Lab officials excited by new H-bomb project

Myth 2. Use of a nuclear device(s) means the end of life on Earth.
Fact: The most probable use of a nuclear weapon, as described above, would be a single ground-burst detonation of limited yield device on a city in the Western world. It would be a terrible thing resulting in the loss of perhaps as many as a million lives. Even as Hiroshima and Nagasaki recovered and were rebuilt in less than ten years, so would recovery follow a terrorist bomb.

A DPRK use of a nuclear device would provoke almost instant retaliation, but even that would be limited in nature and effects. The three most likely targets would be Tokyo, Seoul, and the U.S. Fleet. Nuclear targets are not unlimited, but specific. In all the DPRK there are probably fewer than 50 targets that might warrant a nuclear warhead, and all could probably be destroyed with warheads of 10Kt, or less, not even 1 megaton in total. U.S. weapons (the most likely retaliatory arsenal) are very clean and produce relatively little residual radiation. Not the end of the world, nor even North Korea.

The next step up might be the total expenditure of the Pakistani-Indian arsenals. Both arsenals tend to consist of relatively small and primitive weapons mounted on medium-range missiles. Let's assume that each arsenal consists of two dozen devices averaging 10Kt. That's 48 detonations, with a combined yield of less than 1 megaton. The great cities of both nations would be destroyed with very great loss of life from blast/heat effects, and direct military targets would be decimated with somewhat less loss of life. We have to assume the these would be rather dirty bombs, and so radioactive elements with longer half-lives would be present, especially downwind of target sites. Cancer rates and mortality associated with the nuclear explosions would persist for several decades before tapering off to near normal rates. Both India and Pakistan would almost certainly recover and rebuild. It is very unlikely that any other nuclear powers would be drawn into what would be a limited regional nuclear war, and where consequences of that war would be minimal outside the region.

A greater danger would exist if Israel and Iran began flinging weapons at one another. Here the danger isn't from the direct effects of the nuclear exchange, but the political consequences that would follow. If Israel were annihilated (being small and densely populated, Israel is especially vulnerable to nuclear attack), would the rest of the world and Israel's allies let Iran go unpunished? Even if Israel were able to respond to a nuclear attack with a counter-strike, much of Iran would probably survive. In this scenario we probably would see a total of no more than 10-12 devices used in the exchange. The weapons would almost certainly be of 10Kt, or less in yield. The Iranian bomb, if it is permitted to come into existence, would likely be very dirty and present a major radioactive fallout problem for the entire region, most of whom affected would be the Muslim population. It isn't particularly comforting to hear Muslim clerics call for martyrs willing to die in the destruction of Israel, is it?

Even in the worst case scenario, a spasmic nuclear exchange between large, effective arsenals the size and power of those in the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980's, would not probably be the end of life on earth. The number and power of those arsenals could theoretically come close to being The End, but only if they all worked and they were evenly distributed over the planet's surface. In actuality, the missiles were concentrated in large numbers on a limited number of enemy targets. Each of the 100 largest American cities, for instance, was target for multiple Soviet warheads. If the average weapons to target ratio was 10:1, that is around a thousand devices out of the total inventory. Why so much redundancy? First, one had to plan for some percentage of missile failure in launch, guidance, or bugs in a particular delivery/bomb system. Second, both sides planned primarily for retaliation and no one could predict how effective the first strike would be. If you lost 50% of your capacity in a first strike, to be effective in the retaliation you had to increase your inventory to compensate for first strike losses. If the first weapon failed for any of a number of reasons, then follow-on weapons would insure the destruction of the target. Finally, no one could predict exactly would happen if thousands of warheads were detonated in a short time/space context. For instance, the EMP of the first weapon would "kill" some, perhaps all of the weapons descending on the same target.

At the risk of sounding like Dr. Strangelove, even in the worst case scenario cited above, more people would have survived than were killed. Some areas of the world would have been almost untouched, while other areas in highly concentrated target zones would have been reduced by as much as 90 or 95%. The effects of radioactive fallout would probably have been severe for one or two decades after the holocaust, but would have eventually declined in most locations to almost zero. Technology and industrial capacity would have been set back for a period, but reconstruction would have occurred and survivors of the War that Never Happened would have returned to "normalcy" within 50 to 100 years. No nuclear exchange even close to that scenario is in the offing today, or even the mid to long-term future given current trends.

Myth 3. All nuclear weapons are the same.
Fact. Nuclear weapons have the following effects: blast/heat, Radioactive artifacts, and an Electro-Magnetic Pulse. Most of the destructive power of nuclear warheads is found in the blast/heat effect, and is measured in either kilotons, or megatons, of TNT. When a nuclear device explodes the first effect noted is a fireball that can be hotter than the surface of the Sun. What follows is a series of pressure waves as the atmosphere tries to adjust to the fireball, that is the blast measured in Kt, or Mt, of TNT. In actuality there often is a series of pressure waves into and out from the point of detonation. The destructiveness of the fireball and blast is highly dependant upon the target site and whether the detonation is an air burst, ground burst, or sub-surface burst. An air-burst produces the most destructive blast effect when the fireball just touches the surface of the earth. With an air burst, incineration from the fireball is somewhat less than in a ground burst, though destruction by fire will be very widespread. A ground bursts create the greatest amount of residual radioactivity, and the fallout cone will be much more poisonous. With a ground burst the diameter of total destruction will very nearly equal the diameter of the fireball (varies by weapon yield). Subsurface bursts vary whether the detonation is underground, or under water. Subsurface bursts in earth tend to be the least destructive of all nuclear detonations, but subsurface water bursts can create really huge tsunami conditions, and irradiated water may seriously contaminate nearby shores. These are all common effects with nuclear detonations. So how do the effects vary, beyond the altitude of detonation?

First, of course is the size and yield, of the device. Even conventional weapons can produce blast effects approaching 1Kt, but nothing less than a H-Bomb (or Mother Nature) can produce anything close to 100 Mt. The old Soviet Union detonated one 100 Mt. Test device during the Cold War, yet most people in the world remain ignorant of it even today. The problem is that the cost of scaling up yield do not justify the increased destructive power of the detonation. Both the USSR and the US arsenals generally ranged in yield from 10Kt to 10Mt by the end of the Cold War. Those warheads were produced and tested using advanced technology and the secrets of their production kept reasonably secret. The DPRK and Iran may be able to produce nuclear weapons, but they are highly unlikely to be capable of producing H-bombs and yields above 10Kt. In fact I rather doubt that India, Pakistan, or Israel have anything in their arsenal above 10Kt. The destructive capacity of this size weapon is limited, but is a sufficient yield to destroy almost any city if properly targeted, delivered and detonated.

Advanced nuclear design can accentuate, or mitigate, the effects produced from the device. An excellent example is the neutron-bomb designed to kill massed Soviet tank regiments as they came through the Fulda Gap. These bombs have almost no blast/heat effect, but generate very high doses of radiation with very short half-life. The bomb is detonated without destroying buildings, forests, etc., but the radioactive rays penetrate excellent armor shielding to kill the soldiers inside tanks. The residual radioactivity then falls off rapidly and humans can re-enter the kill zone within a few days. The nuclear weapons in the American inventory are "clean", in that they produce minimal and non-persistent radioactive fallout. The EMP effect destroys any electrical device plugged in within its range. The effect lasts only a short period and has no known effect on living tissues. This effect might be amplified to "fry" the electronics of a considerable area resulting in complete disruption of an enemy's C-Cubed infrastructure.

We have not earnestly pursued advanced research in these areas for at least a decade. Yet the development of specialized nuclear effects can greatly reduce the destruction and loss of life that have in the past been associated with nuclear detonations. If we had found huge underground poison gas facilities in Iraq, a clean subsurface nuclear explosion with little radioactive artifacts might have been the safest way of disposing of a dangerous and lethal product … though popular opinion would have condemned that tactic in favor of much riskier means of disposal. Continued research can greatly reduce the lethality of nuclear devices, and isn't that a "good" thing? Design capability to produce these specialized effects is much, much more difficult to obtain than that needed to produce simple, primitive weapons in limited numbers.

Myth 4. Nuclear weapons are pretty easy to build and represent an unacceptable danger that will never go away, unless the weapons are decommissioned, and decommissioning atomic weapons is no great problem.
Fact. Only primitive weapons with limited yield can be constructed and then only by large, nation-sized organizations with considerable technical competence. Those weapons tend to be large and their reliability is very much in question unless the design is properly tested. Making small reliable weapons isn't something within the ability of most organizations. A workable device requires a certain amount of fissionable material without which the bomb is virtually inert. Primitive weapons require more fissionable material than sophisticated weapons, and primitive weapons are far dirtier because greater proportions of the fissionable material will survive detonation.

Most bomb designs today are implosive, and rely upon a trigger (T). The necessary trigger has a very short shelf life. If the T becomes too old, it will not activate and the bomb will not work as planned. This means that the T must be constantly renewed, and that is an expensive proposition. Of the thousands of weapons in the Soviet/American stockpiles in the late 1980's., many are today virtually useless. So why not decommission them? The answer is that decommissioning nuclear devices in that generation is expensive, dangerous, and disposal of the fissionable materials is problematic. Even so decommissioning is going forward and the effective stockpiles of these old weapons are decreasing, though we will have them around for many years to come. The good news is that old Soviet devices that may fall into the hands of terrorists may no longer be capable of full detonation, though a fizzle may be almost as bad as if the device were fully active.

I see a whole new career for Rumsfeld when he finally leaves Washington and one he was born for "Mad Man Dapper Dan, The Used Nuclear Weapon Man". "Would give 'em away but Mrs. Rumsfeld won't let me. These babies have all gone through my 60 point inspection check and are guaranteed to go off in the first Mosque or Temple you take 'em to first time every time. Come see us this weekend, free balloons and Camel rides for the kiddies. We're dealin'.

I'd like to amend somewhat my posing above in Myth 3. It still needed some editing, but the old BlueveinThrobber posted before I could manage the corrections .......... sorry about that.

Myth 4. Nuclear weapons are pretty easy to build and represent an unacceptable danger that will never go away, unless the weapons are decommissioned, and decommissioning atomic weapons is no great problem.
Fact. Design and construction of nuclear weapons is not really as easy as people seem to think. Primitive weapons with limited yield can be constructed, but only by large, nation-sized organizations with considerable technical competence. Those weapons tend to be large and their reliability is very much in question unless the design is properly tested. Making small reliable weapons isn't something within the ability of most organizations, even those who possess a small number of basic nuclear weapons. A workable device requires a certain amount of fissionable material without which the bomb is virtually inert. Primitive weapons require more fissionable material than sophisticated weapons, and primitive weapons are far dirtier because greater proportions of the fissionable material will survive detonation. We should be much more anxious about radioactive, but sub-nuclear weapons. This sort of device has no bang, no nuclear fire, no EMP, but it can spread radioactive particles (not rays) that could contaminate an area. The number of direct deaths from such a device is likly to be small, but indirect problems from cancer, etc. could be more problematical. The real problem with this sort of weapon is the political fallout, panic and fear that it might engender among the populace.

Most bomb designs today are implosive, and rely upon a trigger (T). The necessary trigger has a very short shelf life. If the T becomes too old, it will not activate and the bomb will not work as planned. This means that the T must be constantly renewed, and that is an expensive proposition. Of the thousands of weapons in the Soviet/American stockpiles in the late 1980's., many are today virtually useless. So why not decommission them? The answer is that decommissioning nuclear devices in that generation is expensive, dangerous, and disposal of the fissionable materials is problematic. Even so decommissioning is going forward and the effective stockpiles of these old weapons are decreasing, though we will have them around for many years to come. The good news is that old Soviet devices that may fall into the hands of terrorists may no longer be capable of full detonation, though a fizzle may be almost as bad as if the device were fully active.

The real problem is that at the same time we are telling the world that Iran can't create nuclear weapons we are creating new ones of our own.

"Do as I say, not as I do, because I am the meanest MF on the planet.," doesn't exactly make the world safer no matter how right we may think we are.


The argument that a democracy has never started a war doesn't hold much water these days. We just justify it to ourselves before, during, and afterwards. France is lucky they have nukes if you listen to some on the extreme side.

Too bad the present administration decided to not fully fund the program designed to buy and decommission those devices. We don't have to worry about them I guess.

Countries like Iran do not have half the worlds loons gunning for them either. Heck, most of them LIVE in countries like Iran. That's why they shouldn't have WMD's

I'll keep my points salient and few for the sake of clarity, although I am tempted to counter each of your points with flourish.I never said "always", and I am fully aware of the stockpile destruction that has taken place in the processes of modern mechanized warfare. I do not consider that it changes the long term chances of nuclear weapon usage however, due to increased proliferation and the (as mentioned) historical precedent, which I should add, goes far beyond the history of modern mechanized warfare, and takes into account the long term mindset of the countries and leaders themselves.

You amplify my point when you sayfor two reasons: Firstly it's hubris to assert you know the full intent and circumstances of all nuclear powers. Secondly your reference to "At this time" is myopic as I make reference to long term future actions as well as historical precedent whereas your refer only to "At this time".Again your temporal reference is questionable vis-à-vis "foreseeable future" for two reasons. Your hubris in claiming future knowledge, and your lack of a definitive time line for your so-called "foreseeable future".

Asherman, one of the main problems with your premises and arguments, is that you do not provide meritable points that can be extended over longer time lines.

I was not responding to any particular prior posting, but trying to bring a bit o'light to some very wide-spread myths about nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use. It is remarkable how little people seem to know about the subject, even though there is quite a lot of information that is not classified.

You amplify my point when you say, "At this time there is little danger that any national government will initiate a nuclear strike", for two reasons: Firstly it's hubris to assert you know the full intent and circumstances of all nuclear powers. Secondly your reference to "At this time" is apt as I make reference to long term future actions as well as historical precedent whereas your refer is only addresses "At this time".
Ah, but it is exactly because no one can fully know the future that I use terms like "foreseeable future", "improbable", and etc. By acknowledging the inperfection of our analysis and even knowledge, we hopefully have avoided that dread disease: hubris.

The further we project trends and consequences of current events into the future, the more likely we are to be wrong. I don't like to be wrong, so I confine my analysis to the "foreseeable", and the "most probable" outcomes. In most cases extrapolation beyond 5 years (and even that is a bit of a stretch), is virtually useless. What sort of timelines would you like to speculate on? Several hundred years? Before the Sun fails to shine, what?

A more cogent objection to my analysis might be that I haven't done much by way of citation. So here are a few outstanding works that underlie my anaylsis;

The Effects on Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Dept. Defense and the Atomic Energy Commision, ed. 1964. Though over 40 years old this is still very likely the best description of nuclear effects available to the general public

On Thermonuclear War, Herman Kahn, Hudson Inst.

Thinking the Unthinkable, Herman Kahn, Hudson Inst.

Sorry, but I don't have the publication dates available at my desk for Prof. Kahns seminal work.

Information regarding the size and capability of nuclear arsenals at the beginning of the 21st century are much harder to document. Much of the information is classified, but I'm confident that a rigorous internet search will yield the researcher much the same information I've posted above.

Again I will keep it concise and to the point even though I am very tempted not to!

I disagree, to some fair degree, as per your contentions of an unknowable future, and I'll demonstrate:

1) Nuclear weapons will get considerably easier and cheaper to build with longer life spans
2) More and more countries will become nuclear powers
3) Man's warfaring intents will not change unless or until man himself changes

Care to counter the above?

The type of timelines I would care to *expound* on are prefaced by the above contentions, so let's set it on 300 - 600 years. Given that an individual human life span will very likely increase rather dramatically (at least in the more developed countries) that is not unreasonable at all. PS I used the word *expound* as opposed to *speculate* (as you did) unless or until you successfully argue points 1- 3 as invalid.

Loons are in the eye of the beholder.

Is it sane to want to change the government of another country?

Asherman.
And as per the premise that through technology, counter devices will make the nuclear bombs ineffectual, I would disagree, because the escalation of offensive and defensive weaponry increases collateral damage.

Now if you want to argue that advanced smart weapons will make WMD obsolete, and moderate collateral damage as per the above, you could try, but I do not see that either.

1) Nuclear weapons will get considerably easier and cheaper to build with longer life spans

I don't believe that nuclear weapons will ever become so easy and cheap to build that virtually any country/group could build one. Not even in 500 years, which it seems to me is a very unreasonable planning period. Hell, I can't even project accurately an election 6 months in advance, can you? How much cheaper and easier to build will nuclear devices become in the next five years? Twenty-five years? One hundred years?

Fissionable materials will remain a problem for a very long time, unless nuclear reactors and associated technology for refining and concentrating materials becomes much more prevelant than it is today. On the other hand, renewed research may indeed reduce many of the difficulties associated with the current generation of devices, though improvements in nuclear technology will probably be almost entirely within the United States, and perhaps China. Not much can be expected to come of the British, French, Soviet Republics, India, Pakistan, or even Israeli nuclear establishments. The DPRK and Iran may in 100 years improve their weaponry to levels similar to those in the Soviet Union in 1975, or so. The DPRK has no where to test designs, and that is a serious handicap. Iran does have testing grounds, but its technology is hamstrung.

2) More and more countries will become nuclear powers

This is pure conjecture. Acquisition and maintanance of nuclear weapons is, and will remain for a very long time, a costly affair with not much return on the investment. What countrird in the world today are actively seeking to develope nuclear weapons? Some news out of Japan suggests their nervousness about the DPRK. If Japan embarks upon a nuclear program to counter the DPRK threat, the Japanese economy will be adversely affected. The prosperity of Japan is at least partially due to limiting its military spending and foreswearing nuclear development. Far better to remain behind the American shield ... if only the Americans can be relied upon to keep their commitments. Almost the whole of the developed world relies on the American shield, though its popular to say bad things about us. Denmark as a nuclear power? How about Mexico? Syria, Jordan, Dubai? Anything is possible, but very unlikly. If anything, I would expect that over time the number of nations within the Nuclear Club to decrease, not increase.

3) Man's past history of warfare will not change unless or until man himself changes

Well, we agree on this one. Humans are territorial and aggressive. The cost of losing justifies the cost of victory. Human kind isn't likely to change in the next thousand years, so even that long-range prediction I can accept. So what?

I didn't comment on development of defenses against nuclear devices, that is another subject entirely and outside my intent to deflate some of the myths surrounding nuclear weapons.

Are defenses against nuclear weapons possible? Yes, though more properly the defenses are against having one delivered to your front door by UPS. All delivery systems have some vulnerability and impose certain constraints on the package delivered. Modern, technologically advance warheads can be MIRV'd, but are vunerable upon launch and before separation. In the sort of spasm exchange between inventories the size and quality of those held by the USSR and the US at the height of the Cold War, significant numbers would have gotten through even the best defensive system ... had one existed. Indeed, both sides were constrained against defensive systems to avoid de-stabilizing the Balance of Terror. Regan took a great chance with StarWars, but it turned out his choice was apparently well-informed, and the Soviets imploded. There has been some promising research into anti-missile systems, but all remain unproven at this time. Its hard for me to see how an effective anti-missile system capable of knocking down say, 70% of all missiles inbound to American targets would increase the liklihood of wide-spread nuclear war.

Missiles have long been the preferred delivery system for nuclear munitions, because they are fast and pretty hard to destroy in flight. Short range missiles can go from launch to target in minutes, so almost nothing can defend against them. On the other hand, its prudent to detonate nuclear weapons as far from your own as possible. The DPRK has the missile capability to strike ROK, Japan, China, Russia, and Okinawa. They have a multistage missile believed capable of striking the west coast of North America, perhaps as far south as Los Angeles. The problem is that the missile is not known to have ever been stacked, much less test fired. It is believed that the missile might be fited for a single nuclear warhead, but perhaps not. There have been reports that the missile has been seen in Iran. Other DPRK missile systems (the great majority) are short range Korean versions of the SCUD. Korean SCUDS are believed to be more accurate and reliable than those Saddam had in his inventory. Information on DPRK systems is difficult to obtain and even harder to verify. China can reach any place on the globe, but most other members of the Nuclear Club make do with medium range missiles. Sea launched missiles are pretty much confined to a few nations like the U.S., Russia (though their navy is floundering), Britain, and perhaps some of China's most recent additions to the fleet. Iran and the DPRK have small numbers of old Soviet boats, but are not believed capable of effective campaigning outside their regional waters.

Manned aircraft could be used, but without command of the skies, espceially over intercontinental distances, no decisive nuclear attack could be launched on a large nation. Aircraft are slow relative to missiles and easy to destroy. Neither the DPRK, nor Iran, have airpower suitable for delivering a nuclear device outside their region, though B-52's can reach almost anywhere in numbers that would overwhelm AA defense systems.

Surface delivered systems mostly require ships, railways, or trucks with pretty heavy haul capacity. The sort of weapons we expect in the DPRK and eventually in the Iranian inventories are large and heavy. A device could be delivered into a port city anywhere in the world hidden inside a cargo container. To defend against this our intelligence services monitor as closely as possible cargos entering and leaving DPRK and Iranian ports. Suspect ships are watched by satelite, and a limited number of cargo containers are inspected at U.S. ports. Not by any means a fool proof system against a nuclear weapon delivered by sea. Delivery of a nuclear device through Mexico or Canada on one or more trucks is certainly within the realm of possiblity. The so-called suitcase nukes of popular spy fiction exist, but there aren't very many loose in the world and they are much larger and heavier than any suitcase you or I might lug around.

I never said "so easy and cheap to build that virtually any country/group could build one" nor do my three premises require that to ensure substantial future proliferation.I did not use the word "planning" you did, my premises are not specific to your precepts of "planning". I don't consider 500 years to be very long given the high stakes. Nor have I heard merited arguments from you (aside from your - so far - oblique precept of "planning") as to why 500 years should not be given consideration, nor have I heard arguments as per life span or grandchildren etc.For a potential comparable to that question look at computers, airplanes, telecommunications, robotics, aeronautics, particle physics, etc. Future particle physics applications alone could change your entire precept. I am surprised that someone who appears to have a grasp on the technological revolution, would steadfastly argue against the cheaper better bomb and the fast pace of change.Perhaps yes, perhaps no, see above. In any case your "very long time" always seems to have a very short life span. I would contend that nuclear energy will become much more prevalent than it is today that plus the dissolution of the former Soviet could suffice not even taking into account the technological revolution as discussedNot even close to "pure conjecture". "Pure conjecture" would mean I have no evidence on which to base my facts; past events and present events demonstrate my premise quite well. If you are going to argue that they do not, I would like to see your evidence over the last 100 years to demonstrate you arguments. Also you would have to argue against man's warlike nature, which you have not done, and I gather you don't intend to.
Perhaps but not if mankind's future is at stake, then there is no victory per se.
I assume you mean this in a rhetorical sense and that I do not need to answer. Let me know.

Could you perhaps keep your posts more concise as I am trying to do, it makes it rather hard to keep things congruent. I like your thoughtful intelligent manner.

Alright ... in the next 300-500 years:

There will be a global pandemic that is easily passed between people. From infection to the onset of symptoms will take between 7 and 14 days. Once symptoms appear, mortality will approach 30%. The disease will hit hardest those underdeveloped parts of the world where medical support systems are not strong and robust. This massive "die-off" will topple governments, and badly shake all world economies. The disease will spread very quickly and within 6 months the world population will shrink overall by 25-30%. There will be a brief recess in the deaths, but the disease will continue to crop up with only slightly less mortality for at least 50 years after onset.

There will be a major famine in East Asia and as many as 60 million people will starve to death. Social organization will be tattered at best, and will collapse in some areas. The famine will hit hardest in China and India and will last at least three years. During the time that the famine is at its worst, open warfare against nations in the most productive rice growing regions of Souteast Asia can be expected. Between famine and disease, the CCP will collapse and political chaos inside China will tear the country apart for about 75 years before order and stability return.

The DPRK will collapse and be reunited with ROK. After Kim Jong-Il dies there will be a period of internal conflict as members of the Dynasty struggle to seize power. The end result will be collapse of the DPRK. There will be no atomic weapons use on, or from the Korean Penninsula, but there will be renewed conventional conflict along the borders of China and ROK. The cost of the reunification will nearly bankrupt the ROK, and its economy will be badly damaged for at least a decade.

Africa will continue to be a terrible place, though some recovery may be seen 100 to 150 years out. In the intrim, population will decline and poverty will remain the overriding fact of African life. Tribal warfare will continue and intensify, but the munitions will mostly consist of obsolete armaments. Famine and disease will hit Africa especially hard.

In this timespan, World oil supplies will be largely depleted. Oil kingdoms will go back to the sort of poverty that existed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The oil wealth will vanish like icecream at a 4th of July picnic without refrigeration. Petrolium substitutes will greatly soften the blow in the industrialized West, and alternative energy sources will be common and cheap. There will be a great deal of political pressure in some parts of the world to build nuclear power plants, but that option will only be partially successful.

The U.N. will no longer exist after it fails to effectively handle the challenges that will be cropping up every 10-15 years. Nation States will experience a revival, though War Lords will rule in many fragmented regions.

The United States will still be the leading superpower on Earth, but its ability to intervene in global calamities will be greatly reduced from what it is at the beginning of the 21st century. Americans will still enjoy the highest standard of living in the world, but it will not be an expotential increase from today. The U.S. Constitution and political structures will still be recognizable, though there may be some pretty dramatic changes after another 200 years, or so.

There will be human colonies on space, on the Moon and on Mars. The off-earth colonies will depend upon fusion reactors and nuclear weapons will be effectively banned from the colonies. If the colonial movement occurs before the pandemic, they will quarantine the planet and escape the ravages of the disease. If the disease strikes before colonization, then man may not found extra-terrestrial colonies until near the end of your 300-600 year you "expound".

Male life expection will rise from 81 today in the industrialized West to about 125 in 600 years only if disease with high mortality rates and famine can be averted. Otherwise, in that time period men in the industrialized parts of the world may not rise at all, and may even fall back to levels experienced during the early 20th century.

600 years from now a great asteroid will plunge into the North Atlantic causing a world die-off comparable to that at the end of the Cambrian. 99% of our species will perish, and it will take another 600 years to re-establish complext human societiess comparable to that which existed at the end of the 19th century. Nuclear weapons will only exist in theory and legend.

Very safe predictions, Asherman. Very.

Of course, as John Maynard Keynes said, "In the long run, we are all dead."

Yeah, but not really on point for the topic of this thread.

Understood.