Released Iraqi documents - what do they tell us?

We've plowed this ground so many times, its pointless. The fact is Bush got authorization to go to war by Congress, based on the reasons put forth by the administration. Enough of Congress agreed with the administration to authorize it, based on what was known at the time, and the opinions about what was known. End of story. The effort to rewrite what was known along with the attempt to get people to believe Bush made it all up and pulled the wool over everybody's eyes has met with some success. I personally do not think it is correct or even logical to think one man could orchestrate such a scenario if he tried. The fact is that Hussein had a WMD program, the UN tried to monitor the situation for years, got kicked out, went back, but Hussein continued to evade, dodge, and lie. Congress concluded he continued to be dangerous and therefore voted to go to war. Get over it Parados.

I really don't know what Mr. Parados is talking about. He rarely gives links or documentation. What teams? What did they search? How long did they search?Where did they search?

I don't think you know what you are talking about, Mr. Parados.

Your statement flies in the face of information from German, British and yes, French Intelligence and, as I have quoted, statements from Gore, Kerry and HR Clinton. You aren't saying that they are liars, are you?

I know of no one who disputes the fact that Saddam has been
a homicidal maniac since the age of 10.
His biography repeatedly shows a vindictive nature.
Saddam was not ( and probably still is not ) happy
with us, since Kuwait.

Both Clinton and W were irresponsible
in leaving Saddam intact until W finally got the war started,
after seemingly endless discussion thereof.
It seemed to me, at the time,
that each day and each nite that Saddam remained in power
might have become the occasion of a nuclear 9/11.
His relatives ( by marriage ) who were among his top ranking
assistants came here and told us, on national TV,
that he was involved in nuclear preparations.
( Shud a word to the wise be sufficient ? I think it shud. )


Saddam 's nuclear ambitions were never
a trivial matter. I was concerned that he 'd put a mini-nuke
on a little boat which wud detonate, as it approached a
major American port.
Wealthy homicidal maniacs with grudges against us,
and nuclear ambitions, can bring bad luck, but no more.


As a citizen of a major American port city,
I feel a lot safer now; I really do.

Obviously, W 's father ( for whom I voted ) bears responsibility
for leaving Saddam intact after the First Gulf War.
Terrible policy; shameful.

I would think someone as intelligent as yourself would be aware of the Iraqi Survey Group. You don't live in a cave, do you Bernard?


From that ISG report




In case you can't use google. The report can be found here..
http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/duelfer.html
or here
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/

Your long winded argument has no bearing in the discussion of whether WMD was moved to Syria in 2003.

What people said in 1999 or 2001 prove nothing about the existence of the WMD on the eve of the US invasion.

Because Saddam didn't reveal everything in 1991 means nothing to the discussion of WMD's being moved in 2003.




Really? I seem to recall Saddam claimed he did NOT have WMD in 2003. When was he claiming he did have them? Please provide some evidence of said claim.

This is an interesting claim. Secret biological labs hidden throughout Baghdad? The report lists 5 facilities. 2 were destroyed in 1996. 1 contained UNSCOM tagged equipment. Another had destroyed equipment under UNSCOM direction. That leaves one facility. One facility is hardly secret labs unknown to any intelligence agency.

The problem isn't that the Duelfer report is filled with innaccuracies. The problem is your article claiming such innaccuracies is filled with innacuracies.

This one is laughable. The US has never made military-grade anthrax? The US created the process used.

You say, Mr., Parados:

This is an interesting claim. Secret biological labs hidden throughout Baghdad? The report lists 5 facilities. 2 were destroyed in 1996. 1 contained UNSCOM tagged equipment. Another had destroyed equipment under UNSCOM direction. That leaves one facility. One facility is hardly secret labs unknown to any intelligence agency.

You did not read my post0 The report you refer to is incomplete. You also did not comment on the quote from Hans Blix, Why Not?

You have no evidence that WMD's did not go into Syria. I have no evidence that they did but General Franks noted a great deal of traffic just before the invasion. That alone is suspicious.

Here is a pretty good summary of Iraq's biological weapons program, including production of anthrax. I believe most or all of the information provided is verifiable.

http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-8.htm

No need to comment on a preliminary report by Blix when the final report speaks for itself.

The report is incomplete? If you would possibly provide evidence then maybe we could discuss that. I already pointed out glaring errors that your post made about what is in the report. Such errors point to problems with your claim that things aren't in the report. How can you know what isn't in the report when you get wrong what IS in it?

Traffic doesn't mean a thing without evidence of WMD existing to actually ship. Vehicles drive every day. Just because they do doesn't prove that nuclear weapons are being shipped. Nor does it prove that anything else is in those vehicles. In order for there to actually be shipment of WMDs then you have to have those WMDs to ship. Until you can show me evidence of those WMDs in direct contradiction to the people that actually DID the searches and asked the people you don't have much to prove your claim. In fact you have NOTHING to prove your claim.

The report says there were secret labs in the mid 90s. By 1996 those labs were discovered and destroyed or inspected. Your post claims those labs were still secret in 2003. That is a false claim and such shoddy investigation points to other shoddy investigation.

More errors by your source..
In reality the al Samoud barely exceded the 150km range. The UNSCOM report says Iraq was trying to get it to the 200km range when they were destroyed for violating the 150km range. UNSCOM estimates the range was 180km.

specs for the Al Samoud

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/samoud.htm

More of the made up accusations..
The shell was used as part of an IED and had residual gas in it. It set off detectors but Marines were not targeted with mustard gas. Setting off such a shell in that manner in the Sears tower would have not gassed anyone. The argument is made up and unsupported by reality.

First of all, Mr. Parados, on the issue of Anthrax, which you cavalierly dismiss, you did not read or respond to the excellent summary of evidence on Anthrax given by Foxfyre- Why?

Anyone can say that we won the war
because the purpose of the war was to
overthrow Saddam. HE IS NOW IN OUR JAIL.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED.


Anything after that is only foreign aid,
and a waste.

First of all, Mr. Parados, You have not replied to Mr. Foxfyre's excellent post on anthrax( the anthrax you so blithely dismissed).

Second, your comment on Blix shows you don't really know what Blix has said;

Read below and see my comments in CAPS!!!

Posted: 2:47 AM EST (0747 GMT)



Blix addresses the Security Council.

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Story Tools



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TRANSCRIPTS

Transcripts of weapons inspectors' presentation to the U.N. on Iraq
• Blix's report
• ElBaradei's report
• Powell's response
• Iraqi ambassador's response

RELATED
• U.S. unswayed by inspectors' report

SPECIAL REPORT

• Interactive: Council on Iraq
• Latest: Iraq Tracker
• Explainer: Al Samoud
• Special Report: Showdown Iraq

(CNN) -- Following is a transcript of chief weapons inspector Hans Blix's February 14 presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the inspection effort in Iraq.

Mr. President, since I reported to the Security Council on 27th of January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of inspections so far to 11 weeks.

Since then, we have also listened on the 5th of February to the presentation to the Council by the U.S. secretary of state and the discussion that followed.

Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on the 8th and 9th of February.

Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational.

With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters.

The number of Iraqi minders during inspections has often reached a ratio -- had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about 1:1. The situation has improved.

Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq, at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centers, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile-production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites.

At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, rebase lining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples, and discussions with the site's personnel regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment.

Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability. But as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.

BUT AS BEFORE, WE DO NOT KNOW EVERY CAVE AND CORNER

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened, using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad center. The results to date have been consistent with Iraqi declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 liters of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site; one-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed.

The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 50 IAEA inspectors, 15 air crew and 65 support staff.

Mr. President, in my 27th of January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process -- most importantly, prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure.

This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that have never been declared or inspected, as well as to presidential sites and private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on the firm course.

Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of Resolution 1441, it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament, either by presenting remaining proscribed items and programs for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated.

In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply.

While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons program by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for further talks.

How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programs? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed.

ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF EMPTY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED AND DESTROYED.

Another matter, and one of great significance, is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for.

ANOTHER MATTER, AND ONE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, IS THAT MANY PROSCRIBED WEAPONS AND ITEMS ARE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR.

To take an example, a document which Iraq provided suggested to us that some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for. I must not jump to the conclusion that they exist; however, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.

1,000 TONS OF CHEMICAL AGENT WERE UNACCOUNTED FOR. 1,000 TONS--THAT IS TWO MILLION POUNDS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programs continue to exist. The U.S. secretary of state presented material in support of this conclusion.

Governments have many sources of information that are not available to inspectors. The inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on the evidence which they can themselves examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.

WE ARE FULLY AWARE THAT MANY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS ARE CONVINCED AND ASSERT THAT PROSCIBED WEAPONS, ITEMS AND PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO EXIST. THE US SECRETARY OF STATE PRESENTED MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF THIS CONCLUSION. GOVERNMENTS HAVE M A N Y S O U R C E S OF I N F O R M A T I O N T H A T A R E N O T A V A I L A B L E T O G O V E R N M E N T I N S P E C T O R S.

Mr. President, in my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 and should be well known to Iraq.

I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX, and long-range missiles, and said that such issues -- and I quote myself -- "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside," unquote.

The declaration submitted by Iraq on the 7th of December last year, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions.

This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.

In my January update to the Council I referred to the al-Samud II and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq.

I noted that the al-Samud II and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 150 kilometers limit set by the Security Council.

I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review.

Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of member states to discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the al-Samud II missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometers in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to Resolution 687 and the monitoring plan adopted by Resolution 715.

As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.

With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr 2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometers. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The expert also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far the test stand has not been associated with the proscribed activity.

On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export-import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of Resolution 687, UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended for use in the al-Samud II missile system, which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in this missile system would also be proscribed. I intend to communicate these findings to the government of Iraq.

At the meeting in Baghdad on the 8th and the 9th, February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers -- for instance, regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile production.

Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8th of February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for further clarifications.

Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on the important open issues.

The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured into the grounds years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.

ALTHOUGH OUR EXPERTS ARE STILL ASSESSING THE SUGGESTIONS, THEY ARE NOT VERY HOPEFUL THA TIT COULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE QUANTITIES POURED INTO THE GROUND YEARS AGO.

Not least against this background, a letter of the 12th of February from Iraq's National and Monitoring Directorate may be irrelevant. It presents a list of 83 names of participants, I quote, "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field which took place in the summer of 1991," unquote.

As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals had been deemed unaccounted for, the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance.

AS THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE EVIDENCE THAT DESTRUCTION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS AN IMPORTANT REASON WHY QUANTITIES OF CHEMICALS HAD BEEN DEEMED UNACCOUNTED FOR>

I trust that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological field.

The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed.

A second commission, we learned, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programs. It is headed by the former minister of oil, General Amir Rasheed, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses.

The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us and the world that it is a serious effort.

The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment which they had made to us on the 20th of January to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad.

A number of persons have declined to be interviewed unless they were allowed to have an official present or were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that had previously refused interviews on UNMOVIC terms subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on the 8th and 9th of February. These interviewed proved informative.

No further interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted with any third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest credibility.

At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my colleague, Dr. ElBaradei, and I had urged the Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the U.N. prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a message that a presidential decree has now been issued, containing prohibitions with regard to importation and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had time to study the details of the text of the decree.

Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role of intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.

A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation on process, (inaudible) granting immediate access everywhere to inspectors, and on substance, providing full declarations supported by relevant information and material and evidence.

However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there, other sources of information, such as defectors and government intelligence agencies, are required to aid the inspection process.

I remember myself how in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were based on information received from a government, helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapon program. It was realized that an international organization authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of the information obtained from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for weapons-related material.

It was understood that the information residing in the intelligence services government could come to very active use in the international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true, and we have by now a good deal of experience in the matter.

International organizations need to analyze such information critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such information must know that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people.

UNMOVIC has achieved good working relations with intelligence agencies, and the amount of information provided has been gradually increasing. However, we must recognize that there are limitations and that misinterpretations can occur.

Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and, in some cases, the presence of other items, conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction.

The presentation of intelligence information by the U.S. secretary of state suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programs.

I would like to comment only on one case which we are familiar with, namely the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect.

We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart.

The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection.


THE REPORTED MOVEMENT OF MUNITIONS AT THE SITE C O U L D J U S T A S E A S I L Y H A VE BEEN A ROUTINE ACTIVITY( OR THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN A ROUTINE ACTIVITY.

********************************************************

It is clear to me, Mr. Parados, that you are almost completely unfamiliar with the findings of Mr. Blix.

You are requested to especially note my comments in caps above and respond to them!!!

What I said



Here is your response to my statement Bernie....


You seem to have a reading comprehension problem Bernie. I said the Al Samud exceeded the 150km range but did NOT come close to the 600 km your source claimed.

This from the piece you posted and didn't provide the source for. (Plagiarism is bad form Bernie...)


Gee Iraq achieved 151 km with the Al Samoud II. That is more than 150, sounds similar to the 180 I said and is a FAR CRY from the 600km your source claimed. Thanks for proving my statement true Bernie. Too bad you can't read or you would have seen that was the case.

No evidence? Did Blix really say "no evidence" of those trailers has been found?.. Why yes, he did say just that.

Hmmm... seems to contradict Bush's claim doesn't it. I am really beginning to question your reading abilities Bernie. You seem to skip right over parts when you read if they don't conform to your desired outcome.

Now do you see why I didn't bother to address your demand that I deal with Blix's statements? I saw no need to. Blix is saying exactly what I said.
NO EVIDENCE OF TRAILERS

Two important points, Mr. Parados.

First, the source of the material on Al Samad II

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/...

THIS IS THE SAME SOURCE YOU USE.

HOW COULD IT BE WRONG FOR ME AND NOT WRONG FOR YOU?

Strike One-Mr.Parados.

I post the entire report from Hans Blix just thirteen days before the invasion and HIGHLIGHT CERTAIN SECTIONS AND

ASKED YOU

TO COMMENT ON THEM, MR. PARADOS.

YOU DID NOT. I wlll repeat the sections in which I challenged you, Mr. Parados.

THE KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS?


WHILE DURING OUR MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD, THE IRAQI SIDE TRIED TO PERSUADE US THAT THE AL SAMOUD 2 MISSLES THEY HAVE DECLARED, THEY HAVE DECLARED, THEY HAVE DECLARED, FALL WITHIN THE PERMISSIBLE RANGE SET BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CALCULATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS LED US TO THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION, OPPOSITE CONCLUSION, OPPOSITE CONCLUSION.



EVEN IF THE USE OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY COULD QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT OF ANTHRAX SAID TO HAVE BEEN DUMPED AT THE SITE. THE RESULTS WOULD STILL BE OPEN TO INTERPRETATION, OPEN TO INTERPRETATION, OPEN TO INTERPRETATION.





AS I NOTED ON 14 FEBRUARY, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES HAVE CLAIMED THAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE MOVED AROUND IRAQ BY TRUCKS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THERE ARE MOBILE PRODUCTION UNITS FOR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.



THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS, DENIED FROM THE IRAQI SIDE, THAT PROSCRIBED ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED UNDERGROUND.

I SHOULD ADD THAT, BOTH FOR THE MONITORING OF GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND THE INSPECTION OF UNDERGROUND FACILITIES, WE WOULD NEED TO INCREASE OUR STAFF IN IRAQ.


Now, the capitalized sections above are taken from Mr. Blix's final report just thirteen days before the invasion.

Then Mr. Parados wrote:

No need to comment on a preliminary report by Blix when the final report speaks for itself.


My quotes in caps above are quotes from the final report which, Mr. Parados says speaks for itself.

It doesn't speak- It shouts--and anyone, anyone with two ounces of brains who reads the final report will say that the Report is not definitive and finalized and that it raises more questions than it answers.

Speaks for itself indeed----International Panel reaches opposite conclusion from Iraqi on Samoud II( see above)

Speaks for itself indeed- Results on amount of Anthrax said to have been dumped open to interpretation( see above).


Speaks for itself indeed-Intelligence Sources are saying "WMD's being moved around Iraq by trucks"

Speaks for itself indeed- "Proscribed activities being conducted underground"

Speaks for itself indeed-To monitor, we would need to increase our staff"

Speaks for itself indeed-THE KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS-

REMAINING????


__________

Anyone who would label Hans Blix's final report as definitive and one that answered all of the questions still out there IN THE FACE OF HANS BLIX'S OWN ADMISSION THAT NOT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED AND THAT THERE ARE OTHER CLAIMS ABOUT WMD'S STILL IN PLAY JUST THIRTEEN DAYS BEFORE THE INVASION, is either a fanatic partisan or someone who just doesn't understand what a definitive report is supposed to say.

If you can't explain why Hans Blix made all of those "reservations" in his final report, Mr. Parados, I am very much afraid that I will have to say:

Strike Two!

One more strike and you are out, sir!!!

Om Sig David- Even though you are a skilled attorney, I am afraid you have met your match. Don't you know that the Germanic mind is superior to all others in the world? He disposed of your argument in just one word-
NO.