Released Iraqi documents - what do they tell us?

OMG..

You did NOT use global security as a source when you claimed the Duelfer report had holes in it. In fact you gave NO LINK but you did cite where it came from



FrontPageMagazine is not related to global security in any way.
Mr Carson made numerous errors of fact that I pointed out and gave a link to globalsecurity that showed those items to be errors. Your silly claim that you used globalsecurity for a source is just that, silly.

Your first post can be found here
http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=2081582#2081582

My response can be found here.
http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=2085611#2085611

The only holes you are proving are the ones in Mr Carson's fantasy but you were far to interested in joining his little orgasmic circle to care about reality.

It's the bottom of the 9th and you are down by 200 runs at this point Bernie. Claiming I have a strike on me when the ball cleared the fence and the scoreboard in straight away centerfield doesn't make much sense.

Do you continue to think that that Al Samoud missile had a range of 600km? Or do you agree that Mr Carson was wrong in his claim? Globalsecurity says he is wrong.

Funny that you keep bringing this up. I said it travelled about 180 km, globalsecurity says it traveled about 151km, The UN says it travelled past the 150km range. NO ONE but you and Chris Carson have said it travels 600km. (Oh, and Bush when he lied in his speech in Cincinnati about Iraq's ability to hit Israel with missiles.)

Open to interpretation. Maybe you don't understand the meaning of the phrase and that is why you repeated it so many times. Were you trying to figure out its meaning? It means there is no evidence that they did or didn't dump the quantity they claimed. Lacking any evidence of anthrax being anywhere else, the claim seems to be valid and no longer open to interpretation.



Which is followed by..
"The inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on the evidence which they can themselves examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise. "


Followed by...
"In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far."

You can read what he says about the increased staff yourself but you left off a very important part of the paragraph.
Interesting how all your capitalized portions are the first half of paragraphs and you fail to post the rest of the paragraphs that deal with your capitalized portions. Perhaps you are unfamiliar with how the English language works Bernie. Normally the paragraph is laid out that the opening sentence lays out the problem and the closing sentence reaches the conclusion. If you were to read the entire paragraph you would find the answer to the first sentence. If you need tutoring help in the English language I am sure that you can find it in your local yellow pages.

The average human brain weighs 48 ounces. I am sorry to hear that yours weighs only two since you think the report is not finalized.

Yes, the same conclusion I stated earlier and you had problems reading. Then you forgot who you originally cited as your source for why the report had holes. My mother in law has problems remembering things and was diagnosed with dementia. They were able to conduct some rather conclusive testing to determine she had it. It is amazing the research they can do these days. I am sure there is a facility near you that can do the same tests.

Actually it does speak to that and it doesn't say what you just said. Let me quote it for you..
"Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and, in some cases, the presence of other items, conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction. "


More attempts by you to change what was really said.
Fails to address the REST of the paragraph.
The remaining ones before the war. You do realize that the Duelfer report came out 18 month after the war, don't you? The key task remaining had to do with answering questions. They had nothing to do with specific WMDs that were known to exist. I didn't realize you are time challenged as well as English deficient. I would have thought you were old enough to have been taught time with "the big hand is on the 6 and the little hand is on the 3 then it is 3:30." I may be wrong.

Reports are done to answer questions. The questions are raised then the report is done to answer those questions. Anyone that has spent any time in the corporate world would understand this. I guess McDonald's fry cooks might not but even a receptionist or an admin at any business would know it.
Your flailing around is quite funny. Strikes? Standing off by yourself spinning in circles without a bat doesn't equate to strikes but it does tend to build up pity for you and hope that you can find help somewhere.

This now coming out.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199053,00.html
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199052,00.html
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199586,00.html

Flail Around with this- Mr. Parados-

WHO IS LYING ABOUT IRAQ? Norman Podhoretz December 2005

Harry Reid, the Democratic leader in the Senate, spoke for a host of other opponents of the war in insisting that

[t]his case is bigger than the leak of classified information. It is about how the Bush White House manufactured and manipulated intelligence in order to bolster its case for the war in Iraq and to discredit anyone who dared to challenge the President.

Yet even stipulating?-which I do only for the sake of argument?-that no weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq in the period leading up to the invasion, it defies all reason to think that Bush was lying when he asserted that they did. To lie means to say something one knows to be false. But it is as close to certainty as we can get that Bush believed in the truth of what he was saying about WMD in Iraq.

How indeed could it have been otherwise? George Tenet, his own CIA director, assured him that the case was "a slam dunk." This phrase would later become notorious, but in using it, Tenet had the backing of all fifteen agencies involved in gathering intelligence for the United States. In the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2002, where their collective views were summarized, one of the conclusions offered with "high confidence" was that

Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.

The intelligence agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Israel, and?-yes?-France all agreed with this judgment. And even Hans Blix?-who headed the UN team of inspectors trying to determine whether Saddam had complied with the demands of the Security Council that he get rid of the weapons of mass destruction he was known to have had in the past?-lent further credibility to the case in a report he issued only a few months before the invasion:

The discovery of a number of 122-mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. . . . They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

Blix now claims that he was only being "cautious" here, but if, as he now also adds, the Bush administration "misled itself" in interpreting the evidence before it, he at the very least lent it a helping hand.




So, once again, did the British, the French, and the Germans, all of whom signed on in advance to Secretary of State Colin Powell's reading of the satellite photos he presented to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. Powell himself and his chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, now feel that this speech was the low point of his tenure as Secretary of State. But Wilkerson (in the process of a vicious attack on the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense for getting us into Iraq) is forced to acknowledge that the Bush administration did not lack for company in interpreting the available evidence as it did:

I can't tell you why the French, the Germans, the Brits, and us thought that most of the material, if not all of it, that we presented at the UN on 5 February 2003 was the truth. I can't. I've wrestled with it. [But] when you see a satellite photograph of all the signs of the chemical-weapons ASP?-Ammunition Supply Point?-with chemical weapons, and you match all those signs with your matrix on what should show a chemical ASP, and they're there, you have to conclude that it's a chemical ASP, especially when you see the next satellite photograph which shows the UN inspectors wheeling in their white vehicles with black markings on them to that same ASP, and everything is changed, everything is clean. . . . But George [Tenet] was convinced, John McLaughlin [Tenet's deputy] was convinced, that what we were presented [for Powell's UN speech] was accurate.

Going on to shoot down a widespread impression, Wilkerson informs us that even the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was convinced:

People say, well, INR dissented. That's a bunch of bull. INR dissented that the nuclear program was up and running. That's all INR dissented on. They were right there with the chems and the bios.

In explaining its dissent on Iraq's nuclear program, the INR had, as stated in the NIE of 2002, expressed doubt about

Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes [which are] central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program. . . . INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors . . . in Iraq's nuclear-weapons program.

But, according to Wilkerson,

The French came in in the middle of my deliberations at the CIA and said, we have just spun aluminum tubes, and by God, we did it to this RPM, et cetera, et cetera, and it was all, you know, proof positive that the aluminum tubes were not for mortar casings or artillery casings, they were for centrifuges. Otherwise, why would you have such exquisite instruments?

In short, and whether or not it included the secret heart of Hans Blix, "the consensus of the intelligence community," as Wilkerson puts it, "was overwhelming" in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq that Saddam definitely had an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and that he was also in all probability well on the way to rebuilding the nuclear capability that the Israelis had damaged by bombing the Osirak reactor in 1981.

Additional confirmation of this latter point comes from Kenneth Pollack, who served in the National Security Council under Clinton. "In the late spring of 2002," Pollack has written,

I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did. Three people added that they believed Iraq was also operating a secret calutron plant (a facility for separating uranium isotopes).

No wonder, then, that another conclusion the NIE of 2002 reached with "high confidence" was that

Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.1




But the consensus on which Bush relied was not born in his own administration. In fact, it was first fully formed in the Clinton administration. Here is Clinton himself, speaking in 1998:

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction program.

Here is his Secretary of State Madeline Albright, also speaking in 1998:

Iraq is a long way from [the USA], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face.

Here is Sandy Berger, Clinton's National Security Adviser, who chimed in at the same time with this flat-out assertion about Saddam:

He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983.

Finally, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, was so sure Saddam had stockpiles of WMD that he remained "absolutely convinced" of it even after our failure to find them in the wake of the invasion in March 2003.

Nor did leading Democrats in Congress entertain any doubts on this score. A few months after Clinton and his people made the statements I have just quoted, a group of Democratic Senators, including such liberals as Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, and John Kerry, urged the President

to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.

Nancy Pelosi, the future leader of the Democrats in the House, and then a member of the House Intelligence Committee, added her voice to the chorus:

Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons-of-mass-destruction technology, which is a threat to countries in the region, and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process.

This Democratic drumbeat continued and even intensified when Bush succeeded Clinton in 2001, and it featured many who would later pretend to have been deceived by the Bush White House. In a letter to the new President, a number of Senators led by Bob Graham declared:

There is no doubt that . . . Saddam Hussein has invigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical, and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf war status. In addition, Saddam continues to redefine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies.

Senator Carl Levin also reaffirmed for Bush's benefit what he had told Clinton some years earlier:

Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations, and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton agreed, speaking in October 2002:

In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical- and biological-weapons stock, his missile-delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members.

Senator Jay Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, agreed as well:

There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. . . . We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction.

Even more striking were the sentiments of Bush's opponents in his two campaigns for the presidency. Thus Al Gore in September 2002:

We know that [Saddam] has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.

And here is Gore again, in that same year:

Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to deter, and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power.

Now to John Kerry, also speaking in 2002:

I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force?-if necessary?-to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security.




Perhaps most startling of all, given the rhetoric that they would later employ against Bush after the invasion of Iraq, are statements made by Senators Ted Kennedy and Robert Byrd, also in 2002:

Kennedy: We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.

Byrd: The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in October of 1998. We are confident that Saddam Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to build up his chemical- and biological-warfare capabilities. Intelligence reports indicate that he is seeking nuclear weapons.2

Liberal politicians like these were seconded by the mainstream media, in whose columns a very different tune would later be sung. For example, throughout the last two years of the Clinton administration, editorials in the New York Times repeatedly insisted that

without further outside intervention, Iraq should be able to rebuild weapons and missile plants within a year [and] future military attacks may be required to diminish the arsenal again.

The Times was also skeptical of negotiations, pointing out that it was

hard to negotiate with a tyrant who has no intention of honoring his commitments and who sees nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as his country's salvation.

So, too, the Washington Post, which greeted the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001 with the admonition that

[o]f all the booby traps left behind by the Clinton administration, none is more dangerous?-or more urgent?-than the situation in Iraq. Over the last year, Mr. Clinton and his team quietly avoided dealing with, or calling attention to, the almost complete unraveling of a decade's efforts to isolate the regime of Saddam Hussein and prevent it from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. That leaves President Bush to confront a dismaying panorama in the Persian Gulf [where] intelligence photos . . . show the reconstruction of factories long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons.3




All this should surely suffice to prove far beyond any even unreasonable doubt that Bush was telling what he believed to be the truth about Saddam's stockpile of WMD. It also disposes of the fallback charge that Bush lied by exaggerating or hyping the intelligence presented to him. Why on earth would he have done so when the intelligence itself was so compelling that it convinced everyone who had direct access to it, and when hardly anyone in the world believed that Saddam had, as he claimed, complied with the sixteen resolutions of the Security Council demanding that he get rid of his weapons of mass destruction?

Another fallback charge is that Bush, operating mainly through Cheney, somehow forced the CIA into telling him what he wanted to hear. Yet in its report of 2004, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee, while criticizing the CIA for relying on what in hindsight looked like weak or faulty intelligence, stated that it

did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence, or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities.

The March 2005 report of the equally bipartisan Robb-Silberman commission, which investigated intelligence failures on Iraq, reached the same conclusion, finding

no evidence of political pressure to influence the intelligence community's pre-war assessments of Iraq's weapons programs. . . . [A]nalysts universally asserted that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments.

Still, even many who believed that Saddam did possess WMD, and was ruthless enough to use them, accused Bush of telling a different sort of lie by characterizing the risk as "imminent." But this, too, is false: Bush consistently rejected imminence as a justification for war.4 Thus, in the State of the Union address he delivered only three months after 9/11, Bush declared that he would "not wait on events while dangers gather" and that he would "not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer." Then, in a speech at West Point six months later, he reiterated the same point: "If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long." And as if that were not clear enough, he went out of his way in his State of the Union address in 2003 (that is, three months before the invasion), to bring up the word "imminent" itself precisely in order to repudiate it:

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.

What of the related charge that it was still another "lie" to suggest, as Bush and his people did, that a connection could be traced between Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda terrorists who had attacked us on 9/11? This charge was also rejected by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Contrary to how its findings were summarized in the mainstream media, the committee's report explicitly concluded that al Qaeda did in fact have a cooperative, if informal, relationship with Iraqi agents working under Saddam. The report of the bipartisan 9/11 commission came to the same conclusion, as did a comparably independent British investigation conducted by Lord Butler, which pointed to "meetings . . . between senior Iraqi representatives and senior al-Qaeda operatives."5


You will be unable to rebut this statement, Mr.Parados.

Just so you don't skip over any important items I will list what you must rebut.


l.; Tenet says WMD case a slam dunk...HE gave President Bush the assurances

2. All fifteen agencies involved in gathering evidence for the USA said Saddam was expanding its biological, nuclear and missle programs- EXPLAIN THAT --MR. PARADOS

3. The Intelligence Agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China. Israel and France all agreed with the above judgment- DON'T DODGE THIS, MR. PARADOS--EXPLAIN IT!

4. Hans Blix noted that several thousands of chemical rockets were unaccounted for--Was Hans Blix lying, Mr. Parados?

5. The British, the French and the Germans all signed on in advance to Colin Powell's reading of the satellite photos he offered to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. How can the British,French and Germans be so stupid, Mr. Parados--Please explain why they signed on.

6. Why did Laurence Wilkerson say that everyone, even the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. agree with Powell's interpretation of the satellite photos? Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

7. Why did Kenneth Pollack, formerly with the NSA under Clinton, indicate that a meeting of UNESCOM--FROM THE UN--NOT THE USA-agree that Iraq was operating as secret centrifuge plant? Please explain that, Mr. Parados

8. Why did Clinton think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

9. Why did Madeline Albright think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

10. Why did Sandy Berger, Clinton's NSA, think Saddam had WMD's-1998

11. Why was Cohen, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, so sure that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD's that he REMAINED 'ABSOLUTELY CONVNCED OF IT EVEN AFTER OUR FAILURE TO FIND THEM IN THE WAKE OF THE INVASION?? Explain that- Mr. Parados--Or, maybe, you had access to better intelligence than the Secretary of Defense????

12. Why did Pelosi think Saddam had WMD'S?

13. Why did Senators headed by Bob Graham give a letter to President Bush saying-THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS REINViGORATED HIS WEAPONS PROGRAM--PLEASE EXPLAIN MR. PARADOS?

14. Why did Hilllary Rodham Clinton, in October 2002, tell the country that--In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock? Explain that please, Mr. Parados.

15. Why did Al Gore, in September 2002, say that we know that Saddam has STORED SECRET SUPPLIES OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT HIS COUNTRY? Why, Mr. Parados

16. Why did the Democratic Candidate for President in 2004, John Kerry, indicate that Saddam Hussein had WMD's. Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

17. Can you tell us why the conscience of the Senate, Ted Kennedy, who is rarely wrong, said that We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction?
Can you tell us why he said that, Mr.Parados?

18. Can you explain why, Mr. Parados, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE THAT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ATTEMPTED TO COERCE, INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE ANALYISTS TO CHANGE THEIR JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WMD CAPABILITIES?

Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

***********************************************************

There are at least Eighteen questions that Mr.Podhoretz raises. I challenge you to answer them--You are respectfully requested not to skip any of them.

Mr. Parados- You dismiss Mr. Carson's article but you do not show how and why he was wrong---

Please respond to the vital parts of his article.

Do you deny that Mr. Duelfer decided to leave Iraq, as Mr. Carson said, and had to 'CUT SHORT" its concluding look at the transfer of WMD material to Syria?--SURE, MR. PARADOS--A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION--
That investigation was not complete nor was it thorough.

Do you deny NINE Iraqi scientists questioned by ISG were murdered and that 50 fled the country? Do you deny that Mr. Duelfer told the Congress that he was struck by the extreme reluctance of Iraq's managers and scientists to speak freely? Congressman Buyer( Ind. R) reports that is what Duelfer told the Congress.

Yes, Mr. Parados, the ISG really got a lot of information from the Iraqis!!!!


Mr. Carson reports that American Soldiers found purchase orders dated Aug. 21, 200 and Sept. 6, 2000 for 5 KILOGRAMS OF Mustard Gas and 3 Ampules of Anthrax.

Do you deny this, Mr. Parados? I guess Duelfer didn't look hard enough!!!



David Kay( Duelfer's predecessor) said that Saddam had sent agents to North Korea to buy parts for the NO DONG missle which has a range of about 1,500 Km.

Do you deny this, Mr. Parados?

Duelfer wrote that the ISG cannot be certain whether Samddan maintained his government's work on weaponization of Smallpox up to MARCH 2003. THAT IS WHAT WE LIKE, MR. PARADOS--CERTAINTY!!!
BUT DUELFER'S PEOPLE WERE NOT CERTAIN.

Do you deny this. Mr. Parados?


Mr. Carson indicated that Duelfer's technical advisors felt that the Iraqis could have Smallpox stores concealed from the public.

Do you deny this, Mr. Parados?

THE ISG SEEM TO HAVE BEEN A BUNCH OF BLUNDERING IDIOTS WHO NEEDED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER IRAQI MATERIALS WERE SENT TO SYRIA.


Apparently , Duelfer had a close call, having a bomb detonate close to him and hightailed it out of Iraq.

SURE, MR. PARADOS--A THOROUGH AND COMPLETE SEARCH OF IRAQ--ALL 168,000 square miles of it------AND SADDAM HAD FOUR YEARS TO HIDE OR SEND AWAY HIS WMD'S.


Mr. Carson challenged the Duelfer Report. I challenge it. If you wish to defend it, you will have to meet the questions above.

it is evident to me that you are misreading the Blix Report, Mr. Parados. I think you should open your mind and re-read it. I will post comments in parentheses-telling what you have missed--



Now, let us examine Blix's last report to the UN, on March 7, 2003, just 13 days before the US went into Iraq on March 20th. IT IS JUST AS FILLED WITH QUALIFIERS AS THE PRIOR REPORT. NOTE MY COMMENTS IN CAPITALS.

QUOTE:

As delivered







SECURITY COUNCIL 7 MARCH 2003



Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC

Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix


Mr. President,



For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized ten days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the Council up-to-date.



Inspection process


Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.



Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.



American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries, which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.





Documents and interviews


Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections.


IRAQ, WITH A HIGHLY DEVELOPED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ABOUT ITS PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES. ONLY A FEW FEW FEW FEW FEW NEW SUCH DOCUMENTS HAVE COME TO LIGHT SO FAR AND BEEN HANDED OVER SINCE WE BEGAN INSPECTIONS.

( If you don't understand. Mr. Parados, that Hans Blix is saying that the Iraqis were being EXTREMELY uncooperative, you don't understand English. Mr. Bilx is giving a report about a country whose leaders and higly placed officials were not being AT ALL cooperative. To hold that Hans Blix's Report is anywhere near complete and/or definitive is ridiculous)



It was a disappointment that Iraq's Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.



Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. The provision of names prompts two reflections:



The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.





The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.





As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons.

AS I NOTED ON 14 FEBRUARY, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES HAVE CLAIMED THAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE MOVED AROUND IRAQ BY TRUCKS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THERE ARE MOBILE PRODUCTION UNITS FOR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.


(Even though Mr. Blix mentions in the next paragraph that no evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found, the fact that Intelligence authorites said that weapons of mass destruction are moved around means that despite Blix's efforts to find WMD's he has no evidence that WMD"s are there ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE SAYS THAT THE WMD'S ARE BEING MOVED AROUND--THIS CANNOT BE CALLED DEFINITIVE. IT IS MORE EVIDENCE THAT BLIX DID NOT FINISH HIS JOB.)





The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.



Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.



There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground.


THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS, DENIED FROM THE IRAQI SIDE, THAT PROSCRIBED ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED UNDERGROUND.

(No underground facilities were found so far for chemical or biological production-----in a country of 168,000 SQUARE MILES AND FOUR YEARS TO BURY THE MATERIAL. How many of those 168,000 Square Miles did Blix and his crew cover? How difficult is it for trucks to move Chemical and Biological material from place to place?)

Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.



I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.

I SHOULD ADD THAT, BOTH FOR THE MONITORING OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND THE INSPECTION OF UNDERGROUND FACILITIES, WE WOULD NEED TO INCREASE OUR STAFF IN IRAQ.

( Why would Blix ask for an increase in staff? To monitor ground transportation and inspect underground facilities? IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE FELT HE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE TO DO THE JOB.
BLIX'S REPORT MUST BE LABELLED AS TENTATIVE AND NOT AT ALL DEFINITIVE.)



Recent developments



On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you.



As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion.

WHILE DURING OUR MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD, THE IRAQI SIDE TRIED TO PERSUADE US THAT THE AL SAMOUD 2 MISSLES THEY HAVE DECLARED, THEY HAVE DECLARED, THEY HAVE DECLARED, FALL WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE RANGE SET BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CALCULATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS LED US TO THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION, OPPOSITE CONCLUSION, OPPOSITE CONCLUSION.

Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope it's a temporary break.



To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.



Two ?'reconstituted' casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.



The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.



More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will require further study and discussion.



There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.



Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

EVEN IF THE USE OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY COULD QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT OF ANTHRAX SAID TO HAVE BEEN DUMPED AT THE SITE. THE RESULTS WOULD STILL BE OPEN TO INTERPRETATION, OPEN TO INTERPRETATION, OPEN TO INTERPRETATION.

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.



Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.



What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.



This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.



Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:



The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.



It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.





Mr. President,



Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.



Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks" and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required.



UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of "unresolved disarmament issues" or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities.



It is from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks". As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready.



UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the "key remaining disarmament tasks" to the Council. As I understand that several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.



I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 - including information which has come to light after 1998. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.



Mr. President,



Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, e.g. for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.



How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.

THE KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS?


*********************************************************

I don't think you know very much about the Blix reports, Mr. Parados.

Check out my sentences in CAPS and the comments in brackets and respond to them, please!

Was Saddam Regime a Broker for Terror Alliances?
Monday, June 26, 2006
Ray Robison

Prologue:

Newly declassified documents captured by U.S. forces indicate that Saddam Hussein's inner circle not only actively reached out to the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan and terror-based jihadists in the region, but also hosted discussions with a known Al Qaeda operative about creating jihad training "centers," possibly in Baghdad.

Ray Robison, a former member of the CIA-directed Iraq Survey Group (ISG), supervised a group of linguists to analyze, archive and exploit the hundreds of captured documents and materials of Saddam's regime.

This is the final installment in a three-part series concerning a notebook kept by an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) agent called Khaled Abd El Majid, and covers events taking place in 1999. The translation is provided by Robison's associate, known here as "Sammi."

The first two translations from this notebook detailed an agreement between members of the Saddam regime and the Taliban to establish diplomatic and intelligence based cooperation. This final translation further advances the link between the Saddam regime and world-wide Islamic Jihad terrorism.

The relationship between the Taliban and Saddam appears to have been mediated by a Pakistani named Maulana Fazlur Rahman. Another document captured in Afghanistan and written by an Al Qaeda operative confirms the relationship between the Maulana and Saddam. The translation provided here includes an early 1999 meeting between the director of the IIS and the Maulana.

Another notebook entry records a meeting with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghani Islamic Jihadist and leader of the Islamic Party in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar made news recently with the BBC article Afghan Rebel's pledge to al-Qaeda that reports on a video statement from Hekmatyar in which he states he will fight alongside A Qaeda. In this translation, Hekmatyar makes specific requests for a "center" in Baghdad and/or Tajikistan.

A third meeting involves an Islamist representing Bangladesh that we believe to be Fazlur Rahman Khalil. Another page of the notebook indicates Khalil is coming or came to Iraq. Khalil is a Taliban/Al Qaeda associate who signed the 1998 fatwa from Usama bin Laden declaring war on the United States.

Editor's notes: "Sammi" puts translation clarifications in parenthesis. Robison (RR) uses parenthesis for clarification and bold-face type for emphasis.

Translation:

Translation for ISGP-2003-0001412 follows (PDF):

Page 70, Left Side:

Saturday 3/20 at 11:45

Met with him Mr. MS4 (translator's note: MS4 is the code name for the high ranking IIS official).

1. Intelligence and security cooperation.

2. Mr. MS4 informed him that the Iraqi president and Iraqi leadership are interested in him.

3. "We are ready to help you in any country and against your enemies". (translator's note: most probably this is MS4)

4. Fadlul Haq - The governor of Peshawar that was assassinated.

(translator's note: points 5 and 6 are direct quotes from the Afghani)

5. "We are facing a vicious international plot against the Islamic Party and cannot find any country to help us at the time being".

6. "Iran helped us at the beginning and we brought 2,000 fighters but things changed at the time being. Also the Russians called to help but we do not trust them. Moscow and Iran want the war to drag on." (RR: this is probably the Taliban vs. Northern Alliance conflict). This is why he is coming to Baghdad for help. Asked Baghdad to help open a center in Tajikistan or in Baghdad and they will bring them (translator's note: not clear what them refers to) in through Iran or Northern Iraq.

He asked for help in printing Afghani money in Baghdad or help in printing it in Moscow.

Page 69, Right Side:

Stinger missiles have a range of 5 kilometers. (translator's note: there is only this one sentence on this page)

Page 69, Left Side:

Meeting of MS4 with 6951 on 4/10 at 8 p.m. in room 710.

He (6951) inquired about our relation with Usama (bin Laden).

(translator's note: The Iraqi answer is not reported.).

He (6951) proposed to the Taliban to form a front with Iraq, Libya and Sudan.

He met some of them in Hajj (Translator's note: Pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, it is one of the five pillars of Islam) and he came to the conclusion that they do not know anything about Foreign Relations.

The Taliban defense minister is Abdul Razzak (unclear) Association of Muslim Clerics.

They openly claim that they are against America.

He said that he was ready to build relations between the Taliban and Iraq.

(translator's note: meeting continues on both sides of page 68/76, with questions about Pakistani politics and the other Islamic parties.) The Iraqi official says, "I suggest that the parties come closer together because that means power to Islam against the American and Zionist policies".

Page 39, Left Side:

Meeting with an Islamist leader from Bangladesh. He promises support to Iraq. He says: "Let them know that I made Bangladesh a second country to Mr. President and we have 125 million (people)." (RR: Although no name is given for this meeting, it is important to note Fazlur Rahman Khalil, noted for meeting with Iraqi officials in the previous article, signed the 1998 fatwa as "Fazlur Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh". This is a strong indication that this meeting is with Khalil or his representative.)

Page 27, Left side:

(translator's note: contains notes with information on prior meetings recorded in the notebook.)

The mentioned person (Translator's note: Fazlur Rahman) arrived to the country on 11/27/1999 and he was hosted in Al Rachid Hotel suite number 526. He will leave on 12/1/1999.

(translator's comment: note No. 1 in a list of notes.)

He visited Iraq on the beginning of April 1999 and the ex-director of the intelligence, may God rest his soul, instructed him to mediate between the Taliban and the leader of the Afghani Islamic party, Hekmatyar following the request for mediation done by Hekmatyar to the leadership of Iraq during a visit when they met us on 3/19/1999.

End Translation

Analysis:

Because Arabic writing is right to left, the pages in this notebook go in reverse chronological order. The note on page 27 indicates that Hekmatyar met with the IIS on March 19, 1999. The translation of page 70 is dated March 20 and it refers to someone from the Islamic Party, which is Hekmatyar's group. Therefore it makes sense that the meeting on page 70 is with Hekmatyar.

The note on page 27 also says the meeting was with the director if the IIS, so we believe MS4 is his code-name. It appears that Hekmatyar, a jihadist leader warring with the Taliban for control of Afghanistan at the time, asked Baghdad "to help open a center in Tajikistan or in Baghdad and they will bring them (translator's note: not clear what them refers to) in through Iran or Northern Iraq." There is a strong indication that this requested "center" is a jihadist training camp.

From a US Department of State report Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar … maintained training and indoctrination facilities in Afghanistan, mainly for non-Afghans. They continue to provide logistic support and training facilities to Islamic extremists despite military losses in the past year. Individuals who trained in these camps were involved in insurgencies in … Tajikistan…

It looks very much like Hekmatyar, a long-time jihad leader and recently self-identified Al Qaeda associate, is asking the Saddam regime for a jihad training camp in Tajikistan and/or Baghdad.

Page 27 tells us that the Maulana Fazlur Rahman was meeting with the IIS Director in early April. The meeting on page 69 fits the time frame, has the code for the IIS director, and the guest speaks for the Taliban indicating that "6951" is the Maulana. According to these notes, the Maulana "proposed to the Taliban to form a front with Iraq, Libya and Sudan." He also enquires about the IIS relationship to Usama bin Laden.

In researching the Maulana, a third document has been found that demonstrated the relationship between Saddam and the Maulana. The document which appears to be an IIS memo also mentions a relationship with Hekmatyar. There is no government authentication of the document. Because this document matches closely with what we find in the IIS agent notebook we will reference it so that the reader may decide.

The article entitled Exclusive: Saddam Possessed WMD's, Had Extensive Terror Ties states:

A senior government official who is not a political appointee provided CNSNews.com with copies of the 42 pages of Iraqi Intelligence Service documents. The originals, some of which were hand-written and others typed, are in Arabic. CNSNews.com had the papers translated into English by two individuals separately and independent of each other.

The CNS report includes a translation of a memo from the IIS to Saddam. The memo is dated January 25, 1993. The subject is IIS influence with two groups: the JUI, led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman; and, the Afghani Islamic Party led by Hekmatyar. These are the same two men meeting with the IIS in Baghdad in 1999, according to the notebook.

The document states that the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) depended upon Pakistani support as well as foreign help from Iraq and Libya. It also mentions that the secretary general of the JUI has had a good relationship with the IIS since 1981, and that he is "ready for any mission".

The IIS document reported on by CNS News also states that the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar relies on Iraqi funding. It says the relationship has existed since 1989 and has improved under Hekmatyar's leadership. Although this document has not yet been validated by the U.S, government, we can see very specific information, not publicly available before 2004, that matches what we find in the IIS notebook. It indicates a long history of Saddam regime support to Islamic jihad groups, and that the IIS considers them organizations that will take on missions for Iraq's interests.

Epilogue:

Let's review what we have learned from the IIS notebook.

• We learned that in 1999 the IIS met with three significant leaders of Islamic jhad from Afghanistan: a warlord and Islamic jihadist; an Al Qaeda leader; and, a man known as the "Father of the Taliban."

• The Saddam regime and Taliban leadership agreed to diplomatic ties and a secret intelligence service relationship. They discussed security cooperation with Hekmatyar's Islamic Jihad group. The Taliban representative also agreed to support the Saddam regime in Pakistan's North-West Frontier, a region sympathetic to and actively involved with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the world-wide Islamic jihad movement. An Islamist, most likely the Al Qaeda and Taliban affiliated Fazlur Rahman Khalil, promised the support of Bangladesh.

• We see a request to the Saddam regime for a training center in Baghdad or Tajikistan from a jihad leader accused by the U.S. State Department during the Clinton Administration of running Islamic extremist training camps.

• There is a discussion about transporting something into these centers, including a discussion that appears to mention surface-to-air missiles.

• And, we have numerous statements of Islamic fidelity between Afghani jihad leaders and the Saddam regime, with many statements of mutual animosity towards the United States and intent to cooperate.

This notebook thus provides significant evidence that the Saddam regime collaborated with and supported Islamic jihad elements in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban and Al Qaeda were attacking United States citizens and their interests and plotting the 9/11 attacks.

In this notebook, we see a Saddam Hussein actively seeking to expand his sphere of influence in a region at the heart of the world-wide Islamic jihad movement.

This now-public relationship between Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Saddam Hussein deserves great scrutiny.

As we researched the Maulana, a picture came into focus that our team was not looking to find: The Maulana is a senior leader of an affiliation of Pakistani groups supportive of Islamic jihad. These groups include the JUI and the Jamaat Islami (JI). The JUI provided direct support to both the planner and paymaster of the 9/11 attacks. The Pakistani government accused the JI of working with Al Qaeda. The Maulana mediated an intelligence pact between the IIS and the Taliban.

Clearly, this evidence indicates that the Maulana was in a position to procure assistance from Iraq for the 9/11 attacks.

Dr. Laurie Mylroie, an expert on Iraq, testified in front of the 9/11 commission in 2003:

After al Qaeda moved to Afghanistan, Iraqi intelligence became deeply involved with it, probably, with the full agreement of Usama bin Ladin. Al Qaeda provided the ideology, foot soldiers, and a cover for the terrorist attacks; Iraqi intelligence provided the direction, training, and expertise…

This notebook demonstrates that Islamic jihad leaders in Afghanistan were seeking IIS assistance and Saddam was giving them that assistance.

Bernard,
I see you failed to address my posts point by point. Such failure as we both know means you capitulate and my statement stands.

Reposting Podhoretz for the 14th time only increases the likelyhood you will be banned for repetitive posting. It doesn't address my dealing with Podhoretz on a different thread.

It is notable, Mr. Parados, that both Mr. McGentrix and I posted evidence that showed that you are egregiously mistaken and you just blubber something about your statement. Why don't you just admit that you are incapable of debating correctly?

More on Saddam Hussein Al Qaeda links:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,202277,00.html

It is notable, Mr. Parados, that both Mr. McGentrix and I posted evidence that showed that you are egregiously mistaken and you just blubber something about your statement. Why don't you just admit that you are incapable of debating correctly?

Heres where we stand now. Evidence shows that not only did Saddam Hussein have WMD, he tried to hide it from inspectors for years upon years, and he had programs either working quietly or waiting in the wings to pick up where they left off whenever inspections weren't being done. He also had a relationship with Al Qaeda, and of course other terrorist organizations. Some evidence suggests more recent WMD was moved out of country shortly before the war. Bottom line, Saddam Hussein was not to be trusted, and he was unable to show proof of no WMD programs before we went to war. Remember here, the burden of proof was on the guilty, Saddam Hussein, not on George W. Bush.

And let us remember also that WMD was but only one of several reasons to get rid of Saddam Hussein. All of these reasons were agreed upon by Congress, and even the press at the time to a large degree. So just wondering, where is Congress, and where are the Democrats on this now? Where is the press? Who has always been consistent and someone we could trust? answer George W. Bush. In contrast, who do we never know what they believe or what they think, and who we cannot trust? Who are the spineless ones? answer Democrats.

When you trust ruthless dictators, what is the result? Another example, the guy in North Korea. Clinton and Madeline Allbright pride themselves in having a dialogue with this guy, and in exchange for his agreement not to develop weapons, we gave him technology to build nuclear facilities. Surprise, he uses the technology to build weapons. Now, people like Allbright are held out as experts on North Korea. Again, it shows liberals are either stupid or naive, or both, and the press even believes them.

Evidence that Iraq helped the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,202277,00.html

Evidence?
The article states in the first paragraph..

"possibly Iraq" suddenly becomes for sure Iraq? There are more Arab regimes than just Iraq. Bin Laden isn't Iraqi. None of the 19 Arabs on 9/11 were of Iraqi origin.
The translation goes on to say no country is mentioned at all.

I see Fox continues to leave off the warnings from intelligence services that the authenticity of these papers cannot be confirmed.


http://70.168.46.200/

Mr. Parados' pathetic attempt to block evidence by prattling something about repetitive posting is rendered ridiculous by the fact that the post completely destroyed his argument and he seems not to have EVEN NOTICED IT. Here it is,.Mr. Parados and it is repetitive because you apparently didn't read it or read it and couldn't handle it.

I can wait------------



l.; Tenet says WMD case a slam dunk...HE gave President Bush the assurances

2. All fifteen agencies involved in gathering evidence for the USA said Saddam was expanding its biological, nuclear and missle programs- EXPLAIN THAT --MR. PARADOS

3. The Intelligence Agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China. Israel and France all agreed with the above judgment- DON'T DODGE THIS, MR. PARADOS--EXPLAIN IT!

4. Hans Blix noted that several thousands of chemical rockets were unaccounted for--Was Hans Blix lying, Mr. Parados?

5. The British, the French and the Germans all signed on in advance to Colin Powell's reading of the satellite photos he offered to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. How can the British,French and Germans be so stupid, Mr. Parados--Please explain why they signed on.

6. Why did Laurence Wilkerson say that everyone, even the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. agree with Powell's interpretation of the satellite photos? Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

7. Why did Kenneth Pollack, formerly with the NSA under Clinton, indicate that a meeting of UNESCOM--FROM THE UN--NOT THE USA-agree that Iraq was operating as secret centrifuge plant? Please explain that, Mr. Parados

8. Why did Clinton think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

9. Why did Madeline Albright think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

10. Why did Sandy Berger, Clinton's NSA, think Saddam had WMD's-1998

11. Why was Cohen, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, so sure that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD's that he REMAINED 'ABSOLUTELY CONVNCED OF IT EVEN AFTER OUR FAILURE TO FIND THEM IN THE WAKE OF THE INVASION?? Explain that- Mr. Parados--Or, maybe, you had access to better intelligence than the Secretary of Defense????

12. Why did Pelosi think Saddam had WMD'S?

13. Why did Senators headed by Bob Graham give a letter to President Bush saying-THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS REINViGORATED HIS WEAPONS PROGRAM--PLEASE EXPLAIN MR. PARADOS?

14. Why did Hilllary Rodham Clinton, in October 2002, tell the country that--In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock? Explain that please, Mr. Parados.

15. Why did Al Gore, in September 2002, say that we know that Saddam has STORED SECRET SUPPLIES OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT HIS COUNTRY? Why, Mr. Parados

16. Why did the Democratic Candidate for President in 2004, John Kerry, indicate that Saddam Hussein had WMD's. Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

17. Can you tell us why the conscience of the Senate, Ted Kennedy, who is rarely wrong, said that We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction?
Can you tell us why he said that, Mr.Parados?

18. Can you explain why, Mr. Parados, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE THAT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ATTEMPTED TO COERCE, INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE ANALYISTS TO CHANGE THEIR JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WMD CAPABILITIES?

Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

No, I can't explain why you are going from thread to thread attacking me.
Why do you think you are doing it?

Nor can I explain your obsession about repeating the same posts over and over even after they have been answered. Why do you think you do that instead of dealing with the responses?

BECAUSE YOU DO NOT RESPOND, MR PARADOS!!

I think you are able to read- I asked you a series of questions relating to this discussion. YOU IGNORED THEM AS IF THEY HAD NEVER BEEN ASKED--SO---

Here are the questions again----



l.; Tenet says WMD case a slam dunk...HE gave President Bush the assurances

2. All fifteen agencies involved in gathering evidence for the USA said Saddam was expanding its biological, nuclear and missle programs- EXPLAIN THAT --MR. PARADOS

3. The Intelligence Agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China. Israel and France all agreed with the above judgment- DON'T DODGE THIS, MR. PARADOS--EXPLAIN IT!

4. Hans Blix noted that several thousands of chemical rockets were unaccounted for--Was Hans Blix lying, Mr. Parados?

5. The British, the French and the Germans all signed on in advance to Colin Powell's reading of the satellite photos he offered to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. How can the British,French and Germans be so stupid, Mr. Parados--Please explain why they signed on.

6. Why did Laurence Wilkerson say that everyone, even the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. agree with Powell's interpretation of the satellite photos? Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

7. Why did Kenneth Pollack, formerly with the NSA under Clinton, indicate that a meeting of UNESCOM--FROM THE UN--NOT THE USA-agree that Iraq was operating as secret centrifuge plant? Please explain that, Mr. Parados

8. Why did Clinton think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

9. Why did Madeline Albright think that Saddam had WMD's--1998

10. Why did Sandy Berger, Clinton's NSA, think Saddam had WMD's-1998

11. Why was Cohen, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, so sure that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD's that he REMAINED 'ABSOLUTELY CONVNCED OF IT EVEN AFTER OUR FAILURE TO FIND THEM IN THE WAKE OF THE INVASION?? Explain that- Mr. Parados--Or, maybe, you had access to better intelligence than the Secretary of Defense????

12. Why did Pelosi think Saddam had WMD'S?

13. Why did Senators headed by Bob Graham give a letter to President Bush saying-THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS REINViGORATED HIS WEAPONS PROGRAM--PLEASE EXPLAIN MR. PARADOS?

14. Why did Hilllary Rodham Clinton, in October 2002, tell the country that--In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock? Explain that please, Mr. Parados.

15. Why did Al Gore, in September 2002, say that we know that Saddam has STORED SECRET SUPPLIES OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT HIS COUNTRY? Why, Mr. Parados

16. Why did the Democratic Candidate for President in 2004, John Kerry, indicate that Saddam Hussein had WMD's. Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

17. Can you tell us why the conscience of the Senate, Ted Kennedy, who is rarely wrong, said that We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction?
Can you tell us why he said that, Mr.Parados?

18. Can you explain why, Mr. Parados, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE THAT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ATTEMPTED TO COERCE, INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE ANALYISTS TO CHANGE THEIR JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WMD CAPABILITIES?

Can you explain that, Mr. Parados?

Why do you continually post the same thing over and over that has nothing to do with the thread Bernard?

I see no reason to be a party to your attempt to derail this thread.

If you want something dealt with, start a new thread. If people are interested they will come.

You have a point, Mr. Parados. But, please be informed. If you are ever on a thread in which you make any kind of allusion to whether President Bush or his administration was lying about WMD's I will, of course, ask you the same questions below.

I hope I have made that clear.

And, if you were so confident you could rebut my post on that subject, I am sure, cogency or no cogency, you would have rebutted my post.

Of course, you are unable to do so!!

I see you can't resist continuing to derail the thread Bernard.