The US, UN & Iraq III

You wrote "the Iraqis" and "they don't want". I think a reasonable English speaker would infer that you mean all, or at least the majority, yes.

You certainly made no allowance for the existence of another opinion among them.

Offhand, i'd say #1 arises from an unthinking acceptance of the Shrub's ludicrous propaganda . . .

Setanta - Is it possible that georgeob1 has in fact given it thought, and simply arrived at a conclusion with which you do not agree?

naw, course not . . .

Scrat, Your global interpretation just doesn't make any sense to me. When we say "Americans" demonstrated against the war, you presume that "all Americans" demonstrated? c.i.

The presumption that the US went into Iraq with the goal of reducing world terror is bolstered by no compelling evidence nor rationale, and is contradicted by the great majority of analysis (not to mention the administration's own weekly re-created justifications for the action). It is an item of faith. Why anyone would yet subscribe to this faith in the face of all which contradicts, and after the chronic duplicitousness of this administration, is a shining example of human suckerhood.

Call me faithless, Blatham. I think anyone who has faith in this administration is... I won't say it, but you know what I mean!

As nimh and others have stated the present administrators of Iraq must first "turn on the lights" and provide those basic utilities needed in a civilization (Electricity, water, communication, etc).

Next, Iraq needs the rule of law. This means laws that protect life, liberty, or property. This, in turn, implies the existence of a police force and a court system (criminal and civil) for adjudification purposes. Until basic human needs are met and citizens feel their lives and property are safeguarded we will see little progress towards the "self rule" all aspire to in Iraq. Iraq's people should feel their protection coming from the central government and not the local mullahs.

Setting up these basic laws is not difficult and they are indeed already familiar to citizens of all societies, it will be the enforcement that becomes tricky in the Iraqi situation. The difficulty of using past Iraqi officials is manifest in the recent banishment of all past Baath officials in future governmental positions. The present U.S. administration has tried to recruit American police officers to help in the training of new Iraqi officers. I would suggest using the U.N.'s expertise in this regard. They are a proven resource.

Also important is the creation of a judiciary to handle both types of legal disputes as the laws presently address. This is extremely important, as this will tend to eliminate Islamic courts (Islamic Shari'ah law) and further reduce the chance of Islamic clerical intervention in the governing process (I do not propose elimination of Islam in Iraqi society just its marginalization in government). This will prove difficult because of many of the social functions the mosques have taken over due to Saddam's lack of care in these areas in the last 25 years.

Once these basic protections are established the Iraqi people can then concentrate on gathering representatives to formulate an Iraqi constitution. I have very little advice on how this selection process would proceed for this seems a difficult step. How does one choose a fair representation of the Iraqi people so that the proposed government, when finally constituted, will be fair to all? Remember, over 60% of Iraq's people are Shia and have demanded that the final resultant government reflect that fact (There is something to be said for separation of church and state). It can be done, but what is the make-up of the chicken that is to lay the initial constitutional egg? Who, in the form of governmental bodies, will be responsible for its content and how is this constitution to be ratified?

It is only after all this constitutional, executive, and judiciary dust has settled that one may even ponder free elections. Implicit in this is that the government so constituted will be strong enough to survive the legal transference of power that we see in European and American "democracies" that such elections will demand.

JM

Yeah, what he said . . .

This just in:
I have finally figured out what the next rationalization will be for the missing WMDs. The Iraqi's had, get ready, successfully made mankind's first INVISIBLE weapons. Try to get your head around that. Doesn't it all make sense? No wonder the satellites couldn't see anything but a couple of trailers. Invisibility makes it easy to hide 1500 liters of anthrax and a couple-a-hundred Scuds can be completely concealed from human sight by the special Iraq-o-ray array. ole.

just kidding, but still........


Joe

Joe N, Now that you've given this administration a 'new' idea on why we/our military can't find any WMD's........ maybe, tomorrow. c.i.

My notion that the overall security situation of the United States has been improved is based on the following;

1. More than a year ago before the U.S. announced its intent to bring about regime change in Iraq the sanctions regime was already crumbling. The European powers on the Security Council, led by France and Russia (both of which had very substantial financial stakes in the matter) were openly ready to scuttle the sanctions: their support for the sanctions came later and only as a means of delaying or preventing U.S. intervention. Saddam, armed with billions in annual oil revenues, could have posed a grave threat to U.S. security interests in the Gulf and the Mideast. Our choice was either to take him out, or eventually face that situation.

2. The opposition of Islamic fundamentalists to the West and to the U.S.in particular had already been demonstrated beyond doubt. There was nothing more to be lost with them and everything to be gained if we could create a moderate, secular regime that could become a counterforce to them. Iraq is, by far the best and most likely candidate for such a development.

3. The example of firm, independent action on the part of the U.S. has already favorably changed the behavior of key players in North Asia concerning North Korea. China is now willing to engage the issue. The North Korean calculus for their bullying behavior and attempts at nuclear blackmail has been made far more adverse for them. South Korea has begun to break out of the grip of the illusion that they could call the shots on U.S. policy and still enjoy U.S. security guarantees. Japan is less likely to conclude that they need to develop nuclear weapons.

4. The feckless behavior of the western world in the grip of the world weary western European (old Europe) obsession with world governance through legalisms (workable only in the West) and avoiding at all costs any risky confrontation, whether with genocide (either in Africa or even in the Balkans), or proximate threats of terrorism, has been replaced with a measure of values based leadership, self confidence and a willingness to meet serious challenges.

We have excellent reasons to believe that each of these considerations was very much a part of the strategic thinking in the Bush administration. Each represents a significant issue with lasting importance. It is too early to claim success on any but the first, but without these outcomes our situation and that of the western world would be much more dangerous than it is today.

It is easy to find fault with the difficulties on the road we travel - much harder to see and think through the dangers we are avoiding.

George,
Thoughtful arguments for your argument #1 in your previous post, but #4 above seems highly debatable. While I do not follow international news as closely as I should, I do not recall seeing any real change in any of the key players in the 'old Europe' orientation, save those that are clearly self-serving.

Joe Nation, Irak-O-Ray.

Sumac,

I agree that we have not dented the attitudes and policies of France and Belgium - Germany may be another matter. However we have emboldened the Central and Southern Europeans who do not entirely sympathize with the views (or dominance) of their Gallic masters. This will likely alter the continuing European dialogue concerning a European constitution, It has already shattered the notion of the inevitability of Franco-German dominance of Europe.

Is that not a wee bit of a leap of faith there? Nevermind, let's just say the possibility is an inevitability and cut this short. I doubt we will ever be in the same ballpark as far as the probability of the "mushroom" cloud etc. We simply evaluate the threat very differently.

george, I hope you're right; but I think it's still too early to make conclusions about the US/UK war with Iraq. There's a big difference between short-term and long-term gains and/or losses. As you are probably aware, we are back on Red Alert for terrorist activities. There have been more suicide bombings in Israel and Saudi Arabia. We are informed by the intelligence agencies that al Qaida are on a active recruiting campaign. We must wait to see how successful this war with Iraq pans out six months from now, and several years from now. Let's wait and see, before making assumptions about how successful this war has been to world security. c.i.

1. More than a year ago before the U.S. announced its intent to bring about regime change in Iraq the sanctions regime was already crumbling. The European powers on the Security Council, led by France and Russia (both of which had very substantial financial stakes in the matter) were openly ready to scuttle the sanctions: their support for the sanctions came later and only as a means of delaying or preventing U.S. intervention. Saddam, armed with billions in annual oil revenues, could have posed a grave threat to U.S. security interests in the Gulf and the Mideast. Our choice was either to take him out, or eventually face that situation. I think this is a really simplistic view of the status quo ante. Not one country in the equation you set up here, including ours, was without economic and political interests in Iraq. However, there was real concern in the UN (and clearly much less in the US) about the uselessness of the effect of the sanctions on Saddam vs. the horrendous day-to-day impact they were having on his people. Many believed the sanctions should have been lifted years ago, not only helping the people with their immediate needs but empowering them. I believe the US didn't want to empower them.

2. The opposition of Islamic fundamentalists to the West and to the U.S.in particular had already been demonstrated beyond doubt. There was nothing more to be lost with them and everything to be gained if we could create a moderate, secular regime that could become a counterforce to them. Iraq is, by far the best and most likely candidate for such a development. At the rate we're going right now, a moderate secular regime seems kind of wishful thinking. But even imagine it were achieved: why and how that kind of regime would do anything more than incense religious fundamentalists who detest western culture and politics is beyond me.

3. The example of firm, independent action on the part of the U.S. has already favorably changed the behavior of key players in North Asia concerning North Korea. China is now willing to engage the issue. The North Korean calculus for their bullying behavior and attempts at nuclear blackmail has been made far more adverse for them. South Korea has begun to break out of the grip of the illusion that they could call the shots on U.S. policy and still enjoy U.S. security guarantees. Japan is less likely to conclude that they need to develop nuclear weapons. I think it's really hard to tell at this point what effect our actions have had on the situation in the Far East. They certainly brought people up short, but apart from China's increasing savvy in dealing with us and the general dubiousness on the part of other Far Easterners who have shown wariness, don't forget the existence of Muslim "extremists" also in that area, who dislike America and are just waiting for an excuse...

4. The feckless behavior of the western world in the grip of the world weary western European (old Europe) obsession with world governance through legalisms (workable only in the West) and avoiding at all costs any risky confrontation, whether with genocide (either in Africa or even in the Balkans), or proximate threats of terrorism, has been replaced with a measure of values based leadership, self confidence and a willingness to meet serious challenges. I nominate you for the Ari Fleisher award. For this new award, we are working on an design which should be attractive for your coffee table or mantel: a small fountain, set in a miniature Rose Garden, from which will flow highly toxic fluids in televisual colors.

Oh stop:
mostly because the sanctions weren't having any effect on the ruling class of Iraq, that only the common people were suffering by their continuation. Which they saw as premature and ill-advised as is their right. What was he going to do? Throw money at us? We controlled all of the no-fly zone air space and showed that we could control all of Iraq's air once hostilities had commenced, he had no Scuds, the few missiles he did have that could break the 90 mile range limit couldn't have hit any US security interests.

Lookit, the Bush administration from the time of the Axis of Evil speech had Iraq in it's sights and it wouldn't have mattered what Saddam had done, he could have presented video tapes of all his weapons down to his favorite shotgun being destroyed and Rumsfeld would have found some snide crack to make before the President gave Saddam forty eight hours to strip naked and sing the Longhorn's fight song.

More tomorrow, my head hurts from the density.

The Real Quagmire is the Aftermath
Everywhere There are Signs of Breakdown
By PATRICK COCKBURN
In one sense everybody, supporters and opponents of the war in Iraq, got it wrong. Opponents denounced US plans to impose neo-imperial control the country. Supporters spoke of the good things the US planned to bring to the Iraqi people once Saddam Hussein was overthrown.
It was only as the looting of Baghdad continued week after week and the US visibly failed to get control of the situation that the bizarre truth emerged: Washington does not have any real plans for Iraq at all. It is making up its policy as it goes along.
Everywhere there are signs of the breakdown. A few weeks ago I nervously drove from Baghdad to Amman in Jordan along the great highway through the western desert of Iraq. As we passed looters, their elderly pick-ups and taxis piled high with junk, I wondered if it would occur to any of them that they could make a lot more money by stealing our car at gun point than they could by stripping old Iraqi government offices of broken chairs and battered filing cabinets.
But even then I thought that the phenomenon was probably temporary. At some point the Americans, whom we could see assiduously checking the papers of aid convoys from Jordan, would surely feel bound to secure the most important land route leading to Iraq. In fact it has got worse. Even tough Jordanian drivers, who drove to Baghdad at the height of the bombing, now often refuse to travel the road because of fear of armed bandits.
Paul Bremer, the new US viceroy in Iraq, who abruptly replaced retired Gen Jay Garner last week, has supposedly started a new tough policy, holding looters for 20 days and sacking some 15,000 to 30,000 former Baath party members. It is probably all too late. With at least 60 per cent of the Iraqi population destitute before the war, according to the UN, brief detention by US troops is not going to end the looting.
The US has largely wasted any political capital it gained with Iraqis for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Iraqis remember that after the Gulf War in 1991 the Iraqi administration, vicious though it was, did a better job than the US in restoring electricity and water.
If the US was so uninterested in what happens in Iraq after the war why on earth did it fight it in the first place? After all it paid an immense diplomatic price in terms of the disruption or destruction of its traditional alliances. George W Bush and Tony Blair tend to treat their previous justifications for the war as a bit of ancient history, but they matter still because they are pointers to what may now happen in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.
The US seems to have fought the war essentially because it wanted a war. It did so because the political fuel on which present US administration runs is to emphasise the external threat. Through this means it has won control of the Senate and may well win the next presidential election.
Other explanations for the war do not really work. Some US oil companies may have wanted to get a share of Iraq's oil wealth. But even they need a measure of security to exploit Iraqi oilfields as some western oilmen dolefully point out . They are also nervous that it is becoming more and more dangerous to be an American, or indeed any other type of westerner, anywhere in the Middle East. There is nothing particularly strange or unique to the US about the willingness of its government to exploit the sense of external threat felt by Americans since the attacks on the World trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001. Most governments anywhere in the world, if they thought they could get away with it, would like to hold a 'khaki' election in which they could wrap the flag around them and traduce their opponents as unpatriotic. The difference in the US today is that the civilian leadership of the Pentagon, notably Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, are uniquely reckless, arrogant and ill-informed about Iraq. At the end of last year Wolfowitz was happily saying that he thought the Iraqi reaction to the capture of Baghdad would be much like the entry of the US army into Paris in 1944. He also apparently believed that Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, then as now one of the most unpopular men in Iraq, would be the Iraqi Charles de Gaulle.
These past mistakes matter because the situation in Iraq could easily become much worse. Iraqis realise that the Saddam may have gone but the US does not have real control of the country. Last week, just as an emissary of Mr Bremer was telling academics at Mustansariyah, the ancient university in the heart of Baghdad, who should be purged from their staff several gunmen, never identified, drove up and calmly shot dead the deputy dean.
There will be more such attacks. They may not be on a large scale. But the tendency is for the present administration in Washington to respond to any threat by escalating its rhetoric and over-reacting. It would not take much for President George W Bush to start describing bomb attacks or assassinations in Iraq as as one more example of the long arm of al-Qa'ida or the Iranian government.
Supposed links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qa'ida, heavily publicised by the White House before the war, were largely journalistic concoctions. But in the present anarchy in Iraq al-Qa'ida will find that Iraq, where people are suffering all the disadvantages of occupation but without civil order, a fertile recruiting ground. http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick05212003.html