real life wrote:The justices wrote their opinion:
Quote:If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment
and stated that the appellant concurred.
Yes it is very plain.
Blackmun, throughout his opinion, spoke of "personhood" only in terms of the fourteenth amendment. But that's a legal definition, not a medical one -- remember, under the fourteenth amendment even corporations are considered "persons," so "personhood" under the amendment means something very different from what it means in normal discourse.
I suspect,
real life, that you would prefer talking about "personhood" in a medical or even a metaphysical sense, rather than in a constitutional sense. The legal complications of considering a fetus as a person would, after all, be vast and bewildering. As Blackmun pointed out in
Roe,
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command?
Or, as he more succinctly remarked, "We are not aware that in the taking of any census under [the apportionment] clause, a fetus has ever been counted."