If you think the Arab Palestinian hatred is justified, please explain what you think needs to be done to ameliorate that hatred.
What I see is not an irony but a failure of so many to deal with the clear truth that the Israelis hate the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs fear the Israelis.
Cycloptichorn
