georgeob1 wrote:The important questions before the United States right now involve whether our basic strategy in the face of interwoven and serious cultural, political, and military challenges is correct and likely to deliver a good result. Whether it was wise to try at all with the Security Council or to become emeshed in a legalistic argument about WMD, or to forecast what will or will not be found in Iraq is decidedly secondary.
And here is and will likely remain the sticking point--my take on the adminstrations actions since last autumn is that whereas the Nation was, ostensibly, engaged in a war on terroism, Bush and Company cobbled together a set of pretexts to justify preemptive war in Iraq--and i consider this to have been a dangerous distraction from the campaign which was to have been focused on terrorism. Afghanistan has been conducted on the cheap, and continues to be the ugly step-child of the administrations policy, although the administration enjoys the kind of support for the war on terror which Roosevelt got on December 8, 1941. The current equivocation about the justifications for the war, after the fact, is a very hollow sound, indeed--the expenditures, the lives lost (by Americans, Brits
and Iraqis) and the long-term obligations acquired there need to have had a better justification than a string of "good" reasons, delivered after the bombs have fallen. I cannot condone what Polk did in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande, I cannot condone Truman's gaffe in the statement of foreign policy (which, by the way, he felt very deeply to his regret), and I cannot condone the casual build-up of "advisors" by Eisenhower (who ought to have known better), the nasty politcal games of Kennedy, nor the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Therefore, i do not condone what i see as a case of the administration playing fast and loose with the truth--especially in an age in which, as Kara has pointed out, information disseminates so widely, so rapidly. Even were i a believer in the rectitude of this war, i would be among the first to criticize the administration for being a bunch of stumblebums in the run up and the conduct of the conflict, and i entertain serious doubts about their ability to deal with the responsibility which is now of necessitiy thrust upon the United States. Finally, i cannot condone this pre-emptive, nearly solitary policy (in terms of international support)--early in these discussions, long before the first bombs, Dlowan wrote that the United States was about to "cross a dark and murky Rubicon." How very well-expressed; how much that thought haunts me.
(Although conceding pre-war opposition to Wilson's and Roosevelt's possible participation in a European war, i would point out that where the rubber hit the road, in Congress asking for a declaration of war, there was substantially little opposition to either President.)